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Abstract		Military	Assistance,	the	development	and	training	of	capacity	and	capability	of	foreign	security	forces,	has	largely	been	ignored	by	the	research	community,	including	the	security	studies	research	community.	Military	Assistance,	as	a	tool,	creates	the	possibility	of	both	positive	and	negative	outcomes	for	both	recipient	and	providing	nations,	and	as	such	it	should	be	examined	within	the	broader	framework	of	international	relations,	with	regards	to	the	projection	and	perception	of	power.	This	research	is	timely	and	important,	since	Military	Assistance	is	an	actively	pursued	security	solution	within	the	international	system.	With	the	growth	of	Military	Assistance	missions	around	the	world,	from	Iraq	and	Afghanistan	to	the	Central	African	Republic,	understanding	the	dynamics	that	can	create	or	facilitate	successful	Military	Assistance	and	its	broader	implications	has	become	more	critical.	As	a	tool	of	United	States	foreign	policy,	Military	Assistance	missions	extend	United	States	power,	while	at	the	same	time	minimizing	the	risk	of	protracted	United	States	military	involvement.	Consequently,	reliance	on	Military	Assistance	has	become	the	preferred	method	for	pursuing	strategic	military	direction	and	the	development	of	strategic	alliances.	This	will	be	explored	in	two	case	studies:	South	Korea	and	Vietnam.	This	research	study	seeks	to	recognize	and	define	the	dynamics	of	successful	Military	Assistance	missions:	more	specifically,	by	defining	its	role	in	possibly	linking	the	development	of	an	army	and	a	broader	strategic	alliance	between	states.	I	trace	how	the	creation	of	capacities	and	capabilities	establishes	a	more	integrated	relationship	between	two	states,	and	acts	as	a	prime	process	to	extrapolate	and	test	an	applicable	theory	that	can	be	used	in	multiple	contexts.	The	goal	of	this	research	is	a	better	understanding	of	Military	Assistance	as	an	international	relations	tool	which	can	further	strategic	alliances	and	American	Grand	Strategy.		 	
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Introduction		Accepting	broad	strategic	failure	since	World	War	II	has	never	been	easy	for	the	United	States	of	America	to	admit,	to	itself	or	others.	However,	as	many	successful	leaders	have	found,	understanding	their	failures	can	create	opportunities	to	reach	their	highest	successes.	The	United	States	has	experienced	this	in	warfare	as	well,	having	had	initial	struggles	followed	by	victory	in	the	War	of	Independence,	the	Civil	War,	and	World	Wars	I	&	II.	Whether	or	not	a	cultural	flaw,	the	United	States	has	had	challenging	military	experiences	since	becoming	a	global	power	after	WWII,	and	central	to	that	experience	has	been	the	pursuit	to	train	and	develop	the	capacities	and	capabilities	of	Foreign	Security	Forces,	or	Military	Assistance.		The	United	States	has	had	a	long	relationship	with	Military	Assistance,	both	as	recipient	and	supporter.	Understanding	this	relationship	is	important	due	the	United	States’	pursuit	of	Military	Assistance	missions	numerous	times	since	WWII	with	varying	results.	In	addition,	the	Unites	States	Army	recently	recommitted	itself	to	Military	Assistance	as	an	enduring	capability,	in	the	creation	of	the	Security	Force	Assistance	Brigades.1	To	this	end,	this	research	project	explores	the	foundations	of	the	relationship	between	the	United	States	and	Military	Assistance,	along	with	its	application	in	the	broader,	geopolitical	narrative,	specifically,	American	Grand	Strategy.	Ultimately,	this	research	project	probes	whether	conditions	can	be	created	to	result	in	more	positive	outcomes	for	the	United	States	and	its	foreign	nation	allies	while	contributing	to	the	United	States’	strategic	goals.	From	the	policy	perspective,	the	concept	of	Military	Assistance	became	ever	more	relevant	during	the	time	of	this	research.	What	many	times	the	United	States	has	considered	a	secondary	effort	to	combat	operations	is	now2	at	the	forefront	of																																																									
1	Thomas	Gibbons-Neff,	“Training	Quick	and	Staffing	Unfinished,	Army	Units	Brace	for	Surging	Taliban,”	The	New	York	Times,	January	26,	2018,	accessed	April	7,	2018,	https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/26/world/asia/afghanistan-army-trainers.html.	Morgan	Smiley,	"Security	Force	Assistance	Brigades:	It’s	About	Time,"	
Small	Wars	Journal,	accessed	April	7,	2018,	http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/security-force-assistance-brigades-it%E2%80%99s-about-time.	2	As	of	the	writing	of	this	section,	in	the	winter	and	spring	of	2018.	
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military	operations	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan.	On	this	point,	the	Secretary	of	the	Army,	Dr.	Mark	Esper,	recently	stated	that	Security	Force	Assistance	would	be	an	ongoing	need	for	the	Army.	“My	view	right	now	is	that	with	regard	to	irregular	warfare,	we’re	going	to	be	engaged	in	that	indefinitely.	There	will	always	be	a	need	to	help	build	allied	or	partnered	forces,	so	[the	Security	Force	Assistance	Brigades]	can	take	on	that	mission,	which	is	far	better	than	us	doing	it	with	our	combat	brigades’	soldiers.”3	This	evolution	in	thinking	by	senior	military	leaders	cannot	be	minimized,	as	it	is	the	first	time	that	a	leader	of	the	Institutional	Army4	has	not	only	declared	that	Military	Assistance	is	important,	but	placed	institutional	resources	of	money,	manning,	equipping,	and	training	toward	filling	this	gap.	On	a	personal	note,	while	deployed	in	Iraq	as	a	United	States	Army	officer	in	2007,	I	served	as	a	member	of	a	Training	and	Transition	(TT)	Team	assigned	to	train,	advise,	and	assist	in	developing	the	capabilities	and	capacities	of	Iraqi	Security	Forces,	both	Police	and	Military.5	While	the	American	endeavor	was	both	poorly	designed	and	executed	during	this	time,	the	entire	experience	began	an	internal	dialogue	of	questioning	how	it	could	be	done	better.	I	had	long	conversations	with	my	team	chief,	a	Special	Forces	officer	who	had	trained	Foreign	Security	Forces	around	the	world.	Thinking	that	there	must	be	a	better	method	for	such	Training	and	Transition	Teams,	and	more	broadly,	the	development	of	Foreign	Security	Forces,	I	began	to	reflect	on	when	and	where	in	history	this	expansion	of	capabilities	and	capacities	had	been	more	strategically	created	and	implemented	—	where	Military	Assistance	emerged	in	context	of	a	broader	Grand	Strategy.	
																																																								
3	Corey	Dickstein,	“Army	Plans	for	More	Security	Force	Assistance	Brigades,”	Stars	
and	Stripes,	April	1,	2018,	accessed	May	9,	2018,	https://www.stripes.com/news/with-1st-sfab-deployed-army-looks-to-build-more-adviser-brigades-1.519734.	4	The	Institutional	Army	is	the	part	of	the	United	States	Army	responsible	for	training,	manning,	and	equipping	soldiers	for	global	operations.	The	Chief	of	Staff	of	the	Army	is	the	most	senior	military	leader	of	the	Institutional	Army.	5	Training	and	Transition	Teams	were	formed	in	2006	as	part	of	an	effort	to	train	and	advise	Iraqi	Security	Forces	by	the	United	States	Army.	Michael	R.	Gordon,	“Break	Point?	Iraq	and	America’s	Military	Forces,”	Survival	48,	no.	4	(Winter	2006-2007):	74.	
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At	the	height	of	the	British	Empire	there	were	numerous	examples	of	developing	populations	in	many	locales	into	competent	forces	fighting	for	the	abstract	concept	of	“King	and	Country”	—	a	king	they	had	never	met,	a	country	they	had	never	seen,	and	no	real	emotional	tie	or	connection	to	either.	In	one	example,	the	Fourteenth	Army	in	World	War	II	(WWII)	under	the	command	of	Field	Marshall	William	Slim6	featured	thousands	of	soldiers	from	every	corner	of	what	was	known	as	Pax	Britannia.	Fighting	in	India	and	Burma	as	part	of	the	Southeast	Asia	theater,	the	Fourteenth	Army	constituted	one	of	the	least	known	but	most	important	fronts	of	WWII,	as	it	supported	China’s	freedom	to	maneuver	against	the	Japanese	in	the	east,	while	limiting	any	possible	assistance	between	the	Axis	powers.7	Had	those	supply	lines	and	exchanges	been	opened,	it	is	likely	that	the	war	would	have	taken	far	longer	to	reach	its	eventual	conclusion.	This	was	just	one	instance	unearthed	in	my	initial	exploration	of	the	history	of	Military	Assistance	that	could	be	mined	for	more	exacting	questions.	My	first	challenge	forced	a	re-evaluation	of	comparing	the	development	of	Foreign	Security	Forces	under	colonial	rule	versus	those	under	the	United	States	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan:	the	obvious	difficulty	being	the	comparison	of	such	dissimilar	concepts.	In	looking	at	the	colonial	dynamic,	it	was	clear	that	colonial	power	existed	absent	of	other	formal	governing	structures	or	organizations.8	Indeed,	the	British	colonial	government	was	the	only	governing	authority	nationally	existing	in	the	case	of	India,	although	in	fairness	there	was	long	history	of	governance	among	the	various	regions	of	India.	In	addition,	there	were	similar	examples	around	the	globe	composed	of	Colonial	Britain.	In	contrast,	there	is	a	great	deal	of	debate	in	viewing	the	present-day	United	States	as	a	colonial	power	or	even	an	empire.9	In	spite	of	the																																																									
6	William	Slim,	Defeat	into	Victory:	Battling	Japan	in	Burma	and	India,	1942-1945	(New	York:	Cooper	Square	Press,	2000),	180,	181,	183,	185,	and	195.	Russell	Miller,	
Uncle	Bill:	The	Authorised	Biography	of	Field	Marshall	Viscount	Slim,	(London:	Weidenfeld	&	Nicolson,	2013),	233-235.	7	Slim,	Defeat	into	Victory,	373-376.	8	I	certainly	do	not	mean	to	imply	in	any	way	that	these	indigenous	societies	were	not	capable	of	governing	themselves	absent	colonial	rule	or	that	they	had	been	unable	to	do	so	prior	to	being	colonized.	9	Robert	Cooper,	The	Breaking	of	Nations:	Order	and	Chaos	in	the	Twenty-First	
Century	(New	York:	Atlantic	Monthly	Press,	2003),	47-48.	Niall	Ferguson,	Colossus:	
The	Rise	and	Fall	of	the	American	Empire	(New	York:	Penguin	Books,	2005),	3-9.	
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United	States	being	the	leader	of	many	coalitions,	each	member	of	such	a	coalition	still	acts,	and	more	importantly,	is	empowered	to	act,	within	the	norms	of	a	sovereign	nation	state,	placing	limitations	on	their	participation	within	said	coalition.	The	United	States	may	utilize	diplomatic	and	economic	incentives	and	pressure	with	varying	forms	and	methods	of	severity,	such	as	in	Turkey’s	opening	a	northern	front	during	the	Iraq	War	in	2003.10	However,	as	a	broad	point	of	national	policy,	the	United	States	has	not	pursued	colonial	endeavors	in	a	similar	manner	as	the	nations	of	Europe,	although	there	are	certainly	examples	to	the	contrary,	such	as	taking	control	of	the	Philippines,	Puerto	Rico,	and	other	territories	after	the	Spanish	American	War.	We	can	see,	therefore,	that	the	policy	was	inconsistent	at	best.11	In	contrast,	the	coalitions	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan,	Operation	Iraqi	Freedom	and	Operation	Enduring	Freedom,	had	various	forms	of	recognized	international	legal	authorities	that	enabled	the	coalition’s	presence	in	both	countries	—	sometimes	after	the	fact.12	In	addition	to	working	within	a	set	of	accepted	international	norms,	both	Iraq	and	Afghanistan	had	recognized	governments.	While	their	local	forms	of	self-rule	may	differ	from	Western,	liberal	democracies,	both	maintain	and	maintained	some	level	of	legitimacy	and	sovereignty.	The	United	States’	coalitions	had	created	interim	governing	systems	that	were	as	democratic	as	possible	under																																																									Niall	Ferguson,	Empire:	The	Rise	and	Demise	of	the	British	World	Order	and	the	
Lessons	for	Global	Power	(New	York:	Basic	Books,	2003),	367-370.	10	Dexter	Filkins,	“Turkey	Seeks	$32	Billion	for	Helping	U.S.	in	an	Iraqi	War,”	The	
New	York	Times,	February	18,	2003,	accessed	April	24,	2018,	https://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/18/international/europe/turkey-seeks-32-billion-for-helping-us-in-an-iraqi-war.html.	11	William	McKinley,	“First	Inaugural	Address,”	Speech,	Washington,	D.C.,	March	4,	1897,	accessed	April	8,	2018,	https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/march-4-1897-first-inaugural-address.	John	L.	Offner,	“McKinley	and	the	Spanish-American	War,”	Presidential	Studies	Quarterly	34,	no.	1	(March	2004):	50,52,	57,	and	61,	accessed	May	24,	2017,	http://www.jstor.org/stable/27552563.	12	United	Nations	Security	Council,	Resolution	1373,	“Threats	to	international	peace	and	security	caused	by	terrorist	acts,”	September	28,	2001,	accessed	April	13,	2018,	http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1373(2001).	United	Nations	Security	Council,	Resolution	1377,	“Threats	to	international	peace	and	security	caused	by	terrorist	acts,”	November	12,	2001,	accessed	April	13,	2018,	http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1377(2001).	United	Nations	Security	Council,	Resolution	1472,	“Situation	between	Iraq	and	Kuwait,”	March	28,	2003,	accessed	April	13,	2018,	http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1472(2003).	
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wartime	conditions,	and	these	systems	created	frameworks	for	the	governments	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan	to	come	to	power.13	This	placed	the	United	States	in	the	situation	of	having	to	support	those	governments’	independent	sovereignty	despite	their	frequent	resistance	to	the	United	States’	influence.	This	recognition	led	to	my	understanding	that	to	compare	colonial	governance	with	a	relatively	clear	line	of	authority	to	the	complex	systems	and	relationships	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan	would	attempt	to	contrast	very	dissimilar	entities,	prohibiting	logical	or	consistent	conclusions.	As	such,	this	necessitated	a	step	back	to	re-think	the	actual	question	to	be	answered,	which	was	to	understand	the	“why”	of	Military	Assistance	rather	than	the	“what”	or	“where”	or	even	“how”	research	questions,	which	have	been	discussed	in	other	research	projects.	In	summation,	the	two	underlying	questions	being	explored	in	this	research	project	are:	1.	Why	is	Military	Assistance	a	tool	rather	than	a	strategy?	2.	Why	was	Military	Assistance	important	in	the	context	of	Grand	Strategy?	This	research	project	probes	these	timely	questions	which	are	relevant	for	both	policymakers	and	academics.	As	noted,	policymakers’	requirement	to	use	Military	Assistance	has	not	diminished	in	the	post-September	11th	world;	if	anything,	it	has	increased.	As	such,	it	is	even	more	essential	for	policymakers	to	understand	how	Military	Assistance	can	help,	and	its	limitations,	in	achieving	their	policy	goals	and	objectives.	For	academics,	the	concept	of	grand	strategy	become	more	relevant	in	International	Relations	literature14	—	a	growing	appreciation	of	the	necessity	of	broader,	long	term	objectives	as	a	focal	point	for	national	power.	Consequently,	
																																																								
13	Mark	Oliver,	“The	New	Afghan	Administration,”	The	Guardian,	December	5,	2001,	accessed	April	24,	2018,	https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/dec/05/qanda.markoliver.	Sharon	Otterman,	“Backgrounder	–	Iraq:	Iraq’s	Governing	Council,”	Council	on	Foreign	
Relations,	February	2,	2005,	accessed	April	24,	2018,	https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/iraq-iraqs-governing-council.	14	Paul	von	Hooft,	“Grand	Strategy,”	in	Oxford	Bibliographies,	online	edition,	ed.	Patrick	James,	August	23,	2017,	accessed	April	23,	2018,	doi:10.1093/OBO/9780199743292-0218.	
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exploring	the	relationship	between	Military	Assistance	and	Grand	Strategy	is	all	the	more	important	due	to	the	gap	in	the	literature.	Definitions	Although	the	entire	Chapter	2:	Military	Assistance	and	United	States	Military	Doctrine	Post	9/11,	is	devoted	to	discussing	military	doctrine	with	these	definitions	in	far	more	depth,	it’s	essential	to	begin	by	establishing	a	fundamental	understanding	and	baseline	appreciation	of	context	for	various	terms	used.	As	with	any	research	study	of	this	magnitude,	there	are	certain	definitions	and	assumptions	that	must	be	made,	while	other	related	subjects	simply	cannot	be	explored	due	to	time	and	space	constraints.	This	section	lays	out	the	design	and	scope	of	concepts	discussed	in	this	study	that	will	lay	the	foundation	of	analysis	undertaken.	Outlining	multiple	definitions	surrounding	the	concept	of	Military	Assistance	is	important	because	Military	Assistance	itself,	as	a	concept,	it	has	been	quite	muddied,	consistently	confused	and	used	interchangeably	with	the	concept	of	Military	Aid.	In	addition,	Military	Support	is	another	concept	that	is	sometimes	used	synonymously	with	Military	Assistance	and	Military	Aid,	and	yet	it	is	also	quite	different.	Most	important	to	appreciate	is	the	idea	that	each	of	these	concepts	—	Military	Assistance,	Military	Aid,	and	Military	Support	—	exists	under	the	umbrella	of	Military	Intervention	and	the	fundamentals	of	understanding	the	definitions	of	warfare	itself.	All	too	often,	both	in	the	realms	of	international	relations	and	military	strategy,	definitions	and	conventional	wisdom	result	in	some	variation	of	United	States	Supreme	Court	Justice	Potter	Stewart’s	famous	“I	know	it	when	I	see	it”15	construct	about	obscenity.	As	in	many	scenarios	of	conventional	wisdom,	the	“I	know	it	when	I	see	it”	phrase	only	offers	a	glimpse	of	the	story;	however,	it	is	the	entirety	of	the	concept,	with	all	its	nuances,	that	ascribes	the	challenges,	difficulties,	and	the	importance	of	defining	key	terms.	In	an	odd	way,	the	very	idea	of	war	and	warfare	has	come	to	occupy	this	lexicon	and	definitional	experience.	The	United	States	Army	specifically	has	evolved	in	its	usage	of	terms	for	the	concept	of	war.	Past	terms	such	
																																																								
15	Jacobellis	v.	Ohio,	378	U.S.	197	(1964).	
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as	“full	spectrum	warfare”16	and	“unified	land	operations,”17	to	name	a	few,	have	become	technical	terms	for	what	the	general	public	would	commonly	consider	as	war	—	a	vast	array	of	armies,	airplanes,	and	ships	competing	against	one	another	for	destruction	or	domination.	Images	of	war	are	condensed	into	soldiers	fighting	in	the	trench	warfare	during	World	War	I	(WWI),	enormous	ships	battling	across	the	Pacific	Ocean	during	WWII,	or	bombs	being	dropped	from	airplanes	during	the	Persian	Gulf	War.	When	Military	Invention	is	discussed,	it	often	evokes	the	popular	idea	of	physically	placing	forces	into	a	foreign	conflict	where	an	altruistic	intention	may	or	may	not	exist.	Examples	raised	may	include	1990	in	Saudi	Arabia,	where	the	United	States	planned	to	push	the	Iraqis	out	of	Kuwait.18	Another	issue	may	be	that	of	the	Russians	coming	into	South	Ossetia	in	2008	at	the	defense	—	flimsy	though	it	may	have	been	—	to	defend	other	ethnic	Russians,19	or	Yemen’s	civil	war	with	both	Saudi	Arabia	and	Iran	backing	their	respective	factions	under	various	trumped	up	humanitarian	goals,	but	actually	competing	for	regional	domination.20	Military	Intervention	calls	for	situations	that	differ	from	traditional	warfare,	even	though	war	may	be	experienced	as	a	result	of	Military	Intervention.	Military	Intervention	is	
considered	a	broader	term	and	concept,	the	general	idea	being	a	military	partnering	
with	a	foreign	country,	under	which	would	be	methods	for	how	the	military	is	
partnering,	or	intervening:	through	aid,	assistance,	or	support.	Military	Intervention,																																																									
16	United	States	Army,	Field	Manual	3-0:	Operations	(Washington,	D.C.:	Department	of	the	Army,	February	27,	2008),	3-1.	17	United	States	Army,	Army	Doctrine	Reference	Publication	3-0:	Operations	(with	
Change	1)	(Washington,	D.C.:	Department	of	the	Army,	October	6,	2017),	3-1.	United	States	Army,	Field	Manual	3-0:	Operations	(Washington,	D.C.:	Department	of	the	Army,	December	6,	2017),	1-68.	18	Joseph	P.	Englehardt,	“Desert	Shield	and	Desert	Storm:	A	Chronology	and	Troop	List	for	the	1990-1991	Persian	Gulf	Crisis”	(Carlisle,	PA:	Army	War	College),	14-43,	accessed	June	3,	2018,	http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a234743.pdf.	19	CNN,	“2008	Georgia	Russia	Conflict	Fast	Facts,”	CNN	Library,	April	3,	2008,	accessed	June	3,	2018,	https://www.cnn.com/2014/03/13/world/europe/2008-georgia-russia-conflict/index.html.	20	Kareem	Fahim,	“U.N.	probe	details	fallout	of	proxy	war	in	Yemen	between	Saudi	coalition	and	Iran,”	The	Washington	Post,	January	11,	2018,	accessed	June	3,	2018,	https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/un-probe-details-fallout-of-proxy-war-in-yemen-between-saudi-coalition-and-iran-/2018/01/11/3e3f9302-f644-11e7-9af7-a50bc3300042_story.html.	
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however,	is	defined	within	United	States	military	doctrine	as	“[t]he	deliberate	act	of	a	nation	or	a	group	of	nations	to	introduce	its	military	forces	into	the	course	of	an	existing	controversy.”21	Conceptually,	there	is	differentiation	between	war	and	Military	Intervention,	and	this	is	an	important	distinction	that	enables	properly	placing	Military	Assistance	within	its	appropriate	context.	The	best	example	to	distinguish	this	difference	between	war	and	Military	Intervention	is	that	of	Operations	Desert	Shield	and	Desert	Storm.	Operation	Desert	Shield	was	the	operation	focused	on	the	buildup	of	resources	and	formation	of	the	coalition	seeking	to	remove	Iraq	from	Kuwait	in	1991,22	and	more	specifically,	a	Military	Intervention,	as	it	was	the	action	whereby	the	United	States	deliberately	acted	“to	introduce	its	military	forces	into	the	course	of	an	existing	controversy.”23	Operation	Desert	Storm	was	the	actual	war.	These	distinctions	are	important	because	aspects	of	Military	Intervention	in	the	form	of	Military	Support,	Military	Aid,	or	Military	Assistance	can	be	introduced	at	any	point	within	an	operation,	including	within	the	actual	activity	of	war.	It’s	equally	important	to	clarify	what	is	not	Military	Assistance.	It	is	not	the	equipment	and/or	training	with	that	equipment,	which	would	be	defined	factually	as	Military	Aid;	it	is	not	the	humanitarian	assistance	given	by	a	military	to	further	develop	local	relations.	Military	Aid	is	a	popular	tool	of	foreign	policy,	from	the	United	States	and	many	other	states	—	one	of	the	most	prominent	examples	being	the	Lend	Lease	program	during	WWII.	Indeed,	one	of	the	case	studies	that	will	be	discussed,	Vietnam,	began	as	a	Military	Aid	mission,	especially	prior	to	the	fall	of	Dien	Bien	Phu	and	the	French	abandoning	their	claim.	Military	Aid	is	defined	as	the	
act	of	supplying	foreign	security	forces,	official	or	otherwise,	with	military	and/or	
civilian	equipment	in	order	to	contribute	to	the	military	and	political	goals	of	those	
foreign	security	forces.	Military	Support	is	not	an	often-used	term	but	its	concept,	as	defined	for	the	purposes	of	this	research	project,	is	often	confused	with	Military	Assistance.	Military																																																									
21	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Publication	3-0:	Joint	Operations	(Washington,	D.C.:	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	August	11,	2011),	GL-13.	22	Englehardt,	“Desert	Shield	and	Desert	Storm,”	14-43.	23	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Publication	3-0,	GL-13.	
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Support	is	defined	as	the	act	of	a	military	or	coalition	of	similar	capacity	and	
capability	allying	with	another	military	with	armed	forces	and	equipment.	An	example	of	Military	Support	is	the	United	States	becoming	allies	of	the	French	and	British	during	World	War	One	(WWI)	and	WWII.	Military	Support	as	a	concept	could	be	considered	problematic	in	the	event	that	a	hegemonic	power	such	as	the	United	States	uses	its	power	to	create	or	manipulate	a	coalition,	as	was	thought	by	many	with	regards	to	Operation	Iraqi	Freedom,24	although	not	relevant	for	this	research	project.	Military	Assistance	does	not	refer	specifically	to	training	foreign	security	forces,	but	to	advising	and	mentoring.	Professors	Antonio	Giustozzi	and	Artemy	Kalinovsky,	in	Missionaries	of	Modernity,	clarify:	“Mentors	[trainers]	practice	a	form	of	on-the-job	training	and	focus	on	developing	the	skills	of	individuals.	Advisors,	by	contrast,	should	be	more	focused	on	the	organization	within	which	individuals	operate,	even	if	they	may	be	assigned	to	advise	a	particular	individual.”25	The	authors	continue	to	note	the	frequent	confusion	between	trainers	and	advisors,	but	simply	distinguish	trainers	as	more	often	associated	with	Military	Aid	due	to	the	relationship	of	equipment	and	training	on	that	equipment.	Military	Assistance,	however,	is	defined	as	
the	efforts	that	develop	capacities	and	capabilities	in	a	foreign	security	force	with	an	
agreed-upon	structure	and	doctrine	understood	by	both	the	support	nation	and	the	
recipient	nation.	As	stated	earlier,	military	doctrine	will	be	analyzed	in	greater	depth	in	Chapter	2;	however,	it	is	important	at	this	juncture	to	clarify	Military	Assistance	in	the	context	of	what	is	known	in	the	United	States	Armed	Forces	as	Security	Force	Assistance	and	Foreign	Internal	Defense.	Security	Force	Assistance,	or	SFA,	is	“Department	of	Defense	activities	that	contribute	to	unified	action	by	the	US	Government	to	support	the	development	of	the	capacity	and	capability	of	foreign																																																									
24	Toni	Erskine,	“Coalitions	of	the	Willing	and	Responsibilities	to	Protect:	Informal	Associations,	Enhanced	Capacities,	and	Shared	Moral	Burdens,”	Ethics	and	
International	Relations	28,	no.	1	(March	2014):	115-116,	121,	and	footnote	1.	25	Antonio	Giustozzi	and	Artemy	M.	Kalinovsky,	Missionaries	of	Modernity:	Advisory	
Missions	and	the	Struggle	for	Hegemony	in	Afghanistan	and	Beyond,	with	contributions	by	Paul	Robinson,	Bob	Spencer,	and	Alfia	Sorokina	(London:	Hurst	&	Co.,	2016),	21.	
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security	forces	and	their	supporting	institutions.”26	Foreign	Internal	Defense,	or	FID,	as	defined	by	United	States	Army	Forces	doctrine	is	“participation	by	civilian	and	military	agencies	of	a	government	in	any	of	the	action	programs	taken	by	another	government	or	other	designated	organization	to	free	and	protect	its	society	from	subversion,	lawlessness,	insurgency,	terrorism,	and	other	threats	to	its	security.”27	To	the	casual	observer	the	definitions	of	Military	Assistance,	SFA,	and	FID	may	seem	somewhat	redundant;	however,	FID	by	its	very	name	focuses	on	internal	defense,	SFA	is	more	comprehensive	and	encompasses	all	forms	of	foreign	security	forces,	whereas	Military	Assistance,	as	I	define	it,	is	the	only	definition	that	stipulates	the	relationship	between	the	recipient	and	supporting	nation.28	In	addition,	this	research	project	will	not	be	using	International	Military	Education	and	Training,	or	IMET	as	it	is	known,	for	the	simple	reason	that	IMET	happens	in	small	numbers	rather	than	a	wholesale	institutional	development	of	foreign	security	forces.	Thus,	Military	Assistance,	Military	Aid,	and	Military	Support	are	all	methods	of	Military	Intervention.	It	becomes	essential	to	establish	these	definitions	within	the	context	of	this	research	project,	since	within	the	literature,	United	States	Armed	Forces	doctrine,	and	general	usage	these	terms	are	used	interchangeably	and	inconsistently.	None	of	these	concepts	should	be	considered	as	replacement	for	“war”	or	“warfare,”	whatever	terminology	used,	although	Military	Support	comes	closest.	As	will	be	discussed	in	Chapter	2,	these	concepts’	evolving	definitions	make	it	all	the	more	necessary	to	lay	out	a	foundation	of	baseline	understanding	for	this	research.	Ultimately,	any	form	of	Military	Intervention,	whether	it	be	Military	Support,	Military	Aid,	or	Military	Assistance,	applies	the	usage	of	military	power	and	influence,	thereby	classifying	these	as	tools	rather	than	strategies.	In	the	usage	of	any	tool,	the	“why”	question	is	the	strategy.	The	goals	and	processes	by	which	those	goals	are	achieved	—	these	are	all	aspects	of	strategy.	
																																																								
26	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Publication	3-22:	Foreign	Internal	Defense	(Washington,	D.C.:	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	July	12,	2010),	GL-11.	27	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Publication	3-22,	GL-7.	28	Afghan	War	News	Staff,	“Difference	between	FID	and	SFA,”	Afghan	War	News,	accessed	June	16,	2018,	http://www.afghanwarnews.info/sfa/differenceFIDandSFA.htm.	
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The	purpose	of	this	project	is	two-fold:	first,	to	explore	and	answer	the	question	about	what	conditions	could	and	should	contribute	to	a	positive	outcome	for	a	Military	Assistance	mission,	but	also	to	expand	the	understanding	of	Military	Assistance	in	the	context	of	American	Grand	Strategy,	ideally,	to	fill	a	gap	in	the	minimal	literature	surrounding	Military	Assistance.	While	grand	strategy	will	be	explored	in	more	depth	in	Chapter	1:	Military	Assistance	and	Grand	Strategy,	in	the	context	of	defining	terms	here,	it	may	be	useful	to	discuss	the	term	“grand	strategy”	at	this	point.	Basil	Liddell	Hart’s29	definition	states	that	the	purpose	of	grand	strategy	“is	to	coordinate	and	direct	all	the	resources	of	a	nation,	or	band	of	nations,	towards	the	attainment	of	the	political	object	of	the	war	—	the	goal	defined	by	fundamental	policy.”30	The	final	definition	to	be	explored	at	this	juncture	is	the	term	“success.”	Success	as	a	concept	can	refer	to	numerous	events,	like	most	definitions;	however,	there	is	a	specific	application	in	the	context	of	military	action	with	regards	to	this	research	project.	Success	should	be	considered	the	achievement	of	the	military	objectives	of	a	
nation	state	for	the	purpose	of	securing	political	goals.	Carl	von	Clausewitz’s	treatise	
On	War	states,	“War	therefore	is	an	act	of	violence	intended	to	compel	our	opponent	to	fulfil	our	will.”31	The	idea	of	imposing	a	“will”	onto	an	enemy	is	based	on	having	a	political	objective.	Clausewitz	considers	that	“war	is	to	be	regarded	not	as	an	independent	thing	but	as	a	political	instrument,”32	and	therefore	war	is	that	continuation	of	efforts	to	achieve	a	political	agenda	or	set	of	goals.33	This	is	not	intended	to	measure	the	rightness	of	the	war,	or	the	politics	and	motivations	behind	war,	but	simply	to	state	this	constant	observed	in	Military	Intervention.34	
																																																								
29	Basil	Liddell	Hart	was	a	British	soldier,	historian,	and	military	theorist	who	explored	the	field	of	strategy	both	professionally	and	academically.	30	Basil	Henry	Liddell	Hart,	Strategy:	2nd	Revised	edition	(New	York:	Meridian,	1991),	322.	31	Carl	von	Clausewitz,	On	War,	trans.	J.	J.	Graham,	eds.	F.	N	Maude	and	Anatol	Rapoport	(Herfordshire,	UK:	Wordsworth	Editions	Ltd,	1997),	5.	32	Clausewitz,	On	War,	23.	33	Clausewitz,	On	War,	22.	34	Military	Intervention	can	and	should	be	seen	as	a	concept	of	war	by	other	means,	although	the	idea	of	Military	Support	would	potentially	look	more	like	traditional	warfare.	While	there	certainly	are	instances	of	tactical	engagements	of	violence	that	
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Furthermore,	if	war	is	to	be	regarded	as	continuation	or	a	means	by	which	that	political	agenda	or	those	goals	would	be	achieved,	then	the	basis	of	this	must	be	achieving	military	objectives,	as	this	is	the	measurement	of	the	completion	of	military	action.	This	is	important	because	many	consider	success	in	context	of	victory	in	battle,	but	as	many	wars	have	shown,	it	is	altogether	possible	to	achieve	military	objectives	in	every	battle	but	to	ultimately	lose	the	broader	strategic	war.	All	this	is	to	say	that	any	form	of	success	in	warfare	must	ultimately	complement	a	political	effort,	and	this	is	the	rationale	behind	the	definition	of	success	stated	above.	These	definitions	of	success	and	the	varying	aspects	of	Military	Intervention	comprise	the	foundation	of	understanding	for	this	research	project.	They	are	by	no	means	the	only	definitions	within	this	research	project,	but	they	are,	thematically,	the	baseline	conception	for	the	context	of	this	research	project.	While	there	is	plenty	of	critique	on	Clausewitz’s	thinking	and	philosophy,	the	relationship	between	war	and	policy	seems	to	have	withstood	the	test	of	time	and	serves	as	a	solid	foundation	of	rationale.	Methodology35	The	methodology	for	this	study	will	be	historical	case	studies	using	the	United	States	as	the	main	protagonist.	Specifically,	the	United	States	as	the	supporting	nation	should	be	considered	the	independent	variable	of	this	research	study,	while	the	respective	recipient	nations	in	the	historical	case	studies	would	represent	the	dependent	variable.	It	could	be	argued	that	since	the	Military	Assistance	is	the	action	or	method	by	which	dependence,	in	the	variable	sense,	is	created,	then	the	supporting	nation,	the	United	States,	should	be	the	independent	variable,	since	the	recipient	nations	only	have	a	relationship	with	the	United	States	due	to	the	Military	Assistance	being	given,	at	least	as	far	as	this	research	study	is	concerned.	If	this	research	study	was	solely	about	Military	Assistance	as	a	concept	then	this	argument	
																																																								can	be	imagined	within	the	umbrella	of	Military	Intervention,	the	focus	is	to	pursue	war	through	influence	to	achieve	the	political	goals	of	which	Clausewitz	speaks.	35	This	section	was	develop	using	Stephen	Van	Evera’s	Guide	to	Methods	for	Students	
of	Political	Science	but	there	was	no	individual	quote	or	specific	reference	for	a	citation,	thus	the	general	citation	here.	Stephen	Van	Evera,	Guide	to	Methods	for	
Students	of	Political	Science	(Ithaca,	NY:	Cornell	University	Press,	1997).	
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would	be	far	more	relevant.	However,	since	this	research	project	is,	in	fact,	about	Military	Assistance	as	a	tool,	and	specifically	about	how	that	tool	contributes	to	American	Grand	Strategy,	then	that	argument	does	not	stand.	American	Grand	Strategy	exists	and	is	conceptually	independent	regardless	of	whether	there	is	a	nation	receiving	Military	Assistance,	and	even	regardless	of	whether	or	not	Military	Assistance	is	utilized	as	a	tool.	This	would	beg	the	question	about	why	American	Grand	Strategy	or	Military	Assistance	as	concepts	are	not	considered	variables,	independent	or	dependent.	The	issue	with	placing	either	concept	as	a	variable	is	that	in	this	research	project,	and	based	on	the	question	being	asked,	both	concepts	should	be	considered	constants	rather	than	variables.	American	Grand	Strategy,	while	an	ever-evolving	construct,	is,	within	the	context	of	this	research	project,	a	constant,	in	that	it	does	not	change	between	the	case	studies	being	researched.	Military	Assistance,	on	the	other	hand,	is	more	nuanced.	On	the	practical	side,	every	military	mission	is	different	and	no	two	Military	Interventions,	even	those	between	the	same	nations,	will	be	exactly	the	same.36	This,	again,	is	why	the	application	of	the	tool	of	Military	Assistance	is	so	important.	Since	the	focus	of	the	research	project	is	about	the	broader	strategic	examination	of	the	application	of	Military	Assistance,	the	process	of	the	application	should	similarly	define	Military	Assistance	as	a	constant.	More	pointedly,	the	application	of	that	constant	with	respect	to	the	independent	variable,	the	recipient	nation,	and	the	dependent	variable,	the	United	States	as	the	supporting	nation,	creates	the	proper	structure	for	a	research	project.37	
																																																								
36	A	perfect	case	of	this	is	the	two	case	studies	on	Lebanon	outlined	by	Dr.	Mara	Karlin	in	her	book	on	building	militaries.	Mara	E.	Karlin,	“Lebanon	I:	‘The	United	States	is	Short	of	Breath’	but	Others	are	not”	and	“Lebanon	II:	‘The	Side	that	Won	was	Willing	to	Kill	and	be	Killed,’”	in	Building	Militaries	in	Fragile	States:	Challenges	
for	the	United	States	(Philadelphia:	University	of	Pennsylvania	Press,	2018),	108-147	and	148-192.	37	In	one	sense	it	could	be	confusing	that	the	United	States	is	thought	of	as	the	dependent	variable	given	that	the	United	States	provides	the	Military	Assistance.	Since	the	underlying	question	of	this	research	project	is	about	the	effect	of	Military	Assistance	on	American	Grand	Strategy,	it	is	the	United	States	that	actually	experiences	the	effect.	
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Within	the	methodology	of	this	research	project,	a	natural	evolution	of	thought	when	considering	the	concepts	of	Military	Aid	or	Military	Assistance	is	the	relevance	of	colonialism,38	the	very	construct	of	which	involves	enslavement,	racism,	and	any	number	of	charged	concepts	that	would	create	a	difficulty	in	any	research	study.	While	this	research	project	touches	on	colonialism,	it	purposely	avoids	the	topic,	not	out	of	cowardice	or	intellectual	dishonesty,	but	in	the	true	belief	that	trying	to	untangle	the	knot	of	colonialism	does	not	assist	in	answer	the	questions	surrounding	Military	Assistance.	As	a	result,	this	study	is	not	intended	to	focus	on	either	colonialism	or	governance,	since	research	into	colonialism	could	easily	necessitate	a	drift	into	a	complex,	moral	quagmire,	and	ultimately	not	answer	the	question	of	focus	of	the	research	study.	Similarly,	research	exploration	of	governance	would	focus	more	on	the	question	of	“how”	Military	Assistance	evolves	from	the	original	conceptualization	of	policymakers,39	rather	than	an	exploration	of	“why”	it	can	achieve	its	goal	—	a	sustainable	security	in	the	nation	receiving	the	Military	Assistance.	However,	it	was		1. Necessary	to	have	a	context	of	the	nations	that	receive	Military	Assistance	given	their	own	history	and	experience	with	colonialism;	and		2. Important	questions	about	the	underlying	objectives	of	Military	Assistance,	ideally	the	pursuit	of	a	Grand	Strategy,	and	the	methods	to	reach	such	objectives.		Due	to	these	points	from	the	perspective	of	developing	the	methodology	for	this	research	project,	I	determined	to	study	and	understand	these	questions	from	a	qualitative	approach	rather	than	quantitatively.	The	rationale	behind	a	qualitative	approach	rather	than	a	quantitative	one	is	derived	from	the	old	saying	that	“generals	always	fight	the	last	war.”40	This	stems	from	an	appreciation	that	generals,	and	even	militaries	as	organizations,	in	addition	to	policymakers,	tend	to	think																																																									
38	Anthony	F.	Lang,	Agency	and	Ethics:	The	Politics	of	Military	Intervention	(Albany,	NY:	State	University	of	New	York	Press,	2002),	197-198.	39	Karlin,	“Understanding	the	Problem”	in	Building	Militaries	in	Fragile	States,	1-19.	40	This	saying	has	numerous	origins	and	references	that	are	lost	to	time	and	history,	but	this	source	provided	the	best	synthesis.	Charles	Clay	Doyle,	Wolfgang	Mieder,	and	Fred	R.	Shapiro	(ed),	The	Dictionary	of	Modern	Proverbs	(New	Haven,	CT:	Yale	University	Press,	2012),	94.	
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qualitatively	rather	than	quantitatively,	with	a	compounding	body	of	literature	concerning	this	topic	from	Professor	Graham	Allison’s	1971	book	Essence	of	Decision	to	Robert	Komer’s	report	“Bureaucracy	does	its	Thing,”	both	of	which	delve	into	the	methods	by	which	policymakers	come	to	their	decisions.41	While	this	should	not	minimize	the	importance	of	data	or	a	quantitative	methodology,	there	is	an	emphasis	within	military	culture	on	history,	and	military	history	more	specifically,	that	creates	an	understanding	for	decision-makers,	and	right	or	wrong,	this	is	how	many	policymakers	and	decision-makers	tend	to	view	the	world.	In	his	work	on	that	subject,	Analogies	at	War,	Professor	Yeun	Foong	Khong	wrote:	“The	way	they	[policymakers]	have	invoked	historical	parallels	when	confronted	with	a	domestic	or	foreign	policy	problem	has	ranged	from	the	implausible	to	the	prescient.”42	He	continues	to	describe	how	policymakers	post-WWI	viewed	the	diplomatic	inflexibility	as	the	foundation	for	the	alliances	that	allowed	what	was	a	small	regional	conflict	to	escalate	into	the	Great	War.	After	the	Treaty	of	Versailles	there	was	a	desire	for	more	conciliatory	exchanges	in	order	to	prevent	hostilities,	helping	to	drive	the	“peace	in	our	time”43	narrative	that	led	to	British	Prime	Minister	Neville	Chamberlain	and	the	Munich	Agreement.	This,	in	turn,	led	to	a	post-WWII	environment	in	which	the	fear	of	conciliating	to	a	Hitler-like	character	developed	into	a	deep	concern,	in	that	any	form	of	diplomatic	capitulation	would	be	considered	an	allusion	to	the	Munich	Agreement.44	In	furthering	Khong’s	work,	Professor	David	Patrick	Houghton	states	that	many	people,	including	senior	policymakers,	find	themselves	overloaded	with	information.	In	the	search	for	the	ability	to	make	a	rational	decision,	people	allow																																																									
41	Graham	T.	Allison,	Essence	of	Decision:	Explaining	the	Cuban	Missile	Crisis	(New	York:	HarperCollins,	1995).	R.	W.	Komer,	“Bureaucracy	does	its	Thing:	Institutional	Constraints	on	U.S.-GVN	Performance	in	Vietnam,”	The	RAND	Corporation,	August	1972.	David	Patrick	Houghton,	The	Decision	Point:	Six	Cases	in	U.S.	Foreign	Policy	
Decision	Making	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2013).	42	Yuen	Foong	Khong,	Analogies	at	War:	Korea,	Munich,	Dien	Bien	Phu,	and	the	
Vietnam	Decisions	of	1965	(Princeton,	NJ:	Princeton	University	Press,	1992),	3.	43	Neville	Chamberlain,	(speech,	10	Downing	Street,	London,	30	September	1938),	
Oxford	Book	of	Quotations:	8th	Edition,	ed.	Elizabeth	Knowles	(Oxford,	UK:	Oxford	University	Press,	2014),	accessed	April	8,	2018,	doi:10.1093/acref/9780199668700.001.0001.	44	Khong,	Analogies	of	War,	4-5.	
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themselves	to	consider	history,	drawing	satisfaction	from	the	problem	before	them	that	has	existed	before,	or	a	similar	type	of	problem	whose	solution	therefore	can	be	referenced	and	categorized.45	Incorporating	both	Khong’s	perception	of	policymakers	and	Houghton’s	view	of	history,	the	relevance	to	this	research	project	was	to	utilize	a	methodology	that	would	be	clearly	relatable	to	the	thought	process	of	policymakers.	Appreciating	the	basis	with	which	to	communicate	this	study,	there	are	three	possible	approaches	specific	to	historical	case	study	research:	time-period	analysis,	singular	actor	analysis,	and	regional	analysis.	A	time-period	analysis	establishes	a	method	to	examine	multiple	cases	over	a	finite	period,	such	as	examining	Military	Assistance	from	the	years	of	1950	to	1970.	This	is	a	challenging	method	for	examining	Military	Assistance	due	to	the	breadth	of	examples,	and	more	importantly	in	that	the	examination	of	a	period	of	time	for	specific	cases	does	not	guarantee	an	answer	to	the	underlying	question	of	the	conditions	that	can	affect	a	successful	or	unsuccessful	Military	Assistance	mission.	Limiting	the	examination	focus	on	a	period	would	create	an	artificial	set	of	boundaries	without	creating	a	more	effective	method	to	examine	the	variables	of	the	case	study,	and	at	the	end,	potentially	create	more	challenges	than	solutions.	However,	there	remains	an	important	element	of	time,	in	that	focusing	around	a	general	but	similar	period	would	minimize	the	differing	factors	that	could	create	the	conditions	for	successful	Military	Assistance	for	the	United	States	post-WWII.	Like	all	projects	of	this	nature	it	is	just	as	critical,	and	possibly	more	so,	to	clearly	delineate	what	will	NOT	be	studied	as	much	as	it	is	defining	the	parameters	of	the	research	project	itself.	Similarly,	regional	analysis	examines	cases	in	a	specific	geographic	area	such	as	Southeast	Asia	or	Africa.	The	weakness	with	solely	using	this	method	is	that	the	focus	understandably	and	automatically	becomes	the	region	itself,	and	the	possible	underlying	variables	that	are	most	likely	affecting	the	outcomes	rather	than	Military	Assistance	and	its	relationship	to	Grand	Strategy.	Another	challenge	that	could	derail	logical	conclusions	is	that	a	regional	strategy	is	more	than	likely	to	focus	on	immediate	outcomes	in	the	diplomatic,	development,	or	security	areas	of	a	region																																																									
45	Houghton,	The	Decision	Point,	13-15.	
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that	could	vary	from	a	broader	grand	strategy.	At	the	same	time,	the	strength	of	a	regional	analysis	is	that	the	nature	of	the	contrast	is	far	more	apparent,	in	that	if	the	result	in	one	nation	is	vastly	different	than	that	of	another	nation,	the	factors	that	have	contributed	to	the	differing	outcomes	or	results	are	far	more	specific	in	what	may	influence	those	variables,	making	this	aspect	fascinating	to	study	and	providing	a	much-needed	case	study	analysis.	This	in	no	way	mitigates	the	underlying	challenge	that	what	impacts	one	nation	in	a	region	could	very	likely	have	little	or	no	effect	on	another	nation.	However,	this	challenge	is	minimized	by	broader	construct	of	Military	Assistance	and	its	relationship	with	grand	strategy	in	this	research	project.	That	is	to	say,	given	that	this	research	project	examines	how	Military	Assistance	is	being	applied	with	respect	to	grand	strategy,	the	comparison	and	contrast	is	more	apparent	due	to	the	fact	that	Great	Powers	had	regional	strategies	and	rarely	approached	international	relations	as	a	“one-off”	and	a	country	by	country	approach.46	This	is	certainly	the	case	in	the	Cold	War	in	the	personification	of	the	United	States	and	the	Soviet	Union.	Ultimately,	however,	it	is	the	separating	of	a	regional	strategy	and	a	Great	Powers’	grand	strategy,	more	specifically	American	Grand	Strategy,	where	the	problem	begins.	That	problem	can	manifest	economically,	diplomatically,	or	militarily,	but	the	shortcomings	of	a	solely	regional	analysis	case	study-based	approach	seemed	to	open	too	many	variable	interpretations,	which	prevented	its	adoption.	The	singular	actor	method	of	analysis	would	examine	Military	Assistance	through	the	prism	of	a	singular	actor	as	either	the	supporting	or	recipient	nation.	The	challenge	of	using	the	recipient	nation	as	the	singular	actor	is	that	since	support	has	been	applied	in	varying	forms	from	multiple	nation	states,	in	the	middle	or	conclusion	of	conflicts,	there	is	no	clear	line	of	correspondence	drawn	between	the	application	of	Military	Assistance	and	by	whom,	in	order	to	illicit	what	type	of	effect.	Examples	of	this	can	be	seen	in	Iraq	or	Afghanistan	after	the	United	States	invaded	each	respective	nation,	when	a	coalition	of	multiple	nations,	including	the	United																																																									
46	Benjamin	Miller	and	Korina	Kagan,	“The	Great	Powers	and	Regional	Conflicts:	Eastern	Europe	and	the	Balkans	from	the	Post-Napoleonic	Era	to	the	Post-Cold	War	Era,”	International	Studies	Quarterly	41,	no.	1	(March	1997):	51-86,	accessed	August	1,	2018,	https://www.jstor.org/stable/2600907.	
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States,	then	participated	(and	as	of	this	writing,	are	currently	participating)	in	developing	the	capacity	and	capabilities	of	Foreign	Security	Forces.	This	becomes	problematic	from	a	logic	perspective,	due	to	the	multiple	types	of	support	from	multiple	actors	that	ultimately	fail	to	allow	enough	commonality	or	consistency	to	create	a	solid	qualitative	research	methodology.	Using	a	singular	actor	is	therefore	most	fitting	in	the	context	of	studying	Military	Assistance,	as	using	one	source	of	doctrine	and	relationship,	while	adding	the	flexibility	of	time	and	space,	does	not	confine	or	restrict	this	research	project.	While	recognizing	the	challenges	and	shortcomings,	the	primary	method	for	this	study	was	determined	to	be	the	single	actor	analysis,	using	the	United	States	as	the	main	protagonist.	At	the	same	time,	this	research	incorporated	time-period	analysis	and	regional	analysis	in	order	to	examine	the	endeavor	of	Military	Assistance	as	thoroughly	as	possible,	and	to	minimize	the	possibilities	of	effects	from	other	variables,	as	opposed	to	the	application	of	Military	Assistance.	Using	the	United	States	takes	advantage	of	its	long	history	of	Military	Assistance	as	a	means	of	expressing	global	presence	and	power,	specifically	being	the	main	proponent	of	the	Military	Assistance	mission	within	the	time-period	of	the	Cold	War	from	the	West	in	the	context	of	the	field	of	international	relations.	The	time-period	examined	with	the	case	studies	will	be	narrowed	to	a	specific	period	in	the	relationship	between	the	United	States	and	the	recipient	nation.	In	particular,	the	research	will	focus	on	the	period	at	the	beginning	of	the	relationship,	when	aspects	of	Military	Assistance	are	being	explored	and	the	Military	Assistance	effort	is	beginning	to	take	hold.	The	origins	of	the	relationship	appear	to	establish	foundations	from	which	the	remainder	of	the	relationship	can	be	examined,	which	is	similar	to	the	regional	perspective	that	is	being	achieved	by	examining	recipient	nations	in	a	specific	region.	Case	Studies	The	case	studies	for	this	research	project	are	South	Korea	and	Vietnam,	examined	before	and	after	WWII.	The	reason	for	the	focus	of	this	period	is	due	to	WWII’s	marking	a	turning	point	in	international	relations,	chiefly	with	reference	to	the	breakdown	in	prior	global	order,	and	foundation	for	the	onset	and	development	of	the	Cold	War.	This	time	featured	the	collapse	of	empires	and	colonialism	as	a	
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viable	construct,	which	manifested	in	a	final	breakdown	of	a	pre-WWI	imperial	global	order.	However,	this	research	project	overall	avoids	any	focus	on	WWII	itself.	War,	sometimes	referred	to	as	full	spectrum	warfare,	will	be	analyzed	in	Chapter	2.	Whereas	the	goal	of	Military	Assistance	is	on	the	creation	and	maintenance	of	a	sustainable	security,	war,	true	warfare	such	as	WWII,	does	not	allow	Military	Assistance	to	influence	foreign	policy.	This	is	due	to	the	complete	focus	on	defeating	the	enemy	by	actors	in	this	type	of	war,	as	opposed	to	concerns	regarding	long-term	sustainable	security.	It	should	be	noted	here	that	this	is	the	main	rationale	for	not	including	the	examination	of	Lieutenant	General	Stilwell	in	China	during	WWII	as	a	case	study.	Although	Stilwell’s	experiences	highlight	one	of	the	main	conclusions	of	this	research	project,	ongoing	difficulties	between	recipient	and	supporting	nation	in	the	event	of	no	shared	understanding	of	methods	and	goals,	this	partnership	did	not	emerge	as	a	long-term	Grand	Strategy,	as	it	did	in	the	chosen	case	studies.	While	the	Stilwell	example	was	a	critical	strategic	element	that	prevented	the	victory	of	the	Japanese	by	the	Chinese,	the	partnership	did	not	play	into	a	long-term	Grand	Strategy	in	the	way	of	this	research’s	case	studies.	Rather,	it	was	the	experience	of	Military	Assistance	solely	in	a	time	of	war.	This	is	the	difference	between	the	United	States’	experience	in	China	and	South	Korea,	as	South	Korea	already	had	a	Military	Assistance	effort	well	underway	prior	to	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Korea’s	crossing	the	38th	parallel	to	start	the	Korean	War.	In	this	example,	the	Military	Assistance	was	implemented	and	tested	during	war	rather	than	organized	due	to	it,	such	as	in	the	WWII	China	example.	After	WWII,	as	India	and	Pakistan	regained	independence	from	the	British,	and	the	citizens	of	Algiers	threw	off	French	control,	there	was	a	general	reordering	of	the	broader	colonial	world	into	the	West,	represented	by	the	United	States	and	Europe,	and	the	East,	represented	by	the	Soviet	Union,	China,	and	their	assorted	allies.	The	United	States	was	acknowledged	as	the	leader	of	the	West	just	as	the	Soviet	Union	was	the	recognized	leader	of	the	East.	The	United	States,	like	the	Soviet	Union,	utilized	any	number	of	tools	to	project	its	power	and	influence	through	various	forms	of	diplomacy,	from	economic	influence	to	various	types	of	Military	
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Intervention,	with	the	Military	Assistance	mission	being	one	of	those	tools	within	the	toolkit	of	options	for	American	policymakers.	While	each	case	—	South	Korea	and	Vietnam	—	has	its	advantages	and	disadvantages,	they	mark	a	broad	range	of	results,	namely:	clear	success	and	clear	failure.	When	the	foundations	contributing	to	these	advantages	and	disadvantages	are	delineated	and	theoretically	applied	elsewhere	in	another	time,	these	case	studies	can	indicate	a	broader	argument	creating	the	conditions	for	future	Military	Assistance	mission	success.	Due	to	the	different	outcomes,	my	conclusion	will	show	why	these	particular	outcomes	developed	by	differentiating	common	conditions	can	be	extrapolated,	identifying	a	required	quality	or	process	for	successful	Military	Assistance	missions	and	the	goal	of	long-term	sustainable	security.	In	the	case	of	South	Korea,	the	United	States	developed	a	more	permanent	relationship	with	the	Republic	of	Korea	from	the	aftermath	of	the	civil	war	on	the	peninsula.	This	relationship	was	based	both	nations	going	to	war	together	and	like	brothers,	they	shed	blood	for	one	another.	The	United	States	operated	under	the	grand	strategy	that	containment	of	communism	was	fundamental	to	its	freedom.	Following	the	domestic	belief	that	President	Truman	had	“lost”	China	to	communism,	the	emphasis	for	the	Republic	of	Korea	to	survive	became	a	driving	force	domestically.	Consequently,	the	United	States	was	determined	to	assist	South	Korea	at	all	costs,	leading	to	a	brutal	and	bloody	war	that	lasted	roughly	three	years.	After	the	Korean	Armistice,	the	United	States	maintained	bases	and	stationed	tens	of	thousands	of	troops	in	South	Korea,	supporting	a	Military	Assistance	mission	for	the	South	Korean	Army	to	this	day.	Meanwhile,	South	Korea	developed	from	an	impoverished,	backwater	nation	to	one	of	the	top	economies	in	the	world.	While	the	Korean	War	ended	in	a	stalemate,	this	case	study	clearly	exemplifies	a	successful	Military	Assistance	mission,	one	that	ended	in	a	long-term	stable	and	sustainable	level	of	security.	The	United	States	and	Vietnam	had	a	complex	relationship	due	to	military	actions:	from	the	insurgent	operations	that	occurred	after	WWII,	followed	by	the	open	warfare	from	the	mid-1950s	to	the	mid-1970s.	This	case	study	has	many	disadvantages,	given	the	nature	of	both	the	conflict	and	the	breadth	of	research	that	has	been	done	on	virtually	every	aspect	of	the	conflict.	Further	challenging	the	
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analysis	is	the	fact	that	Military	Assistance	came	in	many	different	forms	and	was	sometimes	interwoven	with	the	Military	Aid	and	foreign	aid	disciplines,	such	as	the	case	with	the	Civil	Operations	and	Revolutionary	Development	Support	or	CORDS	Program.47	This	support	program	had	both	military	and	development	personnel	assisting	the	Vietnamese	on	multiple	aspects	of	both	civilian	and	military	development	of	capacities	and	capabilities,	in	order	to	achieve	a	political	outcome.	The	CORDS	programs,	while	being	acknowledged,	will	not	be	examined	due	to	the	emphasis	on	foreign	aid	as	a	core	aspect	of	the	program,	which	is	not	germane	to	this	project.	On	a	macro	level,	the	United	States’	policy	operated	on	the	domino	theory	with	respect	to	communism,	that	being	if	one	state	in	Asia	fell	to	communism,	the	rest	would	likely	follow,	similar	to	that	which	occurred	in	the	transformation	of	Eastern	Europe	after	WWII.	As	such,	in	order	to	isolate	the	logic	which	enabled	comparing	and	contrasting	Vietnam	with	Korea,	this	research	project	ceased	to	examine	Vietnam’s	situation	after	the	Gulf	of	Tonkin	incident	in	August	1964.48	The	rationale	for	this	decision	is	that	the	Johnson	Administration	utilized	this	incident	to	justify	the	change	of	mission,	from	a	Military	Assistance	mission	under	the	Military	Assistance	Advisory	Group	to	its	eventual	incarnation	as	the	Military	Assistance	Command-Vietnam.	Although	the	Military	Assistance	Command-Vietnam	was	the	unit	that	operated	from	1962	to	1973,	after	the	Gulf	of	Tonkin	incident,	the	troop	strength	went	from	23,000	to	over	500,000,	which	completely	transformed	the	face	and	operations	of	the	mission.49	
																																																								
47	Dale	Andrade	and	James	H.	Willbanks,	“CORDS/Phoenix:	Counterinsurgency	Lessons	from	Vietnam	for	the	Future,”	Military	Review	86,	no.	2	(March/April	2006):	77.	48	United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, 
Vietnam, 1964, vol. 1, eds. Edward C. Keefer and Charles S. Simpson. (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), documents 255-308, accessed	August	1,	2018, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/ch8.	49	U.S.	Department	of	Commerce,	Bureau	of	the	Census,	"Vietnam	Conflict—U.S.	Military	Forces	in	Vietnam	and	Casualties	Incurred:	1961	to	1972,"	Table	No.	590,	
Statistical	Abstract	of	the	United	States,	1977	(Washington,	D.C.:	U.S.	Government	Printing	Office,	1977),	369.	
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The	United	States’	and	its	allies’	recent	military	actions	in	Afghanistan	and	Iraq	have	highlighted	these	strategies	and	concepts	in	the	public	sphere.	With	the	prominence	of	Military	Assistance	in	Operation	Enduring	Freedom	and	Operation	Iraqi	Freedom,50	it	is	understandable	to	wonder	why	this	research	project	will	not	be	using	either	action	as	case	studies.	This	is	due	primarily	to	the	fact	that	it	would	not	be	possible	to	determine	whether	this	Military	Assistance	has	been	a	success	or	failure	in	developing	or	even	contributing	to	a	long-term	sustainable	security,	given	the	immediacy	of	each	military	experience.	Even	without	the	advantage	of	historical	perspective,	however,	both	experiences	of	conflict	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan	created	a	scenario	in	which	the	responsible	exit	strategy	for	the	US	and	its	allies	was	to	pursue	a	strategy	of	Military	Assistance.	Chapter	Overview		Providing	a	roadmap	seems	necessary	in	a	research	project	of	this	magnitude.	As	discussed	earlier,	this	research	addresses	a	dual	objective:	on	the	one	hand,	to	clearly	answer	the	question	regarding	Military	Assistance,	while	at	the	same	time,	to	unequivocally	identify	the	areas	that	are	not	being	studied	and	stipulate	why	those	areas	are	not	germane	to	question	at	hand.	Thematically,	however,	the	goal	here	is	to	demonstrate	how	the	basic	questions	of	this	research	project	are	being	answered.	That	goal	speaks	to	the	“why”	questions	around	Military	Assistance	classification	as	a	tool	as	opposed	to	a	strategy	(and	the	importance	of	that	distinction),	along	with	the	placement	and	positioning	of	that	tool	within	a	broader	strategic	framework.	The	first	chapter	of	this	dissertation	is	an	explanation	of	the	relationship	between	Military	Assistance	and	American	Grand	Strategy.	This	relationship	formulates	the	basis	for	the	dissertation,	in	that	it	places	Military	Assistance	in	the	framework	of	the	tools	required	for	policymakers	to	associate	into	the	broader	environment	of	International	Relations.	This	chapter	begins	to	contextually	answer																																																									
50	Hearing	to	Receive	Testimony	on	the	Department	of	Defense	Security	Cooperation	
and	Assistance	Programs	and	Authorities,	Before	the	Subcommittee	on	Emerging	
Threats	and	Capabilities	of	the	Committee	on	Armed	Services,	114th	Congress	(March	9,	2016)	(witnesses	Mr.	Jeffrey	W.	Eggers,	Ms.	Melissa	G.	Dalton,	and	Mr.	Michael	J.	McNerney).	Security	and	Stability	in	Afghanistan	and	Iraq:	Developments	in	U.S.	
Strategy	and	Operations	and	the	Way	Ahead,	Before	the	Committee	on	Armed	Services,	110th	Congress	(September	10,	2008).	
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the	second	question	of	this	research	project:	the	importance	of	the	tool	of	Military	Assistance	within	American	Grand	Strategy.	The	chapter	also	explores	the	necessity	of	employing	grand	strategy	as	a	great	power	in	international	relations.	In	addition,	this	chapter	avoids	going	too	far	into	the	history	of	international	relations	or	grand	strategy,	and	yet	provides	the	reader	perspective	to	appreciate	the	questions	being	asked	and	explored.	The	focus	of	the	second	chapter	is	to	elucidate	a	fundamental	understanding	of	how	the	United	States	Military	considers	the	position	of	Military	Assistance	within	the	context	of	its	own	doctrine.	This	includes	the	examination	of	what	conflicts	exist	within	that	recently-developed	doctrine,	and	how	these	could	be	resolved.	The	challenge	with	this	section	is	one	of	military	doctrine	itself,	in	that	it	is	not	a	static	phenomenon:	all	doctrines	evolve,	adapting	to	reflect	new	missions,	equipment,	and	strategy.	Military	Assistance	and	the	doctrine	surrounding	it	is	no	different.	A	striking	and	timely	example	of	an	evolution	in	doctrinal	terminology	is	that	in	the	time	that	this	research	project	has	been	completed,	the	United	States	Army	has	changed	its	term	for	warfare	from	“full	spectrum	war”51	to	“unified	land	operations”52	to	“multi-domain	operations.”.53	This	is	the	nature	of	doctrine.	This	chapter	examines	the	basic	views	of	strategic	planning	to	determine	how	the	United	States	Armed	Forces	considers	and	does	not	consider	Military	Assistance	within	its	options	of	engagement	for	policymakers.	The	third	chapter	offers	a	historic	perspective	and	analysis	of	Military	Assistance	to	the	United	States	Army	and	its	predecessors	in	Colonial	America.	The	goal	of	this	chapter	was	to	create	a	structure	which	develops	concepts	and	understanding	to	appreciate	how	the	United	States	Military	views	the	historical	context	of	Military	Assistance.	This	historical	perspective	stops	at	the	early	1800s,	due	primarily	to	the																																																									
51	United	States	Army,	Field	Manual	3-0:	Operations,	3-1.	52	United	States	Army,	Army	Doctrine	Reference	Publication	3-0,	3-1.		53	David	Perkins,	“Multi-Domain	Battle:	Driving	Change	to	Win	in	the	Future,”	
Military	Review	97,	no.	4	(July-August	2017):	6-12.	There	is	yet	a	current	debate	to	change	the	term	from	“multi-domain	battle”	to	“multi-domain	operations”	(Sydney	J.	Freedberg,	Jr.,	“Services	Debate	Multi-Domain:	‘Battle’	or	‘Operations,’”	Breaking	Defense,	April	10,	2018,	accessed	July	23,	2018,	https://breakingdefense.com/2018/04/beyond-multi-domain-battle-services-brainstorm-broader-concept).	
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fact	that	the	United	States	rarely	experienced	Military	Intervention	as	a	recipient	nation	after	this	period	in	the	same	manner	as	defined.	The	reason	for	this	was	that	the	United	States	at	that	time	developed	an	isolationist	stance	focused	on	internal	expansion,	as	seen	in	the	Mexican-American	War	and	Indian	Wars.	Between	those	conflicts,	the	Civil	War	and	questions	regarding	slavery	dominated	the	attention	of	the	United	States,	until	the	Spanish-American	War	at	the	turn	of	the	20th	century.	The	United	States	Armed	Forces	are	in	reality	deeply	aware	of	their	traditions	and	history,	and	this	chapter	describes	the	role	of	Military	Assistance	in	the	formation	of	many	of	these	traditions,	ultimately	affecting	its	perspectives	and	attitudes,	and	its	perceptions	regarding	Military	Assistance	as	a	tool	to	utilize	internationally.	The	fourth	chapter	is	the	first	case	study	on	the	relationship	between	the	United	States	and	South	Korea,	how	that	relationship	was	created	and	developed	based	on	Military	Assistance,	and	the	experience	of	the	Korean	War.	This	case	study	is	an	example	of	how	successful	Military	Assistance,	characterized	by	achievement	of	military	objectives	in	support	of	political	goals,	facilitated	the	strategic	alliance	between	South	Korea	and	the	United	States,	as	well	as	factors	that	allowed	the	Military	Assistance	to	be	successful.	This	case	study	demonstrates	how	Military	Assistance	fits	as	a	tool	for	the	successful	pursuit	of	those	strategic	alliances	in	the	broader	framework	of	the	International	Relations	discipline.	Writing	this	case	study	helped	crystalize	a	necessity	to	evolve	and	refine	the	approach	and	research	question	further,	showing	the	need	to	incorporate	the	concept	of	strategic	alliances	as	an	end	goal	of	Military	Assistance,	and	how	that	fit	into	a	broader	American	Grand	Strategy.	This	case	study	also	led	to	an	appreciation	about	why	considering	and	assessing	Military	Assistance	in	a	vacuum	is	unrealistic	and	indeterminate,	requiring	a	broader	understanding	while	maintaining	a	specific	focus.	However,	in	a	more	comprehensive	sense,	the	Military	Invention	in	the	Korean	War	is	an	example	of	the	successful	use	of	Military	Support	and	Military	Assistance.	The	next	chapter	and	second	case	study	concerns	what	could	only	be	considered	the	most	obvious	failure	in	the	history	of	American	warfare,	the	Vietnam	War.	In	its	quest	to	combat	a	perceived	global	threat	of	Communism,	the	United	States	found	itself	immersed	in	the	conflict	in	Vietnam.	When	this	research	project	began,	one	of	the	major	goals	was	to	avoid	the	Vietnam	conflict	in	its	entirety,	considering	it	too	
	 33	
large	and	too	complex	to	encourage	detailed	research.	Furthermore,	due	to	the	changing	inflection	points,	as	well	as	evolving	political	goals	and	military	objectives,	a	case	study	about	Vietnam	simply	appeared	to	be	a	journey	into	an	intellectual	quagmire	and	academic	blackhole.	However,	as	this	project	evolved,	it	became	clear	that	understanding	the	beginning	of	the	Military	Assistance	mission	in	Vietnam	was	crucial	to	appreciate	how	and	why	a	Military	Assistance	mission	can	end	in	failure.	As	it	is	often	noted	that	we	learn	more	from	our	failures	than	our	successes,	understanding	the	failure	of	the	Military	Assistance	mission	in	Vietnam	was	critical	to	appreciating	its	utility	within	the	toolset	of	American	foreign	policy.	At	the	same	time,	it	is	critical	to	recognize	the	extent	to	which	the	failures	of	Vietnam	affected	the	United	States.	These	include	concerns	of	political	leaders	too	involved	in	tactical	military	operations,	such	as	planning	bombing	runs	from	the	Oval	Office,	or	questions	of	draft	dodging	that	plague	political	candidates	to	this	day.	The	Army	also	felt	the	trauma	that	the	United	States,	as	a	nation,	experienced,	but	it	could	be	argued	that	the	Army	did	not	learn	the	lessons	from	Vietnam,	which	led	to	both	the	successes	in	the	Persian	Gulf	War	and	the	failures	of	Iraq	and	Afghanistan.	While	there	are	a	myriad	of	failures	evident	in	the	story	of	the	Vietnam	War,	the	focus	of	this	project	will	be	on	how	the	Military	Intervention	mission	failed	to	link	with	a	consistent	set	of	political	goals,	starting	with	the	Military	Aid	mission,	followed	by	considering	a	Military	Support	mission	to	the	French	during	the	Battle	of	Dien	Bien	Phu,	and	then	evolving	into	the	Military	Assistance	mission	that	eventually	became	a	basis	for	the	Military	Intervention	effort	that	went	disastrously	wrong.	The	final	chapter	is	the	summation	of	the	findings	in	the	research	project,	wrapping	up	the	thread	of	the	questions	posed	at	the	beginning:	1.	Why	is	Military	Assistance	a	tool	rather	than	a	strategy?	and	2.	Why	was	Military	Assistance	important	in	context	to	Grand	Strategy?	This	chapter	also	explains	some	of	the	issues	that	time	and	discipline	determined	were	unable	to	be	explored	in	depth,	even	given	that	these	issues	represent	areas	that	could	and	should	be	researched.	That	these	have	not	been	academically	explored	is	possibly	due	to	a	serious	lack	in	a	foundational	literature	surrounding	Military	Assistance,	its	nature	and	application.	Ultimately,	the	goal	of	this	research	project	was	to	answer	the	question	of	where	the	Military	Assistance	mission	pursued	by	the	United	States	represented	a	tool	of	
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its	foreign	policy,	and	how	it	fit	into	the	options	for	policymakers	in	the	pursuit	of	American	Grand	Strategy	during	the	20th	century,	eventually	being	applicable	in	the	current	international	security	environment.	This	perspective	additionally	includes	understanding	how	the	lessons	learned	from	these	experiences	might	be	applied	to	current	alliance	development	through	Military	Assistance	by	the	United	States.	Furthermore,	the	underlying	factor	that	seems	to	differentiate	successful	Military	Assistance	from	a	failed	one	is	the	clear	linkage	to	a	broader,	achievable	political	goal.	As	linking	military	objectives	to	political	goals	is	hardly	a	new	concept,	the	case	studies	indicate	the	challenges	of	these	linkages	due	to	political	leaders	who	failed	to	operate	under	a	more	inclusive	strategic	framework	with	respect	to	international	relations,	and	military	leaders	who	failed	to	challenge	the	political	leadership	to	insure	such	a	linkage.	Conclusion	The	practical	and	theoretical	underpinnings	of	Military	Assistance	are	military	power	and	its	application,	either	through	warfare	or	some	other	construct	of	international	relations.	While	this	research	project	addresses	that	aspect	of	Military	Assistance	which	is	a	part	of	warfare,	the	more	important	aspect	is	to	further	understand	international	relations,	very	much	within	the	rubric	established	by	Clausewitz	and	political	goals.	This	project	will	show	that	Military	Assistance	is	a	tool	of	military	power,	not	a	strategy,	and	has	more	substantial	ramifications	than	that	of	the	pursuit	of	war.	This	broader	application	explored	is	one	whereby	Military	Assistance	plays	a	key	role	in	the	creation	or	continuation	of	long-term	sustainable	security	within	the	context	of	American	Grand	Strategy.	
	 35	
Chapter	1	Military	Assistance	and	Grand	Strategy		Within	the	various	topics	of	International	Relations,	the	idea	of	“Grand	Strategy”	is	a	relatively	new	one,	coming	into	the	academic	lexicon	in	the	1920s	with	Basil	Henry	Liddell	Hart’s	classic	work,	Strategy.1	As	Professor	Sayle	mentions	in	his	article,	Liddell	Hart’s	comment	about	Grand	Strategy	states	that,	“the	term	‘grand	strategy’	serves	to	bring	out	the	sense	of	‘policy	in	execution.’	For	the	role	of	grand	strategy	—	higher	strategy	—	is	to	coordinate	and	direct	all	the	resources	of	a	nation,	or	band	of	nations,	towards	the	attainment	of	the	political	object	of	the	war	—	the	goal	defined	by	fundamental	policy.”2	Although	a	more	recent	academic	concept,	nation	states	have	had	and	pursued	grand	strategies	since	their	origins,	whether	it	was	the	tribes	of	Israel	in	biblical	times,	the	city-states	of	Thucydides’	Greece,	or	the	empires	that	developed	to	expand	their	influence	far	past	their	shores.	Each	sought	to	pursue	an	agenda	with	their	rivals,	clients,	and	others,	in	order	to	further	their	interests	while	utilizing	all	of	their	nation’s	resources	and	power.	Whether	through	expansions	of	power	or	engagements	with	others	through	alliances	or	simply	a	refusal	to	recognize	other	states,	all	were	grand	strategies	being	pursued	in	the	context	of	international	relations.	Those	grand	strategies	can	be	encapsulated	and	conceptualized	as	the	following:	engagement,	selective	engagement,	and	isolation.3	There	is	also	a	sense	that	a	grand	strategy	should	be	global	in	its	pursuit	and	should	define	a	nation’s	sense	of	its	place	in	the	world	
																																																								
1	Timothy	Andrews	Sayle,	“Defining	and	Teaching	Grand	Strategy,”	The	Telegram	4	(January	2011),	accessed	27	February	2017,	http://www.fpri.org/article/2011/01/defining-and-teaching-grand-strategy.	2	Basil	Henry	Liddell	Hart,	Strategy:	2nd	Revised	edition	(New	York:	Meridian,	1991),	322.	3Foreign	policy	thinker,	Ian	Bremmer,	in	discussing	the	next	steps	for	American	foreign	policy,	refers	to	the	United	States	as	having	three	choices:	Independent	America,	Moneyball	America,	and	Indispensable	America.	Ian	Bremmer,	
Superpower:	Three	Choices	for	America's	Role	in	the	World	(London:	Portfolio/Penguin,	2015).	
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and	world	order,	along	with	the	willingness	to	pursue	that	grand	strategy	with	all	levels	of	its	power	and	influence.	In	this	sense,	it	is	difficult	to	imagine	that	a	weak	or	small	state	could	pursue	a	grand	strategy,	and	thus	it	has	generally	been	the	purview	of	a	Great	Power.	This	chapter	will	seek	to	explain	Military	Assistance	in	the	context	of	grand	strategy	more	inclusive	and	American	Grand	Strategy	more	specifically.	The	realization	of	a	necessity	of	security	in	general	relates	to	Military	Assistance	in	that	security,	or	the	need	for	safety,	acts	as	the	link	or	glue	between	Grand	Strategy	and	Military	Assistance.	That	connection	draws	upon	the	fundamental	need	for	the	population	of	a	nation	state	to	feel	secure,	with	respect	to	Maslow’s	hierarchy	of	needs.4	With	that	fundamental	need	for	security,	an	external	actor	can	utilize	Military	Assistance	as	a	tool	of	grand	strategy	to	facilitate	that	need	for	security.	This	becomes	an	effective	method	of	connection	and	dependency	between	a	recipient	nation	and	a	supporting	nation,	which	is	the	external	actor.	Modern	American	Grand	Strategy	has	been	most	traditionally	recognized	as	the	broad,	strategic	thinking	that	challenged	Communism	in	the	post-WWII	bipolar	global	order.	As	the	WWII	fighting	alliance	that	was	commonly	known	as	the	“Allies”	but	in	fact	founded	under	the	lofty	name	of	“United	Nations”5	began	to	dissolve	in	the	aftermath	of	WWII,	the	rise	of	what	is	known	as	the	liberal	world	order	came	into	fruition	in	the	form	of	institutions	such	as	the	World	Bank,	the	International	Monetary	Fund,	the	United	Nations	Security	Council,	the	North	American	Treaty	Organization,	and	others.	In	one	sense	these	institutions6																																																									
4	A. H. Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” Psychological Review 50, no. 4 
(July 1943): 379, accessed April 12, 2017, doi:10.1037/h0054346.	5	Townsend	Hoopes	and	Douglas	Brinkley,	FDR	and	the	Creation	of	the	U.N.	(New	Haven,	CT:	Yale	University	Press,	1997),	110.	William	Manchester	and	Paul	Reid,	
The	Last	Lion:	Winston	Spencer	Churchill	Vol.	3	Defender	of	the	Realm,	1940-1965	(New	York:	Little	Brown	and	Company),	461.	6	It	is	important	to	note	that	these	institutions	that	were	considered	the	liberal	world	order	were	as	much	about	maintaining	and	spreading	capitalism	as	they	were	about	collective	security.	It	was	thought	that	the	protectionist	economics	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Great	Depression	helped	prolong	and	deepen	the	economic	challenges	for	many,	giving	rise	to	the	hyperinflation	that	led	to	the	Nazis	gaining	power	in	WWII.	Paul	N.	Hein,	A	Low	Dishonest	Decade:	The	Great	Powers,	Eastern	
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came	into	being	in	the	hopes	of	creating	an	international	forum	that	would	be	more	successful	than	the	ill-fated	League	of	Nations,	the	international	institution	created	in	the	aftermath	of	WWI.7	In	another	sense	there	was	an	underlying	effort	to	link	nations	together	economically	to	prevent	the	terrible	cost	of	global	wars;	the	idea	was	that	where	diplomacy	had	failed,	economic	dependency	and	the	threat,	rather	than	the	application,	of	military	force	could	succeed.	Success	in	the	case	of	the	liberal	world	order	may	be	defined	as	an	environment	that	would	allow	for	a	peaceful	discussion	of	disagreements	between	nation	states	without	escalating	into	the	outbreak	of	another	global	conflict.	However,	an	additional	intention	of	the	Western	Powers	in	the	founding	of	those	military	and	economic	organizations	was	to	prevent	the	rise	and	expansion	of	Communism	throughout	the	world.	The	Western	Powers’	perspective	was	that	a	community	of	many	nation	states	committed	to	the	betterment	of	all	would	be	far	more	successful	than	the	closed,	controlled	system	of	Communism	practiced	by	the	USSR	and	its	satellite	states,	and	this	would	be	attractive	to	the	various	smaller	potential	client	states	throughout	the	world.8	The	construct	of	this	engagement	type	of	Grand	Strategy	was	endemic	over	many	decades	until	the	fall	of	Communism	in	the	late	1980s	and	early	1990s.	However,	this	was	not	the	first	time	the	United	States	had	pursued	or	developed	a	purposeful	Grand	Strategy.	John	Quincy	Adams	and	America’s	First	Grand	Strategy	The	history	of	American	Grand	Strategy	is	in	one	sense	synonymous	with	the	history	of	the	United	States.	The	origins	of	American	Grand	Strategy	can	be	found	within	the	Farewell	Address	written	by	outgoing	President	George	Washington.	As	he	commented,	“With	me	a	predominant	motive	has	been	to	endeavor	to	gain																																																									
Europe,	and	the	Economic	Origins	of	World	War	II,	1930-1941	(New	York:	Continuum,	2002),	394-395.	7	Robert	C.	Hilderbrand,	Dumbarton	Oaks:	The	Origins	of	the	United	Nations	and	
the	Search	for	Postwar	Security	(Chapel	Hill,	NC:	The	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	1990),	1-2.	8	This	is	important	with	reference	to	grand	strategy	in	that	as	Liddell	Hart	stated,	it	was	about	coordinating	and	directing	all	elements	of	a	national	power.	Liddell	Hart,	Strategy,	322.	
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time	to	our	country	to	settle	and	mature	its	yet	recent	institutions,	and	to	progress	without	interruption	to	that	degree	of	strength	and	consistency	which	is	necessary	to	give	it,	humanly	speaking,	the	command	of	its	own	fortunes.”9	Many	have	incorrectly	interpreted	these	comments	as	the	original	impulse	toward	an	isolationist	grand	strategy,10	but	this	is	a	clear	misreading	of	the	text.	Washington’s	point	“to	progress	without	interruption	to	that	degree	of	strength	and	consistency	which	is	necessary	to	give	it,	humanly	speaking,	the	command	of	its	own	fortunes”	is	an	indication	of	his	considered	and	balanced	statecraft.	This	perspective	developed	in	his	years	overseeing	the	need	for	the	young	United	States	to	find	its	own	place	within	the	broader	array	of	18th	century	nation	states	without	suffering	through	the	challenges	and	interference	of	alliances,	wars,	and	other	such	events	that	could	weaken	the	United	States	before	it	had	“command	of	its	own	fortunes.”	Washington	had	seen	how	the	competing	interests	of	the	European	nations	created	conflict.	In	fact,	he	and	the	United	States	had	been	the	direct	beneficiaries	of	such	a	policy,	as	the	French	competed	with	the	British	for	spheres	of	influence	and	extensions	of	their	respective	empires,	resulting	in	French	support	of	American	during	the	War	of	Independence.	While	from	one	perspective	Washington’s	Farewell	Address	is	a	distinctive	advocacy	of	an	isolationist	grand	strategy,	the	more	nuanced	understanding	is	that	he	had	intended	to	allow	the	young	nation	its	breathing	room	to	grow,	eventually	enabling	the	United	States	to	develop	a	stable,	strong	position	in	the	world	and	in	global	affairs.11	
																																																								
9	George	Washington,	“Farewell	Address,”	September	19,	1796,	page	30,	accessed	August	8,	2016,	http://gwpapers.virginia.edu/documents_gw/farewell/transcript.html.	10	Paul	O.	Carrese,	“George	Washington’s	Legacy	as	a	Foreign	Policy	Guide,”	in	
Public	Discourse,	October	22,	2012,	accessed	May	23,	2017,	http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/10/6688.	11	John	Avlon,	Washington’s	Farewell:	The	Founding	Father’s	Warning	to	Future	
Generations	(New	York:	Simon	and	Schuster	Paperbacks,	2017),	185-186.	
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The	next	chapter	came	from	the	son	of	Washington’s	successor.	President	John	Quincy	Adams12	is	identified	as	both	the	son	of	President	John	Adams	and	one	of	the	less-skilled	presidents	of	the	young	republic,	even	“by	his	own	admission	his	single	term	was	a	failure.”13	While	John	Quincy’s	presidency	ended	in	disappointment,	and	eclipse	by	the	rise	of	the	Jacksonian	era,	the	position	that	prepared	him	for	the	presidency	and	should	enshrine	his	place	in	history	was	his	role	as	Secretary	of	State	for	James	Monroe.	This	was	the	position	in	which	John	Quincy	would	create	a	place	for	the	United	States	in	global	affairs	within	the	Commonwealth	of	Nations,	and	redefine	American	Grand	Strategy	through	the	development	and	drafting	of	the	Monroe	Doctrine.	The	Monroe	Doctrine	was	critical	to	the	evolution	of	the	United	States	for	many	reasons,	not	least	of	which	being	an	establishment	and	change	in	American	Grand	Strategy.	Washington’s	farewell	address	demonstrated	both	practical	and	strategic	thinking,	specifically	as	it	related	to	international	relations,14	but	other	presidents	directly	after	Washington	changed	directions	entirely.	Presidents	John	Adams,	Jefferson,	and	Madison	decided	to	involve	the	country	in	international	matters,	rather	than	heeding	Washington’s	warning	to	allow	the	United	States	to	establish	itself	before	engaging	abroad.	These	series	of	involvements	culminated	in	the	War	of	1812	and	the	destruction	of	Washington,	D.C.	by	the	British.	Heeding	the	lessons	of	President	Madison	and	through	the	work	of	John	Quincy	as	Secretary	of	State,	Monroe’s	presidency	became	the	first	presidential	administration	to	establish	a	defined	Grand	Strategy,	through	the	Monroe	Doctrine.	This	Grand	Strategy	stated	that	the	United	States	would	establish	its	sphere	of	influence	in	the	Western	Hemisphere	and	would	protect	its	interests	and	influence	there	if	necessary.15																																																									
12	To	more	easily	distinguish	between	John	Quincy	Adams	and	his	father,	John	Adams,	John	Quincy	Adams	will	be	referred	to	as	“John	Quincy”	and	his	father,	“John	Adams.”	13	Lynn	Hudson	Parsons,	John	Quincy	Adams	(Lanham,	MD:	Rowman	and	Littlefield	Publishers,	2001),	xvi.	14	Washington	believed	it	prudent	to	avoid	the	international	entanglements	of	Europe	that	he	thought	could	lead	to	ruin	for	the	young	nation.	15	It	is	important	to	note	that	there	is	no	desire	to	give	an	excuse	or	lend	credibility	to	some	of	the	actions	taken	by	the	United	States	in	pursuit	of	
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Another	aspect	of	the	Monroe	Doctrine	is	that	it	was	the	first	time	in	the	nascent	nation’s	history	that	it	separated	itself	from	the	political	dynamics	of	the	European	nations.	As	a	small	nation	on	the	edges	of	empires,	the	United	States	was	essentially	a	pawn	in	the	various	conflicts	of	Europe,	being	swept	up	into	broader	wars	between	various	great	powers.	The	conflicts	of	the	United	States	from	the	French	Indian	War	through	the	War	of	Independence	to	the	War	of	1812	were	all,	by	some	extension,	simply	different	conflict	theaters	of	European	wars.	The	Monroe	Doctrine	declared	to	those	European	powers	that	the	United	States	would	no	longer	engage	in	European	conflicts.	It	could	be	argued	that	this	concept	has	become	so	ingrained	within	the	identity	of	the	United	States	that	it	formulates	a	foundation	of	resistance	that	prevented	immediate	entry	into	the	global	conflicts	of	WWI	and	WWII.16	From	this	perspective,	it	could	easily	be	seen	that	the	United	Stated	was	in	actuality	creating	a	sense	of	isolationism,	to	literally	and	figuratively	detach	itself	from	European	wars	and	power	dynamics.17	However,	this	does	not	support	the	concept	that	the	Monroe	Doctrine	actually	represented,	more	a	statement	on	the	advent	of	selective	engagement,	in	that	the	doctrine	solidified	the	terms	under	which	the	United	States	would	engage	in	global	affairs.	John	Quincy	had	what	could	only	be	described	as	an	excellent	background	to	become	Secretary	of	State.	While	his	father,	John	Adams,	served	the	nation	as	first	Ambassador	to	the	Court	of	St.	James	in	Great	Britain,	he	brought	his	son,	John	Quincy,	as	his	assistant.	After	the	completion	of	his	formal	education,	John	Quincy	became	the	ambassador	to	the	Netherlands,	Prussia,	and	Russia,	culminating	in	following	his	father’s	footsteps	as	the	Ambassador	to	Great	Britain.	John	Quincy	had	a	front	row	seat	to	observe	the	European	Powers	using	their	economic	might,	diplomatic	skill,	and	finally,	military	power	in	pursuit	of																																																									maintaining	dominance	in	the	Western	Hemisphere,	especially	during	the	Cold	War.	The	general	point	is	to	merely	acknowledge	that	the	Monroe	Doctrine	is	an	established	tradition	in	United	States	foreign	policy	that	has	been	maintained	since	the	Monroe	Doctrine’s	inception.	16	Marco	Mariano,	“Isolationism,	internationalism	and	the	Monroe	Doctrine,”	
Journal	of	Transatlantic	Studies	9,	no.	1	(March	2011):	36-39,	accessed	June	20,	2018,	https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14794012.2011.550776.	17	Mariano,	“Isolationism,	internationalism	and	the	Monroe	Doctrine,”	40.	
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their	ability	to	best	one	another	in	a	seemingly	endless	struggle	for	continental	dominance.	As	the	first	ambassador	to	Russia,	he	witnessed	the	Napoleonic	Wars	first	hand.18	As	these	wars	were	the	birthplace	of	a	major	cornerstone	of	military	strategy,	Carl	von	Clausewitz’s	On	War,	so	too	were	they	the	beginning	conceptualizations	of	American	Grand	Strategy.	However,	it	is	important	to	note	that	Clausewitz’s	On	War	was	a	book	on	military	strategy,	and	not	about	Grand	Strategy.	Professor	Charles	Edel	describes,	in	his	book	on	Grand	Strategy	and	John	Quincy	Adams,	the	misconception	that	Grand	Strategy	must	be	developed	prior	to	implementation	or	even	success:	“While	[John	Quincy]	Adams	acted	broadly	according	to	his	grand	strategy,	he	was	also	prepared	to	adjust	when	necessary….Adams’s	grand	strategy	helps	explain	why	America’s	rise	from	a	confederation	of	revolutionary	colonies	to	a	continental	power	was	not	an	inevitable	result	of	resources	and	demographics,	but	rather	the	product	of	a	deliberate	pursuit.	And	because	grand	strategy	is	assessed	not	only	at	a	national	level,	but	also	at	the	personal	level,	it	allows	for	an	analysis	of	what	occurred	when	certain	principles,	values,	and	priorities	were	in	conflict.”19	By	way	of	advice	from	his	father,	the	previous	American	Ambassador	twenty	years	prior,	John	Quincy	gained	an	understanding	of	the	value	of	taking	his	first	post	in	The	Hague.	He	acknowledged	that	his	was	a	unique	opportunity	to	view	the	politics	of	Europe	and	in	comparison,	those	of	the	United	States.	Europe	in	the	late	18th	century	was	awash	in	revolution	and	political	instability,	and	this	was	the	political	uncertainty	feared	by	John	Quincy	and	the	Founding	Fathers.20	Professor	Edel	articulated	a	key	point:	“He	[John	Quincy	Adams]	came	to	understand	that	without	security,	the	nascent	republican	principles	and	institutions	would	not	survive	in	a	world	dominated	by	militarized	empires.”21	That	instability	was	fueled	by	nationalist	moods	of	the	population	due	to	a	
																																																								
18	William	Earl	Weeks,	John	Quincy	Adams	and	American	Global	Empire	(Lexington,	KY:	The	University	Press	of	Kentucky,	1992),	7-8.	19	Charles	N.	Edel,	Nation	Builder:	John	Quincy	Adams	and	the	Grand	Strategy	of	
the	Republic	(Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	2014),	10.	20	Edel,	Nation	Builder,	58-61.	21	Edel,	Nation	Builder,	62.	
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buildup	of	debt	from	wars	and	elites	ignorant	of	the	plights	of	their	citizens.22	By	its	logical	conclusion,	there	was	a	recognition	that	if	security	could	be	developed	and	managed	without	the	cost	of	war,	there	would	naturally	be	a	lessened	impact	on	the	population,	and	with	this	rational,	John	Quincy	appreciated	that	security	was	necessary	to	protect	America.	This	foundational	notion	of	John	Quincy’s,	as	he	formulated	his	concepts	of	Grand	Strategy	and	America’s	place	in	the	world,	could	not	be	more	relevant	to	the	concept	of	Military	Assistance.	It	is	incumbent	on	a	Military	Assistance	mission	to	have	purpose,	a	strategy,	that	ideally	links	with	a	grand	strategy.	Support	for	this	conclusion	is	found	in	recent	memory,	for	the	Iraq	War	offers	an	interesting	similar	example	of	security	as	it	relates	to	Grand	Strategy	and	Military	Assistance.	When	General	Petraeus	took	command	in	Iraq,	he	stated:	“the	term	‘secure’	is	a	clearly	defined	doctrinal	task,	meaning	to	gain	control	of	an	area	or	terrain	feature	and	to	protect	it	from	the	enemy.	Thus,	the	tasks	will	be	clear-cut,	though	difficult.	Certainly	upcoming	operations	will	be	carried	out	in	full	partnership	with	Iraqi	forces,	with	them	in	the	lead	whenever	possible	and	with	arm’s	length	when	that	is	not	possible.”23	While	it	could	easily	be	argued	that	the	tasks	were	anything	but	clear,	there	can	be	no	question	that	General	Petraeus,	based	on	his	own	Congressional	testimony,	saw	the	Military	Assistance	mission	in	Iraq	as	a	critical	effort	to	establish	security	for	the	Iraqi	population.	It	was	the	security	General	Petraeus	sought	to	establish	that	was	fundamental	to	linking	his	efforts	to	a	broader	strategic	effort	in	the	War	on	Terror,	even	though	a	Grand	Strategy	in	the	War	on	Terror	had	not	been	readily	apparent.	John	Quincy’s	career	arc	reinforced	this	critical	understanding	of	the	principal	need	of	security	for	the	general	public;	however,	his	key	question	then	considered	was,	“What	next?”	As	wars	continued	to	consume	the	European																																																									
22	George	Rudé,	The	Crowd	in	History:	A	Study	of	Popular	Disturbances	in	France	
and	England,	1730-1848	(New	York:	John	Wiley	&	Sons,	Inc,	1964),	6-11.	23	David	H.	Petraeus,	“Opening	Statement,”	United	States	Senate,	Armed	Services	Committee,	January	23,	2007,	recorded	by	Federal	News	Service	and	reprinted	by	
The	New	York	Times,	accessed	August	20,	2016,	http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/23/world/middleeast/24petraeustextcnd.html.	
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Powers,	John	Quincy	commented	to	his	father	about	the	benefits	of	the	United	States’	continuing	policy	of	neutrality.24	In	a	sense,	John	Quincy’s	comments	were	a	forerunner	to	George	Washington’s	Farewell	Address,	later	in	the	same	year.	This	is	by	no	means	a	statement	that	John	Quincy	influenced	Washington’s	thoughts	on	the	matter	of	neutrality,	as	it	would	be	a	stretch	of	the	imagination	for	John	Adams	to	consider	sharing	his	son’s	thoughts	with	President	Washington.	It	does	indicate,	however,	that	there	was	common	thinking	between	Washington	and	John	Quincy	in	their	assessment	of	a	need	for	American	neutrality	and	divorce	from	European	machinations.	More	importantly,	John	Quincy’s	thoughts	on	the	issue	were	more	extensive	than	Washington’s	published	Farewell	Address,	and	displayed	an	appreciation	that	neutrality	was	not	an	ongoing	Grand	Strategy,	but	rather	a	temporary	policy	that	recognized	the	United	States’	ability	to	influence	events,	which	was	to	say,	minimal	at	that	point.25	
Security	and	Power	Projection	In	the	context	of	Military	Assistance	this	idea	of	a	temporary	strategy	versus	an	actual	Grand	Strategy	is	interesting	and	relevant.	In	order	to	be	successfully	implemented,	the	tool	of	Military	Assistance	must	support	the	Grand	Strategy	of	the	supporting	nation:	on	a	practical	level,	this	could	not	be	considered	an	act	of	neutrality	according	to	John	Quincy’s	line	of	thinking.	However,	as	discussed,	Grand	Strategies	can	take	many	forms,	though	certainly	not	at	the	same	time.	When	the	United	States	pursued	a	grand	strategy,	be	it	engagement,	selective	engagement,	or	isolation,26	Military	Interventions	can	and	have	been	used	to	further	that	Grand	Strategy.	For	example,	when	the	United	States	pursued	a	grand	strategy	of	isolation	prior	to	WWII,	it	utilized	Military	Aid	in	the	form	of	the	Lend-Lease	Act,	allowing	the	United	States	to	arm	the	Soviet	Union,	China,	
																																																								
24	Edel,	Nation	Builder,	83.	25	Letter	from	John	Quincy	Adams	to	John	Adams,	24	June	1796,	in	Writings	of	
John	Quincy	Adams,	7	vols,	ed.	Worthington	C.	Ford	(New	York:	Macmillan,	1913-1917),	1:497-508.	Initially	found	through	Edel,	Nation	Builder,	83.	26	Bremmer,	Superpower,	25-26.	
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Great	Britain,	and	others.27	When	the	United	States	chose	a	grand	strategy	of	selective	engagement,	such	as	with	China	in	WWII,	Military	Assistance	was	the	tool	of	choice.28	Finally,	when	the	United	States	chose	a	grand	strategy	of	engagement	in	WWII,	it	pursued	an	option	of	Military	Support,	in	addition	to	Military	Aid,	prior	to	full	commitment	to	the	war.29	Temporary	strategies,	however,	make	less	sense	to	utilize	Military	Assistance,	such	as	the	neutral	stance	the	United	States	took	at	its	inception	in	the	18th	century.	The	reason	that	a	temporary	strategy,	like	neutrality,	does	not	work	for	a	Great	Power	is	that	by	its	very	definition	it	is	transitory,	in	that	it	primarily	is	the	movement	from	one	permanent	grand	strategy	to	another.	In	general,	these	are	a	function	of	the	flow	of	time,	and	the	tools	of	Military	Intervention	will	have	difficulty	fitting	into	the	temporary	strategy	box.	Specifically,	Military	Assistance	as	a	tool	of	foreign	policy	must	focus	on	supporting	a	specific	end	state	and	political	objective.	Recall	that	John	Quincy	viewed	the	War	of	1812	from	the	Russian	Court	of	the	Tsar,	and	the	second	rise	of	Napoleon	from	his	next	posting	at	the	British	Court	of	St.	James,	providing	him	with	a	unique	perspective.	Seeing	these	events	from	a	distance	metaphorically	as	an	ambassador	and	their	impact	on	American	prestige	and	influence	had	a	profound	effect	on	John	Quincy,	who	became	more	convinced	of	the	necessity	of	power	projection	—	essentially	adopting	the	realist	school	of	international	relations.30	It	is	important	to	note	that	John	Quincy	came	
																																																								
27	Eric	Foner	and	John	A.	Garraty,	eds.,	“Lend-Lease	Act,”	in	The	Reader’s	
Companion	to	American	History	(Boston:	Houghton	Mifflin	Company,	1991),	649.	Edward	R.	Stettinius,	Jr.,	Lend-Lease:	Weapon	for	Victory	(New	York:	The	Macmillan	Company,	1944),	73	and	89-98.	28	Barbara	W.	Tuchman,	Stilwell	and	the	American	Experience	in	China,	1911-1945	(New	York,	1971),	1-5	and	529-531.	29	Well	before	the	United	States	declared	war	on	Japan	and	Germany,	December	8	and	11,	1941	respectively,	the	draft	began	over	a	year	before	with	the	knowledge	that	support	would	be	provide	to	the	United	States’	allies.	The	National	WWII	Museum,	“Research	Starters:	The	Draft	and	World	War	II,”	The	
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to	this	conclusion	having	considered	the	experience	of	the	United	States	during	the	War	of	1812,	as	it	dealt	with	the	small	standing	army	and	navy	left	by	President	Jefferson	and	the	Democratic-Republicans.31	This	adoption	of	the	Realist	school	of	thought	could	seem	to	be	the	antithesis	of	the	Jeffersonian	model	of	a	more	liberal	political	philosophy,	a	belief	in	the	rationality	of	populous,	or,	rule	by	the	governed.	While	it	is	true	that	John	Quincy	aligned	himself	politically	with	Jefferson	after	his	father	left	office,	his	commitment	to	a	more	established	central	government	did	not	change.	He	noted,	“But	the	surest	pledge	that	we	can	have	of	peace	will	be	to	be	prepared	for	war.	The	peace	of	[the	Treaty	of]	Ghent	did	not	settle	any	of	the	contests	for	which	the	war	had	been	waged,	because	the	peace	in	Europe	had	removed	the	causes	of	the	contest.”32	This	comment	bears	a	striking	resemblance	and	parallel	to	the	statement	made	by	President	Washington	in	his	first	State	of	the	Union,	“To	be	prepared	for	war	is	one	of	the	most	effectual	means	of	preserving	peace.”33	The	difference	between	the	two	comments	is	that	in	John	Quincy’s	letter,	he	broadly	addresses	the	need	to	employ	Realism	within	the	construct	of	international	relations	and	the	ability	to	project	power,	whereas	President	Washington’s	statement	is	a	point	of	departure	without	a	clearer	or	expansive	meaning.	John	Quincy,	however,	understood	that	the	Treaty	of	Ghent,	which	ended	the	War	of	1812,	was	not	agreed	to	by	force	of	arms,	but	rather	because	the	strategic	necessity	for	warfare	by	the	aggressor,	Great	Britain,	simply	dwindled	away.	John	Quincy	was	confirming	a	greater	acknowledgement	of	where	military	power	fit	within	the	nature	of	Grand	Strategy,	rather	than	the	ideology	of	his	current	political	party.	The	application	of	this	entire	experience	for	John	Quincy																																																									
31	James	Scythes,	“Military	Peace	Establishment	Act,”	in	The	Encyclopedia	of	the	
Wars	of	the	Early	American	Republic,	1783-1812,	vol.	2,	ed.	Spencer	C.	Tucker	(Santa	Barbara,	CA:	ABC-CLIO,	2014),	422-423.	32	Letter	from	John	Quincy	Adams	to	William	Plumer,	5	October	1815,	in	Worthington,	ed.,	Writings	of	John	Quincy	Adams,	5:400-401.	Initially	found	through	Edel,	Nation	Builder,	102.	33	George	Washington,	“First	State	of	the	Union,”	January	8,	1790	in	New	York,	NY,	accessed	March	25,	2017,	https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-04-02-0361.	
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led	to	his	position	as	one	of	the	early	leaders	of	the	United	States	who	understood	and	appreciated	the	“where”	and	“how”	of	the	application	of	the	tool	of	military	power	with	respect	to	Grand	Strategy,	essentially	understanding	the	linkage	between	the	two.	That	understanding	is	relevant	to	the	relationship	between	Grand	Strategy	and	Military	Assistance,	in	that	Military	Assistance,	like	any	other	application	of	military	power,	also	requires	such	a	linkage.	It	is	in	this	regard	that	Military	Assistance	can	be	viewed	as	a	tool	for	a	similar	projection	of	power.	Whereas	in	the	18th	and	19th	centuries,	power	projection	meant	influence	through	colonies	and	naval	presence	on	the	high	seas,	in	the	later	19th	and	early	20th	centuries,	power	was	projected	through	colonial	empires	where	resource	extraction	became	a	main	focus.	However,	in	the	post-WWII	era,	where	colonialism	began	to	be	considered	a	national	form	of	enslavement,	powerful	nations	more	specifically	required	a	more	extensive	set	of	options	to	apply	power	and	influence.	Whether	hard	power	or	soft	power	is	projected,	all	are	ultimately	tools	of	Grand	Strategy.	This	connection	thereby	relates	back	to	Liddell	Hart’s	original	definition,	in	that	both	hard	power	and	soft	power	in	pursuit	of	a	policy	objective	inherently	marshal	the	resources	of	a	nation.	John	Quincy,	in	his	own	time,	wrestled	with	these	concepts	in	how	most	advantageously	to	project	without	threatening	the	European	Powers	—	trying	to	digest	and	develop	an	appropriate	grand	strategy	for	the	day	and	age.	
Examining	Hard	and	Soft	Power	with	Respect	to	Grand	Strategy	It	is	important	to	note	that	Military	Assistance	is	the	product	of	both	hard	and	soft	power.	Given	its	military	basis,	the	relation	to	hard	power	is	clear,	but	considering	that	Military	Assistance	is	also	an	aspect	of	soft	power	is	a	little	less	obvious.	Professor	Joseph	Nye	stated	that	“soft	power	rests	on	the	ability	to	influence	others”34	but	that	it	“is	not	merely	the	same	as	influence.”35	He	expanded	in	a	later	journal	article,	“Hard	power	is	push;	soft	power	is	pull.	Fully	defined,	soft	power	is	the	ability	to	affect	others	to	obtain	preferred	outcomes	by	
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	 47	
the	‘co-optive’	means	of	framing	the	agenda,	persuasion,	and	positive	attraction.”36	Military	Assistance	by	its	very	nature	is	dependent	on	“persuasion”	and	“positive	attraction”	on	a	tactical	basis	as	the	manner	of	conduct	between	supporting	trainers	and	receiving	trainees.	However,	as	a	broader	tool	of	American	foreign	policy,	Military	Assistance	cannot	help	but	become	a	projection	of	soft	power.	Nye	agreed,	pointing	out	that	“The	military	can	also	play	an	important	role	in	the	creation	of	soft	power.	In	addition	to	the	aura	of	power	that	is	generated	by	its	hard-power	capabilities,	the	[United	States]	military	has	a	broad	range	of	officer	exchanges,	joint-training,	and	assistance	programs	with	other	countries	in	peacetime.”37	This	projection	exists	in	the	experience	of	soldiers	serving	side	by	side	under	austere	and	challenging	circumstances,38	but	more	importantly	in	the	exchange	of	values.	These	values	vary	depending	on	the	unit	and	the	understanding	of	the	mission:	for	example,	from	the	torture	that	occurred	in	Abu	Ghraib,	to	the	communications	of	fundamental	values	of	the	United	States	Military,	such	as	civilian	control	of	the	military.	Whatever	they	result	in	formulating,	these	values	contribute	to	the	soft	power	that	John	Quincy	understood,	while	at	the	same	time	recognizing	the	necessity	for	hard	power	to	support	it.	In	the	days	that	inaugurated	John	Quincy’s	tenure	as	Secretary	of	State,	the	State	Department	had	a	wide	range	of	responsibilities	in	addition	to	the	duties	of	foreign	relations,	from	patents	to	the	monitoring	of	laws	in	each	of	the	states.	Interestingly,	almost	two	centuries	later,	Secretary	Powell,	understanding	the	pains	and	pressures	of	time	and	works	schedules,	would	specifically	schedule	
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time	on	a	regular	basis	to	simply	think.39	John	Quincy,	however,	had	a	staff	of	only	ten.	The	sheer	volume	of	critical	needs	from	numerous	directions	over-burdened	this	small	staff,	implementing	the	movement	to	segment	and	create	efficient	processes	in	order	to	develop	effective	administration	of	departmental	responsibilities.	This	eventually	enabled	all	involved	to	afford	time	to	think,	and	by	so	doing,	to	appreciate	the	global	dynamics	afoot	and	their	effect	on	the	United	States	in	the	beginning	of	the	19th	century	that	would	allow	them	the	opportunity	to	contemplate	and	develop	America’s	first	Grand	Strategy.40	
Formulation	of	the	First	American	Grand	Strategy	Interestingly,	it	was	the	British,	and	more	specifically,	the	British	Ambassador	to	the	United	States,	Stratford	Canning,	who	happened	to	be	the	foreign	minister’s	cousin,	who	instigated	the	discussions	that	developed	both	John	Quincy’s	ideas	of	American	Grand	Strategy	and	the	Monroe	Doctrine	in	1823.	Through	various	treaties,	wars,	and	agreements	the	United	States	had	acquired	the	territory	of	Florida,	negotiated	access	rights	in	the	Pacific	Northwest,	and	agreed	to	relinquish	its	claim	on	Texas.	Ambassador	Canning	sought	John	Quincy	to	discuss	a	broader	alliance,	essentially	a	“special	relationship,”	because	the	United	States	and	the	United	Kingdom	were	more	closely	aligned	in	governing	styles,	language,	and	relations	than	other	nations	in	Europe.	Due	to	this	alignment,	Ambassador	Canning	proposed	that	both	nations	should	ally	together	with	the	intention	to	prevent	any	further	expansion	or	influence	of	other	nations	in	the	Americas.	President	Monroe	and	much	of	his	Cabinet	were	impressed	by	the	offer,	but	John	Quincy	disagreed,	understanding	that	this	offer	gave	the	British	a	great	deal	while	limiting	the	United	States’	opportunities.41	John	Quincy	stated	to	the	Cabinet,	“we	give	her	[Great	Britain]	a	substantial	and	perhaps	inconvenient	pledge	against	ourselves,	and	really	obtain	nothing	in	return.	Without	entering	now	into	the	enquiry	of	the	expediency	of	our	annexing	Texas	or	Cuba	to	our	Union,	we	should	at	least	keep	ourselves	free																																																									
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	 49	
to	act	as	emergencies	may	arise,	and	not	tie	ourselves	down	to	any	principle	which	might	immediately	afterwards	be	brought	to	bear	against	ourselves.”42	The	next	month	John	Quincy	wrote	the	draft	that	President	Monroe	gave	in	an	address	to	Congress	that	articulated	the	Monroe	Doctrine,	the	Unites	States’	first	endeavor	at	developing	a	Grand	Strategy	that	was	a	response	to	a	poor	effort	made	by	the	British	to	continue	expanding	their	empire.	In	envisioning	America’s	first	Grand	Strategy,	John	Quincy	understood	that	the	United	States	would	only	be	able	to	grow	—	physically	and	strategically,	in	both	hard	and	soft	power	—	by	creating	options	for	itself.	This	entailed	preventing	the	British	from	expanding	their	influence	in	North	America,	rather	than	creating	limitations	for	the	United	States’	own	probable	(and	eventual)	expansion	throughout	North	America.	As	one	scholar	noted,	“the	three	guiding	principles	of	the	Monroe	[A]dministration’s	foreign	policy	—	reciprocity	treaties	and	commercial	retaliation,	reconciliation	with	Great	Britain,	and	a	strengthened	military	—	constituted	a	blueprint	for	global	expansion.”43	More	importantly,	though,	John	Quincy	appreciated	that	these	options	to	create	opportunities	of	expansion,	whether	influence	or	trade	or	diplomacy,	were	all	simply	tools,	much	like	Military	Assistance,	to	achieve	that	Grand	Strategy.	As	prescient	as	John	Quincy	was,	no	one	could	have	predicted	the	far-reaching	nature	of	the	Monroe	Doctrine.	No	one	in	the	United	States	could	have	known	with	certainty	how	it	would	develop	relations	within	the	Western	Hemisphere,	but	in	the	19th	century	world	of	international	relations,	the	Monroe	Doctrine	demonstrated	that	the	United	States	was	present	on	the	international	stage	and	understood	how	to	define	and	achieve	a	Grand	Strategy	for	itself.	From	the	perspective	of	Military	Assistance,	this	foundational	understanding	of	the	difference	between	what	is	strategy,	albeit	Grand	Strategy,	and	a	tool	of	that	strategy	is	an	important	and	nuanced	distinction	that	most	policymakers	fail	
																																																								
42	The	Diaries	of	John	Quincy	Adams:	A	Digital	Collection	(Boston:	Massachusetts	Historical	Society,	2005),	Diary	34,	1	January	1823	-	14	June	1824,	149,	accessed	March	30,	2017,	http://www.masshist.org/jqadiaries.	Originally	seen	in	Edel,	
Nation	Builder,	174.	43	Weeks,	John	Quincy	Adams	and	American	Global	Empire,	47.	
	 50	
to	appreciate.	While	Military	Assistance	is	by	and	large	thought	to	be	a	tactical	implementation	of	military	doctrine,	as	discussed	earlier	in	the	chapter,	there	is	a	clear	exchange	of	values.	This	value	exchange,	or	soft	power,	should	be	placed	in	the	context	of	the	development	of	greater	capabilities	between	the	recipient	and	supporting	nations.	This	leads	to	a	natural	conclusion	that	Military	Assistance	is	in	fact	a	tool	rather	than	a	strategy.	Military	Assistance	cannot	be	a	strategy	because	there	can	be	no	goal	or	achievement	of	militaries	assisting	one	another	that	is	anything	other	than	tactical,	such	as	meeting	the	goal	of	every	soldier	knowing	how	to	fire	a	rifle	or	how	to	perform	land	navigation.	Military	Assistance	must	be	a	tool	to	achieve	a	broader	goal	or	Grand	Strategy.	While	the	United	States	did	not	have	the	capacities	or	capabilities	to	utilize	Military	Assistance	to	pursue	its	Grand	Strategy	in	the	early	19th	century,	it	was	certainly	familiar	with	the	tool.	This	familiarity	arose	from	the	United	States	Army’s	essentially	having	been	created	through	the	Military	Aid	from	France	and	the	Military	Assistance	of	Major	General	Baron	de	Steuben	during	the	War	of	Independence.	Although	the	option	to	utilize	Military	Assistance	in	pursuit	of	Grand	Strategy	was	not	available	at	the	time,	the	post-WWII	administration	of	President	Truman	proved	to	be	a	clear	example	of	how	Military	Assistance	could	and	would	act	as	a	tool	of	Grand	Strategy.	Grand	Strategy	as	a	Presidential	Doctrine	The	Truman	Doctrine	was	a	declaration	made	to	Congress	on	March	12,	1947	by	President	Harry	Truman,	as	a	clear	statement	that	the	United	States	would	stand	against	Communism,	as	a	political	movement,	in	all	ways	—	politically,	economically,	and	militarily.	In	a	broader	sense,	it	was	the	first	post-WWII	pronouncement	by	the	United	States	of	a	clear,	focused	Grand	Strategy.	The	Truman	Doctrine	was	the	first	declaration	of	the	United	States	against	the	global	spread	of	Communism.	It	was	the	embodiment	of	Liddell	Hart’s	definition	of	Grand	Strategy	in	the	sense	that	Truman	would	marshal	“all	the	resources	of	a	nation”	toward	a	“goal	defined	by	fundamental	policy.”44	While	Truman	never	used	the	“domino	theory”	term,	either	as	a	theory	or	a	metaphor,	it	should	not	be																																																									
44	Liddell	Hart,	Strategy,	322.	
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minimized	that	the	Truman	Doctrine	as	a	Grand	Strategy	was	the	basis	for	the	domino	theory	that	President	Eisenhower	would	express	a	few	years	later.45	The	March	1947	declaration	to	Congress	never	directly	referenced	Communism	or	its	global	spread,	but	there	was	no	question	to	listeners	concerning	exactly	to	what	Truman	was	referring.46	He	specifically	called	for	economic	and	military	assistance	for	Greece	and	Turkey,47	both	of	which	had	growing	Communist	insurgencies.	In	addition,	at	the	time	there	was	a	growing	sense	that	the	Soviets	viewed	themselves	in	a	global	competition	with	capitalism,	or,	as	stated	by	noted	foreign	policy	and	Soviet	expert,	George	Kennan	(or	“X”),	“tremendous	emphasis	has	been	placed	on	the	original	Communist	thesis	of	a	basic	antagonism	between	the	capitalist	and	Socialist	worlds.”48	This	type	of	antagonism	was	one	which	many	within	the	international	community	were	carefully	observing.	The	year	before	Truman’s	declaration,	Former	British	Prime	Minister	Sir	Winston	Churchill	dramatically	stated:	“From	Stettin	in	the	Baltic	to	Trieste	in	the	Adriatic,	an	iron	curtain	has	descended	across	the	Continent.	Behind	that	line	lie	all	the	capitals	of	the	ancient	states	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe.	Warsaw,	Berlin,	Prague,	Vienna,	Budapest,	Belgrade,	Bucharest	and	Sofia,	all	these	famous	cities	and	the	populations	around	them	lie	in	what	I	must	call	the	Soviet	sphere,	and	all	are	subject	in	one	form	or	another,	not	only	to	Soviet	influence	but	to	a	very	high	and,	in	many	cases,	increasing																																																									
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measure	of	control	from	Moscow.”49	Churchill,	in	his	eloquence,	highlighted	the	impressions	and	emotions	of	many	leaders	in	the	West,	but	it	took	President	Truman,	as	the	leader	of	the	free	world,	to	communicate	the	Grand	Strategy,	in	the	Truman	Doctrine.	The	political	world,	articulated	by	Churchill,	and	the	policy	world,	in	the	form	of	George	Kennan,	created	a	receptive	environment	for	Truman’s	declaration.	In	addition,	there	were	domestic,	political	considerations,	in	that	the	Republican	Party	controlled	the	House	of	Representatives	and	the	Senate,	creating	a	political	necessity	for	Truman	to	find	commonalities	to	work	with	his	opposition.	The	Truman	Doctrine	was	fundamentally	guided	by	Kennan’s	principle	of	containment,	which	stated	that	it	“is	clear	that	the	main	element	of	any	United	States	policy	toward	the	Soviet	Union	must	be	that	of	a	long-term,	patient	but	firm	and	vigilant	containment	of	Russian	expansive	tendencies.”50	The	Truman	Doctrine	as	a	Grand	Strategy	based	on	this	principle	of	containment	created	by	and	large	a	unification	among	politicians.	There	was	little	debate	between	liberals	and	conservatives	as	to	whether	the	Soviet	Union	should	be	contained,51	but	the	debate	as	to	how	best	to	accomplish	this	goal	was	passionate,	which	created	or	dismantled	many	political	careers.	It	should	be	noted	that	there	was	a	great	deal	of	criticism	when	the	article	was	published,52	but	with	the	coming	period	of	McCarthyism	and	“Red	Scare,”	there	were	few	who	would	stand	against	the	policy	of	containment.	At	the	same	time,	there	was	considerable	doubt	from	the	very	architect	of	the	containment	policy,	George	Kennan,	who,	serving	as	the	Director	of	the	Policy	Planning	Staff	at	the	State	
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Department,	was	unable	to	publicly	clarify	his	thoughts	due	to	his	government	position.	With	regard	to	the	containment	areas	being	advocated	based	on	his	article,	“The	Source	of	Soviet	Conduct,”	Kennan,	in	fact,	was	not	a	supporter	of	President	Truman’s	policy	of	containment,	believing	instead	that	containment	should	only	be	pursued	if	it	was	within	the	United	States’	capabilities.53	However,	establishing	the	Truman	Doctrine	as	a	Grand	Strategy	was	unlikely	to	have	been	prevented	or	even	limited	by	Kennan’s	thinking.	This	was	due	to	Liddell	Hart’s	original	definition	and	understanding	that	the	purpose	of	grand	strategy	was	“to	coordinate	and	direct	all	the	resources	of	a	nation,	or	band	of	nations,	towards	the	attainment	of	the	political	object	of	the	war	—	the	goal	defined	by	fundamental	policy.”54	What	Kennan	was	calling	for	amounted	to	a	basic	understanding	and	assessment	of	each	challenge	that	the	spread	of	Communism	would	create.	It	was	a	thoroughly	rational	approach	that	would	be	expected	of	Kennan	as	a	disciplined	planner	and	practitioner	of	foreign	policy.	However,	Kennan’s	measured	approach	and	Truman’s	broader	Grand	Strategy	demonstrated	that	good	policy	rarely	makes	for	good	messaging	in	politics.	Truman	clearly	felt	that	he	needed	the	grand	gesture	to	unify	elements	of	his	support	for	other	initiatives	at	hand.55	Had	Kennan’s	approach	been	implemented,	quite	likely	many	of	the	Military	Assistance	missions	would	have	been	constructed	quite	differently.	There	is	an	underlying	reason	why	the	Truman	Doctrine	and	the	Containment	Grand	Strategy	it	espoused	is	so	critical	as	it	relates	to	Military	Assistance.	On	a	practical	level,	Military	Assistance	is	often	one	of	the	first	tools	to	be	utilized	by	the	United	States	post-WWII	under	the	rubric	of	containment,	and	as	a	result	has	been	used	extensively.	The	general	understanding	in	this	usage	is	that	if	the	United	States	could	help	create	self-sufficiency	among	the	recipient,	sometimes	client	nations,	this	would	be	far	less	expensive	than	the	
																																																								
53	Gati,	“What	Containment	Meant,”	34.	54	Liddell	Hart,	Strategy,	322.	55	Ninkovich,	Modernity	and	Power,	172-174.	
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obligation	of	fighting	an	entire	war	in	the	respective	region.56	This	strengthening	of	recipient	nations	was	employed	in	Greece	and	Turkey	as	part	of	President	Truman’s	declaration	in	March	of	1947.	Before	that,	Lieutenant	General	John	Hodge,	commander	of	the	United	States	Army	Military	Government	in	Korea,	implemented	Military	Assistance	as	a	method	for	supplementing	local	security	for	which	he	did	not	have	the	personnel.	An	additional	purpose	for	its	implementation	was	to	provide	the	foundation	for	an	eventual	South	Korean	army,	which	would	be	the	Republic	of	Korea	Army,	supported	by	the	United	States	Army	Korean	Military	Advisory	Group.	It	was	used	again	in	the	Philippines	before	WWII	under	the	leadership	of	General	MacArthur,	who	served	as	the	senior	military	officer	to	the	Philippine	government.	Post-WWII,	Military	Assistance	was	instituted	in	a	more	formal	manner	in	the	Philippines	when	the	United	States	organized	the	Joint	United	States	Military	Advisory	Group.	And	again,	this	time	in	Indochina,	which	would	become	Vietnam,	it	was	part	of	the	Military	Advisory	Command-Vietnam.	This	utilization	of	Military	Assistance	as	a	tool	of	American	Grand	Strategy	is	entirely	dependent	on	achievable	political	objectives	being	determined.	In	addition,	it	is	dependent	on	policymakers	understanding	that	the	strategy	they	are	putting	forth	is	also	achievable.	Grand	Strategy	as	Theory	Domino	theory57	was	a	concept	popularized	by	President	Eisenhower	during	a	press	conference	in	1954,	when	he	discussed	Vietnam	as	one	of	many	possible	falling	dominos.	He	stated:	“Finally,	you	have	broader	considerations	that	might	follow	what	you	call	the	‘falling	domino’	principle.	You	have	a	row	of	dominoes	set	up,	you	knock	over	the	first	one,	and	what	will	happen	to	the	last	one	is	the	certainty	that	it	will	go	over	very	quickly.	So	you	could	have	a	beginning	of	a																																																									
56	It	should	also	be	noted	that	given	the	various	manning	needs	of	the	United	States	Military,	such	as	serving	as	the	occupying	force	in	Germany	and	Japan	in	the	late	1940s,	the	full-scale	Korean	War	in	the	1950s,	and	then	Vietnam	in	the	1960s,	there	were	rarely	more	troops	to	send	to	another	war	in	the	event	one	developed.	57	It	is	important	to	note	that	the	idea	of	“domino	theory”	is	not	a	political	theory	in	the	sense	of	International	Relations	theories	such	as	Realism,	Constructivism,	or	Neoliberalism.	Domino	theory	is	far	more	relevant	as	an	aspect	of	American	Grand	Strategy	and	therefore	is	discussed	in	this	chapter.	
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disintegration	that	would	have	the	most	profound	influences.”58	This	statement	was	essentially	the	foundation	of	the	United	States’	policy	of	containment	of	Communism	for	the	next	twenty	years,	and	it	was	the	basis	for	escalation	in	Southeast	Asia.	In	fairness	to	Eisenhower,	he	was	only	articulating	what	he	saw	as	the	natural	evolution	of	the	Truman	Doctrine	that	established	the	focus	of	American	Grand	Strategy	to	contain	the	spread	of	Global	Communism.	The	problem	with	the	domino	theory	was	that	it	was	a	fallacy	on	the	face	of	it,	failing	to	appreciate	any	sense	of	strategic	or	practical	thinking,	despite	the	theory	being	propagated	by	Eisenhower,	a	great	appreciator	of	strategic	and	practical	thinking.	The	fallacy	was	that	Eisenhower,	and	others	who	subscribed	to	the	domino	theory,	conceived	that	the	actions	existing	within	one	nation	could	create	a	predictable	outcome	in	another	nation.	History	can	be	conceptualized	as	occurring	in	waves,	which	is	as	good	an	explanation	as	any	for	the	waves	of	revolution	that	were	occurring	around	the	world	at	that	time.	WWII	had	changed	the	global	order	of	things,	and	the	resulting	bipolar	world	that	arose	from	the	ashes	of	war	helped	to	create	these	waves.	Conceptualizing	a	wave	does	not	mean	that	there	is	a	clear	predictable	outcome,	such	as	a	government	falling	or	even	failing.	It	does,	however,	mean	that	what	happens	in	one	nation	will	more	than	likely	affect,	in	some	manner,	the	dynamics	of	domestic	affairs	in	its	neighbor.	This	is	extremely	different	from	a	domino	theory	and	is	far	less	predictable,	making	it	more	challenging	to	appreciate.	Many	years	later	the	neoconservatives	seemed	to	believe	that	they	were	picking	up	the	mantle	of	domino	theory	and	Grand	Strategy	at	the	end	of	the	Cold	War.	As	noted	former	neoconservative	Francis	Fukuyama	stated,	“Communism	collapsed	within	a	couple	of	years	because	of	its	internal	moral	weakness	and	contradictions,	and	with	regime	change	in	Eastern	Europe	and	the	former	Soviet	Union,	the	Warsaw	Pact	threat	to	the	West	evaporated.”59	However,	it	was	the																																																									
58	Office	of	the	Secretary	of	Defense	Vietnam	Task	Force,	United	States	–	Vietnam	Relations,	1945	-1967:	Study	Prepared	by	the	Department	of	Defense,	“The	Pentagon	Papers,”	Part	5,	Section	A,	Volume	1B,	B-11.	59	Francis	Fukuyama,	America	at	the	Crossroads:	Democracy,	Power,	and	the	
Neoconservative	Legacy,	The	Castle	Lectures	in	Ethics,	Politics,	and	Economics	(New	Haven,	Conn.:	Yale	University	Press,	2006),	51.	
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neoconservatives	misunderstanding	of	history	that	led	to	the	Iraq	War	in	2003.	Since	this	research	project	is	not	specifically	exploring	the	Iraq	War,	delving	into	this	conflict	is	not	critical	per	se,	but	what	is	important	to	the	broader	dynamic	of	American	Grand	Strategy	is	how	the	neoconservatives	saw	the	Iraq	War	in	the	context	of	American	Grand	Strategy.	The	misunderstanding	that	neoconservatives	had	with	regards	to	the	fall	of	the	Soviet	Union	and	Communism	had	far	more	to	do	with	internal	issues,	as	discussed	by	Fukuyama.	However,	the	neoconservatives	viewed	the	fall	of	Communism	very	much	under	the	rubric	that	the	Reagan	Administration	created.	The	narrative	consistently	advocated	was	that	the	buildup	of	the	United	States	Military	created	a	competition	that	eventually	broke	the	economy	of	the	Soviet	Union.	This	led	to	a	natural	conclusion	by	the	neoconservatives	that	the	external	pressure	contributed	to	the	fall	of	the	Soviet	Union,	and	that	actions	made	by	external	actors	could	create	similarly	predictable	results.	However,	this,	in	fact,	did	not	follow.	Fukuyama	continued,	“the	[Soviet]	hardliners	themselves	had	no	stomach	for	such	a	struggle	[with	respect	to	military	force]	suggested	a	much	deeper	moral	rot	at	the	heart	of	the	communist	system	than	practically	anyone	had	suspected.”60	Similar	to	the	case	of	the	Soviet	Union,	the	neoconservatives	viewed	the	Arab	dictators	and	autocrats	as	resting	on	the	“moral	rot”	of	their	governments	and	political	organizations	that	allowed	them	to	remain	in	power,	which	led	the	neoconservatives	to	believe	that	an	external	action	could	topple	them	from	power.	As	the	neoconservatives	rose	to	power	in	the	administration	of	President	George	W.	Bush,	they	entered	the	Bush	Administration	looking	to	take	on	Saddam	Hussein	and	Iraq.61	They	did	this	for	many	reasons,	not	the	least	of	which	was	the	sentiment	that	Saddam	had	avoided	justice	during	the	first	Gulf	War,	but	also	because	they	believed	that	they	had	enough	support	among	the	
																																																								
60	Fukuyama,	America	at	the	Crossroads,	52.	61	Fredrik	Logevall,	“Anatomy	of	an	Unnecessary	War:	The	Iraq	Invasion,”	in	The	
Presidency	of	George	W.	Bush:	A	First	Historical	Assessment,	ed.	Julian	E.	Zelizer	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2010),	90-93.	
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region	and	that	there	was	a	minimal	risk	of	resistance	among	the	United	States’	allies.62	Ultimately,	it	was	the	goal	of	the	neoconservatives	to	create	a	reverse	domino	effect:	if	the	United	States	was	able	to	topple	a	dictator	and	creating	a	liberal	democracy	in	its	place,	this	would	result	in	a	natural	wave,	or	outbreak,	of	democracies	throughout	the	Middle	East.	However,	because	of	the	misunderstood	lessons	of	the	Cold	War	and	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union	as	outlined	by	Fukuyama,	the	entire	endeavor	failed,	and	failed	spectacularly.	As	previously	stated,	the	purpose	of	this	research	project	is	not	to	delve	into	the	Iraq	War;	however,	this	sidestep	is	useful	to	consider	in	this	context,	since	the	neoconservatives	were	attempting	to	develop	and	extend	the	reverse	domino	effect,	based	on	the	original	domino	theory	propagated	by	Eisenhower,	into	a	new	Grand	Strategy	for	the	United	States	in	a	post-Cold	War	era.	This	idea	of	reverse	domino	effect	is	important,	as	it	highlights	what	is	not	a	Grand	Strategy.	Ironically,	the	effect	created	by	the	Iraq	War	was	exactly	opposite	in	almost	every	aspect	of	what	had	been	intended	by	the	neoconservatives.	To	begin	with,	the	United	States	quickly	and	painfully	learned	that	where	a	nation	state	has	none	of	the	institutions	necessary	for	a	liberal	democracy	to	flourish,	democracy	in	any	form	would	struggle.	This	lesson	underlined	the	understanding	that	the	formation	of	a	liberal	democracy	is	far	more	than	simply	having	the	public	vote	at	a	ballot	box.	With	the	total	failure	of	the	Iraq	War	to	achieve	its	broader	strategic	aims,	the	idea	of	reverse	domino	effect	through	external	actions	for	a	Grand	Strategy	was	deemed	a	failure.	It	should	be	noted	that	the	idea	for	the	reverse	domino	effect	of	democracy	seemed	as	though	it	might	come	into	fruition	with	the	advent	of	Arab	Spring,	which	arose	at	the	end	of	2010.	As	in	the	completion	of	this	research	project	in	2017,	the	effects	of	the	Arab	Spring	are	still	being	integrated	and	debated,	and	although	there	was	regime	change	in	a	number	of	Middle	East	countries,	those	transitions	were	all	the	result	of	internal	rather	than	external	pressure.	Finally,	the	pursuit	of	this	domino/reverse	
																																																								
62	Michael	Gordon	and	General	Bernard	Trainor,	Cobra	II:	The	Inside	Story	of	the	
Invasion	and	Occupation	of	Iraq	(London:	Atlantic	Books,	2006),	39-43.	
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domino	theory	of	Grand	Strategy	ended	in	the	necessary	examination	and	development	around	Military	Assistance.	
Connecting	Grand	Strategy	to	Military	Assistance	Due	to	the	failure	of	standard	warfare	in	both	Iraq	and	Afghanistan	against	the	local	insurgencies	that	the	United	States	was	unable	to	defeat,	Counterinsurgency	or	COIN	doctrine	was	developed	for	United	States	Military.	This	doctrine	was	based	on	the	work	of	David	Galula63	and	his	more	contemporary	evolution,	David	Kilcullen,64	who	both	made	the	argument	that	the	goal	of	COIN	was	to	win	the	“hearts	and	minds”	of	the	people,	(from	the	perspective	of	the	United	States	Armed	Forces)	to	legitimize	the	local	government.	This	was	done	through	first	clearing	out	enemy	militants	or	combatants,	then	engaging	with	the	population,	building	infrastructure	to	maintain	or	raise	the	populations’	standard	of	living,	and	finally,	developing	local	security	forces	to	keep	the	population	secure.	It	is	important	to	note	that	this	is	the	origin	of	the	United	States	Armed	Force’s	recognition	that	it	needed	to	begin	the	process	of	developing	a	set	of	doctrines	around	the	concept	of	Military	Assistance,	beginning	with	the	creation	of	the	Unites	States	Army	Field	Manual	3-24.65	Previous	doctrinal	endeavors	had	failed	to	become	institutionalized	with	the	conventional	forces	of	United	States	Armed	Forces	and	more	specifically	within	the	United	States	Army.66	This	led	to	the	further	development	of	Joint	Doctrine:	that	is,	doctrine	developed	by	the																																																									
63	David	Galula,	Counterinsurgency	Warfare:	Theory	and	Practice	(London:	Pall	Mall	Press,	1964).	A.	A.	Cohen,	Galula:	The	Life	and	Writings	of	the	French	Officer	
Who	Defined	the	Art	of	Counterinsurgency	(Santa	Barbara,	CA:	Praeger,	2012).	64	David	Kilcullen,	"Twenty-Eight	Articles:	Fundamentals	of	Company-level	Counterinsurgency,"	Military	Review	86,	no.	3	(May-June	2006):	103-08,	accessed	April	5,	2014,	http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2006CR1031_art017.pdf	65	Thomas	E.	Ricks,	The	Gamble:	General	David	Petraeus	and	the	American	
Military	Adventure	in	Iraq,	2006-2008	(London:	Allan	Lane,	2009),	24-31.	66	Acknowledging	that	there	has	been	a	great	deal	of	doctrinal	development	within	the	Special	Forces	and	Special	Operations	community,	little	of	that	doctrine	had	been	applied	to	the	conventional	forces	of	the	United	States	prior	to	the	thorough	re-write	of	FM	3-24	by	then	LTG	Petraeus.	
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Joint	Staff	within	the	Department	of	Defense	that	is	applicable	to	the	entire	United	States	Armed	Forces,	and	created	to	explore	and	clarify	elements	of	Military	Assistance.	This	area	of	research	will	be	further	explored	in	Chapter	2.	The	connection	and	relevance	of	Military	Assistance	and	Grand	Strategy	as	theory	is	that	Military	Assistance	is	a	tool,	a	method	of	implementation,	by	which	to	achieve	a	grand	strategy.	COIN	similarly	is	a	method	of	implementation	to	accomplish	a	grand	strategy.	The	failed	understanding	of	the	neo-conservatives	regarding	the	domino	and	reverse	domino	theories	was	the	unsupported	belief	of	a	predictable	outcome	given	the	application	of	an	external	influence.	At	the	same	time,	policymakers	seem	to	have	mistaken	the	nature	of	COIN	and	Military	Assistance	and	the	connection	between	both.	The	flawed	strategies	of	the	domino	and	reverse	domino	theories	were	potentially	as	problematic	as	believing	that	a	tool	or	method	can	be	construed	as	a	strategy.	This	demonstrated	the	misunderstanding	of	the	nature	and	the	differentiation	between	strategy	and	methods.	As	military	theorist	Professor	Colin	Gray	stated,	“in	modern	times	it	has	become	ever	easier	for	policymakers	and	military	commanders	to	be	so	diverted	by	the	proliferation	of	different	forms	of	war	that	they	have	neglected	‘the	basics’	of	strategy.”67	The	Powell	Doctrine	and	Military	Assistance	The	Powell	Doctrine	was	further	evolution	on	the	Weinberger	Doctrine68	and	was	both	a	result	of	and	a	response	to	the	Domino	Theory	of	the	Vietnam	era.	At	its	essence,	the	Powell	Doctrine	outlined	the	principle	concept	to	only	commit	military	force	as	a	last	option.	As	will	be	discussed	in	Chapter	2	on	United	States	Military	Doctrine,	the	nature	of	the	strategic	level	of	warfare	is	such	that	international	relations	is	first	and	foremost	an	integral	part	of	military	planning.	This	construct	of	strategic	thinking,	however,	is	distinctively	different	from	
																																																								
67	Colin	S.	Gray,	Modern	Strategy	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1999),	127.	68	Walter	LaFeber,	“The	Rise	and	Fall	of	Colin	Powell	and	the	Powell	Doctrine,”	
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Grand	Strategy,	and	this	understanding	is	important	when	appreciating	the	utilization	of	the	tool	of	Military	Assistance.	The	Powell	Doctrine	is	relevant	to	military	strategic	planning	in	that	“the	Powell	Doctrine	largely	came	to	define	the	conventional	wisdom	among	much	of	the	military	leadership	and	officer	corps.”69	It	colored	the	process	by	which	military	planners	and	advisors	presented	options	to	their	political	masters.	This	eventually	created	enough	of	a	disconnect	that	then	Army	Chief	of	Staff	General	Eric	Shinseki,	in	a	now	famous	exchange,	told	the	United	States	Senate	Armed	Services	Committee	that	it	would	take	approximately	350,000	soldiers	to	secure	Iraq.70	This	was	wildly	different	from	the	Bush	Administration’s	predictions,	but	in	a	sense,	both	were	correct,	and	both	were	wrong.	General	Shinseki,	responding	from	the	perspective	of	the	Powell	Doctrine,	was	correct	in	his	prediction	that	those	soldiers	would	be	required	in	order	to	achieve	overwhelming	force,	both	during	the	force	on	force	phase	of	the	conflict,	as	well	as	securing	the	population.	General	Shinseki	was	wrong,	however,	in	thinking	that	the	goals	for	his	estimate	were	the	same	as	the	Bush	Administration’s	goals.	The	Bush	Administration,	on	the	other	hand,	was	correct	in	its	assessment	based	on	its	Grand	Strategy	of	reverse	domino	theory,	while	being	incorrect	regarding	the	need	to	emphasize	a	clear,	coherent	plan	for	the	day	after	the	military	victory.	Why	outline	the	Powell	Doctrine	within	the	context	of	this	research	project?	Military	planners	and	advisors	mistake	the	Powell	Doctrine	for	a	Grand	Strategy.	The	Powell	Doctrine	neither	meets	the	definition	outlined	by	Liddell	Hart	nor	does	it	outline	a	goal	or	set	of	goals.	The	Powell	Doctrine	is	rather	more	of	a	checklist	of	necessary	factors	that	should,	or	must,	in	then	General	Powell’s	opinion,	be	met	prior	to	beginning	military	action.	This	is	not	to	say	that	there	is	no	use	or	utility	in	the	Powell	Doctrine’s	being	considered	as	a	strategy	on	any	level,	but	it	should	be	specified	as	a	method	or	a	tool	for	achieving	a	strategy	or																																																									
69	Jonathan	Monten	and	Andrew	Bennett,	“Models	of	Crisis	Decision	Making	and	the	1990–91	Gulf	War,”	Security	Studies	19,	no.	3	(August	2010):	503,	accessed	March	13,	2017,	http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2010.505129.	70	Gordon	and	Trainor,	Cobra	II,	101-102.	
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Grand	Strategy.	This	is	the	relevance	of	the	Powell	Doctrine	to	American	Grand	Strategy,	in	that	similar	to	Military	Assistance,	the	Powell	Doctrine	must	be	considered	a	tool	rather	than	a	strategy.	Military	Assistance	as	a	Tool	of	Grand	Strategy	At	best,	the	doctrine	around	Military	Assistance	constitutes	a	tactical	strategy,	which	may	be	conceptualized	as	a	strategy	that	is	implemented	by	tactical	military	units,	that	is,	by	soldiers	on	the	ground.	This	is	not	a	traditional	construct	of	strategy,	in	fact,	as	Professor	Sir	Lawrence	Freedman	stated	in	his	seminal	work	Strategy:	A	History,	“there	is	no	agreed-upon	definition	of	strategy	that	describes	the	field	and	limits	the	boundaries.”71	As	stated,	while	this	issue	will	be	explored	in	detail	in	Chapter	2,	it	is	important	to	extrapolate	that	this	perspective	of	the	United	States	Military	and	policymakers	is	incorrect.	Military	Assistance,	as	it	has	been	defined	in	terms	of	developing	the	capacities	and	capabilities	of	an	indigenous	military,	cannot	be	thought	of	as	a	“strategy,”	even	by	Professor	Freedman’s	loose	definition.	“There	was	a	consensus	that	strategy	had	something	to	do	with	the	supreme	commander	and	it	was	about	linking	military	means	to	the	objects	of	war.”72	By	this	construct	of	strategy,	Military	Assistance	does	not	fit,	as	it	is	much	more	of	a	“means”	or	a	method	to	engage	the	enemy,	rather	than	matching	the	broader	concept	of	a	strategy.	As	a	“means”	or	method,	it	is	far	more	logical	to	think	of	Military	Assistance	as	a	tool	within	a	range	of	options	for	policymakers,	Military	Assistance	simply	being	one	option	for	policymakers	to	consider	with	respect	to	a	broader	strategy	or	Grand	Strategy.	On	a	more	practical	side,	as	the	Iraq	and	Afghanistan	Wars	evolved	into	insurgency-based	conflicts	and	a	COIN	strategy	was	agreed	upon,	Military	Assistance	became	a	critical	component	of	that	COIN	strategy,	as	a	method	to	achieving	the	broader	Grand	Strategy	in	the	War	on	Terror,	a	grand	strategy	that	was	never	fully	articulated	or	understood.	
																																																								
71	Lawrence	Freedman,	Strategy:	A	History	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2013),	xi.	72	Freedman,	Strategy:	A	History,	74.	
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Ultimately,	however	much	disagreement	there	exists	among	policymakers	regarding	nation	building,73	it	remains	a	means	or	method	of	American	Grand	Strategy.	Given	the	various	grand	strategies	available	to	the	United	States	that	are	likely	to	be	pursued	by	policymakers,74	an	engagement	grand	strategy	is	one	in	which	Military	Assistance	is	most	likely	to	be	implemented	in	pursuit	of	a	COIN	strategy,	since	this	Grand	Strategy	is	one	where	nation-building	seems	most	likely.	Conclusion	If	there	is	one	lesson	from	warfare,	it	is	what	United	States	Naval	Academy	historian	Kenneth	Hagan	and	University	of	New	South	Wales	professor	Ian	Brickerton	concluded:	“Going	to	war	did	not	solve	problems,	it	created	new	ones.”75	War	in	pursuit	of	Grand	Strategy	creates	an	inherent	conflict,	in	that	pursuit	of	a	Grand	Strategy	requires	utilization	of	all	elements	of	national	power	in	pursuit	of	“fundamental	policy.”	However,	if	war	is	being	used	in	pursuit	of	that	Grand	Strategy,	there	will	automatically	be	an	issue	with	limiting	the	construct	of	the	pursuit	of	war.	At	the	same	time,	there	can	be	no	question	that	the	dynamics	of	international	relations	have	evolved	such	that	limited	warfare	is	the	only	option	that	will	be	viewed	as	legitimate	in	the	eyes	of	the	international	community.	The	reason	that	many	concepts	by	policymakers	are	referred	to	as	“doctrines”	is	more	a	matter	of	political	messaging	and	framing	of	what	many	are	trying	to	thematically	develop	into	an	American	Grand	Strategy.	However,	very	few	“doctrines”	can	or	should	be	considered	as	Grand	Strategy:	many	are	simply	sets	of	rules	or	guidelines	by	which	policy	or	military	action	should	be	pursued,	as	was	outlined	with	the	Powell	Doctrine.	However,	the	history	of	Grand	Strategy	in	the	United	States,	begun	under	John	Quincy	Adams	in	his	role	as	Secretary	of																																																									
73	Barbara	J.	Falk,	“1989	and	Post-Cold	War	Policymaking:	Were	the	"Wrong"	Lessons	Learned	from	the	Fall	of	Communism?”	International	Journal	of	Politics,	
Culture,	and	Society	22,	no.	3	(September	2009):	309-310,	accessed	May	20,	2017,	http://www.jstor.org/stable/25621927.	74	Bremmer,	Superpower,	17-19	and	44-45.	
75 Kenneth J. Hagan and Ian J. Bickerton, Unintended Consequences: The United 
States at War (Reaktion Books Ltd: London, 2007), 188. 
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State,	established	a	broad	base	of	power	internationally	that	allowed	the	United	States	to	grow	and	prosper	domestically.	That	the	Monroe	Doctrine	continues	to	endure	as	a	policy	of	United	States	foreign	policy	to	this	day	speaks	to	the	acceptance	of	that	policy	by	other	nations.	The	costs	of	this	policy	have	been	extremely	high,	whether	with	reference	to	the	Native	Americans	driven	from	their	homes,	or	the	South	American	regimes	supported	to	prevent	the	spread	of	Communism.	However,	it	must	be	recognized	that	due	to	this	Grand	Strategy,	the	United	States	was	able	to	establish	itself	as	a	force	in	the	world.	Leading	off	that	example,	President	Truman,	being	pressured	domestically	for	being	soft	on	Communism,	needed	to	establish	a	clear	signal	of	where	the	United	States	would	stand.	By	establishing	a	policy	of	containment	versus	the	global	spread	of	Communism,	using	Military	Assistance	as	a	tool	of	that	Grand	Strategy,	Truman	unknowingly	established	a	link	between	the	two	that	has	been	maintained	throughout	the	Cold	War	and	after.	At	the	same	time,	policy	makers	must	understand	the	relationship	between	Grand	Strategy	and	Military	Assistance	in	that	Military	Assistance	can	and	should	be	considered	as	an	application	of	both	hard	and	soft	power.	Appreciating	that	Military	Assistance	has	a	natural	connection	of	both	hard	and	soft	power	enables	a	clear	link	between	those	who	want	to	project	power	and	those	who	see	institutional	development	as	a	critical	method	for	establishing	power.
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Chapter	2	Military	Assistance	and	United	States	Military	Doctrine	Post	9/11		Customarily	found	only	within	the	grounds	of	military	doctrine,	the	concepts	surrounding	Military	Assistance	are	ultimately	rooted	more	broadly	in	the	concepts	of	international	relations.	As	previously	discussed,	Military	Assistance	is	a	tool	rooted	in	both	the	projection	of	power	and	cooperation	within	an	extensive	international	regime	and	the	fraying	global	order.	This	chapter	describes	and	develops	a	fundamental	understanding	of	the	different	types	of	Military	Assistance,	the	concepts	of	Foreign	Internal	Defense,	Security	Force	Assistance,	and	the	Advise	and	Assist	mission	that	collectively	exist	within	United	States	Armed	Forces’	joint	doctrine,	placing	those	concepts	into	the	overall	structure	of	the	operational	timeline	that	is	a	foundation	of	that	doctrine.	The	purpose	of	this	fundamental	understanding	is	then	to	translate	these	concepts	from	military	tactics	and	methods,	placing	them	within	the	larger	context	of	the	international	relations	security	narrative,	in	order	to	better	explain	the	strategy	nature	of	the	tool	of	Military	Assistance.	While	this	doctrine	has	been	primarily	developed	from	the	lessons	of	Operations	Iraqi	Freedom	and	Enduring	Freedom,	the	methods	and	structure	that	are	found	within	the	doctrine	are	still	applicable	to	the	chosen	case	studies	of	Korea	and	Vietnam.	However,	the	doctrine	and	this	chapter	are	intended	to	give	context	to	the	tool	of	Military	Assistance	and	the	framework	of	American	Grand	Strategy.	Though	the	tool	of	Military	Assistance	has	involved	training	the	respective	militaries	to	lead	and	fight	a	conflict	in	their	own	indigenous	methods,	its	purpose	is	to	develop	the	foreign	security	force	to	the	extent	that	those	forces	could	eventually	assume	responsibility	for	the	overall	security	within	their	respective	nation.	At	the	same	time,	throughout	history,	nations	have	sought	to	influence	other	nations	through	other	methods	of	Military	Intervention,	such	as	Military	Aid	or	Military	Support,	as	discussed	during	the	Introduction.	Examples	of	Military	Intervention	in	history	can	be	seen	in	the	Athenian	and	Spartan	alliance	during	the	Peloponnesian	War,	the	Crusades	in	which	European	nations	
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sought	to	save	Christendom,	efforts	to	modernize	the	Japanese	military	in	the	late	1800s,	and	the	experience	of	United	States	Civil	War	veterans	in	Egypt.	Military	Intervention	has	been	a	time-honored	tradition	for	nation	states	to	consistently	extend	their	influence,	within	an	international	context	for	their	own	security.	They	operationalize	the	theoretical	arguments	about	the	need	and	desire	to	project	power	with	an	international	framework.	Iran,	for	example,	believes	that	to	protect	itself	from	the	United	States,	it	must	extend	its	sphere	of	influence	into	Lebanon	through	Hezbollah	and	in	Iraq	through	various	armed	militias.1	While	the	fallacy	or	genius	of	this	strategy	has	and	will	be	debated	for	years	to	come,	the	fact	is	that	the	strategy	is	a	reality,	one	in	which	nation	states	presently	operate	under	and	have	done	so	for	centuries.2	During	those	centuries,	theorists	and	strategists	have	discussed	how	the	fundamental	nature	of	war	works	with	respect	to	relations	between	nation	states.	Sun	Tzu	described	in	The	Art	of	War	how	the	goal	of	warfare	was	to	impose	one	nation’s	will	onto	another	through	violence,3	while	Clausewitz	declared	in	On	War	that	war	was	not	only	a	continuation	of	politics	by	other	means	but	“a	real	political	instrument.”4	These	understandings	have	become	so	ingrained	into	the	lexicon	of	warfare	that	they	are	fundamental	to	the	perceptions	and	assumptions	of	the	nature	and	origins	of	war.	The	idea	that	war	has	this	fundamental	nature	in	terms	of	an	extension	of	relations	between	states	is	essentially	the	core	of	the	understanding	of	international	relations,	regarding	how	nation	states	relate	to	one	another,	with	war	being	a	violent	expression	of	that	core	idea.	Within	the	more	expansive	construct	of	war	and	warfare,	Military	Assistance	is	a	nuanced	approach	to	expanding	a	nation’s	power	and	influence,	
																																																								
1	Dexter	Filkins,	“The	Shadow	Commander,”	The	New	Yorker,	September	30,	2013,	accessed	December	8,	2013,	http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/30/the-shadow-commander.	2	Lawrence	Freedman,	Strategy:	A	History	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2013),	136–139.	3	Sun	Tzu,	“The	Art	of	War,”	trans.	Lionel	Giles,	Sun	Tzu’s	Art	of	War,	6:2,	accessed	April	3,	2014,	http://suntzusaid.com/book/6/2.	4	Carl	von	Clausewitz,	On	War,	trans.	J.	J.	Graham,	eds.	F.	N	Maude	and	Anatol	Rapoport	(Hertfordshire,	UK:	Wordsworth	Editions	Ltd,	1997),	22.	
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while	in	one	sense	to	extend	relations,	but	more	as	an	exercise	in	extending	a	nation’s	interests.	The	connection	between	Military	Assistance	and	Military	Invention	is	that	Military	Assistance	is	the	concrete	manifestation	of	Military	Intervention,	which	more	comprehensively	is	the	extension	of	the	nations’	interests.	As	French	President	and	former	general	Charles	de	Gaulle	once	stated,	nations	did	not	have	friends;	they	had	interests.5	The	concepts	and	constructs	of	war	and	the	nature	of	war	and	warfare	are	relevant	to	the	United	States	Armed	Forces’	doctrine,	because	that	doctrine	too	is	based	on	understanding	and	incorporating	the	fundamentals	of	war	and	warfare.	If	war	is,	as	Clausewitz	observed,	politics	by	other	means,	then	the	extensive	concept	of	Military	Assistance	should	be	interpreted	as	war	by	other	means,	and	just	as	military	operations	have	existed	and	do	yet	exist	in	modalities	of	peacetime,	so	too	can	Military	Assistance.	Military	Intervention	has	taken	many	different	forms	throughout	the	ages,	from	the	Persian	funding	of	various	Greek	city-states	to	ferment	animosity	between	them,6	to	the	Soviet	Union’s	sending	weapons	and	other	materials	to	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Vietnam	during	the	Vietnam	War,7	both	forms	of	Military	Aid.	Military	Assistance	has	often	become	a	method	of	being	involved	in	a	conflict	without	being	fully	committed	to	a	war,	as	will	be	shown	in	more	detail	in	the	case	studies.	The	essence	of	this	concept	entails	allowing	others	to	do	the	fighting	and	dying,	while	the	sponsoring	nation	helps	develop	the	capacities	and	capabilities	of	a	recipient	nation.	In	one	sense,	it	could	be	considered	a	less	expensive	military	endeavor	or	more	aggressive	form	of	military	engagement,	and	possibly	thought	of	as	a	war	on	the	cheap,	but	in	another	sense	simply	a	lighter	exertion	of	influence.	
																																																								
5	Yoel	Marcus,	“A	self-respecting	country	has	interests,	not	friends,”	Haaretz,	last	modified	November	22,	2013,	accessed	April	6,	2014	http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.559444.	6	M.	I.	Finley,	“Appendix	4:	Notes	on	Book	VIII,”	in	Thucydides,	History	of	the	
Peloponnesian	War,	617-620.	Hermann	Bengtson,	The	Greeks	and	the	Persians:	
From	the	Sixth	to	the	Fourth	Centuries,	trans.	John	Conway	(London:	Weidenfeld	&	Nicolson,	1969),	297.	7	John	Prados,	Vietnam:	The	History	of	an	Unwinnable	War,	1945-1975	(Lawrence,	KS:	University	Press	of	Kansas,	2009),	545-549.	
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It	is	important	to	note,	however,	that	this	type	of	Military	Assistance	is	rarely	
only	about	building	and	developing	capacity	and	capabilities	—	it	is	in	fact	all	
about	extending	and	projecting	power	through	international	cooperation.	In	both	the	example	of	Persia’s	Greek	city-states,	and	the	Soviet	Union	with	the	Viet	Minh,	neither	was	about	anything	more	than	creating	a	strategic	quagmire	for	their	respective	enemies	in	extended	conflicts.	The	Persians	were	trying	to	keep	the	Greek	city-states	from	uniting	and	fighting	the	Persian	Empire,	which	eventually	did	happen	under	Alexander	the	Great.8	The	Soviet	Union	similarly	was	supporting	the	Vietnamese	to	limit	the	Chinese	as	much	as	to	frustrate	the	United	States.9	Capabilities	and	Capacities	Building	capacity	and	capabilities	is	an	integral	part	of	not	only	developing	a	military	but	also	the	broader	national	security	apparatus.	In	examining	both	the	idea	of	capabilities	and	capacities,	capabilities	should	be	understood	as	the	development	of	skillsets	within	the	overall	goals	of	a	military.	If,	for	example,	a	unit	within	the	United	States	Army	is	to	have	the	capability	of	being	an	airborne	unit,	there	will	be	a	set	of	tasks	associated	with	that	capability.	Those	tasks	would,	for	example,	include	the	ability	of	each	Soldier	to	parachute	out	of	an	airplane	at	a	certain	altitude,	or	the	ability	to	operate	without	a	resupply	for	a	certain	number	of	days.	Each	of	the	tasks	exists	in	order	for	the	unit	to	become	capable	of	carrying	out	a	specific	type	of	mission.	That	mission	must	then	feed	into	an	overall	strategy,	and	this	concept	is	known	within	United	States	Army	doctrine	as	nesting.	Nesting	refers	to	the	act	of	vertically	connecting	from	that	list	of	tasks	that	create	a	capable	military	unit,	all	the	way	up	through	to	the	national	strategic	
																																																								
8	Bengtson,	The	Greeks	and	the	Persians,	306-307	and	310.	9	Joseph	L.	Nogee,	“The	Soviet	Union	in	the	Third	World:	Successes	and	Failures”	(Carlisle	Barracks,	PA:	Army	War	College,	June	20,	1980),	16-17	and	20,	accessed	May	20,	2017	http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA090959.	
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objectives.10	Tasks	lead	to	capabilities	that	lead	to	the	capacity	to	accomplish	a	given	mission,	which	in	turn	leads	to	accomplishment	of	military	objectives,	which	in	turn	ultimately	leads	to	the	overall	national	strategic	objectives	achieved.	Essentially,	this	is	how	the	smallest	of	details	can	develop,	create,	and	even	have	an	impact	on	the	integration	of	the	most	expansive	circumstances.11	The	term,	capacity,	by	traditional	definition,	is	specifically	about	numbers	or	resources,	but	in	a	military	context	similar	to	capabilities,	have	to	do	with	the	nature	of	how	military	units	are	able	to	function.	Whereas	capabilities	relate	to	a	
unit’s	ability	to	accomplish	a	task,	capacity	has	to	do	with	whether	a	unit	has	the	
time,	space,	and	most	importantly,	the	resources	to	accomplish	the	task	in	question.	Capacity	essentially	involves	the	resource	constraints	a	unit	may	have	that	enables	it	to	be	capable	of	accomplishing	that	task,	and	this	is	the	reason	that	the	concept	of	time	and	space	is	so	critical	to	the	definition	of	capacity.	As	such,	capacity	building	is	about	creating	sustainability,	insuring	that	a	unit	can	in	fact	maintain	its	operations	throughout	the	duration	of	a	mission.	Capacity	building	is	more	than	simply	having	a	unit	allocated	supplies,	but	in	reality,	deals	with	developing	systems,	processes,	and	models	that	can	fluctuate	and	be	flexible	depending	on	mission	circumstances	and	dynamics.	Capacity	building	and	unit	sustainment	are	a	necessary	aspect	of	developing	foreign	security	forces.	Although	numerous	books	and	studies	have	been	done	on	military	logistics,	capacity	building	is	much	more	about	the	underlying	
																																																								
10	United	States	Army,	Army	Doctrine	Reference	Publication	No.	5:	The	Operations	
Process	(Washington,	D.C.:	Department	of	the	Army,	May	17,	2012),	2-14	to	2-19.	11	The	concept	is	so	common	that	Benjamin	Franklin	cited	a	traditional	nursery	rhyme	in	Poor	Richard’s	Almanac:	“For	want	of	a	nail	the	shoe	was	lost.	For	want	of	a	shoe	the	horse	was	lost.	For	want	of	a	horse	the	rider	was	lost.	For	want	of	a	rider	the	message	was	lost.	For	want	of	a	message	the	battle	was	lost.	For	want	of	a	battle	the	kingdom	was	lost.	And	all	for	the	want	of	a	horseshoe	nail.”	Benjamin	Franklin,	Poor	Richard’s	Almanac	(New	York:	H.	M.	Calwell	Co.,	1900),	17-18	accessed	April	6,	2014,	https://archive.org/details/poorrichardsalm01frangoog.	Kenneth	Mackey,	For	Want	of	a	Nail:	The	Impact	on	War	of	Logistics	and	
Communications	(London:	Brassey's	(UK),	1989),	xiii.	Based	on	“Outlandish	Proverbs:	#499,”	in	Mr.	G.	H.	(thought	to	be	George	Herbert),	Outlandish	
Proverbs,	(London,	1640).	
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organization	and	the	systems	it	supports	rather	than	specifically	about	the	delivery	of	goods	and	services.	Maturing	those	foreign	security	forces	into	self-sufficient	and	reliable	forces,	capable	of	securing	their	local	population,	is	the	fundamental	principle	of	Military	Assistance.	It	is	only	by	developing	and	expanding	the	capacities	and	capabilities	of	the	recipient	nation’s	military	and	security	forces	that	the	supporting	nation	can	assist	in	creating	long-term	sustainable	security.	From	the	perspective	of	the	supporting	nation,	once	the	recipient	nation’s	military	and	security	forces	become	capable	of	maintaining	local	security,	the	recipient	nation	can	cease	to	be	a	resource	drain	on	the	supporting	nation,	and	may	be	thought	of	as	a	future	ally,	such	as	the	Republic	of	Korea	during	the	Korean	War.	Understanding	capacities	and	capabilities	is	necessary,	then,	for	appreciating	Military	Assistance,	in	that	they	form	the	foundational,	practical	basis	for	Military	Assistance.	While	on	a	theoretical	basis	Military	Assistance	may	be	about	power	projection	through	international	cooperation	on	the	unit	level,	on	the	soldier-to-soldier	level,	Military	Assistance	must	entail	expanding	capacities	and	developing	capabilities.	It	is	only	from	this	expansion	and	development	that	Military	Assistance	can	possibly	achieve	a	long-term,	sustainable	security	that	is	linked	to	a	political	objective.	Military	Assistance	and	Joint	Doctrine	United	States	Armed	Forces	joint	doctrine	outlines	warfare	generally	in	two	separate	concepts:	regular	or	conventional	warfare12	and	irregular	warfare.																																																									
12	The	doctrinal	terminology	for	what	would	commonly	be	thought	of	as	“war”	such	as	in	WWI	or	WWII	has	evolved	even	since	pursuing	this	research	project.	Initially	the	term	“full	spectrum	operations”	was	outline	in	Field	Manual	3-0:	
Operations	in	2008	(page	3-1)	and	then	evolved	to	“unified	land	operations”	in	
Army	Doctrine	Reference	Publication	3-0:	Operations	in	2017	(Glossary-9).	The	term	is	currently	under	review	with	a	quick	evolution	to	“multi-domain	battle”	(David	Perkins,	“Multi-Domain	Battle:	Driving	Change	to	Win	in	the	Future,”	
Military	Review	97,	no.	4	(July-August	2017):	6-12).	There	is	a	current	debate	to	change	the	term	from	“multi-domain	battle”	to	“multi-domain	operations”	(Sydney	J.	Freedberg,	Jr.,	“Services	Debate	Multi-Domain:	‘Battle’	or	‘Operations,’”	Breaking	Defense,	Arpil	10,	2018,	accessed	July	23,	2018,	https://breakingdefense.com/2018/04/beyond-multi-domain-battle-services-
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Irregular	Warfare	is	defined	as	“A	violent	struggle	among	state	and	non-state	actors	for	legitimacy	and	influence	over	the	relevant	population(s),”13	and	is	the	underlying	basis	for	Security	Force	Assistance	and	as	such,	Military	Assistance.	The	challenge	is	that	while	there	are	libraries	(and	generations	of	those	libraries)	about	traditional,	regular	warfare	there	is	little	in	the	way	of	official	military	doctrine	on	Irregular	Warfare.14	Indeed,	one	of	the	foundational	(and	current)	documents	on	Irregular	Warfare	is	the	Joint	Operating	Concept	titled	“Irregular	Warfare:	Countering	Irregular	Threats”	from	2010.	In	this	Joint	Operating	Concept	are	five	core	activities	or	operations	that	can	be	used,	according	to	the	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	in	Irregular	Warfare:	counterterrorism,	unconventional	warfare,	foreign	internal	defense	(FID),	counterinsurgency	(COIN),	and	stability	operations.15	As	a	footnote	of	the	Joint	Operating	Concept,	there	is	mention	that	Security	Force	Assistance	overlaps	with	FID.16	As	it	was	noted	in	the	Introduction	of	this	dissertation,	Security	Force	Assistance	and	FID	involve	two	different	doctrinal	missions	with	differing	capabilities	and	capacities.	To	revisit	the	definitions	discussed	in	the	Introduction,	FID	is	“participation	by	civilian	and	military	agencies	of	a	government	in	any	of	the	action	programs	taken	by	another	government	or	other	designated	organization	to	free	and	protect	its	society	from	subversion,	lawlessness,	insurgency,	terrorism,	and	other	threats	to	its	security.”17	Security	Force	Assistance	entails	“Department	of	Defense	activities																																																									brainstorm-broader-concept).	Within	Joint	Doctrine	the	term	“traditional	warfare”	is	used	and	is	outlined	in	Joint	Publication	1:	Doctrine	for	the	United	
States	Armed	Forces	(25	March	2013	incorporating	Change	1,	12	July	2017,	X).	13	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Publication	1:	Doctrine	for	the	United	States	Armed	
Forces,	GL-8.	14	This	has	been	a	factor	for	years	and	was	even	noted	when	United	States	Army	doctrine	began	maturing	for	WWII	in	the	late	1930s.	Walter	E.	Kretchik,	U.S.	
Army	Doctrine:	From	the	American	Revolution	to	the	War	on	Terror	(Lawrence,	KS:	The	University	of	Kansas	Press,	2011),	145-147.	15	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Operating	Concept:	Irregular	Warfare:	Countering	
Irregular	Threats	(Washington,	D.C.:	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	17	May	2010),	5.	16	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Operating	Concept,	5	note	7.	17	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Publication	3-22:	Foreign	Internal	Defense	(Washington,	D.C.:	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	July	12,	2010),	GL-7.	(This	doctrine	has	
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that	contribute	to	unified	action	by	the	US	Government	to	support	the	development	of	the	capacity	and	capability	of	foreign	security	forces	and	their	supporting	institutions.”18	The	general	difference	between	the	two	is	that	FID	is	a	core	capability	of	Special	Forces,19	while	Security	Force	Assistance	as	stated	by	Secretary	of	the	Army	Dr.	Mark	Esper	indicates	that	it	was	capability	that	the	Army	had	been	doing	and	was	going	to	continue	doing	as	practice	of	Irregular	Warfare.20	Military	Assistance,	however,	was	defined	in	the	Introduction	as	the	efforts	that	develop	capacities	and	capabilities	in	a	foreign	security	force	with	an	agreed-upon	structure	and	doctrine	understood	by	both	the	support	nation	and	the	recipient	nation.	A	nuanced	difference	but	a	difference	nonetheless.	Within	the	broader	construct	of	Military	Assistance,	this	chapter	will	seek	to	analyze	all	the	various	forms	that	Military	Assistance	can	take:	Foreign	Internal	Defense	(FID),	Security	Force	Assistance,	and	then	the	Advise	and	Assist	mission.	In	order	to	appreciate	the	context	and	nuances	between	these	three,	it	is	crucial	to	understand	and	appreciate	how	each	participates	in	the	broader	rubric	of	military	operations	and	concepts	of	international	relations.	Moreover,	to	best	understand	and	appreciate	that	broader	rubric,	an	explanation	of	the	general	timeline	or	phases	of	military	operations	is	required.	Existing	within	military	operations	planning	are	six	phases	along	the	operational	timeline:	Shape	(Phase	0),	Deter	(Phase	1),	Seize	Initiative	(Phase	2),	Dominate	(Phase	3),	Stabilize	(Phase	4),	and	Enable	Civil	Authority	(Phase	5).21	These	phases	exist	irrespective	
																																																								not	been	updated	since	2010	but	discussions	are	currently	underway	to	address	this	shortcoming	within	various	sections	of	the	Joint	Staff).	18	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Publication	3-22,	GL-11.	19	Special	Forces	are	commonly	referred	to	as	“Green	Berets”	in	reference	to	the	headgear	they	wear,	but	as	a	general	point	the	“Special	Forces”	referred	to	here	is	the	range	of	special	operations	forces,	only	one	part	of	which,	are	“Green	Berets.”	20	Corey	Dickstein,	“Army	Plans	for	More	Security	Force	Assistance	Brigades,”	
Stars	and	Stripes,	April	1,	2018,	accessed	May	9,	2018,	https://www.stripes.com/news/with-1st-sfab-deployed-army-looks-to-build-more-adviser-brigades-1.519734.	21	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Publication	3-0:	Joint	Operations	(Washington,	D.C.:	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	January	17,	2017),	V-9	to	V-11.	
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of	the	type	of	military	operation	and	whether	the	operation	is	foreign	humanitarian	assistance	or	counterinsurgency	or	full	spectrum	warfare.	Each	phase,	however,	is	distinctive	while	at	the	same	time	malleable,	and	has	the	
potential	to	bleed	into	one	another.	In	the	Shape	phase,	Armed	Forces	have	begun	planning	efforts	of	possible	outcomes	based	on	the	type	of	scenario	that	may	develop,	while	on	the	diplomatic	side,	ongoing	negotiations	and	relationship	development	would	be	a	status	quo.	At	this	point	there	is	a	status	quo	phase,	when	no	specific	mission	or	scenario	is	being	engaged.	This	enables	the	Armed	Forces	to	continually	plan	for	any	number	of	contingencies,	and	the	diplomats	to	constantly	negotiate	and	build	relationships.	From	the	perspective	of	international	relations,	this	idea	of	contingency	planning	is	a	challenge	to	the	idea	of	the	status	quo,	because	there	is	always	some	crisis,	humanitarian	or	otherwise,	happening	in	the	world.	Due	to	the	nature	of	military	action,	there	does	exist	a	“steady	state”	or	status	quo	as	conceived	by	the	Shape	phase.	The	same	cannot	be	said	of	the	international	arena	since	the	nature	of	the	international	arena	is	always	an	existing	conflict,	conflict	in	the	field	of	international	relations	being	different	than	the	idea	of	conflict	in	a	military	setting.	Ultimately,	then,	the	definition	for	the	Shape	phase	that	makes	the	most	sense	in	the	area	of	international	relations	is	a	phase	in	which	international	actors	can	manage	and	drive	events	rather	than	be	controlled	by	them.22	An	obvious	example	of	this	situation	would	be	when	Iraq	invaded	Kuwait	and	prior	to	the	Persian	Gulf	War	until	the	buildup	of	forces	for	Operation	Desert	Shield,	as	it	was	a	period	in	which	the	international	community	was	working	to	shape	events	in	the	broader	sense.	The	Deter	phase	is	the	phase	of	the	initial	response	to	a	crisis.	If	that	crisis	is	humanitarian	in	nature,	then	the	response	will	begin	with	the	civilian	leadership	outlining	the	scope	of	the	response	with	personnel	and/or	resources,	such	as	in	the	aftermath	of	the	2010	Haiti	Earthquake.	If	the	crisis	is	military	in	nature,																																																									
22	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Publication	5-0:	Joint	Operational	Planning	(Washington,	D.C.:	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	August	11,	2011),	III-42.	(The	2017	version	of	this	joint	publication	does	not	address	the	phasing	aspect	of	planning).	
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various	military	posturing	would	begin	this	phase	with	something	akin	to	massing	forces	at	a	border,	such	as	during	Operation	Desert	Shield	from	1990	to	1991.	If	the	crisis	is	diplomatic	in	nature,	there	could	be	an	effort	of	shuttle	diplomacy	such	as	the	actions	of	Secretary	Henry	Kissinger	with	Arab-Israeli	disputes	in	the	1970s.	In	general,	however,	the	nature	of	crisis	is	that	two	or	three	of	these	aspects	are	present	simultaneously	and	this	requires	a	multi-faceted	approach,	because	no	single	crisis	can	be	prevented	by	one	solution	set.	The	international	relations	dynamic	to	this	phase	involves	actors	being	driven	by	events	rather	than	being	drivers	of	them,	because	in	some	sense	outside	actors	and	external	events	are	imposing	a	set	of	events.	As	events	continue	to	develop,	actors	become	more	and	more	consumed	by	those	events,	trying	to	prevent	them	from	escalating	and	continuing	to	exacerbate.23	The	next	phase,	the	Seize	Initiative	phase,	is	one	that	can	be	best	described	as	the	phase	in	which	friendly	forces,	be	they	military,	humanitarian,	or	diplomatic,	create	a	scenario	to	allow	for	freedom	of	maneuver	within	the	operational	area.	While	usually	thought	of	as	a	physical	area,	such	as	the	seizing	of	a	beachhead	at	the	outset	of	Operation	Overlord	(more	popularly	known	as	D-Day),	this	area	does	not	necessarily	have	to	be	restricted	to	a	physical	space.	On	the	diplomatic	side,	there	could	be	the	creation	of	a	metaphoric	space,	such	as	United	Nations’	Ambassador	Adlai	Stevenson’s	address	to	the	United	Nations	Security	Council	during	the	Cuban	Missile	Crisis.24	In	this	instance,	enough	“space”	was	created	for	a	solution	to	be	created	between	the	Soviet	Union	and	the	United	States	behind	the	scenes.	From	the	perspective	of	the	international	relations	aspect,	this	phase	on	the	operational	timeline	is	one	in	which	actors	transition	from	a	more	preventative	or	defensive	stance	to	a	proactive	one.	Essentially,	this	phase	
																																																								
23	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Publication	5-0,	III-42.	24	Thomas	Hamilton,	“Stevenson	Charges	in	U.N.	Cuba	is	Soviet	Bridgehead,”	The	
New	York	Times,	October	24,	1962,	accessed	May	18,	2017,	https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1962/10/24/90546817.html?pageNumber=1.	
74		
is	preparation	for	the	Dominate	phase,	which	at	this	point	in	the	operational	timeline	is	usually	a	foregone	conclusion.25	Building	on	the	Seize	Initiative	phase,	the	Dominate	phase	is	one	in	which	decisive	operations	take	place.	It	is	in	this	phase	of	the	operational	timeline	that	the	necessary	efforts	to	accomplish	the	overall	goal	or	goals	are	accomplished.	Diplomatically,	this	might	be	the	time	when	negotiations	conclude	and	ratification	of	a	treaty	takes	place,	essentially	where	the	diplomatic	actions	are	being	implemented	and	completed.	On	the	humanitarian	side,	an	example	of	a	Dominate	phase	would	be	when	an	emergency	response	begins,	because	that	type	of	response	is	the	critical	part	of	the	operation.	On	the	military	side,	the	focus	of	this	phase	is	on	operations	specifically	designed	to	accomplish	the	key	task	or	set	of	tasks	that	will	achieve	the	overall	strategic	goals	of	the	mission.	At	the	level	of	international	relations,	the	Dominate	phase	is	one,	as	Sun	Tzu	stated,	whereby	one	actor	is	taking	the	actions	necessary	to	impose	goals	onto	another.26	Clausewitz	would	recognize	this	principle	as	one	whereby	an	actor	is	intent	on	compelling	another	to	fulfill	his	or	her	will.27	Actors	are	hoping	to	achieve	the	focus	of	their	actions	that	have	occurred	within	the	operational	timeline	thus	far.	In	achieving	those	actions	through	maneuvering	within	the	international	system,	the	actors	can	and	will	be	able	to	impose	their	will	upon	the	system	more	widely.28	Following	the	Dominate	phase	is	the	Stabilize	phase,	in	which	the	concept	of	nation	building	begins.	Whether	the	operation	is	humanitarian,	military,	or	diplomatic	in	nature,	this	is	the	phase	for	the	development	of	governance	capacity.	From	the	international	relations	perspective,	this	is	the	phase	on	the	operational	timeline	in	which	the	will	that	was	imposed	by	one	nation	on	the	other	during	the	Dominate	phase	becomes	normalized.	By	making	the	actor’s	newly	imposed	will	normalized	or	the	new	status	quo,	the	purpose	of	this	phase	
																																																								
25	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Publication	5-0,	III-42	and	III-43.	26	Sun	Tzu,	Art	of	War,	6:2.	27	Clausewitz,	On	War,	5.	28	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Publication	5-0,	III-43.	
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becomes	one	of	transition	into	a	scenario	where	that	will	is	integrated	into	the	overall	system.29	While	on	the	face	of	it,	this	phase	may	resemble	one	not	taken	seriously	by	planners	or	actors,	as	the	head	of	the	Coalition	Provisional	Authority,	Ambassador	Paul	Bremer,	found	during	Operation	Iraqi	Freedom,	this	phase	is	extremely	difficult,	one	that	requires	substantial	effort	and	planning.	In	fact,	WWII	is	an	excellent	example	of	how	the	Stabilize	phase	prepares	for	ongoing	relations,	as	there	were	numerous	conferences	of	political	leaders	during	the	war,	such	as	Teheran	in	1943	and	Yalta	in	1945,	in	which	the	war’s	aftermath	was	discussed	in	detail,	in	addition	to	planning	teams	devoted	to	long-term	solutions	for	Italy,	Germany,	and	Japan.30	Finally,	in	the	last	phase,	Enable	Civil	Authority,	all	elements	focus	on	legitimizing	the	host,	or	invaded,	nation	government	and	the	transition	to	having	the	host-nation	in	the	lead	begins.	This	is	to	say	that	the	dynamics	within	the	nation	are	such	that	there	exists	a	new	reality	or	a	new	normal	or	status	quo;	a	capacity	and	capability	to	maintain	security	and	basic	services	to	the	population.	This	is	the	reality	in	the	frame	of	reference	of	the	international	relations	perspective	as	well.	As	the	government	becomes	more	legitimized,	both	internal	to	the	nation	and	within	the	international	community,	the	government,	on	behalf	of	the	nation,	becomes	capable	of	being	admitted	as	an	actor	within	the	extensive	international	arena.	Operating	within	this	new	paradigm,	the	host	nation	will	be	seeking	to	pursue	all	avenues	that	create	and	solidify	its	legitimacy,	the	new	status	quo,	or	in	military	parlance,	a	new	“steady	state.”	An	important	point	to	note	is	that	these	phases	have	elements	of	their	primary	activities	happening	in	some	form	concurrently	throughout	each	phase,	and	depending	on	the	specific	phase,	on	which	activity	is	most	demonstrative,	as	the	graph	below	displays.	For	example,	within	the	Stabilize	phase	there	are	serious	elements	of	the	Dominate	phase	still	at	work	that	can	and	do	create	
																																																								
29	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Publication	5-0,	III-43.	30	Office	of	the	Historian,	“Tehran	Conference,	1943,”	United	States	Department	of	State,	Milestones:	1937-1945,	accessed	May	18,	2017,	https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/tehran-conf.	
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constraints	on	personnel	and	resources.	Due	to	the	dynamic	nature	of	the	international	systems	in	which	actors	and	militaries	operate,	each	of	these	phases	may	even	be	occurring	simultaneously,	depending	on	the	situation	at	any	given	moment.	However,	due	to	the	nature	of	the	international	system,	there	generally	exists	a	primary	scenario	that	is	the	predominate	focus	within	the	international	community.31	
	
Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Publication	5-0,	III-39.		Foreign	Internal	Defense	Foreign	Internal	Defense	(FID)	is	defined	by	the	United	States	Military’s	Joint	Staff32	as	“the	participation	by	civilian	and	military	agencies	of	a	government	in																																																									
31	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Publication	3-0,	V-5	to	V-29.	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	
Publication	5-0,	III-38	to	III-44.	32	The	term	“Joint	Staff”	refers	to	those	civilians	and	military	members	that	work	directly	for	the	Chairman	of	the	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff.	The	Joint	Staff,	on	behalf	of	the	Chairman,	is	responsible	for	the	development	of	Joint	Doctrine.	
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any	of	the	action	programs	taken	by	another	government	or	designated	organization,	to	free	and	protect	its	society	from	subversion,	lawlessness,	insurgency,	terrorism,	and	other	threats	to	their	security.”33	Traditionally,	the	FID	mission	is	developed	and	accomplished	by	United	States	Special	Forces,	sometimes	know	by	the	more	popular	nomenclature	“Green	Berets,”	and	not	by	Conventional	Forces.	FID	connects	into	a	more	comprehensive	nation	assistance	program	and	is	dependent	on	the	recipient	nation’s	support.	That	support	cannot	simply	be	an	invitation	into	the	country,	and	is	dependent	on	a	plan	known	as	an	Internal	Defense	and	Development	(IDAD)	Plan.	In	addition,	the	recipient	nation’s	support	must	include	a	whole	of	government	approach	in	cooperation.	This	means	that	based	on	the	Joint	Staff	doctrinal	definition,	FID	cannot	only	consist	of	a	military-to-military	cooperation;	there	needs	to	be	an	integration	with	the	recipient	nation’s	government	to	create	a	broader	basis	of	capacities	and	capabilities,	such	as	comprehensive	institutional	reforms.	The	concept	of	institutional	development	is	referred	to	in	military	doctrine	as	Defense	Institution	Building	(DIB)	or	sometimes,	Minister	of	Defense	Advising	(MODA).34	From	the	planning	perspective,	the	government	agencies	responsible	for	internal	security	should	be	incorporated	into	the	security	arrangements	for	the	recipient	nation,	and	the	supporting	nation	should	be	prepared	to	work	towards	such	initiatives.	The	IDAD	plan	is	the	document	in	which	the	recipient	nation	will	clarify	these	initiatives,	the	capacities	and	capabilities	needed	to	create	a	sustainable	security.	According	to	Joint	Staff	doctrine,	the	IDAD	plan	“focuses	on	building	viable	political,	economic,	military,	and	social	institutions	that	respond	to	the	needs	of	the	host	nation’s	society.”35	As	such,	the	IDAD	is	the	foundational	document	that	creates	a	baseline	of	the	status	quo	of	the	host	nation,	from	the	perspective	of	where	the	host	nation	would	like	to	be	with	respect	to	those	institutions,	and	in	a																																																									
33	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Publication	3-22:	Foreign	Internal	Defense	(Washington,	D.C.:	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	July	12,	2010),	I-1.	34	Walter	L.	Perry,	et	al,	Defense	Institution	Building:	An	Assessment	(Santa	Monica,	CA:	RAND	Corporation,	2016).	35	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Publication	3-22,	II-1.	
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sense	it	is	logical	that	the	“recipient	nation”	of	Military	Assistance,	or	FID	in	this	case,	is	referred	to	as	a	“host	nation,”	since	in	a	FID	the	host	nation	is	quite	literally	hosting	the	supporting	nation.	This	is	an	important	goal-building	process	for	the	host	nation	for	several	reasons:	first,	in	that	it	creates	a	need	in	the	host	nation	to	understand	and	confront	likely	or	current	issues	with	respect	to	its	security,	and	secondly,	the	process	helps	inform	both	the	host	nation	and	the	supporting	nation	of	the	various	dynamics	at	work	that	could	possibly	prevent	the	success	of	the	mission.	These	dynamics	could	be	internal,	from	competing	internal	politics	to	economic	challenges	to	an	actual	insurgency,	or	they	could	be	external,	from	a	neighboring	aggressor	to	general	regional	insecurity.	The	necessity	is	to	understand	and	plan	in	an	all-encompassing	way	around	the	total	security	situation	faced	by	the	host	nation.	As	a	doctrinal	concept,	FID	creates	numerous	concerns	that	should	be	examined	more	closely,	particularly	in	that	the	definition	is	problematic	in	terms	of	its	alternating	from	being	both	too	specific	and	not	being	specific	enough.	Where	the	definition	delineates	“participation	by	civilian	and	military	agencies	of	a	government,”	there	exists	an	implication	to	develop	a	whole	of	government	solution,	which	creates	a	further	problem	when	addressing	the	issue	of	which	agency	of	the	host	nation	is	the	coordinator	during	a	FID	mission.	Logic	would	conclude	that	this	be	a	Ministry	of	Defense	due	to	the	FID	mission	being	promulgated	by	United	States	Special	Forces,36	but	that	is	not	necessarily	the	case.	The	challenge	arises	from	the	fact	that	the	definition	is	unclear	on	this	point	because	the	United	States	Armed	Forces	doctrine	maintains	that	a	FID	operation	can	occur	during	any	phase	of	an	overall	operational	timeline,	as	was	discussed	earlier.37	This	does	not	necessarily	make	sense,	however,	in	the	broader	
																																																								
36	Afghan	War	News	Staff,	“Difference	between	FID	and	SFA,”	Afghan	War	News,	accessed	June	16,	2018,	http://www.afghanwarnews.info/sfa/differenceFIDandSFA.htm.	37	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Publication	3-22,	I-4	and	I-5.	
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construct	of	both	Military	Assistance	and	international	relations,	or	even	the	United	States	Armed	Forces’	own	operational	timeline.	From	the	military	perspective,	each	phase	on	the	operational	timeline	has	elements	of	all	the	others,	as	seen	above	on	the	graphic,	even	during	its	own	predominant	phase;	therefore,	the	idea	of	FID	strategically	fitting	into	the	operational	timeline	at	any	phase	is	not	justified	by	the	understanding	of	the	operational	timeline	established	by	United	States	Armed	Force	doctrine.	FID	and	nation	building	more	broadly	cannot	fit	into	the	Deter,	Seize	Initiative,	or	Dominates	phases.	While	many	types	of	Military	Assistance	missions	could	be	taking	place	during	these	phases,	it	would	not	make	sense	to	begin	FID	during	these	phases.	This	is	due	to	the	emphasis	of	those	phases	being	on	the	development	and	implementation	of	an	operation,	rather	than	the	overall	strategic	perspective.	In	addition,	from	a	logical	perspective	it	is	unlikely	that	a	host	nation	will	have	the	capacity	or	capability	to	create	the	IDAD	plan	during	these	phases.38	Looking	at	these	three	phases	specifically,	the	Deter	phase	is	highlighted	by	a	response.	As	previously	mentioned,	in	the	Deter	phase,	actors	are	being	driven	by	events,	and	this	does	not	allow	beginning	a	FID	effort,	because	an	actor	is	being	driven	by	events	and	trying	to	focus	on	controlling	the	outcome.	It	is	unlikely	that	the	actor,	being	focused	on	that	outcome,	will	be	able	to	integrate	the	type	of	broad	national	assistance	program	that	would	have	incorporated	FID	into	its	national	strategy,	because	the	host	nation’s	national	security	assets	would	be	consumed	by	the	events	in	the	ongoing	operation.	The	Seize	Initiative	phase,	emphasized	by	creating	the	space	for	a	successful	offensive,	whether	that	space	is	physical	or	metaphoric,	is	also	a	poor	choice	to	begin	FID.	It	could	be	argued	that	a	method	for	creating	that	space	is	to	begin	a	FID	program,	but	that	follows	from	misunderstanding	where	the	Seize	Initiative	phase	ends	up	on	the	operational	timeline.	The	space	or	freedom	to	maneuver	in	
																																																								
38	Examples	of	where	host	nations	have	worked	with	the	United	States	on	a	Military	Assistance	mission	during	Phases	I-III,	such	as	Columbia,	have	had	governing	institutions	that,	while	not	ideal,	certainly	function.	The	point	here,	is	that	Phases	I-III	are	entirely	separate	from	institution	building	or	development.	
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military	parlance	exists	in	order	have	a	successful	Dominate	phase,	in	which	the	protagonist	“focuses	on	breaking	the	enemy’s	[or	opposing	forces’]	will,”39	or	as	Sun	Tzu	stated,	“to	impose	one’s	will	on	the	enemy.”40	A	FID	program,	however,	in	its	fully	realized	state,	is	not	going	to	break	the	enemy	or	opposing	forces	in	either	a	military	operation	or	humanitarian	crisis,	because	at	its	core	a	FID	program	is	supporting	and	developing,	not	imposing.	As	such,	actions	to	launch	a	FID	program	during	the	previous	phase	of	Seize	Initiative	would	not	lead	to	the	breaking	of	anyone’s	will,	and	so	should	not	be	a	phase	of	consideration	for	a	FID	program.	This	leaves	three	possible	phases	to	begin	a	FID	program:	Stabilize,	Enable	Civil	Authorities,	and	Shape.	The	Stabilize	phase	is	a	possibility,	because	as	stated,	this	is	when	nation	building	begins	as	a	primary	focus,	or	when	the	actor’s	will	that	was	imposed	during	the	Dominate	phase	begins	to	become	the	status	quo.	A	fully	develop	FID	program	would	seem	to	make	sense	during	any	stage	where	the	primary	focus	is	nation	building,	since	the	cornerstone	of	any	functioning	society	is	one	in	which	citizens	feel	secure	to	pursue	their	interests,	and	the	purpose	of	a	FID	program	is	to	create	security	capacity	and	capability.	There	are,	however,	a	few	challenges	that	come	with	the	Stabilize	phase	that	lend	itself	to	not	being	an	ideal	phase	for	a	FID	program.	One	perspective	is	that	any	state	beginning	in	some	way	to	rebuild	itself,	on	its	own	or	with	external	assistance,	has	a	primary	focus	of	legitimizing	itself.	As	such,	the	state,	or	more	specifically,	the	government,	is	unlikely	to	have	the	capacity	or	capability	to	focus	on	first	developing	an	IDAD	plan	and	then	integrating	the	broad	nature	of	a	FID	program	into	a	probably	nascent	national	security	apparatus.41	The	reason	there	is	such	a	focus	on	an	IDAD	plan	is	that,	when	properly	developed,	the	IDAD	
																																																								
39	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Publication	5-0,	III-43.	40	Sun	Tzu,	“The	Art	of	War,”	6:2.	41	While	the	host	nations’	legitimacy	must	be	a	concern,	and	may	even	be	a	goal,	of	the	IDAD	plan,	it	must	be	a	result	of	the	plan	rather	than	a	part	of	the	plan	due	to	the	fact	that	the	United	States	Armed	Forces,	be	they	conventional	or	non-conventional	forces,	do	not	have	the	capability	to	bequeath	legitimacy	upon	a	host	government.	
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plan	will	help	to	expose	many	of	the	fault	lines	and	discrepancies	within	the	security	structure	of	a	nation	state.	The	Stabilize	phase,	due	to	its	transitory	nature,	theoretically	is	unlikely	to	have	functioning	national	security	institutions	or	government,	and	will	not	be	able	to	identify	where	its	long-term	shortcomings	exist,	because	there	simply	has	not	been	time	to	create	or	develop	a	baseline	apparatus.	Another	challenge	with	the	Stabilize	phase	is	that	since	it	is	transitory,42	it	enables	an	actor	to	move	from	the	Dominate	phase	to	the	Enable	Civil	Authorities	phase,	taking	into	consideration	the	reality	that	there	are	variations	of	stability.	It	also	clarifies	that	an	actor	must	have	a	strategy	to	assist	in	this	transition,	since	no	nation	could	emerge	from	either	a	conflict	or	disaster	with	an	unscathed	government.	At	the	same	time,	from	the	perspective	of	international	relations,	the	Stabilize	phase	could	be	constructed	to	be	that	stage	of	transition.	Since	a	FID	program	could	also	be	considered	a	transitory	program,	and	one	that	would	fit	within	the	dynamic	described	by	the	Stabilize	phase,	there	is	a	challenge	in	that	this	analysis	could	be	parsing	over	minutia,	as	it	is	a	matter	of	degrees.	Based	on	Joint	Staff	doctrine,43	a	FID	program	is	part	of	a	larger	nation	assistance	effort,	and	there	is	an	inherent	need	for	the	nation	to	exist	at	a	certain	level	of	stability	in	order	to	receive	a	fully	advanced	program	of	assistance.	This	is	due	to	the	simple	reality	that	any	nation,	whether	advanced	or	developing,	only	has	a	limited	amount	of	capacity	with	which	to	absorb	and	utilize	any	external	assistance,	and	this	is	equally	true	of	Military	Assistance.	When	an	actor	is	in	the	Stabilize	phase	on	the	operational	timeline,	this	means	that	the	actor	and/or	the	host	nation	is	transiting	from	unstable	to	stable,	because	the	Dominate	phase	of	the	operational	timeline	is	an	inherently	unstable	phase.	In																																																									
42	It	has	been	noted	that	each	of	the	phases	are,	by	their	own	nature,	transitory.	However,	Phases	V	and	0	can	be	maintained	and	go	back	and	forth	depending	on	the	operational	nature	in	question.	At	the	same	time,	the	Stabilize	phase	is	transitory	in	the	sense	that	there	is	an	operational	shift	from	Phases	I-III	to	Phases	V	and	0.	43	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Publication	3-22,	I-1,	IV-1,	IV-2,	and	IV-16.	
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addition,	because	the	concept	of	the	Stabilize	phase	is	transitory,	this	does	not	mean	that	no	instability	exists.	In	fact,	more	than	likely	there	will	be	pockets	of	significant	instability.	The	instability	that	exists	will	probably	be	both	geographic	and	societally	specific,	more	likely	in	the	areas	of	the	economy	or	governance.	If	that	instability	is	too	great,	then	broad	assistance	efforts	will	likely	fail.	The	host	nation	needs	to	have	a	certain	level	of	capacity	and	capability	in	order	to	internalize	any	external	development	efforts.	Recognizing	this	is	crucial	for	any	national	assistance	program	to	be	successful,	and	a	FID	program	specifically	will	not	create	the	sustainable	level	of	military	competence	or	broader	security	that	is	needed	to	be	considered	successful	without	an	overall	national	assistance	program	to	act	as	the	foundation.44	No	military	structure	can	exist	in	a	governance	vacuum.	This	dynamic	of	a	FID	program	and	the	Stabilize	phase	does	not	give	the	best	foundation	for	a	FID	program	to	begin,	because	of	its	transitory	nature.	The	Stabilize	phase,	however,	does	call	for	a	type	of	Military	Assistance	to	be	discussed	later	in	this	chapter.	As	stated	earlier,	the	Enable	Civil	Authorities	phase	is	one	that	highlights	the	recipient	or	host	nation’s	being	the	primary	driver	with	respect	to	security	and	other	areas	of	governance.	The	purpose	of	this	phase	is	to	legitimize	the	state,	and	more	specifically,	the	government.	It	is	important	to	note	that	the	Enable	Civil	Authorities	phase	ends	in	transitioning	back	to	Phase	0,	the	Shape	phase.	When	looking	at	the	operational	timeline,	it	may	seem	natural	to	view	it	linearly,	but	in	fact	the	timeline	should	be	conceptualized	and	viewed	as	circular.	This	view	of	one	phase	blending	into	the	next	makes	it	is	easier	to	imagine	the	nuances	of	each	phase,	appreciating	that	there	are	no	hard	stops	in	transitioning	from	one	phase	to	another,	but	more	of	a	shading	between	one	another,	and	thereby	elements	of	one	phase	exist	in	another.	Based	on	this	understanding	of	a	circular	timeline,	there	will	be	elements	of	instability	within	the	Enable	Civil	Authorities	phase.	As	the	phase	progresses	and	
																																																								
44	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Publication	3-22,	I-1	and	GL-9.	Walter	L.	Perry,	et	al,	
Defense	Institution	Building,	33	and	115-116.	
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the	host	nation	and	government	become	more	legitimized,	the	natural	outcome	is	that	less	instability	exists,	and	the	more	substantially	the	government	can	maintain	its	existence.	For	the	FID	program,	Enable	Civil	Authorities	is	not	the	ideal	phase	to	start	due	to	the	instability	and	the	lack,	though	being	reduced,	of	the	legitimization	of	the	host	nation.	With	the	assumption	that	the	foundation	of	the	FID	program	is	to	expand	the	capacities	and	capabilities	of	the	national	security	apparatus	within	a	host	nation,	it	is	equally	necessary	that	a	FID	program	develops	into	long-term,	sustainable	security.	In	order	to	establish	such	long-term,	sustainable	security,	the	population	must	recognize	the	government	as	legitimate.	With	that	legitimization,	a	sense	of	permanence	can	extend	the	efforts	the	government	is	pursuing,	and	in	keeping	with	that	permanence,	the	developments	in	the	national	security	apparatus	that	come	with	a	FID	program	are	a	seamless	fit.	However,	the	Enable	Civil	Authorities	phase	is	one	in	which	the	host	nation	is	moving	from	less	stabilizing	toward	more	stabilized.	A	FID	program	cannot	create	stability,	as	it	is	developing	capacity	and	capability	to	create	a	sustainable	national	security	apparatus,	because	the	government	remains	in	transition.	That	transition	is	critical	for	the	host	nation	to	develop	through,	but	the	FID	program	might	be	mistaken	for	a	stabilizing	force,	which	it	is	in	the	sense	that	it	results	in	a	deeper	level	of	military	expertise	in	the	host	nation.	At	the	same	time,	it	is	not	primarily	stabilizing,	since	in	order	for	a	FID	program	to	be	implemented,	the	host	nation	must	have	effectively	developed	an	IDAD	plan.	To	imagine	that	IDAD	plan	being	created	during	a	period	of	instability	is	simply	not	realistic	for	many	of	the	same	reasons	discussed	regarding	the	Stabilize	phase.	The	creation	of	the	IDAD	plan,	which	is	a	separate	but	necessary	step	completed	before	beginning	a	FID	program,	should	ideally	start	during	the	Enable	Civil	Authorities	phase.	While	it	is	also	possible	to	develop	the	IDAD	plan	during	the	Shape	phase,	the	Enable	Civil	Authorities	is	the	ideal	phase	for	several	reasons.	The	first	reason	is	that	by	the	time	the	host	nation	is	capable	of	transitioning	through	much	of	the	remaining	elements	of	instability	from	the	Stabilize	phase,	the	host	nation	has	developed,	in	order	to	survive,	a	level	of	
84		
depth	in	both	its	national	security	knowledge	and	its	capabilities.	More	than	likely,	due	to	the	transition	from	instability,	the	host	nation	has	some	capacity	challenges,	and	therefore	is	requiring	a	FID	program.	This	level	of	depth	in	the	national	security	apparatus	is	the	expertise	necessary	to	develop	a	thorough	IDAD	plan.	Indeed,	a	solid	IDAD	plan	may	be	a	sign	of	government	legitimacy,	both	in	how	the	host	nation	sees	itself,	and	in	how	the	population	will	react	to	an	invitation	of	foreign	trainers	aiding	the	host	nation’s	capacities	and	capabilities.	An	argument	could	be	made	that	a	host	nation	that	is	able	to	develop	an	IDAD	plan	competently	likely	does	not	need	a	FID	program,	but	this	conclusion	creates	a	possible	false	correlation,	since	one	does	not	necessarily	result	in	the	other.	One	rationale	for	this	argument	could	be	the	logic	that	if	a	host	nation	is	able	to	clearly	define	and	describe	its	shortfalls,	then	it	should	be	able	fix	them,	perhaps	not	at	the	speed	that	it	would	prefer,	but	still	capable	of	accomplishing	such	an	effort.	When	a	host	nation	is	capable	of	developing	a	thorough	IDAD	plan,	it	could	simply	be	due	to	a	deep	understanding	of	the	internal	defense	and	security	issues,	an	awareness	on	the	part	of	the	host	nation.	This	is	a	level	of	self-awareness	that	should	exist	by	the	time	an	IDAD	plan	is	developed	in	the	Enable	Civil	Authorities	or	Shape	phase.	The	IDAD	must	be	developed	in	concert	with	the	supporting	nation,	because	if	the	host	nation	has	an	unrealistic	understanding	of	the	capacities	and	capabilities	that	the	supporting	nation	brings	to	the	endeavor,	then	the	FID	program	will	clearly	fail.	The	work	on	the	IDAD	can	take	many	different	forms,	and	in	theory,	each	set	of	circumstances	will	dictate	not	only	the	final	developed	IDAD	plan,	but	also	the	style	in	which	the	host	nation	and	supporting	nation	will	work	with	one	another.	At	the	conclusion,	however,	the	goal	of	both	should	be	the	same,	in	that	they	have	a	foundational	plan	from	which	to	accomplish	the	FID	mission.	The	FID	program	is	best	aligned	for	the	Shape	phase	primarily	because	of	its	stable	nature,	although	this	could	also	mean	beginning	the	FID	program	at	the	end	of	the	Enable	Civil	Authorities	phase.	This	is	due	to	the	recognition	that	the	host	nation’s	military	will	have	the	most	ability	to	absorb	the	broad	dynamics	of	
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a	FID	program	and	incorporate	those	lessons	during	times	of	greater	stability.	It	is	important	to	remember	that	a	FID	program	is	about	expanding	the	capacities	and	capabilities	of	the	entire	national	security	apparatus.	Any	nation,	especially	one	emerging	from	a	transition	period	the	way	that	a	host	nation	likely	would	evolve	into	the	Shape	phase,	can	best	adapt	and	evolve	during	a	more	stable	environment.	At	the	same	time,	organizations	and	specifically	military	organizations	change	and	adapt	during	periods	of	conflict	or	instability;	however,	they	do	not	necessarily	institutionalize	that	new	way	of	thinking	or	acting.	Many	times,	the	new	ways	are	just	considered	as	adaptations	specific	to	the	current	circumstance,	and	not	as	options	for	long-term	change.	During	a	period	of	stability,	and	given	the	probable	transition	necessitating	a	FID	program,	the	host	nation	has	opportunities	to	determine	what	kind	of	capabilities	and	capabilities	it	wants	and	needs	its	military	to	have,	which	is	why	the	IDAD	plan	is	developed.	The	concept	of	a	FID	program	is	encompassed	within	an	overall	national	assistance	program,	which	requires	stability	so	that	it,	too,	can	become	sustainable.	In	pursuance	of	that	sustainable	national	assistance	effort	to	exist,	security	must	have	been	established	at	an	early	phase	within	the	operational	timeline.	Based	on	the	understanding	of	the	operational	timeline,	the	phase	where	the	host	nation	moves	from	instability	to	stability	is	the	Stabilize	phase,	and	additionally	into	the	Enable	Civil	Authorities	phase.	These	are	the	phases	in	which	the	concepts	of	Security	Force	Assistance	and	the	Advise	and	Assist	mission	become	part	of	the	national	security	reality	in	the	host	nation.	Security	Force	Assistance	Security	Force	Assistance	(SFA)	is	defined	by	Joint	Staff	doctrine	as	“a	range	of	activities	to	enhance	the	capacity	and	capability	of	partner	nations	by	organizing,	training,	equipping,	rebuilding	and	building,	and	advising	and	assisting	FSF	[foreign	security	forces].”45	The	challenge	with	this	definition	is	that	it	is	essentially	similar	to	the	definition	for	FID,	which	was	defined	as	“the																																																									
45	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Publication	3-22,	VI-30.	
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participation	by	civilian	and	military	agencies	of	a	government	in	any	of	the	action	programs	taken	by	another	government	or	other	designated	organization,	to	free	and	protect	its	society	from	subversion,	lawlessness,	insurgency,	terrorism,	and	other	threats	to	their	security.”46	There	are	two	problems	with	these	definitional	similarities,	the	first	being	the	execution	of	the	mission.	SFA,	as	defined	by	Joint	Staff	doctrine,	can	and	is	executed	by	any	member	of	the	United	States	Armed	Forces;	however,	traditionally	this	has	involved	the	training	and	development	of	foreign	security	forces	by	the	Conventional	Forces,	which	would	be	defined	as	those	service	members	who	are	trained	for	regular	warfare	rather	than	Irregular	Warfare.47	The	conceptual	problem	as	discussed	previously	in	this	chapter	is	that	the	definition	of	FID	given	within	the	Joint	Staff’s	doctrine	is	too	broad,	and	encompasses	aspects	of	the	United	States	Government	that	are	neither	under	the	authority	or	expertise	of	the	United	States	Armed	Forces.	To	enable	a	FID	program	to	be	part	of	the	sustainable	security	effort,	it	must,	by	its	own	nature,	address	the	broader	capacity	and	capability	with	the	host	nation’s	national	security	apparatus.	In	the	context	of	the	above	definitions,	this	means	that	a	FID	must	broadly	meet	the	needs	of	the	host	nation	to	aid	in	the	expansion	of	its	national	security	capacity	and	capabilities.	To	equip	the	FID	program	to	address	those	concerns,	it	(and	by	logical	extension	the	IDAD	plan),	must	focus	on	national	security	as	a	whole,	its	interactions	and	interdependencies,	but	cannot	seek	to	control	them.	More	specifically,	just	as	the	Department	of	Defense	cannot	dictate	Department	of	State	policy,	even	in	Afghanistan	during	the	decade-plus	conflict,	neither	can	a	FID	program	seek	to	develop	a	control	between	the	host	nation’s	military	and	other	parts	of	its	national	security	apparatus.	Joint	Doctrine	does,	however,	state	this,48	and	while																																																									
46	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Publication	3-22,	I-1.	47	Irregular	Warfare	is	defined	as	“A	violent	struggle	among	state	and	non-state	actors	for	legitimacy	and	influence	over	the	relevant	population(s).”	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Publication	1:	Doctrine	for	the	United	States	Armed	Forces,	pg.	GL-8.	48	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Publication	3-20:	Security	Cooperation	(Washington,	D.C.:	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	May	23,	2017),	viii	and	I-10.	
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a	FID	program	can	and	should	seek	to	develop	the	host	nation’s	capabilities	for	interagency	coordination	and	cooperation,	it	should	not	attempt	to	create	a	scenario	in	which	the	host	nation’s	military	is	dictating	those	relationships	as	the	doctrine	implies.	It	is	due	to	this	reasoning	that	the	definition	for	SFA	is	in	fact	a	much	better	and	precise	definition	for	a	FID	program.	How	then	should	SFA	be	defined	and	where	should	it	exist	on	the	operational	timeline?	In	spite	of	the	doctrinal	definition,	SFA	is	best	defined,	under	the	rubric	of	Military	Assistance,	as	those	security	operations	where	the	host	nation,	which	at	this	point	may	only	be	thought	of	as	a	“nation”	in	a	limited	manner,	is	not	in	the	main	effort	nor	do	its	security	forces	have	the	capacities	and	capabilities	to	successfully	secure	the	population.	The	supporting	nation	has	primary	authority	over	what	will	eventually	be	the	host	nation’s	territory	in	this	scenario.	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	host	nation	does	not	have	some	form	of	sovereignty	that	is	recognized	domestically,	and	even	possibly	diplomatically	recognized	within	the	international	community.	At	the	same	time,	the	reality	on	the	ground	is	likely	that	the	host	nation	has	little	or	no	authority	or	control	over	much	of	anything,	for	example,	when	Afghan	President	Hamid	Karzai	was	referred	to	as	the	“Mayor	of	Kabul”	in	order	to	highlight	his	lack	of	authority	and	control.49	More	than	likely,	the	host	nation	is	primarily	focused	on	getting	its	domestic	political	house	in	order.	In	this	situation,	the	host	nation	needs	to	ensure	that	it	has	a	legal	and	moral	framework	for	the	government	to	govern.	That	legal	framework	will	most	likely	take	the	form	of	a	constitution	or	a	similar	type	of	document,	which	will	be	of	no	practical	use	unless	the	population,	and	probably	the	various	factions	within	the	nation,	support	that	overall	framework.	It	is	this	support	that	forms	the	basis	of	the	moral	framework	that	can	and	will	express	itself	in	empowering	the	legitimization	of	the	government	or	not.	
																																																								
49	Ullrich	Fichtner,	“The	Third	World	War:	Why	NATO	Troops	Can't	Deliver	Peace	in	Afghanistan,”	Speigel	Online,	May	29,	2008,	accessed	June	28,	2018,	http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-third-world-war-why-nato-troops-can-t-deliver-peace-in-afghanistan-a-556304-4.html.	
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Based	on	its	definition,	the	placement	of	SFA	most	naturally	presents	itself	in	the	Stabilize	phase.	This	phase	in	the	operational	timeline	is	one	in	which	the	host	nation	is	still	developing	and	formulating	its	government,	building	coalitions	that	will	hopefully	lead	it	to	legitimization	by	the	broader	population.	During	the	Stabilize	phase	the	host	nation’s	military	forces,	from	the	perspective	of	the	United	States	Armed	Forces,	will	likely	be	at	a	nascent	level	due	primarily	from	having	withstood	a	Dominate	phase	in	some	form,	whether	the	circumstances	are	military	conflict	or	a	humanitarian	disaster.	At	the	same	time,	because	the	purpose	of	the	supporting	nation	is	to	leave	a	legitimate	government	in	its	wake,	and	since	part	of	a	legitimate	government	is	having	a	functioning	security	force	that	both	enforces	and	upholds	rule	of	law	in	the	nation,	there	is	an	implied	task	to	begin	developing	the	host	nation	security	forces.	As	a	result,	a	rebuilding	effort	of	the	host	nation’s	national	security	apparatus	and	military	forces	will	be	required.	However,	at	the	Stabilize	phase	the	host	nation’s	national	security	apparatus	is	still	beginning	to	be	formed,	based	on	the	founding	governing	efforts	taking	place.	Thus,	the	focus	from	the	protagonist	(or	supporting)	nation	must	be	on	the	military	or	FSF	itself.	In	focusing	on	the	FSF,	the	supporting	nation	will	understand	the	nascent	capabilities	and	capacities	inherent	in	the	FSF	and	plan	accordingly,	which	entails	the	SFA	being	defined	more	carefully	than	Joint	Staff	doctrine	implies.	SFA	should	be	defined	as	a	specific	mission	and	implemented	at	a	specific	point	in	the	operational	timeline.	As	previously	discussed,	SFA	should	be	defined	as	an	effort	to	learn	through	partnership	and	teaming-up	together	with	the	forces	of	the	supporting	nation.	While	stating	that	SFA	was	best	placed	at	the	Stabilize	phase,	Joint	Staff	implies	that	aspects	of	SFA	exist	within	each	phase	on	the	operational	timeline,50	although	this	results	in	an	untidy	conceptualization	in	which	to	utilize	the	SFA	aspect	of	Military	Assistance.	
																																																								
50	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Doctrine	Note	1-13:	Security	Force	Assistance	(Washington,	D.C.:	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	29	April	2013),	III-10	&	III-11.	
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Operational	realities	suggest	that	SFA	should	be	integrated	with	the	Stabilize	phase	because	of	its	emphasis	on	the	dynamics	of	development	of	FSF,	where	few	capabilities	and	capacities	exist.	For	Joint	Staff	doctrine	to	declare	that	SFA	exists	within	each	of	the	phases	indicates	a	lack	of	understanding	or	appreciation	of	the	six	phases	outlined	with	the	Joint	Staff’s	own	doctrine.	This	type	of	misunderstanding	parallels	the	lack	of	understanding	of	FID,	first	and	foremost	about	what	the	SFA	mission	clearly	is	and	what	it	is	not,	and	about	how	the	definition	of	that	mission	is	linked	with	its	placement	on	the	operational	timeline.	SFA	could	not	address	diminished	capabilities	and	capacities	with	FSF	in	the	Shape,	Deter,	Seize	Initiative,	or	Dominate	phases,	because	the	nature	of	each	of	those	phases	indicates	that	FSF	in	those	phases	has	a	credible	level	of	competence.	In	reality,	this	would	amount	to	doing	SFA	for	the	sake	of	doing	SFA,	without	achieving	a	strategic	effort.	As	such,	there	is	no	need	for	an	SFA	mission	at	this	time,	but	there	are	instances	specifically	in	the	Shape	phase	where	a	FID	program	is	likely	needed,	as	discussed	previously	in	this	chapter.	This	leaves	the	Stabilize	and	the	Enable	Civil	Authorities	phases	as	possibilities.	In	the	Enable	Civil	Authorities	phase,	the	fundamental	element	is	that	the	host	nation	has	already	transitioned,	or	is	in	the	later	stages	of	transitioning,	into	a	situation	of	stability	in	which	the	government	of	the	host	nation	is	becoming	or	has	become	legitimate.	While	it	is	taken	for	granted	that	in	each	of	these	situations,	the	dynamics	on	the	ground	are	volatile	at	best,	there	still	must	be	some	element	of	stability.	It	is	difficult	in	any	scenario	to	have	a	legitimate	authority	of	a	government	when	it	has	little	or	no	control	of	the	security	scene	within	its	own	borders.	These	types	of	situations	establish	a	population’s	unsurprising	conclusion	that	its	government,	rather	than	being	a	legitimate	representation	of	the	people,	is	in	fact	a	puppet	government	playing	the	pliable	front	for	the	supporting	nation,	which	clearly	helps	neither	the	supporting	nor	the	recipient	nation.	Since	the	previous	phases	in	the	operational	timeline	are	partially	a	response	to	some	form	of	unstable	situations,	for	the	population	to	believe	in	the	independence	of	its	government,	the	people	must	see	signs	of	transition	as	well	as	basic	services	being	met,	which	is	the	core	of	the	legitimization	efforts	of	the	Enable	Civil	Authorities	phase.	One	of	the	elements	of	
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government	that	will	be	most	visible	during	the	phases	of	instability	is	the	host	nations’	security	forces.	The	government	will	hardly	be	considered	as	legitimate	if	the	security	policy	and	its	security	forces	are	blatantly	seen	being	dictated	by	a	foreign	power,	such	as	the	supporting	nation.	While	not	the	purpose	of	SFA,	this	scenario	is	certainly	a	plausible	risk	that	would	need	to	be	addressed.	This	idea	and	concept	of	host	nation	legitimization	makes	the	Enable	Civil	Authorities	phase	a	less	natural	phase	for	SFA	than	the	Stabilize	phase.	The	Stabilize	phase	should	be	the	period	for	the	SFA	mission,	due	to	its	nature	as	one	of	transition	from	the	instability	of	the	Dominate	phase	to	the	stability	of	the	Enable	Civil	Authorities	phase.	Similarly,	SFA	must	also	be	a	mission	of	transition.51	This	is	not	only	to	help	develop	the	FSF,	but	even	more	importantly,	to	assist	in	assuring	the	population	of	the	temporary	disposition	of	the	supporting	nation’s	involvement,	preventing	the	perception	that	the	recipient	nation’s	security	forces	are	beholden	to	the	support	nation’s	security	forces.	Ideally,	for	the	host	nation,	the	supporting	nation	is	sincere	in	its	desire	to	remain	solely	for	a	limited	period.	This	is	most	important	for	the	population:	to	believe	that	ultimately,	it	will	have	influence	over	the	future	of	their	nation.	When	the	population	does	not	believe	in	either	the	legitimacy	of	the	government	or	its	eventual	independence,	expected	concerns	will	arise.	Those	concerns	will	be	represented	in	the	population’s	interests	in	the	social	contract	with	the	government,	and	if	not,	then	the	consent	of	the	governed	begins	to	breakdown.	That	breakdown	will	likely	lead	to	some	form	of	protest,	either	marching	or	rioting,	or	in	the	worst	of	cases,	an	actual	armed	insurgency	such	as	the	clashes	
																																																								
51	While	there	is	no	doctrinally	set	timeline	for	an	SFA	mission,	there	are	implications	within	the	doctrine	regarding	its	not	being	an	indefinite	mission.	(Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Doctrine	Note	1-13:	Security	Force	Assistance,	III-2).	However,	there	are	numerous	examples	of	the	SFA	mission	from	South	Korea	to	Afghanistan	where	the	mission	has,	as	of	the	writing	of	this	dissertation,	continued	indefinitely.	
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between	the	United	States	Marines	and	the	forces	of	Muqtada	al-Sadr	in	Fallujah	in	2004.52	The	transition	that	the	SFA	efforts	are	striving	for	is	from	the	nascent	condition	of	FSF	post	the	Dominate	phase,	into	a	security	force	that	exists	independent	of	the	recipient	nation,	due	to	the	supporting	nation’s	own	increased	capacities	and	capabilities.	This	transition	is	intertwined	with	the	transition	of	the	overall	phase	from	Stabilize	to	Enable	Civil	Authorities.	The	SFA	mission	can	begin	during	the	Dominate	phase	depending	on	the	broader	operational	mission	of	the	supporting	nation,	because	the	supporting	nation	will	be	the	primary	proponent	of	the	SFA	mission.	Specifically,	the	commander	of	the	supporting	nation’s	forces	will	set	the	priority	of	starting	and	resourcing	the	SFA	mission.	It	will	be	the	staff	of	the	commander	that	will	set	up	a	structure	to	monitor	and	evaluate	the	development	of	the	FSF,	whose	monitoring	and	evaluation	will	need	to	clearly	delineate	a	desired	end	state	to	demonstrate	when	the	transition	from	the	SFA	is	complete.	It	is	essential	that	this	monitoring	and	evaluating	be	fluid	and	flexible,	for,	as	the	host	nation’s	government	comes	into	power,	it	will	be	required	to	set	up	its	own	priorities	and	metrics	for	its	security	forces.	Once	the	end	state	for	the	supporting	nation	is	reached	and	the	SFA	is	complete,	the	dynamics	in	the	recipient	nation	should	be	at	a	place	where	it	can	transition,	or	be	near	transitioning,	to	the	Enable	Civil	Authorities	phase.	As	the	host	nation	transitions	into	the	Enable	Civil	Authorities	phase,	the	necessity	for	Military	Assistance	is	not	to	be	eliminated;	rather,	the	FSF	are	at	a	critical	juncture	in	their	development.	That	juncture	can	best	be	described	as	the	stage	in	which	the	host	nation’s	security	forces	are	the	main	effort,	and	primarily	planning	and	executing	operational	missions.	More	than	likely,	however,	they	will	not	yet	have	created	an	extensive	logistical	supply	chain	and	training	capabilities	or	capacities.	Due	to	this	lack	of	capability	and	capacity,	the	
																																																								
52	Steven	M.	Buechler,	“Social	Strain,	Structural	Breakdown,	Political	Opportunity,	and	Collective	Action,”	Sociology	Compass	2,	no.	3	(May	2008):	1035,	accessed	May	18,	2017,	http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1751-9020.2008.00109.x.	
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supporting	nation	will	be	obligated	to	provide	some	form	of	assistance	to	the	host	nation,	as	the	host	nation	is	not	likely	to	be	able	to	develop	an	IDAD	plan	as	a	precursor	to	a	FID	program.	At	the	same	time,	this	phase	is	a	point	when	Defense	Institutional	Building	or	MODA	should	begin.	As	recipient	and	supporting	nations	are	in	a	transitory	phase,	so	too	is	the	transition	from	SFA	to	the	Advise	and	Assist	mission	of	Military	Assistance.	Advise	and	Assist	Mission	While	Joint	Staff	doctrine	does	not	clearly	define	the	specifics	of	the	Advise	and	Assist	mission,	it	does	recognize	that	advising	and	assisting	is	part	of	SFA;53	however,	this	does	not	allow	for	transition	between	an	SFA	and	a	FID	program.	That	bridge	should	be	characterized	as	the	Advise	and	Assist	mission.	Allowing	for	different	understandings	of	the	dynamics	that	compromise	the	main	tenet,	the	Advise	and	Assist	mission	from	the	supporting	nation	provides	Military	Assistance	to	help	legitimize	the	host	nation,	given	the	focus	of	the	Enable	Civil	Authorities	phase.	The	Advise	and	Assist	mission	is	best	described	as	a	training	effort,	whereby	the	supporting	nation	is	allowing	(and	at	times	insisting)	the	recipient	nation’s	FSFs	to	be	the	main	effort	during	operational	missions.	The	supporting	nation	will	be	required	to	provide	continual	logistical	aid,	and	will	probably	be	called	on	to	actively	assist	FSFs	to	create	systems	and	processes	where	none	previously	existed,	in	some	cases	where	there	has	been	no	history	of	the	FSF	having	a	system	or	a	process.	The	Advise	and	Assist	mission,	however,	cannot	be	limited	to	logistical	support.	As	the	bridge	between	SFA	and	a	FID	program,	the	Advise	and	Assist	mission	must	continue	helping	to	develop	capacities	and	capabilities	around	the	planning	and	staff	functions	that	are	indicative	of	a	modern	military	organization.	These	staff	functions	are	essential,	because	it	is	the	staff	that	will	develop	the	IDAD	plan,	which	will	in	turn	create	the	foundation	for	the	FSF	to	becoming	a	fully	functioning	military	organization.	The	supporting	nation,	as	a	result,	will	need	to	adjust	its	resourcing	of	this	mission	from	the	units	that	were																																																									
53	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Publication	3-22,	VI-30.	
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originally	partnered	with	the	FSF	during	the	SFA	mission,	to	groups	or	teams	of	advisers	that	can	focus	the	FSF	unit	on	its	development.	It	is	important	to	note	that	the	theoretical	scenario	cannot	overcome	the	dynamics	of	human	relationships,	making	this	critical	to	the	success	of	the	mission,	not	only	so	that	the	supporting	nation’s	teams	have	good	relations	with	the	FSF	commander,	but	additionally	so	that	the	FSF	commander	desires	the	advice	and	assistance	of	the	supporting	nation’s	team.	In	the	end,	both	the	supporting	nation	and	the	recipient	nation	have	a	security	relationship	that	is	dependent	on	the	good	relations	between	individuals,	making	the	development	of	the	advising	teams	a	critical	effort	of	the	supporting	nation.	The	Advise	and	Assist	mission	reaches	its	culmination	point	once	the	recipient	nation’s	military	forces	have	demonstrated	the	capacity	and	capability	to	both	train	and	equip	themselves	independent	of	external	resources	or	knowledge,	and	to	own	the	planning	abilities	in	order	to	develop	a	competent	IDAD	plan.	The	IDAD	plan,	as	previously	noted,	is	important	at	this	juncture	to	develop	more	sophisticated	planning	and	systems	of	a	modern	military	organization.	These	two	benchmarks	for	the	Advise	and	Assist	mission’s	completion	are	required	so	that	each	feeds	into	the	overall	effort	of	creating	a	military	that	is	independent.	From	the	training	and	equipping	capacity,	the	host	nation	will	need	to	have	the	infrastructure,	processes,	and	systems	in	place	for	a	smooth	flow	on	both	logistics	and	personnel.	This	will	ensure	that	the	requesting	military	unit	receives	what	is	required	in	a	timely	manner.	The	completion	of	the	IDAD	plan	is	critical,	given	that	the	capabilities	needed	to	develop	an	IDAD	plan	validate	the	host	nation	military’s	underlying	understanding	and	ability	to	assess	where	and	how	it	must	train	so	as	to	develop	into	a	better	military.	Once	the	FSF	have	that	capability	and	can	capably	execute	the	IDAD	plan,	they	are	prepared	to	transition	to	the	next	phase	and	embrace	a	FID	program.			
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Operational	Levels	of	Warfare54	The	importance	of	the	Operational	Levels	of	Warfare	to	Military	Assistance	is	to	understand	the	nature	of	the	impact	of	the	Military	Assistance	mission	from	the	perspective	of	the	United	States	Armed	Forces.	The	challenge	that	many	military	operations	suffer	from,	be	they	SFA	or	other	types	of	missions,	is	that	there	is	a	failure	to	link	the	actions	of	the	Soldier,	Sailor,	Airman,	or	Marine	on	the	ground	with	a	broader	strategic	narrative,	or	even	a	grand	strategy.55	In	order	to	appreciate	this	underlying	fundamental	theme	of	this	research	project,	it	is	necessary	to	establish	a	baseline	understanding	of	what	the	levels	of	warfare	are	from	the	planning	methodology,	and	how	they	factor	into	the	Military	Assistance	mission	and	it	relationship	to	American	Grand	Strategy.	The	doctrine	of	United	States	military	operations	divides	operational	planning	into	three	levels	of	warfare	–	tactical,	operational,	and	strategic.	Each	level	is	based	on	unit	size	and	focus.	1. Tactical	level	operations	tend	to	focus	on	immediate	tasks	with	limited	perspective	of	long-term	implications.	They	take	the	form	of	operations	such	as	the	need	to	hold	a	crossroad	for	effective	flow	of	logistical	traffic,	or	the	need	to	take	control	of	a	mountaintop	for	visibility.	The	units	that	focus	on	these	operations	range	from	a	few	to	several	hundred	people.	Since	the	tactical	level	operations	focuses	primarily	on	immediate	tasks,	and	those	tasks	may	either	be	achieved	or	not,	the	tactical	level	of	warfare	is	the	easiest	level	to	examine	under	the	framework	of	success	and	failure.	The	concept	of	success	and	failure	concentrates	on	achieving	or	not	achieving	a	task	or	set	of	tasks.	While	this	appears	obvious,	the	need	to	appreciate	the	grander	strategic	effort	necessitates	a	link	to	the	operational	level	of	warfare.56		2. The	operational	level	of	war	tends	to	focus	on	the	“why”	of	the	tasks	or	set	of	tasks	along	with	the	planning	factors	of	warfare,	essentially	planning	and	connecting	tactical	operations	into	more	comprehensive	strategic	goals.	These	units	are	composed	of	many	tactical	units,	totaling	a	few	hundred	to	a	few	thousand	personnel.	Common	knowledge	holds	that	a	military	can	win																																																									
54	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Publication	3-0,	I-12	to	I-14.	55	Charles	C.	Krulak,	"The	Strategic	Corporal:	Leadership	in	the	Three	Block	War,"	Marine	Corps	Gazette	83,	no.	1	(January,	1999):	18-22.	56	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Publication	3-0,	II-11	and	GL-15.	
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every	battle	but	ultimately	lose	the	war,	a	concept	applicable	to	many	wars	that	the	United	States	has	fought	since	World	War	II,	from	Vietnam	to	the	post-9/11	conflicts	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan.	This	happens	when	the	link	between	the	tactical	level	and	operational	level	of	warfare	is	not	properly	established,	and	the	operational	level	is	not	adequately	nested	with	the	strategic	level	of	warfare.57		3. Strategic	level	operations	are	those	military	operations	most	associated	with	international	affairs.	These	tend	to	be	internationally	based	operations	on	a	scale	that	involves	several	or	many	nations,	such	as	General	Eisenhower’s	command	of	the	European	Theater	during	WWII,	or	General	MacArthur’s	during	the	Korean	War.	Strategic	level	operations	allow	for	the	linking	of	the	tactical	and	operational	levels	of	warfare	into	a	broader	international	strategic	narrative,	one	that	must	be	closely	aligned	with	a	political	objective	and	foreign	policy	goals	or	ideally,	a	grand	strategy.	An	example	of	this	interconnected	relationship	between	strategic	narratives	is	the	Korean	War;	an	example	of	when	this	relationship	was	not	well	interconnected	is	the	Vietnam	War.58	Within	each	of	these	levels	of	warfare	exist	nuances	that	differ	from	one	another	in	levels	of	varying	subtleties,	and	those	levels	are	only	coherently	linked	to	one	another	through	the	concept	of	“nesting,”	a	concept	defined	earlier	as	the	process	of	connecting	tasks	to	national	strategic	objectives.	The	United	States	Army	defines	nesting	as	“a	planning	technique	to	achieve	unity	of	purpose	whereby	each	succeeding	echelon’s	concept	of	operations	is	aligned	by	purpose	with	the	higher	echelons’	concept	of	operations.”59	This	means	that	tactical	operations	or	tasks	done	by	a	specific	unit	must	be	clearly	aligned	with	the	overall	goals	of	the	campaign.	It	also	means	that	if	a	unit’s	task	is	not	properly	nested,	it	could	go	on	continually	completing	tasks,	“being	successful”	by	one	definition,	but	in	the	broader	strategic	dynamic,	in	fact,	failing	to	contribute	its	requirements	for	the	overall	mission.	This	idea	of	nesting	then	becomes	almost	
																																																								
57	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Publication	3-0,	II-13	to	II-14	and	GL-13.	58	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Publication	3-0,	II-13	and	GL-14.	59	Department	of	the	Army	Headquarters,	Army	Doctrine	Reference	Publication	5-
0:	The	Operations	Process	(Washington,	D.C.:	Department	of	the	Army,	2012),	2-20.	
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like	the	conceptual	connective	tissue	between	the	levels	of	warfare,	which	when	severed	creates	a	disconnect	effecting	the	entire	endeavor.	Since	nesting	is	also	an	important	factor	in	shaping	mission	failure	or	success,	it	should	be	the	responsibility	of	the	operational	level	of	warfare	in	order	to	ensure	that	the	concept	is	being	properly	implemented.	Monitoring	and	implementation	tend	to	be	the	driving	factors	for	determining	success	or	failure	at	this	level	of	warfare.	Because	the	operational	level	of	warfare	must	focus	on	linking	the	tactical	level	of	military	operations	to	the	broader	strategic	goals	of	a	campaign,	operational	units	must	logically	be	able	to	assess	and	analyze.	This	includes	not	only	the	success	or	failure	at	the	tactical	level,	but	whether	the	tactical	level	tasks	being	assigned	and	achieved	are	fitting	properly,	or	“nested,”	within	the	overall	strategic	narrative.	This	is	true	for	both	the	planning	and	the	implementation	of	tasks	or	sets	of	tasks.	Even	though	there	is	no	higher	level	of	warfare	for	a	strategic	unit	to	nest	with,	it	would	be	a	mistake	not	to	appreciate	that	at	the	strategic	level	of	warfare,	nesting	also	serves	a	critical	purpose.	That	role	is	to	balance	the	military	strategic	efforts	and	goals	with	the	desired	civilian	or	political	outcomes,	in	essence,	nesting	the	military	strategy	with	a	political	end	state	or	objective.	Those	outcomes	are	both	dictated	to	and	from	the	dynamic	existing	within	the	field	of	international	relations	and	structure	of	the	global	political	regime.	This	is	what	an	overall	strategic	narrative	means	—	that	the	civilian	political	objective	must	be	the	ultimate	focus	of	any	military	operation.	Conclusion	The	aspects	of	the	doctrine	surrounding	Military	Assistance	are	important	not	only	because	of	the	framework	to	develop	capabilities	and	capacities	at	the	local	and	nation	state	level,	but	also	in	how	these	aspects	of	Military	Assistance	contribute	to	the	broader	concepts	within	international	relations	and	a	nation’s	grand	strategy.	Since	the	focus	of	these	tools	is	to	help	create	a	sustainable	security	in	the	recipient	nation,	it	is	important	to	also	recognize	that	this	is	a	contribution	to	the	stability	of	the	international	arena.	In	that	regard,	there	is	no	better	example	of	regional	stability	(or	lack	thereof)	than	the	Arab	Spring	that	
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occurred	throughout	2011,	as	one	country’s	protest	led	to	another’s,	because	instability	bred	more	instability.60	Sustainable	security	and	stability	throughout	the	international	environment	is	the	goal	of	all	aspects	of	Military	Assistance,	including	the	forms	of	SFA,	Advise	and	Assist,	and	FID,	as	they	function	within	a	cohesive	framework	of	international	relations.	The	basis	of	that	stability	in	the	end	is	due	to	the	support	of	the	population,	and	it	is	this	support	that	forms	the	foundation	for	the	security	of	the	nation.	From	the	perspective	of	international	relations,	it	is	necessary	to	appreciate	that	these	aspects	of	Military	Assistance	are	both	dependent	on	and	dependent	of	the	experience	of	the	local	population.	“Dependent	on”	because	as	previously	mentioned,	these	Military	Assistance	aspects	must	have	the	support	of	the	population	to	ultimately	allow	a	transition	from	instability	to	stability.	“Dependent	of”	in	that	the	support	of	the	population	will	be	unlikely	to	come	to	fruition	in	the	event	of	a	poor	security	environment.	In	the	framework	of	international	relations,	Military	Assistance	should	be	considered	a	tool	of	a	nation’s	foreign	policy,	and	to	the	degree	that	these	aspects	of	Military	Assistance	are	utilized	in	the	broader	strategy	of	a	nation,	that	nation	can	more	easily	transition	through	the	phases	of	the	operational	timeline.	The	approach	within	this	chapter	has	been	to	examine,	assess,	and	clarify	the	concepts	of	Military	Assistance	from	the	perspective	of	United	States	Armed	Forces	doctrine	under	the	framework	of	the	operational	timeline.	The	operational	timeline	that	has	been	developed	under	Joint	Staff	doctrine	is	the	foundation	for	this	research	project,	because	all	of	the	case	studies	being	examined	have	in	common	the	United	States’	acting	as	the	supporting	nation.	The	challenge	with	the	existing	doctrine	is	a	lack	of	clarity	and	a	general	inconsistency.	This	lack	comes	from	the	inability	of	current	doctrine	to	clarify	
																																																								
60	Florence	Gaub,	“Understanding	Instability:	Lessons	from	the	‘Arab	Spring’”	(Swindon,	UK:	Arts	and	Humanities	Research	Council,	December	2012),	8,	accessed	June	3,	2018,	https://ahrc.ukri.org/documents/project-reports-and-reviews/ahrc-public-policy-series/understanding-instability-lessons-from-the-arab-spring.	
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distinct	definitions	and	differences	between	the	different	tools	and	even	within	the	construct	of	Military	Intervention	itself.	This	causes	a	natural	and	structural	confusion	when	examining	and	assessing	the	tools	and	aspects	within	the	rubric	addressed.	While	Joint	Staff	doctrine	can	and	will	change	and	evolve,	the	underlying	dynamics	of	war	rarely	do	so.	Realizing	the	aspects	and	definitions	of	Military	Assistance	within	the	context	of	international	relations	challenges	the	paradigm	of	traditional	constructs	of	power	projection	and	international	cooperation.	The	framework	of	the	operational	timeline	allows	for	this	context,	enabling	those	Military	Assistance	aspects	to	be	examined	within	the	structure	of	military	operations.	Most	importantly	though,	defining	the	concepts	of	Military	Assistance	creates	a	need	for	the	United	States	Armed	Forces	to	re-examine	its	fundamental	understanding	of	Military	Assistance,	enabling	the	intellectual	rigor	to	re-think	and	re-frame	its	doctrine,	which	is	a	constant	effort	in	refinement.	The	broader	debate	with	the	international	relations	field	with	regards	to	the	global	order	is	further	appreciated	due	to	Military	Assistance	furthering	the	strategic	efforts	of	a	nation	understanding	the	concept	as	a	tool	of	grand	strategy.
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Chapter	3	Military	Assistance	in	Context	of	the	Early	American	Military	Experience		The	history	of	Military	Assistance	within	the	early	American	military	experience	can	be	conceptualized	as	a	microcosm	history	of	warfare	and	grand	strategy.	In	whatever	time	and	age	that	nation	states	have	attempted	to	project	power	through	alliance	or	subterfuge	with	minimal	expenditure	of	money	and	manpower,	Military	Assistance	has	often	been	a	strategy	pursued	either	in	the	forms	of	material	or	advisors.	Material,	however,	has	been	referred	to	in	the	Introduction	as	Military	Aid,	whereas	Military	Assistance	is	actually	in	the	form	of	people,	such	as	those	present	in	a	recipient	nation	to	develop	capacities	and	capabilities.	The	formation	of	the	modern	state	recognized	under	the	Treaty	of	Westphalia	is	replete	with	such	examples,	whether	as	the	Soviets	training	the	Vietnamese	or	Cubans	against	the	United	States,	or	Iranians	and	Syrians	training	Hezbollah	against	the	Israelis.	This	chapter	seeks	to	establish	a	historic	foundation	and	framework	from	which	to	assess	the	United	States	Armed	Forces	experience	with	the	tool	of	Military	Assistance	and	how	that	experience	forms	the	basis	of	the	utilization	of	Military	Assistance.	The	focus	of	Military	Assistance	must	begin	on	the	development	capacity	and	capabilities	of	another	military	for	a	broader	strategic	purpose,	a	grand	strategy,	because	tactical	success	divorced	from	a	strategy	does	not	end	in	victory.	One	such	example	is	advisors	who	are	nominally	commanding	the	troops	of	a	recipient	nation,	such	as	the	Marquis	du	Lafayette	during	the	Revolutionary	War,1	an	experience	that	will	be	seen	repeated	during	the	Korean	War	by	the	American	advisors	of	the	Korean	Military	Advisory	Group.	Another	example	is	the	Michigan	State	University	Vietnam	Advisory	Group,	which,	while	not	uniformed	military	personnel,	did	provide	technical	assistance	in	Vietnam	from	1955	to	1962	in	the	form	of	public	administration	and	police	training.2																																																									
1	Harlow	Giles	Unger,	Lafayette	(Hoboken,	NJ:	John	Wiley	&	Sons,	Inc.,	2002),	21-22	and	55.	2	Robert	Scigliano	and	Guy	H.	Fox,	Technical	Experience	in	Vietnam:	The	Michigan	
State	Experience	(New	York:	Frederick	A.	Praeger,	1965).	
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Examining	the	dynamics	by	which	a	supporting	nation	pursues	and	furthers	its	power	and	influence	through	extending	the	capacities	and	capabilities	of	a	recipient	nation	is	necessary	for	appreciating	Military	Assistance	as	a	tool	within	the	context	of	the	comprehensive	framework	of	international	relations,	and	through	this,	a	grand	strategy.	By	way	of	integrating	this	discussion	with	the	case	studies	developed	further	in	this	project,	the	focus	of	this	historical	analysis	will	feature	the	United	States’	military	origins	and	the	colonial	experience	of	Western	Europe	in	the	Americas.	The	focus	on	Western	Europe	is	due	to	the	colonial	military	history	of	the	Americas,	and	how	that	history	has	become	part	of	the	underlying	military	culture	of	the	United	States.	The	United	States	simply	did	not	absorb	the	military	cultures	of	Asia	or	other	parts	of	the	globe	in	the	same	manner	or	tradition	that	it	has	with	Europe.	This	is	likely	due	to	America’s	own	colonial	connections	with	Europe,	but	also	due	to	common	language	and	recognition	of	national	power.	Furthermore,	placing	this	history	in	context	helps	establish	the	understanding	of	the	capabilities	and	capacities	that	the	Europeans	brought	to	the	New	World.	Although	it	could	be	argued	that	Russia	and	China	also	have	and	have	had	enormous	capacities	and	capabilities,	both	have	a	limited	history	with	the	United	States	with	regard	to	Military	Assistance,	other	than	perhaps	in	opposing	one	another	or	in	the	present-day	competition.	A	noted	exception	to	this	is	when,	at	the	onset	of	WWII,	the	United	States	sent	military	advisors	to	China	to	train	and	develop	the	Chinese	Nationalist	Army,	teaming	senior	military	advisor	Lieutenant	General	Joseph	“Vinegar	Joe”3	Stillwell	to	assist	China’s	leader,	Chiang	Kai-shek.4	It	should	also	be	noted	that	both	this	chapter	and	this	research	project	focuses	on	Military	Assistance	with	reference	to	advisors	rather	than	military	observers.	While	both	may	serve	varying	political	ends,	and	more	inclusively,	the	
																																																								
3	The	irony	of	the	United	States	sending	a	senior	advisor	to	China	whose	nickname	was	Vinegar	Joe	should	be	lost	on	no	one.	4	Charles	F.	Romanus	and	Riley	Sunderland,	China-Burma-India	Theater:	
Stillwell’s	Mission	to	China	(Washington,	D.C.:	Center	for	Military	History,	1987.	First	published	1953	by	Government	Printing	Office.),	212–221.	
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projection	of	power	in	a	realist	sense,	the	distinction	is	that	advisors	are	present	in	a	recipient	nation	to	assist	in	the	development	of	that	nation’s	military	capacities	and	capabilities.	Observers,	on	the	other	hand,	may	have	any	number	of	intentions,	from	genuine	to	more	sinister,	but	have	more	of	an	intelligence-gathering	function	rather	than	a	development	endeavor.	Observers	certainly	have	been	utilized	within	the	context	of	sharing	information	around	similar	enemies	or	conflicts,	and	the	United	States	has	a	long	tradition	of	sending	military	observers	even	up	to	the	present.	An	example	of	this	can	be	seen	in	the	Camp	David	Accords	between	Egypt	and	Israel,5	which	resulted	in	an	entire	United	States	Army	battalion	stationed	on	the	Sinai	as	observers.	Since	their	focus	is	to	“observe”	rather	than	“advise”	there	is	little	to	be	gained	from	understanding	how	a	military	observer	could	extend	the	capacities	and	capabilities	of	a	recipient	nation	in	this	instance.	Professor	Donald	Stoker,	of	the	Naval	Postgraduate	School,	notes	that	“military	advising”	usually	can	be	categorized	as	one	of	the	following:	1.	Military	modernization;	2.	Nation	building;	3.	Economic	purpose	or	penetration;	4.	Ideological;	5.	Counterinsurgency;	or	6.	A	corporate	approach	for	fun	or	profit.6	While	Stoker’s	categorization	of	Military	Assistance	is	quite	complete,	it	still	fails	to	allude	to	either	the	dynamics	of	power	projection	in	an	extended	sense	or	more	specifically,	the	need	for	both	the	supporting	nation	and	recipient	state	to	cooperate	in	order	to	accomplish	each	other’s	broader	goals.	While	these	categories	of	Stoker	may	define	the	tactical	or	operational	basis	of	Military	Assistance,	they	do	not	include	the	principles	of	the	strategic	interaction	between	states	or	their	underlying	motivations	for	partnering	to	expand	capabilities	and	capacities	of	another	state’s	military.	This	is	important	in	that	
																																																								
5	Thomas	W.	Spoehr,	“This	Shoe	No	Longer	Fits:	Changing	the	US	Commitment	to	the	MFO,”	Parameters	30,	no.	3	(Autumn	2000):	109-25,	accessed	July	20,	2018,	http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/Parameters/articles/00autumn/spoehr.htm.	6	Donald	Stoker,	“The	History	and	Evolution	of	Foreign	Military	Advising	and	Assistance,	1815	–	2007,”	in	Military	Advising	and	Assistance,	ed.	Donald	Stoker	(London:	Routledge,	2008),	2.	
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the	categorizations	of	Stoker	are	ultimately	limited	in	their	scope,	failing	also	to	capture	the	need	of	a	nation	state	that	has	a	grand	strategy	driving	its	agenda.	
In	looking	at	Military	Assistance	from	the	perspective	of	the	United	States	and	
the	framework	provided	by	United	States	Armed	Forces	doctrine,	the	levels	of	
warfare	offer	an	insight	into	the	experiences	of	Military	Assistance.	The	three	levels	of	warfare	—	tactical,	operational,	and	strategic	—	are	primarily	viewed	through	the	prism	of	the	size	and	scope	of	a	unit,	from	smallest	to	largest.	The	levels	of	warfare	within	the	overall	construct	of	Joint	Staff	doctrine	are	both	a	standard	and	an	ideal	of	placing	the	context	within	the	greater	scope	of	history	of	Military	Assistance	with	respect	to	the	discipline	of	international	relations.	The	concept	of	a	grand	strategy	should	also	be	considered	from	the	holistic	perspective	of	encompassing	all	the	levels	of	warfare,	because	as	United	States	Marine	Corps	Commandant	General	Charles	Krulak	noted,	even	a	corporal	at	the	tactical	level	can	affect	the	national	strategic	narrative.7	Military	Assistance	and	the	Origins	of	the	Colonial	Americas	Military	knowledge	does	not	exist	in	a	vacuum,	and	the	relevance	of	the	origins	of	Colonial	America	can	be	appreciated	in	the	modern	experience	of	Military	Assistance.	Unlike	many	other	disciplines,	Military	Assistance	has	no	single	discovery	that	flips	every	known	prior	on	its	proverbial	head:	it	is	a	discipline	of	precedence,	making	origins	of	military	relations	in	the	Americas	critical	for	understanding	and	appreciating	the	issues	of	present	day	international	relations.8	For	example,	contemporary	United	States	Army	Rangers	learn	that	many	of	their	current	tactics	have	a	direct	lineage	to	experiences	of	Colonel	Benjamin	Church	in	Colonial	Massachusetts.9	
																																																								
7	Charles	C.	Krulak,	"The	Strategic	Corporal:	Leadership	in	the	Three	Block	War,"	
Marine	Corps	Gazette	83,	no.	1	(January,	1999):	18-22.	8	John	M.	Collins,	“How	Military	Strategists	Should	Study	History,”	Military	
Review	63,	no.	8	(August	1983):	32,	38,	and	44.	9	Garrett	DeWayne	Hall,	“Benjamin	Church	and	the	Origins	of	American	Rangers”	(masters’	thesis,	Valdosta	State	University,	May	2016),	20,	https://vtext.valdosta.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10428/2174/hall-garrett_thesis_history_2016.pdf.	
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The	origins	of	the	United	States	differ	when	examined	from	the	perspective	of	the	various	states.	From	the	penal	colony	of	Georgia	to	the	religious	freedom	of	Massachusetts	to	the	Dutch	merchant	trading	center	of	New	Amsterdam	(New	York),	each	state	had	its	own	origination	story,	an	understanding	of	self-actualization	that	was	affected	by	its	wider	interests	in	becoming	part	of	the	overall	United	States,10	and	it	could	be	said	that	these	differences	continue	to	play	out	into	the	present	day.	This	origination	story	can	be	seen	almost	as	a	social	or	cultural	construct.	A	simple	example	of	an	origination	story	as	a	cultural	construct	is	the	mythology	that	has	developed	in	the	American	South	around	what	is	widely	considered	the	Flag	of	the	Confederacy,	although	in	fact	it	is	the	battle	flag	of	the	Army	of	Virginia	from	the	American	Civil	War.11	As	in	many	histories,	the	myth	acts	as	the	basis	of	reality	from	which	future	generations	learn	and	act,	the	interpretation	of	which	becomes	a	new	reality.	Since	the	origins	of	the	Americas	are	rooted	in	a	Colonial	past,	one	that	survived	based	on	the	assistance	and	involvement	of	Western	European	powers,	in	its	essence,	the	military	foundation	of	the	United	States	was	formed	on	the	concepts	of	Military	Assistance.	In	some	instances,	that	Military	Assistance	took	the	form	of	weaponry,	an	example	of	Military	Aid;	in	others,	it	was	sending	troops	from	Britain	during	the	French	and	Indian	War	in	the	1750s,	which	included	the	training	of	local	Colonists.12	
																																																								
10	Colin	Woodward,	American	Nations:	A	History	of	the	Eleven	Rival	Regional	
Cultures	of	North	America	(New	York:	Viking,	2011),	23-111.	11	John	M.	Coski,	The	Confederate	Battle	Flag:	America’s	Most	Embattled	Emblem	(Cambridge,	MA:	Belknap	Press	of	Harvard	University	Press,	2005),	13-14	and	292.	12	An	important	note	is	that	because	the	United	States,	at	the	time	of	the	French	and	Indian	War,	was	a	colony	of	Great	Britain,	concepts	of	Military	Assistance	do	not	apply.	The	colonists	viewed	themselves	as	British	subjects,	which	had	much	to	do	with	the	origin	of	the	complaints	during	the	American	Revolution.	Don	Higginbotham,	“Army,	U.S.:	Colonial	and	Revolutionary	Eras,’	in	The	Oxford	
Companion	to	American	Military	History,	online	edition,	ed.	John	Whiteclay	Chambers	(Oxford,	UK:	Oxford	University	Press,	2004),	accessed	May	19,	2017,	doi:10.1093/acref/9780195071986.001.0001.	
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In	effect,	conflicts	that	existed	in	the	colonies	were	simply	extensions	of	the	conflicts	that	existed	in	Europe,	a	fight	for	supremacy	between	the	Great	Powers	of	England,	France,	and	Spain.	Despite	the	extension	of	European	power	in	the	New	World,	each	nation	had	settled	in	the	Americas	for	different	reasons.	For	the	French,	it	was	furs;	Spanish	focus	was	gold;	Dutch	interest	was	trade;	and	the	English	came	for	land.13	This	theme	continued	throughout	every	region,	and	through	the	colonizing	of	the	Americas,	the	Great	Powers	extended	their	search	for	resources	and	wealth	in	newfound	areas,	while	at	the	same	time	continuing	many	of	the	same	interactions	of	the	Old	World.	But	this	only	explains	part	of	the	equation,	that	of	the	Europeans	Powers.	Ultimately,	as	the	American	Colonies	stated	in	their	Declaration	of	Independence	certain	terms	relating	to	the	principles	of	John	Locke:14	“Governments	are	instituted	among	man,	deriving	their	just	powers	from	the	consent	of	the	governed.”15	So	even	prior	to	the	Revolutionary	War,	the	Colonist	in	the	Americas	had	some	sense	of	cooperation,	such	that	Military	Assistance	was	requested	by	the	local	population	and	supported	by	a	European	Power.	Indeed,	this	concept	of	Military	Assistance	to	local	communities	was	the	basis	of	local	militias,	which	evolved	in	the	United	States	more	formally	into	the	National	Guard	due	to	the	Militia	Act	of	1903.16	This	capability	and	capacity	development	as	it	relates	to	Military	Assistance	came	to	be	engaged	in	the	early	years	of	the	colonies	leading	up	to	the	French	and	Indian	war.	The	origin	of	this	dynamic	initially	coming	to	fruition	was	in	fact	the	competition	between	the	British	colony	of	Massachusetts	and	the	French	in	Quebec.	The	French,	in	their	desire	to	extract	resources	for	the	accumulation	of	wealth,	primarily	furs,	in	the	most	efficient	way	possible,	had	created	an	alliance																																																									
13	Robert	Leckie,	The	Wars	of	America,	2nd	revised	and	updated	edition	(Edison,	NJ:	Castle	Books,	1998),	7-8.	D.	W.	Meinig,	The	Shaping	of	America:	A	
Geographical	Perspective	on	500	Years	of	History,	Vol	1	Atlantic	America,	1492-
1800	(New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	1986),	41-42.	14	John	Locke,	The	Second	Treatise	of	Government,	ed.	J.	W.	Gough,	3rd	edition	(Oxford:	Basil	Blackwell	&	Mott,	Ltd.,	1966),	49.	15	United	States	Continental	Congress,	Declaration	of	Independence,	1776.	16	Louis	Cantor,	“The	Creation	of	the	Modern	National	Guard:	The	Dick	Militia	Act	of	1903,”	PhD	diss.,	Duke	University,	1963,	Proquest	(AAT	6307503),	248.	
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with	Native	American	tribes	against	the	major	tribe	of	the	region	around	the	French	settlement.	In	this	alliance,	the	French	neither	supplied	weaponry	nor	training,	but	soldiers	to	partner	with	their	Native	American	allies	for	the	purpose	of	defeating	the	Iroquois.	This	was	not	based	on	a	need	to	project	power,	since	power	projection	would	not	create	greater	efficiency	of	resource	extraction	or	make	them	more	money.	If	anything,	projecting	power	would	cost	money	and	resources;	however,	the	relationship	between	the	French	and	the	Native	American	tribes	can	be	appreciated	more	in	the	context	of	a	cooperative	coalition.17	This	was	indicative	of	the	general	experience	in	the	North	American	Colonies.	The	various	Western	European	Powers	amongst	and	against	one	another	perpetuated	that	dynamic,	a	projection	of	power	and	pursuit	of	interests,	prior	to	the	War	of	Independence,	through	various	forms	of	Military	Assistance.	Therefore,	to	appreciate	the	underlying	effects	of	the	power	undercurrents	between	the	Great	Powers	of	the	day,	understanding	the	ebb	and	flow	of	Military	Assistance	is	all	the	more	critical.	It	could	be	argued	that	these	efforts	advanced	due	to	either	the	immediate	realities	or	necessities	within	the	various	colonies.	This	offers,	however,	a	limited	perspective	in	that	it	fails	to	incorporate	the	strategic	military	perspective	and	the	extensive	political	goals	of	the	Western	European	states.	More	importantly,	at	best	it	presents	an	idea	that	the	tactical	realities	being	experienced	were	divorced	from	any	overall	grand	strategy,	and	in	a	larger	sense,	that	the	efforts	of	Military	Assistance	may	have	been	simply	tactics	that	were	pursued	for	expediency.	However,	examining	Military	Assistance	within	the	framework	of	the	levels	of	warfare	instead	of	an	extension	of	tactical	efforts	provides	a	more	complete	understanding	of	that	broader	strategic	understanding.	
Europe	and	the	Native	Americans	Although	it	may	have	been	considered	at	the	time	an	effort	of	expediency,	when	the	British	Colonies	of	New	England	gave	arms	and	weapons	training	to	the	Iroquois	so	that	the	tribe	could	pursue	revenge	against	the	French,18	there																																																									
17	Leckie,	The	Wars	of	America,	3-10.	18	Leckie,	The	Wars	of	America,	5-6	
	 106	
were	unforeseen	benefits.	This	action	also	had	the	effect	of	blunting	French	expansion	efforts,	which	was	certainly	part	of	the	English	policy	of	expanding	its	territorial	control	on	the	continent.19	As	per	the	definitional	differences	of	Military	Assistance	and	Military	Aid,	the	efforts	of	the	New	England	colonists	would	clearly	be	construed	as	Military	Aid,	as	there	was	little	exchange	of	capabilities	and	capacities	that	were	not	focused	around	material	in	some	form.	However,	the	tradition	of	Military	Intervention,	in	both	the	form	of	Military	Aid	and	Military	Assistance,	would	contribute	to	conflict	between	the	Native	Americans	and	the	European	Colonists	until	the	conflict	resulted	in	the	French-Indian	War.	While	there	is	an	element	of	extending	or	exporting	the	European	military	methods	and	capabilities,	there	was	also	the	blending	of	techniques	that	allowed	the	American	Colonies	to	develop	into	a	fighting	force	able	to	withstand	the	strength	of	the	British	Empire.20	This	blending	of	techniques	was	both	by	necessity	due	to	a	need	to	focus	on	the	practicalities	of	warfare	in	a	colonial	(and	often	wilderness)	region	over	the	ceremonies	popular	in	Europe,	and	the	underlying	need	to	be	linked	to	the	overall	strategic	narrative,	the	political	goals	of	the	War	of	Independence.	Though	not	to	minimize	the	contribution	of	the	French	during	the	War	of	Independence,	the	support	had	to	have	a	structure	both	logistically	and	organizationally,21	and	yet	also	had	to	properly	feed	or	nest	into	both	nations’	strategic	narratives,	which	was	to	blunt	British	power	and	influence	in	the	Americas.	At	the	beginning	of	the	colonial	experience,	it	was	in	fact	the	Military	Assistance	that	the	Native	Americans	gave	to	the	Colonists	that	enabled	America’s	eventual	edge	over	the	British.	Both	before	and	after	the	French-																																																								
19	Jack	P.	Greene,	“The	Seven	Years'	War	and	the	American	Revolution:	The	Causal	Relationship	Reconsidered,”	The	Journal	of	Imperial	and	Commonwealth	
History	8,	no.	2	(January	1980):	86	and	89.	20	Leckie,	The	Wars	of	America,	117-118.	Paul	Lockhart,	The	Drillmaster	of	Valley	
Forge:	The	Baron	de	Steuben	and	the	Making	of	the	American	Army	(New	York:	HarperCollins,	2008),	166.	21	Russell	F.	Weigley,	The	American	Way	of	War:	A	History	of	United	States	
Military	Strategy	and	Policy	(Bloomington,	IN:	Indiana	University	Press,	1973),	37-39.	
	 107	
Indian	War,	the	Colonists,	French,	and	British	learned	numerous	techniques	from	Native	Americans.	In	some	instances	it	was	more	formal	tutelage,	such	as	the	techniques	that	Lieutenant	Colonel	Robert	Rogers	learned	that	led	to	the	foundation	of	the	Rangers.22	In	others,	it	was	learning	from	the	techniques	used	by	Native	Americans	against	the	Colonists,	such	as	the	raiding	parties	that	occurred	during	King	Philips’	War,	which	created	a	great	deal	of	fear	in	the	New	England	Colonies.23	Taking	the	best	practices	and	marrying	them	with	political	objectives	is	what	created	the	environment	for	the	Military	Assistance	of	the	17th	Century	to	become	part	of	the	American	military	lexicon.	This	is	exactly	what	happened	during	the	French-Indian	War.	
The	French	Experience	in	Canada	Since	by	and	large	the	American	Colonies	each	existed	as	completely	separate	entities,	with	their	own	origins	and	goals,	it	was	difficult	to	conceptualize	how	they	would	form	an	effective	identity	let	alone	an	effective	fighting	force.	Indeed,	in	this	regard	the	French	had	a	great	deal	of	advantage.	Because	the	goal	of	the	French	Colonies	was	resource	extraction,	the	French	had	an	authoritarian	settlement	structure	with	a	military	to	support	it.	However,	the	British	Colonies	had	a	minimal	military	presence,	and	were	supported	more	generally	by	local	militias.24	Although	these	militias	could	be	quite	professional,	and	many	of	them	were	paid	wages	for	participation,	they	were	still	a	part-time,	volunteer	force	that	was	not	regarded	as	having	same	level	of	expertise	as	a	professional	military.	In	North	America	it	was	the	French,	not	the	British,	who	were	clearer	on	their	strategic	objectives	and	grand	strategy:	namely,	resource	extraction	versus	colonization	of	land.	However,	in	this	sense	the	French	did	not	have	a	greater	political	objective,	because	resource	extraction,	while	economically	important,																																																									
22	Owen	Connelly,	“Rangers,	U.S.	Army,”	in	The	Oxford	Companion	to	American	
Military	History,	doi:10.1093/acref/9780195071986.001.0001.	23	Philip	Ranlet,	“Another	Look	at	the	Causes	of	King	Philip’s	War,”	New	England	
Quarterly	61,	no.	1	(March,	1988):	79	and	100.	24	John	Shy,	A	People	Numerous	and	Armed:	Reflections	on	the	Military	Struggle	for	
American	Independence,	Revised	edition	(Ann	Arbor,	The	University	of	Michigan	Press,	1990),	31-33.	
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did	not	lend	itself	to	a	political	goal.	It	should	be	noted	in	passing	that	among	a	current	set	of	recognized	international	military	values,	such	aims	of	the	French	and	British	were	repugnant	at	best,	and	illegal	or	immoral	at	worst.	In	spite	of	this	contemporary	perspective,	the	purpose	of	this	research	project	is	not	to	delve	into	values,	but	rather	to	understand	and	appreciate	relevant	historical	antecedents	to	modern	constructs	of	military	planning	and	its	application	to	the	field	of	international	relations.	Within	the	context	of	the	operational	framework	of	the	levels	of	warfare	at	that	time,	the	French	had	developed	and	were	implementing	a	more	efficient,	although	not	long-term,	sustainable	approach.	The	difference	between	the	two	approaches,	the	French	goals	of	resource	extraction	versus	the	British	goals	of	land	colonization,	is	that	the	French	tactical	level	of	warfare	was	linked	to	the	overall	strategic	narrative,	while	that	of	the	British	was	not.	The	French	decisions	focused	on	resource	extraction,	whether	by	means	of	outposts	or	relations	with	the	Native	Americans.	From	the	perspective	of	the	levels	of	warfare,	French	leaders	made	sure	that	their	tactical	efforts	were	in	pursuit	of	their	strategic	objectives.	An	illustration	of	this	concept	is	the	example	of	Samuel	de	Champlain	and	the	founding	of	Quebec	with	respect	to	the	Military	Assistance	against	the	Iroquois.	Champlain	had	reasoned	that	if	he	had	a	local	ally	to	aid	his	growing	colony,	then	he	could	be	more	profitable	overall	in	his	trading	and	extracting	efforts.25	This	is	the	rationale	that	led	him	to	support	the	Huron	and	other	tribes.	It	could	be	argued	that	Champlain	was	simply	reacting	to	the	circumstances	that	were	presented	to	him,	and	this	could	very	well	be	true;	however,	even	if	those	decisions	were	simply	tactical	in	nature	they	ended	up,	in	hindsight,	to	link	excellently	with	the	broader	strategic	goals	of	France,	in	that	local	allies	could	further	French	interest	in	aiding	with	resource	extraction.	Continuing	to	delve	into	the	framework	of	this	perspective,	it	would	be	understandable	to	adopt	a	position	that	strategic	narratives	were	layered	onto	the	tactical	achievements	and	efforts	after	the	fact.	However,	this	concept	does																																																									
25	John	C.	Weaver,	The	Great	Land	Rush	and	the	Making	of	the	Modern	World,	
1650-1900	(London:	McGill-Queen’s	University	Press,	2003),	186-187.	
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not	take	into	consideration	the	origins	that	most	of	these	efforts	had	to	begin	with:	explorers	and	colonizers	do	not	set	forth	from	a	vacuum.	Indeed,	all	involved	had	to	raise	money	and	gain	support	from	their	respective	states	or	monarchies	to	pursue	both	their	ventures	and	adventures.	When	gaining	support,	all	parties	had	to	offer	feasible	plans	to	recoup	the	investment	in	one	way	or	another,	a	type	of	business	plan	during	the	Age	of	Discovery.	The	French	were	quite	clear	about	their	desire	to	extract	resources,	just	as	the	English	were	for	colonization.26	Partnerships	as	a	form	of	Military	Assistance	The	partnership	aspect	of	Military	Assistance	is	the	common	thread,	as	it	relates	to	the	broader	construct	of	the	European	experience	in	the	Americas.	The	theoretical	framework	that	the	levels	of	warfare	offers	is	the	understanding	that	Military	Assistance	is	both	a	projection	of	power	in	the	realist	sense,	and	a	cooperative	dynamic.	It	is	important	to	note	here	that	Military	Assistance	challenges	each	theoretical	paradigm,	in	that	both	are	necessary	to	establish	a	balanced	effort,	the	potential	limitations	of	one	being	too	great	without	the	underlying	appreciation	of	the	other.	Champlain	could	not	project	the	power	of	France	through	Military	Assistance	with	the	Native	Americans	without	also	embracing	a	dynamic	of	partnership.	The	example	of	Champlain	highlights	this	concept	of	partnership,	in	that	both	he	and	the	Native	American	tribes	came	out	of	the	Military	Assistance	relationship	in	positions	of	greater	influence	than	they	began.	For	Champlain	and	the	French,	there	was	further	support	for	resource	extraction	involvement	in	the	region	with	a	minimal	commitment	of	resources	and	assets	expended,	while	for	the	Huron	there	was	a	stronger	advantage	over	the	Iroquois.	Since	both	parties	met	their	objectives,	the	experience	between	the	two	with	respect	to	Military	Assistance	should	be	considered	a	success.	In	addition,	both	achieved	a	projection	of	power,	the	Huron	in	that	they	had	an	ally	who	expanded	their	capabilities,	and	Champlain	who	had	an	ally	expanding	his	capacities.																																																									
26	Francis	Fukuyama,	The	Origins	of	Political	Order	(London:	Profile	Books	Ltd,	2011)	330.	
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There	was,	however,	completely	no	regard	for	a	long-term	effort	to	develop	the	capacities	and	capabilities	necessary	for	sustainable	security,	nor	an	appreciation	of	Grand	Strategy,	although	in	fairness,	neither	party	was	in	position	or	had	the	geopolitical	vision	to	pursue	a	grand	strategy,	let	alone	articulate	one.	In	this	regard,	the	example	of	Champlain	serves	as	a	failure.	It	is	certainly	appropriate	to	acknowledge	that	the	French	had	little	interest	and	more	specifically,	no	strategic	interest,	in	assisting	Native	Americans	to	develop	any	type	of	modern	military	organization.	And	though	it	could	be	questionable	as	to	whether	the	Native	Americans	had	a	cultural	interest	in	adapting	to	develop	those	European	capacities	and	capabilities,	they	certainly	accepted	Military	Aid	when	offered.	In	addition,	there	was	no	effort	to	assist	or	offer	to	assist	Native	Americans	in	developing	the	necessary	institutions,	nor	was	there	any	idea	of	a	need	for	sustainable	security	for	the	Native	Americans	from	either	their	side	or	that	of	the	Europeans.	Champlain’s	strategic	interests	of	resource	extraction	had	little	to	do	with	the	long-term,	sustainable	security	of	his	partner.	From	the	Native	American	perspective,	strategic	interests	had	much	more	to	do	with	regional	relations	with	other	tribes	than	the	resource	extraction	the	French	had	planned.	The	conflict	existed	not	only	where	the	actors’	strategic	interests	did	not	align	with	the	construct	of	sustainable	security,	but	also	with	each	other’s	strategic	interests.	Ultimately	the	reason	Champlain’s	case	is	not	one	of	Military	Aid	is	that	it	was	more	strategically	based	than	it	was	materially	or	logistically	based.	The	Military	Assistance	experience	between	Champlain	and	the	Huron	met	one	aspect	of	a	successful	construct,	such	that	both	had	a	motivation	to	enter	into	a	temporary	partnership,	which	was	the	foundation	for	the	rest	of	the	military	relationship	between	the	actors.	However,	both	were	pursuing	their	own	interests,	which	ultimately	lend	to	the	downfall	of	both	in	the	region.	This	is	not	to	imply	that	identical	interests	are	necessary	for	the	tool	of	Military	Assistance	to	be	successful,	but	there	must	be	an	alignment	of	interests.	A	recent	study	by	Dr.	Kathleen	McInnis	and	Nathan	Lucas	for	the	Congressional	Research	Service	discussed	the	alignment	between	parties	as	a	key	factor	for	partner	capacity.	“An	alignment	of	interests	between	the	United	States	and	
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recipients	of	security	assistance	in	the	short,	medium,	and	long	term	appears	to	be	important	for	overall	BPC	[Building	Partner	Capacity]	success.”27	This	is	to	say	that	success	matters	with	respect	to	an	alignment,	but	there	is	no	requirement	for	identical	interests.	The	concept	of	partnerships	is	important	when	conceptualizing	Military	Assistance	as	a	tool,	because	even	though	each	side	of	a	partnership	will	not	always	have	an	equal	set	of	equities,	nor	will	they	even	be	“equals,”	they	should	have	an	equal	desire	for	the	relationship	to	achieve	a	desired	and	mutually	agreed	upon	end	state.	For	Champlain	and	the	Huron,	the	desired	end	state	was	to	displace	the	Iroquois	as	the	predominant	power	in	the	region,	making	this	entire	endeavor	limited	in	its	scope	and	accomplishment.	This	exchange	of	Military	Assistance	however,	is	simply	a	means	to	an	end	for	Champlain,	whose	sole	purpose	was	to	facilitate	the	resource	extraction	goals	of	French	policy.		More	comprehensively,	this	idea	of	partnerships	relates	back	to	the	levels	of	warfare,	in	that	the	“why”	of	warfare	must	be	actors’	motivation	to	develop	and	create	the	capacity	and	capability	for	a	sustainable	security	for	all.	In	this	regard,	the	“why”	or	operational	level	of	warfare	is	the	concept	or	interaction	that	marries	tactical	victories,	such	as	individual	battles	won,	being	nested	with	a	grander	strategic	narrative	or	possibly	an	actual	Grand	Strategy	through	the	strategic	level	of	warfare,	the	interplay	between	nation	states.	Military	Assistance	in	the	American	Colonies	Continuing	the	origins	of	the	European	experience	in	the	Americas,	the	Colonial	American	military	experience	was	also	based	in	the	concept	of	Military	Assistance.	However,	the	implementation	of	Military	Assistance	produced	an	early	undercurrent	of	separateness	between	the	Colonists	and	the	British.	This	separateness	was	created	when	the	American	Colonists	realized	that	neither	they	nor	their	service	to	the	British	Empire	was	viewed	in	the	same	regard	as	that	of	British	natives.	It	was	a	classic	case	of	bigotry,	one	that	played	time	and	
																																																								
27	U.S.	Library	of	Congress,	Congressional	Research	Service,	What	is	‘Building	
Partner	Capacity?’:	Issues	for	Congress,	by	Kathleen	J.	McInnis	and	Nathan	J.	Lucas,	R44313	(2015),	4-5.	
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time	again	between	the	Colonies	and	England.	Prior	to	the	French	and	Indian	War	from	1754	to	1763,28	a	British	expedition	against	the	Spanish	was	planned	and	executed	to	conquer	the	port	of	Cartagena.	The	expedition	went	poorly	from	the	start,	as	the	British	Government’s	inefficient	planning	resulted	in	inadequate	equipment	and	provisions,	setting	the	stage	for	internal	conflict.	This	manifested	as	the	British	regular	army	soldiers’	consideration	of	their	Colonial	compatriots	with	contempt	and	disregarding	any	need	to	treat	them	with	respect.	This	lack	of	regard	by	the	British	towards	the	Colonists	created	a	feeling	of	separation,	because	prior	to	this	time	the	Colonists	regarded	themselves	as	Englishmen,	citizens	of	the	British	Empire	who	simply	did	not	live	in	England.	The	idea	that	they	would	be	considered	less	than	full	citizens	of	the	British	Empire	had	to	have	been	a	foreign	and	distasteful	concept	to	them.	Indeed,	even	when	the	Thirteen	Colonies	of	the	Americas	tried	to	petition	King	George	III,	it	was	over	the	idea	that	their	rights	as	Englishmen	were	not	being	respected	or	regarded.29	Furthering	the	experience	of	the	Cartagena	expedition,	the	French	and	Indian	War	compounded	many	of	these	beliefs.	Even	at	the	beginning	of	the	conflict,	Major	General	Braddock	comment	on	the	Virginia	militia:	“their	slothful	and	languid	disposition	renders	them	very	unfit	for	military	service.”30	Indeed,	the	French	and	Indian	War	in	many	ways	created	the	fermentation	needed	for	the	Revolutionary	War.	For	many	of	the	soldiers	on	both	sides	of	that	war,	Revolutionaries	and	Loyalists	had	served	the	British	during	the	French	and	Indian	War.	This	is	how	that	war	experience	relates	to	Military	Assistance:	the	entire	British	campaign	assisted	in	developing	the	capabilities	and	the	capacities																																																									
28	While	referred	to	as	the	French	and	Indian	War	in	the	United	States,	most	Europeans	would	refer	to	it	as	the	North	American	theater	of	operations	for	the	Seven	Years’	War	between	the	French	and	British	empires.	Fred	Anderson,	
Crucible	of	War:	The	Seven	Years’	War	and	the	Fate	of	Empire	in	British	North	
America,	1754-1766	(New	York:	Alfred	A	Knopf,	2000),	xv.	29	Walter	A.	McDougall,	“The	Colonial	Origins	of	American	Identity,”	Orbis	49,	no.	1	(Winter,	2005):	8-9,	accessed	May	19,	2017,	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2004.10.002.	Weigley,	The	American	Way	of	
War,	19.	30	Leckie,	The	Wars	of	America,	46.	
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of	the	American	Colonists	such	that	they	in	turn	developed	the	foundation	and	structure	to	emerge	victorious	over	the	British	roughly	twenty	years	later.	Principally,	the	American	Colonists’	engagement	in	combat	with	the	British	was	the	Americans’	first	exposure	to	a	modern	military	organization.	The	French	and	Indian	War	in	retrospect	was	a	perfect	type	of	military	exchange,	as	the	British	learned	techniques	from	Rogers’	Rangers,	and	the	American	Colonists	witnessed	the	effects	of	combining	warfare,	the	merging	of	irregular	and	regular	troops	with	artillery.31	Ultimately,	the	Colonists	absorbed	a	lesson	in	the	development	of	capacities	and	capabilities	where	none	was	anticipated	or	intended.	By	the	time	of	the	French	and	Indian	War,	Captain	Robert	Rogers	was	considered	as	one	of	the	military	innovators	of	irregular	combat	in	the	Americas.32	He	had	learned	techniques	from	Native	Americans	in	tracking	and	frontier	survival,	which,	combined	with	European	weaponry,	was	a	substantive	advantage	over	the	fixed	positions	of	the	British,	or	minimal	firepower	of	Native	Americans.	Indeed,	techniques	of	the	Rogers’	Rangers	may	still	be	found	in	the	United	States	Army	Ranger	Regiment,	which	continues	the	lineage	to	the	present	day.	During	the	French	and	Indian	War,	despite	most	British	commanders	who	thought	little	of	American	Colonists,	Brigadier	Lord	Augustus	Howe	observed	the	irregular	warfare	techniques	of	the	Colonials	and	ordered	them	applied	throughout	the	rest	of	the	main	British	force.33	The	situation	of	the	supporting	nation	in	fact	receiving	and	giving	Military	Assistance	from	the	recipient	nation	is	rare.	Although	the	American	Colonies	and	British	were	not	separate	nations	at	that	time,	in	terms	of	capacities	and	
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capabilities	they	certainly	could	have	been	considered	as	such.34	Unfortunately	for	both	the	American	Colonists	and	the	British	quest	to	crush	the	French	in	New	France	(now	Canada),	Lord	Howe	was	killed	in	one	of	the	first	engagements	of	the	campaign,35	and	as	so	many	Military	Assistance	engagements	are	personality	based,	so	too	was	this	one,	which	failed	to	mature	after	Lord	Howe’s	death.	The	uniqueness	of	this	type	of	exchange	is	expressed	in	the	fact	that	Colonial	America	was	in	effect	a	developing	nation	in	terms	of	infrastructure,	while	at	the	same	time	having	many	aspects	of	a	developed	nation.	The	relationship	of	colonizer	and	the	colonized	at	times	had	created	a	tendency	for	romanticism	within	American	thinking,	one	put	forth	by	noted	foreign	policy	expert,	George	Kennan	in	his	book,	The	Cloud	of	Danger.	Kennan	references	the	Wisconsin	Indian	tribe	of	his	grandparents’	time,	1851,	and	relates	how	the	individuals	of	the	time	focused	on	industry	rather	than	war.36	This	romanticized	fallacy	at	the	very	least	discounts	the	Civil	War	fought	only	ten	years	after	the	time	that	Kennan	references:	he	remembers	this	period	as	one	where	Americans	thought	of	farming	rather	than	the	political	reality,	that	the	United	States	was	tearing	itself	apart	over	the	issue	of	slavery,	which	was	the	focus	of	most	political	decisions.	These	points	apply	to	the	American	experience	of	Military	Assistance	with	respect	to	the	British,	in	that	the	Colonists	and	Colonial	America	were	not	simply	a	third-world	infrastructure	with	developed	world	mentality.	The	American	Colonists	at	the	time	of	the	French	and	Indian	War,	and	even	the	War	of	Independence,	were	primarily	a	nation	of	British	expatriates,	British	citizens	living	abroad.	While	the	Colonists	may	not	have	had	a	similar	set	of	capabilities	and	capacities	honed	by	hundreds	of	years	of	military	conflict,	they	did	have	a	
																																																								
34	A	similar,	more	recent	historical	exchange	of	Military	Assistance	can	be	seen	in	the	Gurkhas	of	India,	where	the	development	of	these	capabilities	originated	from	a	singular	entity.	Just	as	Lord	Howe	for	the	Americans,	so	was	the	British	East	India	Company	Army	for	the	Gurkhas.	George	Evans,	“The	Gurkhas,”	The	
Contemporary	Review	276,	no.	1611	(April	1,	2000):	197.	35	Leckie,	The	Wars	of	America,	57.	36	George	Kennan,	The	Cloud	of	Danger:	Current	Realities	of	American	Foreign	
Policy	(Boston:	Little,	Brown	and	Company,	1977),	38	–	39.	
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fundamental	cultural	understanding	and	motivation	to	desire,	accept,	and	integrate	the	Military	Assistance	offered	to	them.	This	is	relevant	in	that,	while	there	was	no	formal	partnership	per	se,	that	fundamental	cultural	familiarity	allowed	for	an	ease	of	exchange	and	knowledge	transfer.	An	argument	against	this	idea	of	a	unique	exchange	of	capabilities	and	capacities	can	be	seen	in	the	French,	whose	local	Canadian	colonists37	had	likewise	adopted	many	of	the	techniques	of	Native	Americans.	However,	there	is	no	evidence	of	an	exchange	of	tactics	between	the	local	Canadians	and	the	native	French.	In	fact,	there	is	a	great	deal	of	evidence	that	the	French	held	their	colonists	in	the	same	contempt	that	they	did	Native	Americans,38	frequently	threatening	those	Native	Americans	into	submission	and	in	this	regard	affirming	the	French	as	very	similar	in	their	relations	to	Native	Americans	as	the	British.	This	is	relevant	because	it	likely	became	a	factor	that	drove	the	Native	Americans	to	develop	a	relationship,	and	thus	offer	Military	Assistance,	to	the	Colonists,	be	they	of	French	or	British	origins,	because	the	Native	Americans	saw	and	dealt	more	frequently	with	the	Colonists.	
Military	Assistance	and	the	Battle	of	Quebec	The	culmination	of	this	Irregular	Warfare	capability	in	the	French	and	Indian	War	occurred	at	the	Battle	of	Quebec	in	1759.	It	was	the	third	campaign	offensive	for	the	British	and	their	American	Colonists,	the	previous	two	having	ended	in	failure.	While	the	Military	Assistance	that	American	Colonists	had	provided	was	long	past	useful,	having	been	developed	with	an	entirely	different	expedition,	the	Battle	of	Quebec	campaign	was	a	clear	example	of	how	leadership	could	affect	the	outcome	of	smaller	battles,	and	as	a	result	a	larger	theater	of	operations.	Most	importantly,	however,	was	the	critical	value	of	staff	officers	to																																																									
37	It	should	be	noted	that	the	French	used	the	term	“Canada”	and	“New	France”	“interchangeably.“	Germaine	Warkent	in	and	Carolyn	Podruchny,	eds.,	
Decentring	the	Renaissance:	Canada	and	Europe	in	Multidisciplinary	Perspective,	
1500-1700	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	2001),	234,	note	1.	38	Gordon	M.	Sayre,	“John	Smith	and	Samuel	de	Champlain:	Founding	Fathers	and	Their	Indian	Relations,”,	in	Les	Sauvages	Américains:	Representations	of	Native	
Americans	in	French	and	English	Colonial	Literature	(Chapel	Hill,	NC:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	1997),	49-78.	
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develop	the	engineering,	logistical,	and	planning	capabilities	necessary	for	prolonged	campaigns	in	modern	warfare.	The	Colonial	American	officers	here	experienced	all	of	these	capabilities	for	the	first	time.	The	British	military	staff	present	at	the	Battle	of	Quebec	was	a	long	way	from	the	development	of	the	tradition	of	the	Prussian	General	Staff	becoming	institutionalized	at	the	time	under	the	leadership	of	Fredrick	the	Great.39	However,	the	American	Colonists	would	have	seen	the	combined	action	of	the	Royal	Navy	and	Royal	Army,	in	the	forms	of	Admiral	Saunders	and	General	Wolfe,	both	in	conflict	and	working	through	their	differences	to	achieve	military	victory.	In	this	regard,	the	Colonial	American	officers	would	have	seen	the	extraordinarily	confusing	chain	of	command,	one	where	General	Wolfe	had	been	placed	in	charge	of	war	effort	while	Admiral	Saunders	had	a	different	reporting	authority.40	They	would	have	observed	and	possibly	worked	with	the	engineers	assessing	the	breastworks	of	the	French,	and	understood	the	critical	necessity	in	the	emplacement	of	artillery.	Most	important,	the	officers	from	the	American	Colonies	would	have	considered	how	these	capabilities	worked	and	did	not	work	together,	in	addition	to	the	leadership	and	command	personality	necessary	to	create	a	plan	utilizing	all	the	pieces	of	this	particular	puzzle.	
Levels	of	War	in	the	French	and	Indian	War	Within	the	dynamics	of	the	levels	of	warfare,	the	French	and	Indian	War	presents	a	case	that	on	its	surface	level	is	simplistic	at	best:	the	British	and	the	American	Colonists	won,	while	the	French	and	their	allies	lost.	The	facts,	however,	present	a	far	more	interesting	case:	until	the	final	campaign	and	the	Battle	of	Quebec	in	1759,	the	British	had	consistently	lost,	a	scenario	of	losing	each	battle	but	ultimately	winning	the	war.	The	difference	is	that	between	the	second	and	third	campaign,	French	tactics	became	divorced	with	broader	French	
																																																								
39	Christopher	Duffy,	The	Army	of	Fredrick	the	Great	(London:	David	&	Charles,	1974),	143-149.	40	It	may	well	be	that	these	experiences	contributed	to	the	American	method	of	military	leadership,	which	was	to	have	a	clearly	designated	officer	as	the	Commander-in-Chief	during	a	given	campaign	with	clear	lines	of	command	and	control.	
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strategic	endeavors	of	resource	extraction	that	came	to	the	fore,	and	created	a	stir	of	trying	to	project	power	in	the	form	of	territorial	expansion	with	little	or	no	planning	behind	the	strategic	shift.41	It	could	easily	be	argued	that	this	confusion	in	French	strategy	began	much	earlier,	with	the	building	of	a	new	fort	at	what	is	now	Pittsburgh.	When	American	Colonists,	being	led	by	then	Major	Washington,	requested	that	the	French	leave	what	the	Colonists	considered	British	territory,	the	French	attacked	the	Colonists.	Had	the	French	continued	to	solely	focus	on	resource	extraction,	which	was	how	their	military	and	political	assets	were	organized,	the	possibility	of	threatening	British	territory	would	have	been	unlikely.	This	is	a	disconnect	of	the	French	Grand	Strategy	that	would	ultimately	prove	its	undoing	on	the	continent	and	the	Seven	Years	War.	Relating	back	to	Military	Assistance,	this	attack	initially	motivated	the	British	only	to	give	Military	Aid,	in	the	form	of	arms	and	training,	but	grew	to	include	Military	Support,	in	the	form	of	British	soldiers	and	officers,	and	Military	Assistance,	in	the	forms	of	training	and	command	structure,	which	expanded	their	capacities	by	developing	the	American	Colonists’	capabilities	—	a	complete	Military	Intervention.	This	exercise	would	have	been	meaningless	had	the	entire	endeavor	not	been	linked	with	the	strategic	level	of	warfare	and	a	political	objective	—	a	grand	strategy.	Understanding	that	Military	Assistance	is	a	tool,	and	not	a	strategy,	to	implement	national	policy	creates	an	appreciation	for	how	the	British	used	that	tool,	and	by	so	doing,	expanded	the	capacities	of	the	British	military	by	creating	the	capabilities	of	the	American	Colonists.	This	demonstrates	how	the	tactical	level	of	warfare	was	nested	within	the	broader	British	strategic	narrative.	That	strategic	narrative	was	one	of	development	and	colonization	focusing	on	the	British	goals	of	expanding	its	empire,	one	with	which	the	French	expansion	efforts	was	bound	to	create	conflict.	The	French	began	the	entire	endeavor	in	North	America	during	the	French	and	Indian	War	conflict	period	by	locating	the	original	fort,	Fort	Duquesne,	nearby	what	is	now	Pittsburg.	Whether	it	was	planned	or	not,	the	British	believed	that	the	French	were	trying	to	extend	and	expand	their	power	in	North																																																									
41	Anderson,	Crucible	of	War,	11-32.	
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America,42	using	territorial	expansion	in	a	manner	very	like	previous	British	efforts	in	the	Americas	to	project	influence.	Since	these	were	the	days	of	slow	communications	and	minimal	level	of	introspection,	one	certainly	operating	from	the	Realist	school	of	international	relations,	the	British	interpreted	the	actions	of	the	French	as	little	other	than	an	attempt	by	the	French	to	exploit	the	position	of	the	British	and	the	gaps	in	their	security.	With	respect	to	the	operational	framework,	the	emplacement	of	the	fort	was	a	disconnect	for	the	French	between	the	actions	they	were	implementing	—	projecting	the	expansion	of	their	territory	—	and	their	actual	and	state	strategic	goals,	namely	resource	extraction.	The	fort	did	not	facilitate	their	resource	extraction	efforts,	neither	from	a	capability	or	capacity	basis.	Due	to	the	efforts	by	the	French	to	project	power,	when	then	Major	Washington	came	to	request	the	fort’s	dismantling,	the	request	was	automatically	dismissed.	These	efforts	are	consistent	with	the	French	attempt	to	create	a	more	permanent	colony	in	the	Americas,	although	there	is	little	evidence	to	support	a	claim	that	the	French	planned	to	develop	a	broader	set	of	capacities	or	capabilities.	However,	it	could	be	argued	that	there	was	an	increased	security	posture	presented	by	the	French,	thereby	being	considered	as	the	further	development	of	capacities	and	capabilities.	On	the	other	hand,	those	capabilities	and	capacities	did	not	nest	within	the	strategic	goals	of	the	French,	and	therefore	were	not	conducive	toward	the	operational	framework.	Had	the	French	properly	nested	these	efforts,	or	at	the	very	least	thought	through	their	implications	under	a	strategic	framework,	the	outcome	might	have	changed.	However,	there	can	be	little	question	as	to	the	fact	that	the	French,	while	able	to	win	many	the	battles	of	the	French	and	Indian	War,	eventually	lost	and	were	essentially	ejected	from	the	continent.	Ultimately,	however,	there	were	no	permanent	efforts	by	the	French	to	develop	capacities	and	capabilities	during	the	time	of	the	French	and	Indian	War,	and	as	such,	it	is	difficult	to	appreciate	the	strategic	efforts	of	the	French	under	the	levels	of	warfare.	This	is	due	to	the	underlying	resource	extraction	strategy																																																									
42	Anderson,	Crucible	of	War,	15-17.	
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being	pursued	by	the	French,	which	was	properly	nested	through	the	operational	framework,	from	the	tactical	level	of	warfare	to	the	operational	level	of	warfare,	but	not	to	the	strategic	level	of	warfare.	Each	of	these	factors	collectively	reinforce	the	paradigm	of	the	inability	of	the	French	during	the	French	and	Indian	War	to	develop	a	Military	Assistance	mission	that	contributed	to	the	broader	strategic	narrative	being	pursued	by	the	French	Empire	of	the	18th	century.	This	was	a	challenge	to	the	paradigm	existing	within	the	traditional	construct	of	colonies	and	colonists,	which	may	have	occurred	simply	in	the	course	of	the	pressure	of	the	French	creating	the	necessity	to	extend	their	existing	capacities	and	capabilities.	Whether	by	accident	or	by	design,	there	is	a	great	deal	of	evidence	that	the	British	commanders,	with	the	notable	exception	of	Brigadier	Lord	Howe,	did	not	think	much	of	their	American	Colonists.43	However,	the	response	to	the	power	projection	efforts	of	the	French	was	to	develop	the	capacities	and	capabilities	among	the	American	Colonists.	It	was	necessary	to	extend	those	efforts	to	maintain	a	sustainable	security	in	the	Colonies	through	the	creation	of	military	institutions	and	structure,	which,	ironically	would	prove	to	be	the	undoing	of	the	British.	The	development	of	sustainable	security	through	an	expansion	of	capabilities	and	capacities	was	possible	because	of	the	alignment	of	strategic	purpose	between	the	American	Colonists	and	the	British,	namely,	that	both	desired	the	British	Empire	to	be	the	dominant	power	in	the	New	World.	This	strategic	narrative	was	the	basis	for	the	tactics	pursued	by	the	British	and	American	Colonists	that	were	finally	victorious	against	the	French.	Since	their	efforts	were	properly	nested	between	their	strategic	goals	and	tactical	operations,	the	British	and	American	Colonists	were	able	to	sustain	continuous	campaign	setbacks,	yet	eventually	were	able	to	accomplish	their	strategic	goals	in	the	French	and	Indian	War	and	emerge	victorious.		
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Military	Assistance	and	the	Origins	of	the	American	Military	Although	the	origins	of	the	American	Military	can	be	found	in	the	capacities	and	capabilities	developed	through	the	experiences	of	the	American	Colonists	during	the	French	and	Indian	War,	the	War	of	Independence	has	an	origin	of	separate,	almost	regional	beginnings.	Indeed,	the	New	Englanders	who	started	in	Concord	and	Lexington	had	little	in	common	with	the	landowners	of	the	South,	who,	while	displeased	with	British	policy,	were	not	as	committed	to	declaring	open	war	on	the	Crown.44	While	the	Continental	Congress	was	formed	to	help	unify	the	Thirteen	Colonies,	it	was	the	proposal	of	Massachusetts	Representative,	John	Adams,	to	appoint	then	Virginia	Militia	Colonel	George	Washington	to	be	the	Commander-in-Chief	of	the	Continental	Army.	This	calculated	action	on	Adams’	part	was	to	help	bring	the	South	into	the	revolution,	to	create	a	sense	of	unity	of	purpose	among	all	the	Thirteen	Colonies.	The	result	was	that	the	United	States	unified	in	some	respects,	not	necessarily	by	the	cause,	but	in	a	practical	sense,	by	the	formation	of	the	Continental	Army.	When	the	Seven	Years’	War	between	France	and	Great	Britain	had	ended,	many	European	officers	saw	their	career	prospects	stall	and	the	American	War	of	Independence	provided	an	opportunity	to	those	officers	to	continue	employment	in	the	only	profession	they	knew.	This	was	common	practice	in	Europe	in	the	18th	century.	Officers	would	be	awarded	their	commission	from	one	nation	and	after	a	period	of	service	to	their	nation,	if	circumstances	warranted,	would	request	a	commission	in	another	nation’s	military.45	Baron	Friedrich	de	Steuben	was	one	such	officer.	Raised	in	a	military	household,	training	from	a	young	child	for	a	life	in	the	Prussian	military,	Steuben	attended	the	Prussian	version	of	a	staff	college	under	the	tutelage	of	Fredrick	the	Great,	and	became	a	rising	star	in	Prussian	military																																																									
44	James	MacDonald,	“Appointment	as	Commander	in	Chief,”	George	
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circles.	However,	Steuben’s	climb	in	the	Prussian	Army	was	prevented	by	some	competing	rivals,	ending	in	his	being	unceremoniously	ousted	from	the	Prussian	Army	in	1763.	After	being	employed	in	various	households	in	Europe,	he	petitioned	for	a	commission	from	the	Americans,	who	were	recruiting	European	military	officers.46	Accepting	the	opportunity	to	be	a	soldier	again,	he	travelled	to	General	Washington’s	camp,	developing	relationships	with	many	of	the	factions	of	Revolutionary	America.	Upon	arrival	at	Valley	Forge,	he	made	numerous	recommendations	to	General	Washington,	and	eventually	was	appointed	the	Inspector	General	of	the	Continental	Army,	a	position	responsible	for	the	training	and	development	of	the	Army.	Specifically,	he	was	given	a	few	weeks	to	train	the	Continental	Army	to	fight	the	British,	who	were	perceived	at	the	time	to	be	one	of	the	best	militaries	in	Europe.47	The	training	and	development	that	Steuben	instituted	was	not	unique,	and	other	European	officers	who	had	received	commissions	in	the	Continental	Army	remarked	as	such.	What	Steuben	did	instinctively	understand,	even	better	than	many	American	officers	themselves,	was	how	different	the	America	citizens	were	compared	to	the	conscripts	of	Europe.	As	Steuben	wrote	a	friend	later	in	his	life,	“The	genius	of	this	nation	is	not	to	be	compared…with	that	of	the	Prussians,	Austrians,	or	French.	You	say	to	your	soldier,	‘Do	this,’	and	he	does	it;	but	I	am	obliged	to	say,	‘This	is	the	reason	why	you	ought	to	do	that,’	and	then	he	does	it.”48	In	this	regard,	Steuben	was	challenging	the	paradigm	of	the	American	officers,	who	themselves	were	modeled	from	the	British	from	their	experiences	
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both	during	the	French	and	Indian	War	and	in	the	Colonies.	The	British	model	of	officer-ship	however,	was	one	of	detachment,	allowing	the	non-commissioned	officers	to	provide	much	of	the	interaction	with	the	soldiers.	The	Prussian	model	was	one	in	which	the	officers	progressed	through	the	lowest	ranks,	being	treated	as	an	officer	trainee,	and	then	ultimately	training	soldiers	on	the	technical	aspects	of	the	profession.	Steuben	modified	this	model	for	the	Continental	Army	and	American	culture	and	in	this	aspect,	Steuben	intuitively	embraced	the	concept	of	the	tactical,	operational,	and	strategic	levels	of	warfare.	Washington’s	war	strategy	was	to	pursue	a	war	of	attrition.	He	believed,	and	was	proven	correct,	that	the	debt	of	obligations	of	the	British	were	such	that	the	British	public	would	not	meet	a	protracted	war	in	a	distant	land	with	support	either	politically	or	financially.	He	also	knew	that	a	key	factor	in	defeating	the	British	was	drawing	other	European	powers	into	a	military	alliance	with	the	nascent	nation.	This	meant	taking	tactical	losses,	sometimes	very	difficult	ones	such	as	the	retreats	from	New	York	and	then	Philadelphia.	Washington	held	this	strategy	in	order	to	maintain	the	very	existence	of	the	Continental	Army,	and	to	perpetuate	the	belief	that	the	American	Colonies	could	and	would	maintain	the	protracted	war	effort.	As	a	result,	while	Steuben	shouted	and	ordered	on	the	drill	field	at	Valley	Forge,	he	infused	a	level	of	pride	and	confidence	in	the	Continental	Army,	which	in	the	modern	military	is	defined	as	morale.	More	importantly,	however,	Steuben	inculcated	a	professionalism	and	discipline	within	the	Continental	Army	where	none	had	existed	prior	to	his	arrival.49	This	discipline	and	professionalism	was	the	connection	between	the	tactical	level	of	warfare	and	the	strategic	goals	for	which	Washington	was	striving,	the	“why”	of	warfare,	essentially	creating	the	link	between	tactics	and	General	Washington’s	strategy.	Steuben	developed	both	the	capacity	and	capability	of	the	Continental	Army.	The	capacity	he	expanded	by	developing	a	training	regime	that	would	institute	a	confidence	in	the	Army	such	that	it	could	do	more	with	the	little	it	had.	The	capability	he	similarly	deepened,	by	imparting	military	skills	where	little	had	previously	existed.	This	experience	of	Military	Assistance,	unlike	the	previous																																																									
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examples,	was	one	where	there	was	no	expression	of	power	projection	by	another	state.	Indeed,	there	was	no	other	state	involvement,	since	Steuben	was	to	a	certain	degree	a	man	without	a	nation,	and	certainly	a	man	without	an	agenda	on	behalf	of	another	nation.	While	many	other	foreign	officers	had	ties	with	their	former	nations	to	varying	degrees,	Steuben	had	not	lived	much	in	Prussia	since	1763.	Therefore,	when	examining	the	Military	Assistance	rendered	by	Steuben,	there	is	a	unique	aspect	that	does	not	apply,	simply	because	there	was	no	supporting	nation	using	Steuben	as	a	tool	with	which	to	project	power.	Even	looking	at	Stoker’s	model,	none	of	the	six	general	categories	fit,	given	Steuben’s	status	as	a	lone	operator.	He	was	simply	a	man	with	the	right	skills	at	the	right	time	and	in	the	right	place,	a	place	that	had	the	right	need	and	exactly	the	right	leaders	willing	to	incorporate	his	knowledge	into	their	efforts.	The	importance	of	Steuben	cannot	be	minimized,	and	though	he	did	not	know	it	at	the	time,	Steuben	was	developing,	through	his	training	and	later	writing	of	the	original	rules	and	regulations	of	the	Continental	Army,	the	basis	that	would	become	the	foundation	for	the	United	States	Army.50	In	essence,	he	created	the	foundations	for	institutional	development	that	would	extend	far	beyond	his	service.	At	the	same	time,	it	is	accurate	to	state	that	what	Steuben	wrote	was	not	so	unique	that	it	created	a	paradigm	shift	in	thinking,	such	as	those	by	Fredrick	the	Great	or	Napoleon,	or	any	of	the	other	military	innovators	of	the	day.	However,	Steuben	did	understand	how	to	take	aspects	of	the	Prussian	system,	marry	it	with	French	military	thinking,	and	simplify	both,	to	adapt	these	into	a	system	for	adoption	into	an	American	practical	process.	By	developing	a	basis	for	the	Continental	Army,	Steuben	was	developing	an	institutional	foundation	whereby	the	United	States	could	operate	within	the	international	regime,	furthering	its	alliance	to	the	French	and	eventually	leading	to	alliances	with	Spain	and	other	European	powers.	It	is	this	memory	which	exists	in	the	traditions	and	lineage	of	the	United	States	Army	to	this	day.51	As	such,	it	is	logical	to	recognize	that	those	traditions	assist	in	creating	a	social	construct	that																																																									
50	“Publisher’s	Note,”	in	Baron	von	Steuben's	Revolutionary	War	Drill	Manual:	A	
Facsimile	Reprint	of	the	1794	Edition	(New	York:	Dover	Publications,	1985).	51	Collins,	“How	Military	Strategists	Should	Study	History,”	31-44.	
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continues	to	affect	the	manner	in	which	the	United	States	Armed	Forces	view	Military	Assistance.	Military	Assistance	and	the	American	Army’s	Initial	Conflicts	The	initial	conflicts	of	the	nation	did	little	to	change	or	develop	the	military	footprint	in	the	United	States.	Whether	it	was	the	various	conflicts	with	Native	Americans,	the	Barbary	Wars,	or	the	rebellions	that	began	from	time	to	time,	most	notably	the	Shays	and	Whiskey	rebellions,	none	of	these	military	engagements	had	much	of	an	impact	on	the	broader	military	buildup	or	evolution	of	the	United	States.	Congress	under	both	the	Articles	of	Confederation	and	then	the	United	States	Constitution	always	had	more	pressing	business	than	authorizing	an	appropriate	military	force	posture.	Indeed,	given	the	experience	of	the	War	of	Independence,	and	prior,	with	respect	to	the	British	Army,52	the	public	was	suspicious	of	standing	armies.53	Although	Congress	had	little	interest	in	creating	or	developing	an	appropriate	military	foundation	or	structure,	the	War	of	1812	provided	an	abrupt	awakening.	Even	though	this	War	ended	quietly,	much	like	it	had	begun,	it	did	have	an	enormous	psychological	impact,	as	it	pertained	to	expanding	the	capacity	and	capabilities	of	the	United	States	Armed	Forces.	It	was	after	the	War	of	1812	that	Congress	began	supporting	naval	innovation,54	as	well	as	developing	further	capabilities	regarding	procurement	and	logistics	by	standardizing	the	components,	in	addition	to	centralizing	distribution.55	As	researcher	Adam	Rothstein	states,	“open	and	standardized	systems	improved	manufacturing	performance,	and	we	see	a	new	coordination	between	the	military	and	industry.”56	However,	it	was	Lt.	General	Winfield	Scott	who	would																																																									
52	Alexander	Hamilton,	“Federalist	No.	24,”	in	The	Federalist,	ed.	Terence	Ball	(Cambridge,	UK:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2003),	110-114.	53	This	gave	rise	to	the	desire	and	ultimately	to	the	ratification	of	the	Third	Amendment	to	the	Constitution:	“No	Soldier	shall,	in	times	of	peace	be	quartered	in	any	house,	without	consent	of	the	Owner,	nor	in	time	of	war,	but	in	a	manner	to	be	proscribed	by	law.”	United	States	Congress,	Constitution	of	the	United	States	
Bill	of	Rights,	1792.	54	Weigley,	The	American	Way	of	War,	60	–	65.	55	Adam	Rothstein,	Drones,	(New	York:	Bloomsbury,	2015)	21.	56	Rothstein,	Drones,	22.	
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define	the	strategic	impact	on	the	19th	century	military	experience,	one	rooted	in	his	own	experiences	with	Military	Assistance.	Scott	grew	up	in	Virginia,	educated	for	a	career	in	law,	which	enabled	his	access	to	the	trial	of	Vice	President	Aaron	Burr.57	After	experience	in	the	local	militia,	he	was	able	to	secure	a	commission	as	a	captain	in	the	light	artillery	from	President	Jefferson,	since	the	Army	was	expanding.	This	would	be	a	constant	for	Scott	both	in	terms	of	his	rank	and	the	political	methods	he	used	to	gain	it,	allowing	him	to	end	the	War	of	1812	as	a	brigadier	general,	having	achieved	that	rank	at	the	age	of	27.58	While	the	Monroe	Doctrine	and	the	Grand	Strategy	that	it	defined	were	the	prevailing	foreign	policies	of	the	period	between	the	War	of	1812	and	the	Civil	War,	the	United	States	was	far	more	absorbed	in	pushing	the	Native	Americans	further	west.	At	first	glance,	the	idea	that	the	European	methods	of	warfare	would	be	most	efficient	against	Native	Americans	could	be	considered	counterintuitive,	since	formations	seemed	poorly	designed	to	fight	an	irregular	combat.	However,	when	there	are	few,	if	any,	concerns	about	the	safety,	or	lives,	of	non-combatants,	the	European	methods	were	surprisingly	effective.	They	were	effective	because	the	focus	of	European	tactics	at	the	time	was	to	mass																																																									
57	Memoirs	of	Lieut.-General	Scott,	LL.	D	(New	York:	Sheldon	&	Company,	1864),	12-15,	accessed	May	20,	2017,	https://archive.org/details/memoirsoflieutge00inscot.	Suzanne	B.	Geissler,	“A	Piece	of	Epic	Action:	The	Trial	of	Aaron	Burr,”	The	Courier	12,	no.	2,	(Spring	1975):	5.	58	It	is	important	to	note	that	the	United	States	Armed	Forces	currently	goes	to	extreme	lengths	to	remain	apolitical	in	every	possible	way,	in	order	to	avoid	the	conditions	of	which	General	Scott	was	able	to	take	advantage.	Office	of	the	Under	Secretary	for	Personnel	and	Readiness,	Department	of	Defense	Directive	1344.10:	
Political	Activities	by	Members	of	the	Armed	Forces,	February	19,	2008,	accessed	March	13,	2015,	http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/134410p.pdf.	However,	the	American	Military	of	the	1800s	had	no	such	reservations,	and	officers	were	routinely	involved	in	dealings	with	politicians,	who	made	numerous	decisions	based	on	political	dealings,	rather	than	what	was	best	for	the	United	States	Military	as	whole.	Steve	Corbett	and	Michael	J.	Davidson,	“The	Role	of	the	Military	in	Presidential	Politics,”	Parameters	39,	no.	4	(Winter	2009-2010):	59-60,	accessed	May	20,	2017,	http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/Articles/09winter/corbett%20and%20davidson.pdf.	
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fires,	which	is	to	say,	a	concentration	of	firepower,	toward	the	enemy,	and	combine	arms,	such	as	artillery	and	cavalry.	Many	of	these	tactics,	along	with	maneuvering	actions	for	logistics	to	support	that,	were	experienced	during	the	Napoleonic	Wars	on	the	European	continent,	and	it	was	there	that	General	Scott	traveled	after	the	War	of	1812.	This	version	of	Military	Assistance	differs	from	the	previous	examples	or	even	the	traditional	understandings	of	Military	Assistance,	namely	that	others	would	be	present	in	the	recipient	nation	to	expand	the	capacities	and	capabilities	of	that	nation’s	military.	In	this	regard,	Scott	was	in	fact	an	importer	of	Military	Assistance,	taking	ideas	and	concepts	that	he	would	learn	and	absorb	from	Europe,	developing	them	into	an	American	method,	and	thereby	utilizing	the	knowledge	of	a	supporting	nation	to	create	and	develop	the	capacities	and	capabilities	of	the	United	States	Armed	Forces.	This	started	with	his	efforts	in	1815	as	presiding	officer	for	the	Board	of	Tactics,	which	essentially	translated	and	minimally	adapted	a	1791	French	manual	on	infantry	tactics.59	His	efforts	continued	when	he	wrote	an	entire	set	of	standardized	regulations	for	the	United	States	Army	in	1818,	drawing	heavily	on	his	European	travels.60	Scott	repeated	this	experience	again	in	1826	in	his	effort	to	develop	and	standardize	other	aspects	of	the	Army,	such	as	engineering,	artillery,	and	ordinance,	among	others.61	Through	each	of	these	developments,	Scott	became	an	importer	of	Military	Assistance.	Understanding	tactics	from	the	French	and	the	British,	general	staffs	and	planning	from	the	Prussians,	these	enrichments	of	capabilities	and	capacities	contributed	to	the	long-term	security	of	the	United	States	after	the	War	of	1812.	Scott’s	importation	of	Military	Assistance	contributed	to	the	tactical	level	of	warfare,	in	that	the	standardization	techniques	the	Army	adopted	were	directly	applied	to	the	Native	Americans	in	the	West.	While	understandably	the	military	actions	against	the	Native	Americans	by	the	United	States	Army	are	now																																																									
59	Timothy	D.	Johnson,	Winfield	Scott:	The	Quest	for	Military	Glory	(Lawrence:	University	Press	of	Kansas,	1998),	68.	60	Johnson,	Winfield	Scott,	75–77.	61	Johnson,	Winfield	Scott,	79.	
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seen	as	neither	moral	nor	ethical,	it	is	still	important	to	acknowledge	the	tactical	effect	in	Scott’s	techniques.	This	tactical	effect	nested	directly	with	the	America’s	strategic	goals	of	a	manifest	destiny,	along	with	a	broader	strategic	political	narrative	of	the	Monroe	Doctrine.	Conclusion	The	idea	within	the	construct	of	the	levels	of	warfare	with	respect	to	the	origins	of	the	American	military	experience	is	one	in	which	the	framework	aids	in	appreciating	the	broader	history	and	context	in	which	the	United	States	Military	views	itself.62	From	the	founding	Western	European	colonies	in	the	North	Americas,	to	the	evolution	and	development	of	the	United	States	Army,	Military	Assistance	is	a	common	thread	and	theme.	The	origins	of	the	United	States	Army,	like	the	origins	of	any	institution,	have	affected	and	molded	the	culture	organizationally	and	strategically.	As	this	chapter	describes,	the	principles	of	the	tools	of	Military	Assistance	are	embedded	within	the	origins	of	the	American	military	culture,	tradition,	and	experience.	This	history	and	context	are	further	perpetuated	by	the	principle	within	the	United	States	Army,	that	its	foundation	as	an	institution	was	strengthened	due	to	its	receiving	Military	Assistance,	and	that	this	foundation	has	been	the	cause	of	its	success.	Indeed,	in	some	of	the	most	significant	but	subtle	ways,	Military	Assistance	has	influenced	the	American	way	of	war,	one	clear	example	being	Steuben’s	adoption	of	equipment	accountability,	a	cultural	aspect	that	influences	the	United	States	Army	to	this	day.	In	and	of	itself	the	concept	of	equipment	accountability	is	seemingly	innocuous;	however,	the	culture	of	accountability	extends	from	an	individual	soldier’s	equipment	to	the	accountability	of	the	personnel	themselves.	That	leaders	within	the	United	States	Armed	Forces	believe	in	continuing	to	apply	this	concept	of	accountability	of	personnel	supports	the	morale	of	the	entire	military	culture.	Similarly,	many	of	Steuben’s	drill	and	ceremonial	exercises	have	continued	to	be	carried	out	in	United	States	Army	units	to	this	day.	Here,	simple	ideas	imported	in	1777,	due	to	the	frugality	
																																																								
62	Weigley,	The	American	Way	of	War,	65	–	66.	
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of	an	imported	Prussian	officer,	have	expanded	into	an	organizational	cultural	bedrock	of	the	United	States	Armed	Forces.	It	is	these	institutionalized	and	ingrained	memories	enshrined	within	the	United	States	Armed	Forces	that	the	tool	of	Military	Assistance	creates	to	develop	capacities	and	capabilities.	Given	the	intimate	experience	with	Military	Assistance	as	a	foundation	of	the	United	States	Army,	from	its	birth	in	the	Colonies	to	United	States’	emergence	as	a	great	power,	it	is	only	natural	that	the	institution	has	a	visceral	connection	to	Military	Assistance.	More	specifically,	on	both	a	policy	basis	and	a	level	of	strategic	thinking,	it	is	on	this	foundation	that	the	United	States	Armed	Forces	continue	to	hold	that	Military	Assistance	is	a	viable	tool.	The	commonality	among	these	seemingly	disparate	military	experiences	of	the	United	States	supports	the	process	of	adoption	and	internalizing	from	a	cultural	aspect	of	Military	Assistance.	Ultimately,	the	reason	the	United	States	Armed	Forces	views	Military	Assistance	as	a	viable	tool	to	work	within	the	international	framework	is	that	it	developed	this	structure,	which	it	values	as	the	basis	for	its	success.	
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Chapter	4	The	United	States	and	the	Republic	of	Korea:	A	Case	Study	in	Successful	Military	Assistance		When	examining	Military	Assistance	as	a	tool	of	foreign	policy	from	the	perspective	of	the	United	States,	the	most	relevant	time	period	to	be	considered	is	after	WWII.	It	was	at	this	time	that	the	United	States	emerged	on	the	world	stage	as	the	dominant	power	in	the	Western	world,	doing	so	through	international	forums	and	alliances	such	as	the	United	Nations	and	the	North	Atlantic	Treaty	Organization	(NATO).	In	the	post-WWII	environment,	the	United	States	pursued	a	policy	of	Military	Intervention	utilizing	the	tools	of	Military	Assistance,	Military	Support,	and	Military	Aid.	In	some	cases,	this	policy	was	instituted	so	as	to	influence	another	nation’s	progress,	and	in	other	instances	to	develop	relationships	with	the	leaders,	but	in	all	cases	to	prevent	the	spread	of	Communism	and	the	growing	influence	of	the	Soviet	Union	—	the	pursuit	of	the	Grand	Strategy	of	the	Truman	Doctrine.	While	the	United	States	was	neither	successful	nor	moral	in	every	scenario	related	to	the	pursuit	of	its	interests,	it	did	so	under	a	perceived	ideal	of	expanding	its	influence	through	the	empowerment	of	institutional	development	in	the	post-WWII	order	and	with	the	motivation	of	preventing	the	rise	of	Communism.	The	experience	of	the	United	States’	relationship	with	Korea,	and	later	South	Korea,	offers	an	example	of	these	pursuits	through	the	tool	of	Military	Assistance.	This	chapter	will	examine	and	analyze	the	United	States’	relationship	with	South	Korea	before	and	during	the	Korean	War,	the	extent	to	which	this	ongoing	relationship	was	developed	and	forged	by	the	tool	of	Military	Assistance	into	a	sustainable	security	for	South	Korea,	and	how	Military	Assistance	contributed	to	American	Grand	Strategy.	To	understand	the	origins	of	this	discussion,	it’s	important	to	appreciate	that	while	the	rest	of	the	world	was	modernizing	through	the	industrial	revolution	in	the	19th	century,	what	little	power	and	influence	Korea	had	was	waning.	This	was	due	primarily	to	isolation	and	rebellion,	and	ultimately	Korea	was	conquered	and	annexed	by	the	Japanese	starting	in	1910,	ending	a	five-century-
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old	dynasty	that	had	grown	insular	and	corrupt.1	The	occupation	of	the	Japanese,	which	lasted	until	the	end	of	WWII,	was	a	traumatic	experience	for	the	Korean	people	and	one	which	provoked	a	challenging	dynamic	between	the	Korean	people	and	the	American	Military	Government	after	WWII.2	Many	elements	of	the	Korean	establishment,	and	as	a	result,	the	Korean	population,	resisted	American-led	rule	of	their	homeland	and	opted	out	of	the	process,	thereby	siphoning-off	much	of	the	legitimacy	from	the	endeavor.	This	resulted	in	enabling	Dr.	Syngman	Rhee	to	seize	power	virtually	unopposed	in	the	newly	formed	Republic	of	Korea	in	1948.3	Many	factors	led	to	the	Korean	War,	leaving	scholars	to	examine	and	re-examine	the	war	even	now,	seventy	years	later.	Although	the	reverberations	of	the	Korean	War	continue	to	play	into	the	general	affairs	in	the	region,	specifically	due	to	North	Korea’s	continuous	quest	for	weapons	of	mass	destruction,	the	war	also	had	an	enormous	impact	on	the	developing	relationship	between	the	United	States	and	the	newly-formed	Republic	of	Korea	(South	Korea	or	ROK).	While	it	is	not	the	purpose	of	this	chapter	to	examine	the	origins	of	war	in	the	process	of	appreciating	the	dynamics	of	the	ongoing	military	relationship	between	South	Korea	and	the	United	States,	it	is	crucial	to	understand	the	relationship	in	context.	Historical	Context	At	the	Yalta	conference	in	1945,	President	Roosevelt	secured	an	agreement	with	Soviet	Union	leader	Joseph	Stalin	to	support	the	Allies	against	Japan	in	the	Pacific	Theater	of	WWII	after	achieving	victory	in	Europe.4	In	August	of	1945,	during	the	period	when	the	United	States	dropped	atomic	bombs	on	Hiroshima	and	Nagasaki,	the	Soviet	Union	revoked	its	neutrality	agreement	with	the																																																									
1	James	F.	Schnabel,	The	United	States	Army	in	the	Korean	War:	Policy	and	
Direction:	The	First	Year	(Washington,	D.C.:	Center	of	Military	History,	1992),	2-3.	2	Bonnie	B.	C.	Oh,	ed.,	Korea	under	the	American	Military	Government,	1945-1948	(Westport,	CT:	Praeger,	2002),	1-2.	3	Jinwung	Kim,	“South	Korea,”	in	The	Ashgate	Research	Companion	to	the	Korean	
War,	eds.	James	I.	Matray	and	Donald	W.	Boose	(Farnham,	UK:	Ashgate	Pub.	Ltd,	2014),	27.	4	Schnabel,	The	United	States	Army	in	the	Korean	War,	7.	
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Japanese	and	declared	war	on	Japan.	The	Soviets	immediately	began	invading	Manchuria,	which	threatened	Japan’s	supply	chain,	and	at	the	same	time	positioning	troops	to	attack	into	the	Korean	peninsula.5	This	led	the	Japanese	leadership	to	begin	serious	discussions	on	surrender,	resulting	in	the	eventual	signing	on	the	decks	of	the	USS	Missouri,	and	placing	command	of	the	Far	East,	including	South	Korea,	with	General	Douglas	MacArthur.	As	the	war	in	the	Pacific	drew	to	a	close,	many	within	the	United	States	Armed	Forces	and	the	Truman	Administration	knew	that	the	Cold	War	with	the	Soviet	Union	was	just	beginning.6	In	Washington,	D.C.,	military	planners	were	discussing	how	Korea	would	be	dealt	with	after	Japan’s	surrender,	and	it	was	then	arbitrarily	decided	that	the	38th	parallel	would	act	as	a	demarcation	point	between	North	and	South.7	The	Soviet	Union	agreed,	and	marched	its	forces	to	the	line	of	the	38th	parallel.	There	they	waited	at	the	newly-drawn	border	until	Lieutenant	General	John	Hodge	landed	“the	25,000-strong	24th	Corps	of	the	United	States	Tenth	Army”8	at	Inchon	in	September	of	1945,	before	occupying	the	remaining	southern	half	of	the	peninsula.	Both	the	Soviet	Union	and	the	United	States	were	backing	leaders	who	would	support	their	respective	political	goals	in	order	to	accomplish	their	respective	efforts	of	a	Grand	Strategy	at	work	throughout	the	world.	On	the	Korean	peninsula	the	Soviet	Union	was	supporting	Kim	Il-sung,	who	had	proven	himself	to	the	Soviets	by	serving	with	the	Red	Army	in	WWII.	For	the	United	States	it	was	Dr.	Rhee	who	had	developed	good	relations	
																																																								
5	The	Learning	Network,	“Aug.	9,	1945:	U.S.	Drops	Atomic	Bomb	on	Nagasaki,”	
The	New	York	Times,	August	9,	2011,	accessed	June	23,	2015,	http://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/09/aug-9-1945-u-s-drops-atomic-bomb-on-nagasaki-japan.	6	Lewis	H.	Gann	and	Peter	Duignan,	“World	War	II	and	the	Beginning	of	the	Cold	War”	(Stanford,	CA:	Hoover	Institution	on	War,	Revolution,	and	Peace,	Stanford	University,	1996),	1,	17-18,	and	30-32.	7	William	Stueck,	Rethinking	the	Korean	War:	A	New	Diplomatic	and	Strategic	
History	(Princeton,	NJ:	Princeton	University	Press,	2002),	11	–	13.	8	Oh,	Korea	under	the	American	Military	Government,	1945-1948,	3.	
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with	the	United	States	military	and	diplomatic	leaders	since	the	Russo-Japanese	War	in	1904.9	For	the	next	few	years	the	American	Military	Government	acted	as	the	administration	of	South	Korea,	until	the	United	Nations	agreed	on	a	plan	leading	to	the	election	of	a	legislative	body	and	an	eventual	constitution.10	The	Soviet	Union	protested	the	adoption	of	the	United	Nations	plan	under	the	grounds	that	it	violated	the	United	Nations	Charter.	Rhee	was	elected	by	the	South	Korean	legislature	as	the	first	President	of	the	ROK,	and	proceeded	to	embark	on	creating	a	government	that	quickly	became	known	as	thoroughly	corrupt	and	incompetent.11	The	American	Military	Government	withdrew,	as	did	most	of	the	United	States	Armed	Forces	except	for	the	500-man	Korean	Military	Advisory	Group	(KMAG).	It	was	under	these	auspices	that	Kim	Il-sung,	as	leader	of	the	Democratic	People’s	Republic	of	Korea	(North	Korea	or	DPRK),	established	in	1948,	launched	an	offensive	in	June	of	1950,	the	beginning	of	the	Korean	War.12	The	Truman	Administration	was	able	to	gain	approval	to	intervene	by	the	United	Nations	Security	Council	due	to	the	Soviet	Union’s	boycotting	its	seat	on	the	Security	Council,	a	boycott	ironically	started	because	the	United	Nations	had	not	granted	the	new	government	in	China,	the	Peoples’	Republic,	the	Chinese	seat	on	the	Security	Council,	instead	leaving	that	power	with	Chiang	Kai-shek’s	Republic	of	China	on	Taiwan.13	After	obtaining	United	Nations	Security	Council	
																																																								
9	Michael	Breen,	“Fall	of	Korea’s	First	President	Syngman	Rhee	in	1960,”	The	
Korean	Times,	April	10,	2010,	accessed	July	2,	2015,	https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/01/113_64364.html.	10	Schnabel,	The	United	States	Army	in	the	Korean	War,	26-27.	11	Kim,	“South	Korea,”	in	The	Ashgate	Research	Companion	to	the	Korean	War,	eds.	Matray	and	Boose,	30.	12	Hakjoon	Kim,	“North	Korea,”	in	The	Ashgate	Research	Companion	to	the	Korean	
War,	eds.	Matray	and	Boose,	37.	13	The	Soviet	boycott	was	in	protest	of	Chiang	Kai-shek’s	Republic	of	China	on	Taiwan’s	continuing	to	hold	China’s	permanent	seat	on	the	UN	Security	Council	rather	than	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	on	the	mainland.	The	Learning	Network,	“Oct.	25,	1971:	People’s	Republic	of	China	In,	Taiwan	Out,	at	U.N.,”	The	
New	York	Times,	October	25,	2011,	accessed	September	3,	2015,	https://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/25/oct-25-1971-peoples-republic-of-china-in-taiwan-out-at-un.	
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authority	under	United	Nations	Security	Council	Resolution	82,14	the	United	States	counterattacked	with	a	coalition	of	United	Nations	forces.15	The	next	three	years	of	fighting	up	and	down	the	peninsula	eventually	ended	in	a	stalemate	in	1953	around	an	area	eventually	known	as	the	demilitarized	zone	or	DMZ.	The	DMZ	that	was	established	under	the	Korean	Armistice	Agreement	in	1953	was	a	far	more	natural	barrier	than	the	initial	line	of	the	38th	parallel,	and	has	remained	to	this	day	the	dividing	line	between	North	and	South	Korea.16	
Republic	of	Korea	as	a	Successful	State	To	appreciate	the	extent	to	which	the	Military	Assistance	to	the	ROK	Army	may	have	impacted	the	United	States	and	its	alliance	with	the	ROK,	it	is	necessary	to	consider	what	constitutes	a	successful	state	and	why	the	ROK	can	be	considered	as	such.	For	example,	is	a	successful	state	one	that	could	be	an	example	to	others,	having	progressed	throughout	a	period	of	years?	While	there	can	be	no	question	about	any	state	being	perfect,	all	having	their	issues	and	challenges,	the	specific	dynamics	that	constitute	a	successful	state	and	to	what	extent	might	well	be	a	Western	construct.	Despite	this	perspective,	at	the	end	of	the	Korean	War,	South	Korea	was	by	any	standard	a	decimated	nation.	Furthermore,	unlike	the	Western	European	nations	after	WWII,	the	newly	created	Republic	of	Korea	did	not	have	similar	capacities	or	capabilities	upon	which	to	draw.	Western	European	nations,	despite	having	been	the	stage	of	over	ten	years	of	war	throughout	WWII,	had	capacity	and	capability,	and	in	addition,	a	level	of	modernity	prior	to	the	outbreak	of	WWII	that	South	Korea	did	not	possess.	Having	endured	Japanese	occupation	since	1910,	and	prior	to	that,	an	imperial-styled	monarchy	that	was	decidedly	isolationist,	South	Korea	had	not	created	a	high	level	of	expertise	in	developing	an	infrastructure	or	industrial-based	capacity	that	would	be																																																									
14	United	Nations	Security	Council,	Resolution	82,	“Complaint	of	aggression	upon	the	Republic	of	Korea,”	June	25,	1950,	accessed	September	5,	2015,	http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/82(1950).	15	These	were	not	blue-helmeted	United	Nations	peacekeeping	forces	but	a	wartime	coalition	far	more	similar	to	NATO	operations.	16	William	Stueck,	The	Korean	War:	An	International	History	(Princeton,	NJ:	Princeton	University	Press,	1995),	210,	238,	and	320.	
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recognized	as	a	modern	nation.	This	necessitated	the	ROK’s	development	of	these	capacities	and	capabilities	internally,	with	the	aid	and	assistance	of	external	nations,	specifically	the	United	States.	Although	there	can	be	no	question	that	the	development	of	a	nation,	both	politically	and	economically,	has	to	do	with	numerous	factors,	from	culture	to	history	to	natural	resources,	there	are	measurements	that	can	be	examined	and	assessed.	And	“while	most	of	the	world’s	societies	have	endorsed	to	some	extent	modern	(Western)	configurations	such	as	capitalism,	liberalism	and	democracy,	no	single	civilization	or	basic	ideological	principle	has	become	dominant.”17	This	indicates	that	while	the	Western	understandings	of	the	success	of	a	nation	state	have	become	prominent,	there	still	remains	a	broad	debate	within	the	field	for	exploration.	The	parameters	of	the	current	discussion	are	very	much	rooted	in	a	Western	construct	of	the	development	of	human	potential	and	state	building.18	Underlying	all	of	this	discussion,	the	relevance	to	Military	Assistance	and	more	specifically,	to	this	research	project,	is	to	provide	a	context	by	which	the	Republic	of	Korea	could	be	considered	a	“success”	and	relate	this	to	the	Military	Assistance	provided	by	the	United	States.	The	end	of	the	Korean	War,	then,	is	a	natural	place	to	begin	an	examination	of	the	success	of	South	Korea	as	a	state,	since	it	was	imperative	for	South	Korea	to	rebuild	both	economically	and	politically.	While	new	statistics	and	understandings	are	continually	being	developed	to	measure	democratization	and	economic	development,	there	have	been	several	standards	that	have	advanced	from	the	development	community.	One	such	statistic	is	the	Freedom	in	the	World	index,	a	measurement	of	democratization	that	was	created	by	the	NGO	Freedom	House,	which	states	that	the	Freedom	in	the	World	index	“is	the	standard-setting	comparative	assessment	of	global	political	rights	and	civil	
																																																								
17	Kyong	Ju	Kim,	The	Development	of	Modern	South	Korea	(New	York:	Routledge,	2006),	13.	18	Rather	than	delve	into	this	debate,	it	should	suffice	to	acknowledge	that	there	exists	a	substantial	debate	within	the	International	Relations	and	International	Development	fields,	and	that	the	exploration	of	this	debate	is	not	crucial	for	this	research	regarding	Military	Assistance.	
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liberties.”19	Covering	the	years	from	1973	to	2015,	the	index	rated	South	Korea	as	“Not	Free”	in	1973	and	“Free”	in	2015	as	the	state	relates	to	political	rights	and	civil	liberties.20	Although	the	index	does	not	continue	back	to	1953,	research	of	that	time	period	includes	numerous	citations	confirming	South	Korea’s	poor	level	of	freedom.21	Regarding	the	economic	development	aspect,	there	is	no	index	that	has	become	quite	so	renown	in	the	development	field	as	the	Human	Development	Index	or	HDI,	developed	from	the	works	of	Nobel	Laureate	Professor	Amartya	Sen.	An	obvious	statistical	analysis	of	economic	development	might	be	based	on	per	capita	income,	which	is	a	nation’s	Gross	Domestic	Product	divided	by	the	population.	The	goal	of	Per	Capita	Income	to	develop	a	clearer	understanding	of	an	individual’s	purchasing	power	parity	is	a	measurement	of	the	true	cost	of	purchasing	goods	and	services	across	different	countries.	Per	Capita	Income	however,	is	only	part	of	HDI,	which	seeks	to	capture	a	picture	of	a	nation’s	economic	opportunity,	doing	so	not	only	through	Per	Capita	Income	but	also	education,	based	on	literacy	rates,	and	health,	from	measurements	in	life	expectancy.	By	applying	these	three	indicators	in	HDI	and	comparing	it	between	nations,	a	statistical	understanding	emerges	on	where	the	greatest	economic	opportunities	exist	to	survive	and	thrive	in	a	society.22	HDI	has	evolved	and	been	refined	over	the	years,	with	the	latest	review	and	improvement	occurring	in	2010,	and	though	these	refinements	have	affected	the	placement	of	a	nation’s	rank	in	comparison	to	others,	it	cannot	account	for	the	dramatic	shift	of	South	Korea’s	position.	In	1980,	when	the	United	Nations																																																									
19	Freedom	House,	“Freedom	in	the	World,”	accessed	August	22,	2015,	https://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.VbidG5NViko	20	Freedom	House,	“Individual	Country	Ratings	and	Status,	1973-2015	(final)”	accessed	August	22,	2015,	https://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.VbidG5NViko	21	Gregg	Brazinsky,	“Institution	Building:	Civil	Society,”	in	Nation	Building	in	
South	Korea:	Koreans,	Americans,	and	the	Making	of	a	Democracy	(Chapel	Hill:	The	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	2007),	41-70.	22	Sudhir	Anand	and	Amartya	Sen,	“The	Income	Component	of	the	Human	Development	Index,”	Journal	of	Human	Development	1,	no.	1	(2000):	84-85,	accessed	September	19,	2015,	http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14649880050008782.	
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Development	Program,	the	organization	responsible	for	creating	the	yearly	HDI	reports,	began	its	measurements,	South	Korea	was	ranked	45,	which	was	a	high	rank	among	lesser-developed	nations.	This	is	in	comparison	to	the	United	States,	which	was	ranked	2,	and	Australia,	which	was	ranked	1.	By	2013,	South	Korea	had	jumped	to	tie	with	Hong	Kong	(which	does	not	including	the	rest	of	China	or	Taiwan)	at	15,	in	comparison	to	the	United	States’	ranking	of	5	and	Australia’s	of	2.23	Again,	similar	to	the	Freedom	in	the	World	index,	there	is	not	an	HDI	ranking	for	1953,	but	the	state	of	the	South	Korean	economy	can	be	seen	through	the	per	capita	income	of	$1,072	in	1953	whereas	in	2010	it	was	$21,701,	in	1990	US$	and	in	comparison	Australia	is	$7,505,	the	United	States	is	$10,613	in	1953	rising	to	$25,584	and	$30,491	for	Australia	and	the	United	States,	respectively.24	There	can	be	little	debate	that	the	ROK	emerged	from	the	aftermath	of	the	Korean	War	as	an	economic	success,	which	is	not	to	excuse	the	method	and	process	the	ROK	government	pursued	to	achieve	that	success,	nor	the	behaviors	the	United	States	excused	in	order	to	maintain	its	alliance.	The	statistics	simply	show	that	South	Korea	experienced	a	dramatic	economic	evolution	as	a	nation,	rising	to	greater	democratization	and	economic	development.	
Context	of	Military	Assistance	in	South	Korea	With	the	alliance	between	the	United	States	and	South	Korea	and	the	general	use	of	the	tool	of	Military	Assistance	post	WWII,	it	could	be	assumed	that	the	purpose	of	the	military	relationship	is	one	of	military	modernization	and	the	promotion	of	an	ideological	agenda.	In	the	previous	chapter,	Professor	Stoker	was	referenced	regarding	his	model	of	the	six	underlying	categories	of	Military	Assistance,	from	modernization	to	corporatization.	He	outlined	these	six																																																									
23	United	Nations	Development	Programme,	“Table	2:	Human	Development	Index	trends,	1980-2013,”	accessed	August	23,	2015,	http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/table-2-human-development-index-trends-1980-2013.	United	Nations	Human	Development	Programme,	“Korea	(Republic	of),”	in	Human	Development	Report	-	The	Rise	of	the	South:	Human	Progress	in	a	
Diverse	World,	lead	author	Khalid	Malik	(New	York:	United	Nations	Development	Programme,	2013),	accessed	August	23,	2015,	http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/KOR.pdf.	24	The	Maddison-Project,	accessed	August	24,	2015,	http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm,	2013	version.	
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categories	as	a	framework	to	view	Military	Assistance,	and	one	of	these	was	the	category	of	Military	Assistance	“as	a	tool	of	nation	building.”25	This	point	must	be	challenged,	in	that	fundamentally	all	Military	Assistance	is	focused	on	nation-building,	including	in	South	Korea,	as	discussed	below.	Whether	the	emphasis	of	the	Military	Assistance	mission	is	promoting	a	counterinsurgency	strategy	such	as	in	the	case	of	the	Philippines,	or	Military	Assistance	with	a	corporate	emphasis	such	as	Iraq’s	private	security	contractors,	any	of	these	categories	conclude	as	an	effort	to	further	develop	the	capacities	and	capabilities	within	a	nation.	Irrespective	of	whether	nation-building	is	a	good	or	bad	endeavor,	whether	thought	to	be	an	extension	of	a	colonialist	or	a	humanitarian	mindset,	nation-building	fundamentally	is	about	developing	capacities	and	capabilities	within	a	state	with	little	cultural	impact.	Military	Assistance,	the	development	of	capacities	and	capabilities	to	create	a	sustainable	security	within	and	on	behalf	of	a	state,	is	a	part	of	that	nation-building,	but	more	fundamentally	it	is	about	the	pursuit	of	a	political	objective.	Additionally,	it	is	likewise	logical	to	dismiss	Professor	Stoker’s	other	options,	from	“corporatization	of	military	advice”	to	“economic	purpose	or	penetration”	to	“counterinsurgency.”	In	these	categories,	he	describes	companies	and	individuals	who	help	train	foreign	security	forces	for	profit	as	mercenaries,26	whereas	on	the	economic	side	he	describes	Military	Aid.27	There	is	little	evidence	of	mercenaries	being	used	to	any	great	effect	in	South	Korea,	although	the	idea	of	counterinsurgency	efforts	was	an	original	concern	of	ROK	security	forces.	The	DPRK’s	methods	of	infiltration	prior	to	the	Korean	War	were	frequently	deployed,	and	created	numerous	challenges	for	the	American	occupation	prior	to	1948	and	the	ROK	government	thereafter.28	Due	to	this	concern,	one	of	the	primary	missions	of	the	Constabulary	and	then	the	ROK	Army	was	a	focus	on	
																																																								
25	Donald	Stoker,	“The	History	and	Evolution	of	Foreign	Military	Advising	and	Assistance,	1815	–	2007,”	in	Military	Advising	and	Assistance,	ed.	Donald	Stoker	(London:	Routledge,	2008),	2.	26	Stoker,	Military	Advising	and	Assistance,	6.	27	Stoker,	Military	Advising	and	Assistance,	3-4.	28	Kim,	“South	Korea,”	in	The	Ashgate	Research	Companion	to	the	Korean	War,	eds.	Matray	and	Boose,	28-29.	
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infiltration	by	Communists	and	their	sympathizers,	and	this	was	supported	by	the	advisory	efforts	of	the	United	States.29	As	it	turned	out,	this	mission	focus	was	detrimental	to	the	development	of	the	ROK	Army,	as	it	prevented	more	training	and	development	as	a	combat	force,	which	became	apparent	with	the	invasion	of	the	DPRK	as	will	be	discussed	in	this	chapter.	Finally,	the	economic	effort,	or	Military	Aid	as	defined	in	this	research	project,	was	not	a	major	factor	in	the	security	relationship	between	the	United	States	and	South	Korea,	at	very	least	not	prior	to	the	Armistice.	As	Stoker	puts	it,	“nations	selling	the	arms…generally	wanted	to	place	missions	in	foreign	nations	because	they	believed	that	it	gave	them	leverage	for	the	sale	of	arms.	To	the	nation	supplying	the	mission	the	sale	of	weapons	was	far	more	important	than	the	modernization	of	the	military	forces	of	the	country	in	question.”30	This	becomes	an	important	point	for	the	alliance	between	the	United	States	and	South	Korea:	over	the	sixty-plus	years	of	their	security	relationship,	billions	in	Military	Aid	have	been	given	to	South	Korea	by	the	United	States.31	It	is	not	due	to	leverage	that	either	South	Korea	has	over	the	United	States	nor	leverage	that	the	United	States	has	over	South	Korea	that	the	alliance	has	continued.	It	is	due,	however,	to	an	underlying	desire	by	the	United	States	to	assist	in	modernization,	so	that	South	Korea	can	more	fully	maintain	in	its	own	defense,	lessening	the	cost	for	the	United	States	in	manpower	and	resources,	which,	as	a	point	of	policy,	has	been	reducing	the	number	American	troops	over	the	years.32	At	no	time	was	this	more	prevalent	than	between	the	occupation	of	South	Korea	by	the	American	Military	Government	and	the	end	of	the	Korean	War.	Acting	on	behalf	of	the	United	States,	the	little	KMAG	equipment	and	general	logistical	guidance	to	
																																																								
29	Allan	R.	Millet,	“The	Ground	War,	1948-1953,”	in	The	Ashgate	Research	
Companion	to	the	Korean	War,	eds.	Matray	and	Boose,	112-114.	30	Stoker,	Military	Advising	and	Assistance,	3-4.	31	Pil	Ho	Kim,	“Guns	over	Rice:	The	Impact	of	US	Military	Aid	on	South	Korean	Economic	Reconstruction,”	International	Development	Cooperation	Review	Vol	9,	no.	1	(2017),	33-50,	accessed	July	1,	2018,	https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/u.osu.edu/dist/2/20360/files/2017/04/GoR-final-w0lqqp.pdf.	32	Bruce	E.	Bechtol,	Jr.,	“Aftermath,	1953-2013,”	in	The	Ashgate	Research	
Companion	to	the	Korean	War,	eds.	Matray	and	Boose,	421-434.	
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the	Constabulary	and	then	the	ROK	Army	was	focused	on	trying	to	support	them	at	a	minimal	level	of	functioning.	This	was	due	to	the	simple	fact	that	the	KMAG	mission	was	low	on	the	priority	list	for	the	United	States	Armed	Forces	consumed	with	the	occupations	of	Germany	and	Japan,	while	the	United	States	Government	focused	on	the	rebuilding	of	Western	Europe.	Another	scholar,	Derek	Reveron,	defines	the	goals	of	Military	Assistance	(or	as	he	calls	it	“security	assistance”)33	as	the	following:	“creating	favorable	military	balances	of	power;	advancing	areas	of	mutual	defense	or	security	arrangements;	building	allied	and	friendly	military	capabilities	for	self-defense	and	multinational	operations;	and	preventing	crisis	and	conflict.”34	The	difficulty	with	these	goals	is	that	they	are	limited	in	their	scope	primarily	to	the	immediate	threat,	as	opposed	to	taking	a	more	global	perspective.	In	the	case	of	South	Korea,	this	is	certainly	applicable	due	to	having	a	very	realistic	immediate	threat	in	the	north	from	both	the	DPRK	and	China.	There	can	be	no	question	that	this	immediate	threat	is	a	prime	motivator	for	the	actions	and	reactions	in	terms	of	the	security	posture	and	development	of	capabilities	and	capacities	in	South	Korea,	especially	given	the	period	of	focus.	The	challenges,	however,	with	these	underlying	goals	is	that	they	all	take	a	narrow	view	of	comprehensive	United	States’	foreign	policy	interests,	regarding	the	United	States	as	utilizing	the	tool	of	Military	Assistance	solely	under	a	realist																																																									
33	Dr.	Reveron	is	clearly	not	referring	to	“security	assistance”	in	the	United	States	Joint	Staff	doctrinal	definition,	which	is	much	closer	to	the	definition	in	this	dissertation	of	Military	Aid.	Security	Assistance	is	defined	as	“Group	of	programs	authorized	by	the	Foreign	Assistance	Act	of	1961,	as	amended,	and	the	Arms	Export	Control	Act	of	1976,	as	amended,	or	other	related	statutes	by	which	the	United	States	provides	defense	articles,	military	training,	and	other	defense-related	services,	by	grant,	loan,	credit,	or	cash	sales	in	furtherance	of	national	policies	and	objectives.	Security	assistance	is	an	element	of	security	cooperation	funded	and	authorized	by	Department	of	State	to	be	administered	by	Department	of	Defense/Defense	Security	Cooperation	Agency.”	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Publication	3-22:	Foreign	Internal	Defense	(Washington,	D.C.:	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	July	12,	2010),	GL-11.	34	Derek	S.	Reveron,	“From	Confrontation	to	Cooperation:	Weak	States,	Demanding	Allies,	and	the	US	Military,”	eds.	Gordon	Adams	and	Shoon	Murray	
Mission	Creep:	The	Militarization	of	US	Foreign	Policy?	(Washington,	D.C.:	Georgetown	University	Press,	2014),	68.	
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agenda	in	order	to	pursue	its	immediate	interests.	While	there	can	be	no	question	that	the	United	States	pursues	its	foreign	policy	goals	as	part	of	a	broader	interest-based	agenda,	it	must,	as	the	most	powerful	military	in	the	world,	look	beyond	its	immediate	interests	and	into	potential	threats	and	future	conflicts.	In	the	past,	this	was	the	pursuit	of	a	defined	Grand	Strategy.	The	United	States	could	afford	this	privilege	of	assessing	potential	threats	and	futures	because	of	its	economic	power	and	influence.	These	can	and	should	be	seen	in	a	more	global	context,	particularly	against	the	perceived	threat	of	Communism,	which,	given	the	time,	consumed	the	attention	of	the	United	States	as	a	strategy	of	containment.	For	example,	had	the	United	States	simply	pursued	an	interest-based	agenda,	there	can	be	little	question	that	it	would	have	left	Vietnam	far	earlier,	as	the	conflict	began	becoming	more	unpopular,	and	political	leaders	incurred	the	wrath	of	voters	and	the	American	population	in	general.35	The	United	States	continued	its	Military	Intervention,	first	in	the	form	of	Military	Assistance	and	then	in	the	form	of	Military	Support	in	places	such	as	Vietnam,	as	some	would	argue,	well	past	the	viability	of	the	mission.	This	was	due	to	a	commitment	to	the	Truman	Doctrine,	and	coupled	with	the	domino	theory,	defined	American	Grand	Strategy	as	focusing	on	the	containment	of	the	march	of	Communism	around	the	globe.	The	basis,	however,	of	these	concepts	originated	from	the	liberal	neurosis	and	accepted	narrative	that	President	Truman	had	“lost”	China.36	The	politics	of	post-WWII	in	the	United	States	was	dominated	by	the	“Red	Scare”	propagated	by	Senator	Joseph	McCarthy,	a	concept	that	began	with	a	speech	on	9	February	1950,37	barely	four	and	half	months	before	North	Korea	would	cross	the	38th	parallel.	Any	number	of	factors	led	to	the	rise	of	McCarthy,	not	the	least	of	which	was	the	Senator’s	own	desires	for																																																									
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to	Present	(Ithaca,	NY:	Cornell	University	Press,	2006),	129.	36	Arthur	Waldon,	“How	China	was	‘Lost’?:	And	could	it	have	been	saved?,”	The	
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fame	and	glory.	On	the	national	security	front,	McCarthy’s	claims	of	Communist	infiltration	of	the	United	States	Government,	specifically	the	State	Department,	fed	the	idea	that	President	Truman	had	“lost”	China	not	through	lack	of	influence	or	resolve	but	by	purposeful	negligence.38	These	factors	exacerbated	the	domestic	political	dynamics	pushing	Truman	into	a	foreign	policy	corner,	and	are	relevant	to	the	Korean	peninsula	because	they	forced	President	Truman	to	act.	Once	the	DPRK	had	broken	through	the	ROK	Army	defenses	and	the	country	was	in	chaos,	there	was	a	great	possibility	that	the	ROK	would	be	crushed	by	its	enemy	and	simply	cease	to	exist.	However,	partially	due	to	the	domestic	political	pressures	faced	by	Truman	and	his	Administration,	the	United	States	affirmed	the	concept	of	collective	security.	Additionally,	for	the	United	States	the	Korean	War	marks	an	interesting	point	in	the	pursuit	of	war,	from	a	general	abandonment	of	war	as	a	sole	nation	endeavor,	into	an	alliance-based	pursuit,	if	for	no	other	reason	than	to	create	the	perception	publicly	of	an	easing	burden	of	cost	in	manpower	and	expense.	Granted,	in	the	case	of	the	Korean	War,	the	alliance	was	American-led,	but	still	the	United	States	was	operating	under	the	mandate	of	the	United	Nations,	a	similar	dynamic	that	would	be	repeated	in	Vietnam,	although	not	with	the	identical	construct	of	collective	security.	The	other	change	that	the	Korean	War	created	for	the	United	States	was	the	abandonment	of	the	strategy	of	total	war.	Although	General	MacArthur	was	quite	public	about	utilizing	the	combat	strategy	of	total	war	through	the	use	of	nuclear	weapons,	specifically	against	the	Chinese	as	they	entered	the	war	to	assist	the	DPRK,	it	was	the	decision	of	Truman	and	his	Administration	that	from	a	political	perspective,	a	regional	conflict	such	as	the	Korean	War	required	containment,	establishing	Kennan’s	misunderstood	policy	as	the	prime	strategic	prism	through	which	conflicts	would	be	viewed	throughout	the	Cold	War	and	
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solidifying	the	concept	of	limited	warfare	in	the	nuclear	age.39	It	is	this	concept	of	limited	warfare	and	fear	of	being	placed	into	a	quagmire	that	created	this	space	of	Military	Assistance,	especially	in	the	case	of	South	Korea	during	the	American	occupation	and	the	ROK	afterwards.	Military	Assistance	allowed	the	United	States	to	reduce	its	military	footprint,	meaning	the	number	soldiers	in	country,	while	at	the	same	time	cultivating	relationships	and	influence	to	support	the	desired	political	outcome.	Most	critical,	however,	was	that	Military	Assistance	empowered	a	nation	such	as	the	ROK	to	develop	its	capabilities	and	capacities	by	way	of	crafting	methods	and	processes	in	order	to	create	a	long-term,	sustainable	security	situation.	Like	the	political	construct	of	limited	warfare,	the	Armistice	of	1953	between	the	Koreas	was	unlike	previous	conclusions	of	conflicts,	such	as	in	WWI	or	WWII.	It	could,	in	fact,	be	considered	the	continuation	of	the	changing	characteristics	of	warfare	in	the	post-WWII	era,	which	was	that	neither	side	truly	stopped	being	at	war;	there	was	just	a	secession	of	full	spectrum	armed	hostilities.	Each	side	simply	went	back	to	their	respective	physical	areas	to	restructure,	resupply,	and	re-strategize	for	the	next	phase	of	conflict.	This	dynamic	has	happened	in	numerous	post-WWII	conflicts,	from	the	Arab-Israeli	Wars	of	1948,	1967,	and	1973,	as	well	as	the	multiple	military	conflicts	between	India	and	Pakistan.	That	the	Armistice	of	the	Korean	War	displayed	this	new	dynamic	of	warfare	is	not	critical	for	this	research	project,	but	what	is	essential	is	that	the	Armistice	evolved	and	developed	into	a	permanent	level	of	an	amplified	security	posture,	necessitating	a	unique	security	structure	being	put	in	place	that	was	based	on	a	firm	alliance	between	the	ROK	and	similarly	anti-Communist	United	States.	The	reason	for	a	permanent	security	structure	was	due	to	the	permanent	perceived	threat,	in	the	form	of	the	DPRK	and	its	ongoing	sabre	rattling,	as	well	as	a	legal	framework	that	created	a	permanent	mandate,	in	the	form	of	United	Nations	
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Security	Council	Resolution	84.40	In	spite	of	this	security	posture,	it	was	Military	Assistance	that	provided	the	connection	between	the	nations	to	establish	that	sustainable	security.	
The	United	States	and	President	Rhee	—	A	Case	of	Strange	Bedfellows	The	permanent	security	arrangement	between	South	Korea	and	the	United	States	partially	had	its	origins	in	the	relationship	between	the	United	States	and	President	Rhee,	the	nominal	leader	of	the	South	Korean	elite.	Rhee	was	an	individual	whom	the	United	States	had	backed	as	early	as	WWII,	and	other	Korean	elites	supported	him	largely	due	to	that	backing,	although	he	had	been	ousted	in	the	Korean	independence	movement	in	the	1920s.41	However,	this	solidified	an	interesting	American	method	of	operating	foreign	policy,	one	in	which	the	individual	became	the	prime	avenue	of	relationship	rather	than	developing	an	alliance	with	a	nation	state	in	the	post-WWII	era.	As	Roger	Makins,	later	Lord	Sheffield,	serving	as	the	United	Kingdom’s	ambassador	to	the	United	States,	pointed	out:	“the	American	propensity	[is]	to	go	for	a	man,	rather	than	a	movement	—	Giraud	among	the	French	in	1942,	Chiang	Kai	Shek	in	China.	Americans	have	always	liked	the	idea	of	dealing	with	a	foreign	leader	who	can	be	identified	and	perceived	as	‘their	man.’	They	are	much	less	comfortable	with	movements.”42	This	concept	is	highly	significant	in	the	context	of	Military	Assistance	in	that	the	United	States	having	“their	man”	tends	to	be	the	foundation	of	the	relationship	with	another	state,	developing	into	an	alliance.	This	has	led	to	numerous	relationships	with	dictators	all	in	the	pursuit	of	defeating	Communism,	a	willingness	to	sacrifice	long-term	ideal	for	short-term	
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objectives.43	Those	alliances	are	the	basis	by	which	Military	Assistance	and	Military	Aid	and	Military	Support	are	given,	and	certainly	was	in	the	case	of	the	ROK.	This	relationship,	during	the	Cold	War,	led	to	a	skillset	among	recipient	nations,	which	some	would	refer	to	as	client	states	and	their	dictator	leadership,	of	resource.	Noted	Strategic	Studies	Professor	Michael	Handel	stated,	“The	diplomatic	art	of	the	weak	states	is	to	obtain,	commit,	and	manipulate,	as	far	as	possible,	the	power	of	other,	more	powerful	states	in	own	interests.	Weak	states	can	sometimes	manipulate	and	lead	a	great	power,	almost	against	its	own	will.”44	During	the	Vietnam	War,	the	desire	by	the	Johnson	Administration	to	create	the	appearance	of	an	international	coalition	led	President	Johnson	to	request	troops	from	the	ROK,	which	readily	supplied	over	300,000	soldiers,	but	did	so	based	on	the	pretense	of	gaining	more	Military	Aid.45	While	the	Military	Aid	might	be	crucial	from	a	bottom	line	dollar	amount,	it	was,	in	fact,	the	Military	Assistance	that	helped	to	cement	the	relationship	between	the	ROK	and	the	United	States	into	a	long-term	alliance.	In	addition,	it	was	the	Military	Assistance	to	the	ROK	Army	that	allowed	those	roughly	300,000	soldiers	to	support	the	Vietnam	campaign.46	This	was	the	dynamic	that	played	out	between	Rhee	and	the	United	States:	Rhee	used	the	United	States’	fear	of	Communist	expansion	to	gain	greater	commitments	in	the	beginning	years	of	the	ROK’s	existence.	The	United	States,	through	its	ambassador,	John	Muccio,	was	able	to	use	Military	Assistance	to	extract	itself	out	of	a	perpetual	obligation	by	pointing	out	how	well	the	ROK	Army	was	performing.	Rhee	also	publicly	praised	the	ROK	Army	for	its	skill	level	and	once	doing	so,	there	was	little	he	could	do	when	the	United	States	
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announced	the	withdrawal	of	military	forces	in	1949.47	In	this	instance	the	United	States	was	pursuing	its	foreign	policy	interests	through	Military	Assistance	as	it	impacted	several	policies.	The	most	obvious	expression	of	that	pursuit	was	that	the	United	States,	specifically	the	Truman	Administration,	did	not	want	to	continue	the	American	Military	Government	any	longer	than	necessary,	in	order	to	bolster	the	United	Nations	as	an	institution	charged	to	peacefully	resolve	international	disagreements.	In	addition,	the	United	States	did	not	favor	creating	or	exacerbating	an	area	of	contention	with	the	Soviet	Union	any	more	than	required.	Lastly,	the	Truman	Administration	had	concerns	about	the	expenses	of	maintaining	military	personnel	on	a	continuous	basis,	given	that	Congress	had	not	given	such	formal	financial	authorization.48	The	undercurrent	of	these	issues	was	the	Military	Assistance	being	provided	by	the	United	States	because	of	the	relationship	it	had	with	President	Rhee.	Ambassador	Muccio	seemed	to	understand,	prior	to	the	Korean	War,	that	Rhee	would	do	all	he	could	to	retain	a	heavy	presence	of	American	military	forces.	However,	Military	Assistance	provided	yet	another	tool	for	the	United	States	to	continue	both	its	relationship	and	influence	without	the	heavy	burden	in	costs	and	personnel,	allowing	the	United	States	to	pursue	its	foreign	policy	goals	of	preventing	the	spread	of	Communism.	This	was	possible	due	to	the	relationship	the	United	States	believed	it	had	developed	with	Rhee,	namely,	that	Rhee	was	so	fervently	anti-Communist	that	the	United	States	was	willing	to	gloss	over	his	many	other	imperfections,	from	his	unstable	temperament	to	his	poor	ability	to	govern.	Time	and	time	again	throughout	the	Cold	War,	the	United	States	found	itself	developing	similar	relationships	with	comparable	dictators	and	dictator-like	individuals,	as	referenced	by	Ambassador	Makins.	There	was	a	constant	belief	that	the	threat	of	the	spread	of	Communism	was	so	great	that	all	other	issues																																																									
47	“Oral	History	Interview	with	John	J.	Muccio,	Special	Representative	of	the	President	to	Korea,	1948-49;	Ambassador	to	Korea,	1949-52;	Envoy	Extraordinary	to	Iceland,	1954,”	by	Jerry	Hess,	Trumanlibrary.org,	February	10,	1971,	accessed	September	3,	2015,	http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/muccio1.htm.	48	Schnabel,	The	United	States	Army	in	the	Korean	War,	19.	
	 146	
were	minimal	in	comparison.	As	a	result,	clients	like	the	ROK	learned	quickly	that	in	order	to	secure	the	support	necessary,	connecting	that	argument	to	the	Communist	threat	was	the	surest	way	to	succeed.49	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	threat	was	not	real:	the	ROK	saw	that	threat	from	the	north	in	the	form	of	both	the	DPRK	and	Communist	China.	However,	from	a	broader	perspective,	this	client	relationship	served	the	United	States	extremely	well	with	respect	to	its	Grand	Strategy	in	the	post-WWII	era	to	defeat	the	global	spread	of	Communism.	At	the	same,	the	United	States	in	its	pursuit	of	that	Grand	Strategy	was	willing	to	sanction	many	sorts	of	dictators,	as	long	as	they	pledged	to	be	anti-Communist.	This	by	and	large	is	the	challenge	with	the	foreign	policy	of	the	United	States:	short-term,	with	a	blatant	disregard	for	the	long-term	costs	associated	with	the	gains.50	This	dynamic	has	been	consistent	in	American	endeavors	for	many	years,	one	where	the	smaller	evils	perpetrated	by	clients	like	Rhee	were	overlooked	for	the	“greater	good.”	Ultimately,	the	challenge	with	this	perspective	is	that	at	the	individual	and	local	levels,	the	small	evil	is	much	more	painful	to	the	population	than	the	perceived	goodness	of	the	greater	good.	So,	for	example,	the	corruption	and	incompetence	of	the	Rhee	government	was	felt	more	acutely	than	the	perceived	fear	of	a	takeover	by	Communism,	one	reason,	no	doubt	among	many,	that	President	Rhee	was	eventually	deposed	in	1960.	The	concept,	however,	of	backing	an	individual	leader	has	continued	as	a	foreign	policy	habit	of	the	United	States	continually	creating	blind	spots,	such	as	President	Rhee	was	prior	to	the	beginning	of	the	Korean	War.	Origins	of	the	Korean	War	The	interweaving	of	the	past	in	this	case	creates	a	necessary	fascinating	background	of	perspective.	As	mentioned,	one	of	the	reasons	that	the	Korean	War	was	able	to	receive	a	United	Nations	mandate	through	United	Nations	Security	Council	Resolution	82	was	that	the	Soviet	Union	had	been	boycotting	
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the	Security	Council.	As	mentioned,	this	was	enacted	as	a	protest	because	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	was	not	seated	at	the	Council,	but	went	to	the	Republic	of	China	on	Taiwan.	In	President	Roosevelt’s	conception	of	the	United	Nations,	his	desire	was	that	China	would	become	a	world	power,51	and	based	on	that	belief,	he	ensured	China’s	seat	on	the	United	Nations	Security	Council.	This	intention	was	based	on	the	belief	that	Chiang	had	a	firm	grip	on	China,	a	scenario	exemplifying	what	Lord	Sheffield	stated	about	the	United	States’	backing	a	man	as	opposed	to	a	movement.	The	problem,	however,	was	that	Chiang	constantly	worried	about	his	position,	even	during	WWII	when	General	Stilwell	was	leading	the	Military	Assistance	mission	in	China.	In	1943,	General	Stilwell	commented	to	General	Marshall	“that	the	Generalissimo	did	not	want	the	[Chinese]	regime	to	have	a	large,	efficient	ground	force	for	fear	that	its	commander	would	inevitably	challenge	his	position	as	China's	leader.”52	Ultimately,	as	with	many	Military	Assistance	missions,	the	relationship	between	advisor	and	advisee	helped	to	dictate	the	relationship	between	nations.	The	relationship	between	Stilwell	and	Chiang	degraded	to	the	point	that	Stilwell	was	recalled.53	Being	challenged	as	he	was,	when	Chiang	lost	to	Mao	Zedong	in	1949,	escaping	to	Taiwan,	Chiang	took	China’s	relationship	with	the	United	States	with	him.54	There	were	numerous	factors	that	led	to	the	loss	of	China	to	the	Communists;	however,	those	factors	and	the	reality	that	the	Communists	won	are	not	critical	in	the	context	of	Military	Assistance	in	South	Korea.	Nevertheless,	that	the	loss	occurred	is	extremely	important,	as	it	placed	President	Truman	in	a	position	in	which	he	could	not	risk	Korea’s	being	“lost.”	It	should	be	noted	here	that	some	scholars,	such	as	critic	Noam	Chomsky,	have	objected	to	defining	China	as	a	“loss,”	in	that	this	implies	a	sense	of	ownership.	“In	1949,	China	declared	independence,	an	event	known	in	Western	discourse	as	‘the	loss	of	China’	in	the																																																									
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US,	with	bitter	recriminations	and	conflict	over	who	was	responsible	for	that	loss.	The	terminology	is	revealing.	It	is	only	possible	to	lose	something	that	one	owns.	The	tacit	assumption	was	that	the	United	States	owned	China,	by	right,	along	with	most	of	the	rest	of	the	world,	much	as	postwar	planners	assumed.”55	This	point	is	absurd,	however,	that	the	United	States	or	even	the	Western	Powers	were	implying	an	ownership	of	China.	When	discussing	the	situation,	foreign	policy	officials	clearly	stated	that	this	“loss”	represented	a	loss	to	Communism	from	the	Chinese	Nationalists	and	the	perspective	of	Western	democracies.	This	situation	thereby	created	a	state	that	the	Western	Powers	knew	they	could	not	work	with	or	possibly	influence,	making	the	“loss”	not	one	of	ownership,	but	a	loss	of	a	relationship	and	likely	influence.	The	relevance	to	the	Military	Assistance	in	South	Korea	is	that	the	loss	of	China	had	to	be	a	factor	for	leaders	in	Washington	and	MacArthur,	as	they	allowed	for	the	withdrawal	of	troops	from	South	Korea,	leaving	only	the	KMAG	mission	in	its	stead.	This	raised	the	question	of	to	what	extent	the	Korean	peninsula	was	being	considered	in	the	broader	context	of	the	struggle	against	Communism	prior	to	the	DPRK’s	invasion,	to	which	the	simple	response	is	not	much	at	all.	This	was	one	of	many	miscalculations	by	both	sides	that	led	to	the	escalation	of	the	Korean	War,	another	being	the	full	force	of	McCarthyism	as	a	considerable	domestic	pressure	on	Truman	in	the	United	States.	Chomsky	in	his	critique	cites	Kennan’s	comment	that	“we	should	cease	to	talk	about	vague	and	—	for	the	Far	East	—	unreal	objectives	such	as	human	rights,	the	raising	of	the	living	standards,	and	democratization.	The	day	is	not	far	off	when	we	are	going	to	have	to	deal	in	straight	power	concepts.	The	less	we	are	then	hampered	by	idealistic	slogans,	the	better.	We	should	recognize	that	our	influence	in	the	Far	Eastern	area	in	the	coming	period	is	going	to	be	primarily	military	and	economic.”56																																																									
55	Noam	Chomsky,	“'Losing'	the	world:	American	decline	in	perspective,	part	1,”	
The	Guardian,	February	14,	2012,	accessed	September	3,	2015,	http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/feb/14/losing-the-world-american-decline-noam-chomsky.	56	George	F.	Kennan,	“Policy	Planning	Staff	Memo	23:	Review	of	Current	Trends	US	Foreign	Policy,”	February	24,	1948,	Foreign	Relations	of	the	United	States,	
1948,	General:	The	United	Nations,	Vol.	I,	Part	2,	eds.	Neal	H.	Petersen	et	al	
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This	prism,	by	which	a	senior	foreign	policy	advisor	at	the	State	Department	defined	how	he	foresaw	the	Cold	War	evolving,	is	crucial	with	respect	to	Military	Assistance	and	relevant	as	to	how	Military	Assistance	was	practiced	in	South	Korea	before,	during,	and	after	the	Korean	War,	the	relationship	construct	by	which	the	military	alliance	with	the	ROK	was	based.	Given	the	numerous	abuses	of	power	by	South	Korean	elites	towards	their	own	people,	from	corruption	to	military	coups,	the	United	States	was	extremely	tolerant	in	one	way	or	another	in	order	to	continue	the	ROK-US	alliance	against	a	possible	Communist	influence	or	invasion.	Under	this	rubric	it	is	understandable	that	the	evolution	of	foreign	policy	during	the	Cold	War	takes	on	a	Realist	perspective	in	terms	of	international	relations	theory.	This	Realist	perspective	can	be	considered	the	context	for	the	Military	Assistance	mission	between	South	Korea	and	the	United	States,	despite	the	fact	that	the	advisory	mission	begins	at	the	end	of	WWII	and	before	the	machinations	between	Stalin	and	the	West	evolved	into	the	Cold	War.	That	period	between	the	end	of	WWII	and	end	of	the	Korean	War	was	the	incubator	which	set	in	motion	both	the	Cold	War	on	a	global	scale,	as	well	as	how	the	United	States	would	approach	and	maintain	its	alliances	and	their	development.	The	purpose	of	the	ROK	and	United	States	alliance	was	ultimately	for	the	purpose	of	promoting	the	ideology	of	anti-Communism.	This	alliance	was	able	to	do	so	through	the	Military	Assistance	mission	that	was	to	utilize	military	modernization	as	a	method	to	extend	and	solidify	the	ROK	Army’s	capabilities	and	capacities	in	the	security	arena.	The	Military	Assistance	experience	in	the	Republic	of	Korea	After	considering	the	background	of	Military	Assistance	in	South	Korea,	the	next	consideration	in	investigating	the	topic	of	alliance	development	through	Military	Assistance	is	exploring	the	form	and	substance	of	the	Military	Assistance	provided	by	the	United	States	to	the	ROK.	In	addition,	it	is	helpful	to	appreciate	
																																																								(Washington,	D.C.:	United	States	Government	Printing	Office,	1976),	accessed	September	3,	2015,	https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v01p2/d4.	
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the	context	of	the	American	Occupation	in	South	Korea	after	WWII	and	the	presence	of	the	United	States	Military	in	support	of	the	ROK	after	the	Occupation	and	prior	to	the	outbreak	of	the	Korea	War.	Historically	speaking,	in	some	form	or	another	the	United	States	had	a	Military	Assistance	relationship	with	Korea	dating	back	to	1881.57	However,	the	current	Military	Assistance	mission	in	the	ROK	can	find	its	origins	in	the	KMAG58	that	began	with	the	Occupation	by	the	United	States	of	South	Korea	and	the	American	Military	Government	in	Korea	in	1945.59	That	Military	Assistance	mission	during	and	after	the	American	Military	Government	was	extremely	distinctive,	given	that	before	the	Korean	War	the	underlying	need	in	South	Korea	was	simply	to	exist:	that	mission	created	a	structural	foundation	that	would	become	the	ROK	Army.	It	was	this	structure	that	withstood	the	might	of	the	DPRK	surprise	invasion	and	that	ultimately	held	together	the	ROK	Army	during	its	retreat	over	the	first	months	of	the	Korean	War.60	This	timeframe,	between	the	American	Military	Government	and	the	Korean	Armistice	Agreement	in	1953,	is	critical	because	it	provided	for	the	foundation	of	alliance	between	the	United	States	and	the	ROK,	all	based	on	the	form	and	substance	of	the	Military	Assistance	begun	in	1945.	The	KMAG	and	its	predecessors	were	primarily	focused	on	the	Advise	and	Assist	mission,	first	with	the	Korean	Constabulary	and	then	the	ROK	Army	once	it	was	constituted	under	the	founding	of	the	ROK.	The	Advise	and	Assist	mission	
																																																								
57	Robert	K.	Sawyer,	Military	Advisors	in	Korea:	KMAG	in	Peace	and	War,	ed.	Walter	G.	Hermes	(Washington,	D.C.:	Center	of	Military	History,	1963),	5.	58	The	KMAG	prior	to	the	Korea	War	was	referred	to	initially	as	the	Department	of	Internal	Security	(DIS)	during	the	American	Military	Government,	evolving	into	the	Provisional	Military	Advisory	Group	(PMAG)	once	the	Republic	of	Korea	declared	its	independence	and	the	Constabulary	became	the	ROK	Army.	For	the	sake	of	ease	of	understanding,	I	will	refer	to	the	DIS,	PMAG,	and	KMAG	simply	as	the	KMAG.	59	Robert	D.	Ramsey	III,	Advising	Indigenous	Forces:	American	Advisors	in	Korea,	
Vietnam,	and	El	Salvador	(Fort	Leavenworth,	KS:	Combat	Studies	Institute	Press,	2006),	5.	Bryan	R.	Gibby,	The	Will	to	Win:	American	Military	Advisors	in	Korea,	
1946–1953	(Tuscaloosa:	The	University	of	Alabama	Press,	2012),	3.	Sawyer,	
Military	Advisors	in	Korea,	35	&	45.	60	A	military	retreat	is	considered	one	of	the	most	challenging	tactical	movements.	That	the	ROK	Army	was	able	to	hold	together	while	so	engaged	bespeaks	of	camaraderie	and	unit	discipline.	
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was	defined	earlier	in	terms	of	the	recipient	nation	in	the	lead	with	the	support	nation	taking	an	advisory	role,	possibly	helping	more	directly	on	logistics	and	material	to	expand	the	capacities	and	capabilities	of	the	recipient	nation.	This	is	consistent	with	the	general	understanding	of	the	Advise	and	Assist	aspect	of	Military	Assistance	discussed	in	Chapter	2.	The	reason	for	the	emphasis	on	the	Advise	and	Assist	mission	is	that	the	American	Military	Government	emphasized	local	security	being	led	by	local	forces.	The	Constabulary	mission	grew	out	of	the	effort	to	create	a	domestic	security	force	capable	of	withstanding	infiltration	from	the	north	and	internal	insurgencies,	which	current	United	States	Joint	Staff	doctrine	would	consider	a	foreign	internal	defense	mission.61	In	fairness	to	the	American	Military	Government,	it	was	not	well	prepared	to	take	on	governing	responsibilities	and	knew	little	of	the	area	or	Korean	people.	The	best	that	could	be	said	about	the	American	Military	Government	in	South	Korea	is	that	it	knew	itself	to	be	a	transitory	government	until	political	leaders	both	in	Korea	and	around	the	world	agreed	on	the	final	disposition	of	the	Korean	peninsula.	It	also	knew	how	to	help	facilitate	an	internal	security	force.	The	intent	was	to	have	military-like	security,	which	was	separate	from	the	National	Police,	and	while	there	was	no	stated	declaration	that	what	was	known	as	the	Constabulary	would	become	the	Army	of	South	Korea	when	the	occupation	ended,	it	could	not	have	been	far	from	the	minds	of	the	American	Military	Government,	the	elites	around	Rhee	who	would	eventually	form	the	ROK,	or	the	advisors	of	the	Constabulary.62	
The	Constabulary	Although	there	was	a	desire	to	have	greater	capability	than	a	militarized	version	of	the	National	Police,	there	was	serious	political	posturing	both	internally	as	well	as	on	the	international	stage	surrounding	the	establishment	of	the	Constabulary.	Internally,	there	were	concerns	by	the	State	Department	about	the	ongoing	negotiations	with	the	Soviet	Union	on	the	final	disposition	of	the	
																																																								
61	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	Joint	Publication	3-22:	Foreign	Internal	Defense	(Washington,	D.C.:	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	July	12,	2010),	GL-7.	62	Brazinsky,	Nation	Building	in	South	Korea,	73-74.	Schnabel,	United	States	Army	
in	the	Korean	War,	32-33.	
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Korean	peninsula.63	At	the	same	time,	General	Hodge,	the	commander	of	the	American	Military	Government,	must	have	believed	that	the	Constabulary	was	an	achievable	effort	to	undertake.	The	precise	capabilities	and	capacities	that	the	Constabulary	would	set	as	a	goal	seems	to	have	been	the	subject	of	an	ongoing	discussion	between	Hodge	and	MacArthur.	Although	both	wanted	the	Constabulary	to	have	a	greater	military	capability,	the	State	Department,	uneasy	concerning	Soviet	reactions,	influenced	both	Generals.	The	Constabulary	would	end	up	more	capable	than	the	National	Police,	having	small	pieces	of	artillery,	but	not	as	capable	as	an	actual	army,	resulting	in	minimal	machine	guns	and	anti-tank	weaponry.64	This	represented	minimal	concern	for	an	internal	force	but	a	major	capability	gap,	as	was	found	in	June	1950.	The	initial	officers	of	the	Korean	Constabulary	would	eventually	form	the	core	of	the	ROK	Army	that	would	eventually	be	established.	From	the	class	of	110	of	the	first	officers,	75	would	become	general	officers,	and	of	these,	13	would	become	the	chief	of	staff.65	However,	the	Constabulary	experienced	an	immediate	conflict	between	the	United	States	Army	training	doctrine	and	discipline	with	the	equipment,	manuals,	and	even	money	left	by	the	Japanese.66	In	addition,	many	of	the	officers	from	the	Constabulary	had	been	part	of	the	Japanese	military,	which	allowed	them	a	better	than	basic	understanding	of	military	operations,	but	it	also	had	the	effect	of	tainting	those	officers,	allowing	them	to	be	seen	as	Japanese	collaborators,	and	as	such,	sometimes	mistrusted	by	the	Korean	populace.	These	officers	had	to	deal	with	the	underlying	challenge	of	negotiating	between	Japanese	and	American	military	doctrines.	While	the	Korean	members	of	the	Constabulary	made	for	competent	soldiers,	suspicion	of	them	initially	prevented	attaining	any	level	of	senior	command.67	As	the	Constabulary	evolved	into	the	ROK	Army,	the	officers	who	advanced	did	so	on	the	basis	of	their	relations	both	with	their	KMAG	advisors	and	President	Rhee	
																																																								
63	Brazinsky,	Nation	Building	in	South	Korea,	73.	64	Schnabel,	The	United	States	Army	in	the	Korean	War,	33.	65	Gibby,	The	Will	to	Win,	30.	66	Brazinsky,	Nation	Building	in	South	Korea,	76-77.	Gibby,	The	Will	to	Win,	31-32.	67	Brazinsky,	Nation	Building	in	South	Korea,	74.	
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and	his	inner	circle.68	The	KMAG	advisors	had	disproportionate	levels	of	influence	due	to	their	ability	to	supply	the	Constabulary	with	weapons,	ammunition,	and	basic	living	amenities	along	with	general	logistical	support.69	In	this	regard,	it	was	both	the	Military	Aid	and	the	Military	Assistance	that	developed	the	relationship	between	the	KMAG	trainers	and	the	Korean	trainees.	The	American	advisors,	however,	found	other	ways	by	which	to	involve	themselves	in	the	development	of	the	Constabulary.	At	the	very	beginning	of	its	formation,	it	was	not	unusual	to	see	American	officers	traveling	with	their	Korean	counterparts	to	partake	in	a	recruitment	drive.	This	put	the	Constabulary	in	direct	competition	with	the	National	Police	for	material	and	men,	but	as	the	National	Police	started	arresting	leftists,	more	men	rushed	to	join	the	Constabulary.	The	recruitment	rush	caused	conflicts,	given	that	at	the	time	the	Constabulary’s	mission	was	to	assist	the	National	Police	and	prevent	the	infiltration	by	Communists.	During	these	endeavors,	one	of	the	major	issues	of	focus	for	the	American	advisors	was	to	create	the	structure	for	the	Constabulary	based	on	the	Prussian	model	of	staff	support	to	a	commander,	the	first	time	South	Korea	had	tried	to	develop	this	type	of	capability.70	While	this	Prussian-based	structure	did	little	good	when	the	Constabulary	was	struggling	for	food,	weapons,	and	bullets,	it	began	to	integrate	a	level	of	professionalism	and	planning	discipline	within	the	Korean	defense	structure	that	became	critical	in	the	war	to	come.	This	was	the	type	of	Military	Assistance	that	the	United	States	provided:	professionalization	of	the	security	forces	and	logistical	assistance,	as	the	American	Military	Government	transitioned	power	to	the	South	Koreans.	It	is	important	to	note	that	there	was	very	little	Military	Aid	given	to	the	South	Koreans,	either	before	or	after	the	ROK	declared	its	independence.	As	noted,	most	of	the	equipment	provided	to	the	South	Koreans	was	leftover	Japanese	supplies	from	WWII.	However,	the	Constabulary’s	professionalization	extended	not	only	to	the	development	of	the	Prussian	staff	model,	but	also	to	the	creation																																																									
68	Gibby,	The	Will	to	Win,	67.	69	Sawyer,	Military	Advisors	in	Korea,	14-15.	70	Sawyer,	Military	Advisors	in	Korea,	23-25.	
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of	their	professional	military	education.	The	KMAG	developed,	through	their	Korean	counterparts,	the	beginnings	of	technical	and	leadership	training.	The	technical	training	created	was	in	the	form	of	artillery,	engineering,	signal,	infantry,	and	logistics	schools,	training	which	was	for	all	ranks	in	the	Constabulary.71	Although	the	technical	military	education	was	important	in	adding	capabilities	to	the	nascent	Constabulary,	capacity	would	come	from	the	leadership	training.	Initially,	there	was	a	specific	development	of	the	Officer	Training	School	(OTS)	course,	which	because	of	minimal	requirements	was	able	to	push	through	class	after	class	of	junior	leaders.	This	in	turn	created	an	additional	difficulty	for	which	the	KMAG	was	unprepared:	a	Korean	officer	corps	as	inexperienced	as	the	Constabulary	they	helped	bring	into	being.	However,	the	KMAG	was	able	to	develop	an	officer	academy	modeled	on	West	Point	early	in	the	existence	of	the	Constabulary	and	gain	access	for	many	graduates	to	the	branch	schools	in	the	United	States	for	specialized	training	such	as	infantry,	artillery,	and	engineering.72	The	few	officers	who	were	able	to	attend	were	not	present	in	enough	numbers	to	have	a	significant	effect	on	the	junior	officers.	Although	those	few	were	able	to	do	so	as	they	rose	through	the	ranks,	the	experience	of	training	in	the	United	States	had	a	profound	effect.	One	officer	commented	on	how,	for	the	first	time,	he	conceptualized	the	idea	of	service	to	a	“nation”	rather	than	an	individual.73	While	the	positives	and	negatives	of	nationalism	may	certainly	be	debatable,	the	important	effect	on	these	young	officers	was	to	begin	to	experience	their	service	as	part	of	a	broader	contribution,	an	offering	to	something	greater	than	themselves.	However,	despite	this	broadening	experience,	a	few	junior	officers	were	not	able	to	influence	the	challenges	of	inexperience	within	the	Constabulary.	This	inexperience	resulted	in	a	natural	tension	between	those	with	Japanese	training	and	development	of	capacities	and	capabilities	the	KMAG	was	trying	to	instill	in	
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the	Constabulary,	a	challenge	that	continued	throughout	the	existence	of	the	Constabulary.	As	the	ROK	began	taking	control	in	the	government	from	the	American	Military	Government	in	1948,	the	expectation	of	the	ROK	Army	was	to	continue	the	mission	of	the	Constabulary.	Focusing	on	internal	defense,	primarily	from	Communist	infiltration,	and	border	defense	from	the	DPRK,	raiding	became	the	primary	mission.74	It	was	at	this	time	that	a	discussion	took	place	between	the	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	the	White	House,	and	General	MacArthur	as	the	Commander-in-Chief	of	United	States	Armed	Forces	Far	East	regarding	the	final	disposition	of	forces	in	the	ROK.	MacArthur	stated,	“the	United	States	did	not	have	the	capability	to	train	and	equip	Korean	troops	to	the	point	where	the	Koreans	would	be	able	to	cope	with	a	full-scale	invasion.”75	He	further	stipulated	that	in	the	event	of	an	invasion,	the	United	States	would	have	to	actively	support	the	ROK	Army,	but	then,	in	a	move	confusing	in	retrospect,	concurred	with	the	recommendation	to	withdraw	United	States	Armed	Forces	in	the	ROK.	The	intention	to	remove	United	States	Armed	Forces	in	1948	seems	to	have	been	based	more	on	costs76	than	on	any	desire	to	build	and	develop	a	long-term	alliance	with	the	ROK.	It	would	be	hard	to	imagine	that	newly	appointed	President	Rhee	could	not	help	but	feel	abandoned	by	the	United	States	due	to	the	reliance	by	the	ROK	on	the	United	States,77	since	it	was	withdrawing	thousands	of	troops	and	leaving	less	than	500	personnel78	to	manage	what	could	only	be	defined	as	a	herculean	effort	to	train	and	develop	the	capacities	and	capabilities	of	the	soon-to-be-founded	ROK	Army.	Shortly	before	the	transition	from	the	Constabulary	to	the	ROK	Army,	Brigadier	General	William	Lynn	Roberts	assumed	direct	responsibility	of	the	KMAG,	taking	command	from	May	1948	until	a	month	after	the	invasion,	when																																																									
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the	Eighth	Army	assumed	command	of	all	forces	in	Korea.	The	KMAG	had	continued	its	mission	of	advising	and	assisting	after	the	completion	of	the	American	military	occupation.	This	mission	evolved	very	directly	as	the	forces	of	the	DPRK	broke	through	the	38th	parallel	on	the	25th	of	June	in	1950.79	Unfortunately,	many	of	the	KMAG	personnel,	along	with	the	ROK	Army	officers,	were	absent	due	to	the	weekend	when	DPRK	forces	rolled	through.80	The	ROK	Army	was	in	a	state	of	disarray,	as	were	their	American	trainers.	While	the	ROK	Army	was	being	decimated	by	the	onslaught	of	the	135,000-man	attack,81	the	KMAG	focused	on	retreating	and	reorganizing	the	ROK	Army	to	face	the	enemy.82	As	with	many	surprise	attacks,	and	with	the	benefit	of	hindsight,	there	had	been	many	warnings	but	none	had	been	heeded,	resulting	in	the	KMAG,	and	more	specifically	Brigadier	General	Roberts	and	the	ROK	Army,	bearing	the	brunt	of	the	criticism	for	failing	to	stop	the	North	Korean	advance.83	However,	a	more	fair	argument	can	be	appreciated	in	the	perception	of	United	States	Army	historian,	Colonel	Bryan	Gibby:	“the	confused	state	of	the	advisory	groups	simply	mirrored	confused	policy	in	Tokyo	[at	MacArthur’s	headquarters]	and	Washington.”84	That	confusion	of	policy	had	already	led	to	the	withdrawal	of	the	United	States	Armed	Forces	a	few	years	before.	The	continued	confusion	in	policy	resulted	in	major	miscalculations	on	both	sides	of	the	38th	parallel.	In	1948,	Truman	believed	that	when	United	States	Armed	Forces	left	Korea	they	were	doing	so	with	a	partner	in	Rhee	and	the	establishment	of	the	ROK.85	Rhee,	however,	was	known	to	have	a	difficult	personality,	and	had	been	projecting	through	various	actions	that	he	wanted	to	unite	Korea	under	his	rule	by	conquering	the	DPRK.86	These	were	not	the	dynamics	that	created	a	strong	alliance,	but	this	was	the	broader	framework																																																									
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under	which	Roberts	and	the	KMAG	were	operating.	A	myth	arose,	however,	throughout	MacArthur’s	headquarters	and	the	national	security	circles	in	Washington	that	the	KMAG	failed	completely	in	its	mission	of	developing	the	ROK	Army	prior	to	the	invasion.	The	KMAG,	however,	had	been	consistently	reporting	the	lack	of	existing	capability	and	capacity	within	the	ROK	Army.87	Part	of	the	challenge	arose	from	the	idea	that	because	the	ROK	Army	had	beaten	back	various	skirmishes,	raids,	and	withstood	artillery	bombardments,	they	were	assumed	to	be	prepared	for	a	full	assault.	However,	in	fairness	to	the	KMAG,	neither	MacArthur	nor	the	military	and	civilian	leaders	in	Washington	considered	this	a	serious	possibility,	and	apparently	MacArthur	did	not	remember	his	earlier	assessment	that	the	ROK	could	not	withstand	an	assault.88	At	the	time	of	the	invasion	the	KMAG	consisted	of	roughly	249	officers	and	NCOs.	Although	like	other	advisors,	Roberts	had	no	formal	training	to	advise	foreign	military	forces,	he	had	a	foundational	understanding	of	how	to	advise.	He	recommended	that	his	KMAG	subordinates	give	advice	and	not	attempt	to	command,	ensuring	that	they	were	sensitive	to	not	try	to	remake	the	American	Army.89	But	his	challenges	with	the	Constabulary	on	his	arrival	were	such	that	many	of	the	Korean	officers,	who	had	trained	under	the	Japanese	military	system	and	been	mistrusted,	resulted	in	an	army	in	which	leadership	was	based	more	on	relationships	than	professional	military	skill.	However,	one	positive	of	the	soon-to-be	Korean	War	was	that	any	competency	of	the	Korean	officers	enabled	them	to	quickly	rise	to	the	top.	During	his	time	commanding	the	KMAG,	Roberts	gave	every	impression	that	the	ROK	Army	was	excelling.	However,	it	is	critical	to	appreciate	that	he	was	judging	them	proficient	compared	to	their	basic	beginnings,	praising	their	excellence	based	on	the	expectations	of	the	ROK	leadership	and	to	a	much	lesser	extent	that	of	the	United	States.90	Given	the	expectation	that	the	ROK	Army																																																									
87	Bryan	R.	Gibby,	“American	advisors	to	the	Republic	of	Korea:	America’s	first	commitment	in	the	Cold	War,	1946-1950,”	ed.	Donald	Stoker,	Military	Advising	
and	Assistance,	103-104.	88	Gibby,	The	Will	to	Win,	119	–	120.	89	Gibby,	The	Will	to	Win,	98.	90	Gibby,	The	Will	to	Win,	103-104.	
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would	be	able	to	prevent	the	intrusion	of	the	DPRK,	either	in	the	form	of	border	skirmishes	or	infiltration,	Roberts	gave	praise	to	the	ROK	Army	and	in	his	reports	on	numerous	occasions.91	At	the	same	time,	he	agreed	with	MacArthur’s	initial	assessment	from	January	1949	that	the	ROK	Army	was	not	prepared	to	withstand	a	total	assault.	However,	the	reports	left	impressions	in	the	minds	of	many	senior	leaders,	who	held	to	their	belief	that	Roberts	had	misled	them,	as	the	ROK	Army	nearly	collapsed	in	June	and	July	of	1950	following	the	DPRK’s	invasion.92	In	his	reports,	Roberts	outlined	the	successes	of	the	KMAG	and	the	ROK	Army,	praising	the	burgeoning	force	as	he	“expressed	the	view	that	the	Korean	Army	had	the	capability	of	containing	the	North	Korean	forces	in	being. However,	he	pointed	to	the	need	for	additional	U.S.	aid	for	the	Korean	security	forces.”93	Since	the	Pentagon	and	national	security	apparatus	of	the	United	States	were	focused	on	nuclear	weapons,	the	Communist	threat,	and	general	internal	machinations	such	as	the	Revolt	of	the	Admirals	in	1949,	the	concept	that	senior	leaders	did	not	have	to	worry	about	Korea	must	have	been	a	relief,	and	considerations	of	the	region	being	more	as	an	afterthought.	Judging	by	the	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff	disbelief	regarding	the	North	Korean	onslaught	and	their	overall	disappointment	in	the	KMAG’s	accomplishments,	it	could	easily	be	assumed	that	there	was	little,	if	any,	attention	being	paid	to	the	Korean	peninsula.	The	nature	of	the	disappointment	by	the	senior	leaders	likely	had	two	effects	in	the	days	following	the	North	Korean	invasion:	the	first	being	that	Roberts	was	permitted	to	continue	his	retirement	process	when	the	more	advantageous	course	of	action	
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would	have	been	to	re-activate	him,	and	the	second	was	to	doubt	the	viability	of	the	KMAG	mission	altogether.	The	KMAG	and	the	Surprise	Attack	Shortly	after	the	initial	assault,	Truman	called	on	both	the	United	Nations	Security	Council	and	the	United	States	Congress	to	authorize	a	UN	mission	to	fight	back	the	DPRK	invasion.94	There	are	disputing	sources	as	to	whether	the	Soviet	Union	and	China	had	given	permission	to	Kim	Il-sung	to	launch	the	attack.	However,	neither	were	in	a	position	to	prevent	the	diplomatic	effort	at	the	United	Nations,	since	the	Peoples’	Republic	of	China	had	no	voice	on	the	Security	Council,	that	seat	being	occupied	by	the	Republic	of	China	on	Taiwan,	and	the	Soviets,	who	were	continuing	to	boycott	their	seat	at	the	Security	Council	in	protest	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	not	being	given	that	permanent	seat.95	This	maneuvering	created	the	diplomatic	space	for	the	Truman	Administration	to	create	a	global	response	to	what	they	viewed	as	Communist	aggression.	The	United	Nations	mandate	under	the	United	Nations	Security	Council	Resolution	82	created	a	legal	framework	for	the	American-led	coalition,	although	according	to	Ambassador	Muccio,	the	reality	is	that	the	United	States	was	operationally	moving	ahead	at	the	same	time	that	the	diplomatic	efforts	were	underway.96	While	the	diplomatic	machinations	occurred	on	the	international	level,	the	KMAG	officers	and	enlisted	were	in	flight-and-fight	mode,	and	the	KMAG	advisors	were	acutely	aware	that	their	actions	could	have	ramifications	far	beyond	Korea,	despite	having	little	time	to	consider	the	broader	implications	of	their	actions.	As	KMAG	Army	historian	Major	Robert	Sawyer	stated,	“there	were	three	alternatives	that	immediately	came	to	mind:	they	[the	KMAG	Advisors]	could	take	up	arms	and	actively	help	the	South	Koreans	repel	the	invaders;	they																																																									
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could	advise	the	ROK	Army	in	combat	operations;	or	they	could	leave	Korea	and	abandon	the	republic	to	its	fate.	These	alternatives	involved	questions	of	U.S.	national	policy	and	had	to	be	decided	on	the	highest	levels	of	the	United	States	Government.”97	During	the	initial	invasion,	the	instincts	of	the	KMAG	advisors	took	over,	many	times	for	their	own	survival,	and	began	heavily	pressuring	their	ROK	Army	officer	counterparts	to	maintain	as	much	unit	cohesion	as	possible,	given	the	circumstances.	This	heavy	pressure	evolved	in	many	cases	with	the	KMAG	officers	in	reality	becoming	operationalized,	as	in	not	acting	or	behaving	in	an	advisory	status,	and	in	emergencies	began	to	take	command	from	the	ROK	Army	officers.98	As	in	so	many	cases	of	Military	Assistance	and	even	warfare	itself,	many	more	factors	were	at	play	than	just	the	invasion	from	the	DPRK.	One	related	gem	of	wisdom	in	Military	Assistance	is	the	Fifteenth	Article	that	Colonel	T.	E.	Lawrence	wrote	in	his	1917	essays,	the	Twenty-Seven	Articles:	“Do	not	try	to	do	too	much	with	your	own	hands.	Better	the	Arabs	do	it	tolerably	than	that	you	do	it	perfectly.	It	is	their	war,	and	you	are	to	help	them,	not	to	win	it	for	them.”99	Although	Lawrence	speaks	of	a	specific	situation	and	time,	this	principle	still	holds:	the	most	sustainable	way	to	develop	capabilities	and	capacities	through	Military	Assistance	is	that	the	recipient	must	be	the	driving	force.	The	example	of	the	KMAG	officers	taking	over	for	the	ROK	officers	during	the	invasion	violated	every	aspect	of	the	broad	framework	of	Military	Assistance	intended	to	be	established,	but	the	realities	of	warfare	are	many	times	overcome	by	expediency.	The	focus	of	Military	Assistance	during	the	Korean	War	was	on	developing	the	ROK	Army	into	a	fighting	force	that	could	aid	the	United	Nations	Coalition,	not	specifically	developing	long-term	capabilities	and	capacities	that	would	contribute	to	a	long-term,	sustainable	security,	nor	was	there	an	effort	on	furthering	alliance	development.	The	Military	Assistance	endeavor	once	the																																																									
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Korean	War	began	was,	however,	primarily	on	survival	of	the	ROK	Army,	their	KMAG	advisors,	and	the	ROK	presence	in	South	Korea	itself.	As	was	previously	alluded,	Kim	Il-sung	is	thought	to	have	planned	his	attack	of	June	25th	to	be	such	a	surprise	that	it	would	overwhelm	the	ROK	Army.	At	the	time	of	the	attack	the	operational	experience	level	of	leadership	in	the	ROK	Army	was	dramatically	low,	as	many	of	the	division	commanders	were	colonels	in	their	late	twenties	or	early	thirties.	By	contrast,	United	States	Army	divisions	are	usually	commanded	by	two-star	generals	in	their	fifties.	Though	some	of	the	ROK	Army	officers	had	served	in	WWII	under	the	Japanese,	the	only	combat	many	had	experienced	was	the	skirmishes	with	the	DPRK	over	the	past	five	years.	As	any	battle-hardened	commander	knows,	probing	skirmishes	is	a	world	of	difference	from	a	surprise	attack	of	135,000	troops	backed	by	artillery	and	airpower.	Thus,	the	KMAG	found	themselves	leaderless	and	overwhelmed,	as	Roberts	had	returned	to	the	United	States	to	retire,	advising	a	leaderless	and	overwhelmed	ROK	Army.	KMAG	during	the	Korean	War	—	Forging	an	Alliance	It	was	no	secret	that	President	Rhee	desired	a	solid	partnership	with	the	United	States.100	Having	spent	his	formative	years	in	America,	Rhee	knew,	intimately,	how	the	United	States	could	form	alliances	within	regions,	and	given	his	own	deposing	from	the	Korean	independence	movement	in	the	mid-1920s,	he	likely	knew	that	having	the	United	States	behind	him	would	continue	to	ensure	his	authority.	To	that	end,	Rhee	put	in	place	two	policies	after	the	beginning	of	the	War	that	effected	not	only	his,	and	by	extension	South	Korea’s,	relationship	with	the	United	States;	it	also	bound	together	the	nations’	militaries	into	the	present	day,	both	directly	influencing	the	broader	Military	Assistance	mission	in	the	Republic	of	Korea.	The	first	action	of	Rhee	that	helped	establish	the	close	relationship	during	and	after	the	Korean	War	was	to	cede	command	and	control	of	all	ROK	Army	forces	to	General	MacArthur.101	There	is	no	clear	way	to	describe	the	basis	for																																																									
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this	type	of	decision;	there	is	certainly	no	clear	history	of	this	happening	in	the	United	States.	In	fact,	the	United	States	tends	to	adopt	the	exact	opposite	stance,	in	that	generally,	United	States	Armed	Forces	will	only	function	under	the	command	of	an	American	commander.102	This	was	a	standard	policy	dating	back	to	WWI,	when	General	Pershing	was	placed	in	command	of	the	American	Expeditionary	Forces	as	opposed	to	allowing	American	Soldiers	to	simply	replenish	British	and	French	units	in	the	trenches.103	MacArthur	himself,	though,	had	prior	experience	with	gaining	control	of	a	foreign	military	force,	since	prior	to	WWII,	he	had	developed	and	commanded	the	Philippine	Army	at	the	bequest	of	its	government.	However,	the	experience	MacArthur	had	there	was	during	a	period	of	relative	peace	and	prosperity,	and	not	in	the	heat	of	combat.	The	importance,	ultimately,	of	Rhee’s	relinquishing	command	and	control	of	military	forces	to	MacArthur	is	because	in	the	most	fundamental	aspects	of	military	institution,	Rhee	had	bound	the	United	States	to	the	ROK.	A	more	cynical	analysis	could	propose	that	Rhee	was	motivated	simply	by	the	political	desire	for	plausible	deniability	for	any	challenges	that	the	military	might	have.104	This,	however,	does	not	negate	Rhee’s	underlying	desire	to	eventually	conquer	and	unite	all	of	Korea	under	the	ROK	flag	and	rule.	There	can	be	little	doubt	of	Rhee’s	intention	to	bind	the	United	States	closer	to	the	fate	of	the	ROK.	Relinquishing	command	and	control	to	MacArthur	may	not	have	been	by	design,	as	it	may	have	been	the	best	decision	in	a	moment	of	panic	and	desperation,	but	there	can	been	no	doubt	as	to	the	effect.	Though	various	Status	of	Forces	Agreements	have	changed	the	command	structure	of	the	United	States	Forces	-	Korea	(USFK),	similar	elements	remain	that	essentially	allow	the	Commanding	General	of	USFK	to	assume	command	and	control	of	the	ROK	military	forces	in	
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the	event	of	an	invasion	from	the	DPRK.105	However,	the	underlying	question	is:	what	did	this	change	of	command	and	control	have	to	do	with	the	KMAG	and	its	mission?	By	1951,	the	ROK	Army	had	enough	combat	experience	against	the	DPRK	forces	that	more	serious	conversations	could	be	entertained	between	the	United	States	Eighth	Army	Commander	General	James	Van	Fleet	and	the	KMAG	leadership	about	the	ROK	Army	and	its	development.	Van	Fleet	approached	Rhee	with	an	ultimatum	that	the	ROK	Army	needed	better	leadership,	which	it	would	need	to	focus	more	on	the	extended	construct	of	serving	the	nation	rather	than	a	single	political	leader.	Van	Fleet	was	straightforward	with	the	ROK	President,	asserting	that	it	would	be	difficult	to	continue	to	guarantee	American	support	of	the	ROK	if	the	ROK	Army	did	not	have	that	better	leadership.106	This	proved	to	be	a	watershed	moment	for	the	Military	Assistance	mission,	because	it	placed	Rhee	in	a	political	situation	where	his	own	survival	was	at	stake.	The	result	was	that	the	KMAG	was	able	to	assist	the	ROK	political	leadership	in	assessing	the	military	capabilities	of	the	ROK	officers,	something	for	which	the	KMAG	was	perfectly	suited,	having	advised	and	many	times	fought	alongside	the	units	in	question.	Under	normal	circumstances	there	potentially	could	have	been	major	unit	repercussions	involving	the	removal	of	officers,	especially	by	foreign	forces.	The	Koreans	had	understandable	cultural	concerns	with	imperialism,	as	it	was	less	than	a	decade	since	Japanese	rule	over	the	Korean	peninsula.	With	the	American	Military	Government	immediately	replacing	the	Japanese	rule	of	South	Korea,	creating	a	rough	transition	in	the	Korean-American	relationship,	it	would	have	been	reasonable	if	the	ROK	Army	units	had	looked	upon	the	KMAG	advisors	with	disdain,	causing	friction	during	combat	operations.	However,	due	to	the	fact	that																																																									
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the	KMAG	had	been	with	their	ROK	Army	units	in	the	field	and	on	the	combat	lines,	in	the	middle	of	battle,	there	was	an	inherent	earned	respect	between	the	ROK	Army	units	and	their	KMAG	advisors.107	In	addition,	the	KMAG’s	effort	in	removing	poor	ROK	Army	officers,	which	could	have	been	seen	as	heavy-handed,	was	primarily	focused	on	those	ROK	Army	officers	who	had	displayed	blatant	disregard	for	their	soldiers.	Colonel	“Tiger”	Kim	Chong-won,	who	was	relieved	of	command	for	beating	a	ROK	Army	soldier	and	shooting	a	fellow	officer,	exemplified	this.108	Due	to	the	common	relations	and	the	underlying	and	noticeable	intention	for	soldier	care,	the	KMAG	rarely	had	challenges	within	units,	proving	to	be	a	microcosm	of	the	broader	dynamics	at	work	within	the	US-ROK	alliance.	
Korean	Augmentation	to	the	United	States	Army	Rhee	further	offered	MacArthur	to	assist	in	filling	American	units	experiencing	critical	shortfalls,	which	greatly	affected	the	US-ROK	alliance.	Thus,	was	born	the	Korean	Augmentation	to	the	United	States	Army	or	the	KATUSA	program.	The	idea	was	that	English-speaking	South	Koreans	would	become	full-fledged	members	of	the	United	States	Army,	going	through	the	same	training,	with	the	same	ranks,	and	essentially	being	treated	exactly	like	American	soldiers,	although	there	is	no	evidence	that	they	were	similarly	paid.	When	the	KATUSA	soldiers	finished	their	training,	they	were	assigned	an	American	Army	unit	in	which	to	serve.	The	program	was	enormously	successful,	bringing	thousands	of	Koreans	into	the	American	Army	during	the	beginning	stages	of	the	war.	This	program	has	continued	to	the	present	day,	although	as	the	number	of	American	military	forces	have	decreased,	so	too	have	the	Koreans	serving	in	the	KATUSA	program.109	The	KATUSAs,	as	they	were	known,	added	capabilities	to	their	American	Army	units	in	that	they	were	able	to	assist	in	Korean	cultural	understanding,	as	well	as	aiding	in	anti-Communist	infiltrations.	They	knew	
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what	to	look	for	in	terms	of	the	subtle	signs	that	might	indicate	an	individual	was	from	the	north.110	While	on	a	practical	level,	the	KATUSAs	added	capabilities	and	capacities	at	the	unit	level,	the	symbolism	in	the	time	of	war	was	far	greater.	The	United	States,	as	discussed	in	previous	chapters,	has	a	long	history	of	alliance	operations.	From	the	Colonists	and	the	British	Army	in	the	French	Indian	War,	to	Baron	de	Steuben	and	the	French	during	the	Revolutionary	War,	the	American	Army	has	constantly	fought	its	wars	with	embedded	allies;	however,	the	KATUSA	program	extended	the	idea	of	embedded	allies	to	another	level.	It	is	important	to	note	that	while	the	Korean	War	was	a	coalition	operation,	as	indicative	of	being	a	United	Nations	command	and	mission,	and	that	Americans	were	used	to	fighting	alongside	other	nations’	militaries,	there	was	no	history	within	the	United	States	Army	of	formally	bringing	foreigners	into	an	American	combat	unit,	as	evidenced	in	the	French	Foreign	Legion.	Like	the	experience	of	the	KMAG	and	its	efforts	to	replace	poor	commanders	and	leaders	within	the	Korean	Army	Officer	Corps,	the	KATUSA	program	could	easily	have	disrupted	combat	unit	cohesion,	but	the	results	were	quite	the	opposite.	As	the	KMAG	noted	in	their	interactions	with	the	ROK	Army,	the	South	Koreans	were	extremely	proficient	fighters,	but	needed	the	equipment	and	direction,	in	the	form	of	combat	leadership,	to	utilize	their	ferocious	skills.	It	was	this	involvement,	of	not	only	having	ROK	Army	units	fighting	side-by-side	with	American	units,	that	helped	create	the	sense	of	“bleeding	together,”	but	it	was	the	actuality	of	bleeding	together,	side-by-side,	that	forged	a	common	sense	of	unit	cohesion	which	helped	to	create	a	deeper	bond.	And	because	the	Korean	War	was	such	an	all-encompassing	experience	for	the	ROK,	as	every	citizen	was	affected,	this	sense	of	“bleeding	together”	and	the	creation	of	that	bond	at	an	individual	level	became	part	of	the	US-ROK	lexicon.111		
																																																								
110	Martin	Blumenson,	“KATUSA,”	Military	Review	37,	no.	5	(August	1957):	51-56.	111	Paek	Sun	Yup,	in	discussion	with	the	author,	November	11,	2015.	
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Conclusion	The	US-ROK	alliance	has	been	one	of	the	most	persistent	throughout	the	Cold	War,	having	withstood	military	coups,	leadership	challenges	on	both	sides,	and	sometimes	questionable	levels	of	support	from	the	United	States.	The	alliance	has	endured	not	despite	its	challenges,	but	because	of	them.	These	challenges,	ultimately,	were	differences	in	political	dynamics.	However,	the	sense	between	both	nations,	especially	within	the	ROK,	that	an	inseparable	bond	was	created	and	developed	in	combat	during	the	Korean	War,	gave	a	sense	of	permanence	to	the	relationship.	This	was	a	sense	that	the	blood	that	was	shed	would	bind	both	nations	into	the	common	purpose	of	resisting	the	spread	of	Communist	influence	and	aggression.	The	Korean	War	United	Nations’	mandate,	while	still	American-led,	remains	intact	to	the	present	day,	although	now	it	has	evolved	to	a	Korean-United	States	coalition	known	as	the	Combined	Forces	Command	(CFC),	which	continues	to	operate	under	the	United	Nations	mandate.	That	mandate	provides	a	legal	framework	for	the	security	of	South	Korea,	allowing	United	States	forces	to	remain	as	both	a	viable	deterrent	to	the	active	aggression	of	North	Korea,	and	continue	to	act	as	tool	of	modernization	for	the	ROK	Army.	It	is	the	evolution	of	the	United	Stated	Forces	–	Korea,	the	security	provided	to	the	ROK,	that	has	allowed	South	Korea	to	develop,	ultimately	reducing	the	requirement	for	the	United	States	to	keep	forces	in	South	Korea	long-term.	This	is	the	fruition	of	the	Military	Assistance	provided	at	the	outset	of	the	alliance,	formed	side-by-side	by	the	bonds	of	combat.	The	KMAG	and	United	States-Republic	of	Korea	relationship	is	rare	in	the	United	States’	post-WWII	efforts	of	Military	Assistance	in	that	it	was	a	clear	success.	The	invasion	of	the	DPRK	failed,	the	ROK	reached	a	sustainable	security,	although	it	is	necessary	to	continue	the	United	States’	presence	in	the	ROK,	due	to	the	threat	of	the	DPRK	rather	than	the	internal	threat	of	insecurity.	More	extensive,	though,	is	the	application	of	the	Military	Assistance	that	was	given	to	the	Grand	Strategy	of	containment	that	was	being	pursued	by	the	United	States.	Because	of	the	ability	of	political	leaders	to	take	military	operations,	the	Korean	War,	and	apply	them	to	a	narrow	political	goal,	preventing	Communist	
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domination	of	the	Korean	peninsula,	there	was	remarkable	success	in	furthering	the	United	States’	Grand	Strategy.
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Chapter	5	Vietnam:	Military	Assistance	and	the	Origins	of	Failure		 “Wars	with	undefined	purposes	are	dangerous	things”1	In	examining	the	Vietnam	conflict,	there	is	almost	too	much	research.	Even	in	the	small	area	of	Military	Assistance	there	exist	numerous	aspects	to	review	and	study,	from	the	Civil	Operations	and	Revolutionary	Development	Support	(CORDS)	program	to	the	precursor	to	the	United	States	Agency	for	International	Development	which	trained	a	civil	and	police	force	(legal	and	otherwise),	to	the	direct	development	of	indigenous	capabilities	and	capacities.	The	Vietnam	conflict	academically,	as	much	as	militarily,	politically,	or	diplomatically,	becomes	something	of	a	quagmire.	At	the	same	time,	the	theme	of	understanding	Vietnam	for	the	United	States	remains:	military	objectives	that	were	never	consistently	linked	to	political	objectives	with	a	recipient	governing	partner	that	was	perceived	as	legitimate	by	both	the	security	forces	and	the	population.	However,	contrary	to	the	popular	opinion	the	Second	Indochina	War,	the	Vietnam	War,	was	not	lost	when	the	American	public	abandoned	the	United	States	Armed	Forces.	The	war	in	fact	was	lost	at	the	beginning,	and	Military	Assistance	was	the	foundation	of	that	failure.	The	United	States	Military	Assistance	Advisory	Group	Indochina	(MAAG	Indochina)	was	formed	in	September	1950	to	assist	the	French	military	and	their	South	Vietnamese	allies	against	the	Viet	Minh	military	forces	and	the	Communist	North	Vietnamese.	MAAG	Indochina	and	its	evolutions	offered	the	best	insight	into	how	a	Military	Assistance	mission	can	fail.	It	could	be	argued,	however,	that	failure	was	a	foregone	conclusion	due	to	complete	lack	of	understanding	of	Vietnam,	both	politically	and	culturally,	as	well	as	its	relations	with	the	French	and	then	with	the	Communists.2	Most	importantly,	there	was	a	general	lack	of																																																									
1	James	Wright,	“Have	Americans	Forgotten	Afghanistan?”	The	Atlantic,	March	23,	2013,	accessed	August	3,	2016,	http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/have-americans-forgotten-afghanistan/274331.	2	Fredrik	Logevall,	Choosing	War:	The	Lost	Chance	for	Peace	and	the	Escalation	of	
War	in	Vietnam	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1999),	xxii	and	109.	
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understanding	or	appreciation	of	the	history	and	its	context	within	the	region.	Added	to	that,	an	inability	to	adapt	the	organizational	structure	to	different	types	of	warfare	created	a	recipe	for	failure	of	the	Vietnam	War,	but	fundamentally,	the	failure	was	due	to	the	origins	of	the	conflict	—	a	war	that	was	lost	before	the	first	battle	had	begun.	Furthermore,	the	United	States’	experience	in	Vietnam	demonstrates	how	the	inability	to	understand	these	various	dynamics	led	to	a	failure	of	understanding	how	and	with	whom	to	partner	for	its	Military	Assistance	missions.	This	chapter	will	seek	to	create	context	for	the	history	of	the	Vietnamese	independence	movement	and	the	resistance	to	the	support	provided	by	the	United	States.	This	will	explain	why	the	origins	of	the	American	“adventure”	in	Vietnam	caused	a	failure	of	the	Military	Assistance	provided	prior	to	the	Gulf	of	Tonkin	resolution,3	foreshadowing	the	inevitable	failure	of	the	overall	military	mission	in	Vietnam.	Historical	Context	of	the	United	States-Vietnam	Relationship	Vietnam	has	a	long	colonial	history,	starting	as	early	as	111	BCE,	when	the	Chinese	seized	the	lands	and	people	of	an	ethnic	group	known	as	the	“Viet.”	For	roughly	1,000	years	the	Chinese	ruled	the	people	and	the	land,	until	internal	strife	and	corruption	within	China	weakened	its	grip	on	its	external	territories,	much	like	the	fall	of	the	Western	Roman	Empire.	As	nature	abhors	a	vacuum,	likewise	does	governance	and	power;	the	opportunity	created	by	the	weakness	of	the	Chinese	Empire	was	seized	by	local	military	leaders,	who	spent	the	next	hundreds	of	years	fending	off	the	Chinese	through	occasional	wars,	diplomacy,	and	strategic	alliances.	While	consistently	concerned	with	the	Chinese,	the	Viet	themselves	began	expanding	into	what	is	now	modern-day	Laos	and	Cambodia.	In	the	1600s,	a	split	that	had	been	brewing	became	a	full-blown	civil	war	between	the	North,	the	traditional	seat	of	government	power,	and	South,	where	access	to	the	sea	had	developed	the	area	into	an	economic	center.	Eventually,	as	the	exploring	Europeans	began	to	establish	colonies	throughout	Asia	in	the	18th	
																																																								
3	The	Johnson	Administration	used	the	Gulf	of	Tonkin	incident	and	a	subsequent	Congressional	Resolution	as	the	precipice	for	the	increase	in	troops	and	the	expansion	of	the	Vietnam	War.	
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and	19th	centuries,	France	realized	that	it	was	at	risk	of	losing	out	in	the	Southeast	Asia	region.	This	led	France	to	formally	establish	French	Indochina	in	1887,	which	initially	encompassed	what	is	now	Vietnam,	and	over	the	next	few	years	expanded	into	what	is	now	Laos	and	Cambodia.4	Interestingly,	the	French	did	not	necessarily	have	a	clear	or	consistent	policy	of	engagement	in	Asia.	As	noted	Hebrew	University	scholar,	Professor	Meron	Medzini	concluded	in	his	doctoral	dissertation,	“France	did	not	behave	in	Japan	the	way	she	behaved	in	North	Africa	and	Indo-China,	and	what	happened	in	Japan	was	very	different	from	what	happened	in	India	or	China.	The	record	of	French	activity	in	Japan	suggests	that	European	expansion	in	the	nineteenth	century	was	a	more	complex	phenomenon	than	is	sometimes	allowed.”5	Professor	Medzini,	in	this	case,	is	referring	to	the	Military	Assistance	provided	by	the	French	to	the	Japanese,	including	some	of	the	elements	found	in	the	book	and	subsequent	movie,	The	Last	Samurai.	This	is	an	important	dynamic,	since	roughly	100	years	later,	in	the	1950s	in	French	Indochina,	the	French	were	receiving	a	large	amount	of	Military	Aid	from	the	United	States,	but	did	not	allow	subsequent	tactical	training	on	the	equipment.	As	Major	General	David	Ott	wrote:	“French	forces	were	happy	to	receive	the	new	material	but	refused	American	advice	on	how	to	employ	it.	The	U.S.	desire	was	that	all	Vietnamese	units	be	organized	and	trained	to	provide	internal	defense	of	their	own	country	and	that	aid	be	used	to	equip	those	units.	Such	a	desire	was	at	odds	with	existing	French	policy.	The	French	Army	was	employed	not	only	to	counter	enemy	forces	but	also	to	assert	France	as	a	colonial	power.”6		 The	French	were	interested	in	re-establishing	their	colonial	presence	in	Vietnam	after	WWII.	A	common	opinion	among	elites	led	the	French	to	a	policy	that	it	must	recreate	its	pre-WWII	French	Empire	in	order	that	France	continue																																																									
4	Mark	Attwood	Lawrence,	The	Vietnam	War:	A	Concise	International	History	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2008),	8-11.	5	Meron Medzini, French Policy in Japan During the Closing Years of the Tokugawa 
Regime (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 175.	6	David	Ewing	Ott,	Vietnam	Studies:	Field	Artillery,	1954-1973	(Washington,	D.C.:	Center	of	Military	History,	1995),	21.	
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to	be	regarded	as	a	global	power	in	the	post-WWII	era.7	This	policy	was	in	stark	contrast	to	Great	Britain,	which	was	able	to	transition	into	the	Cold	War	with	much	greater	ease	—	understanding	that	the	time	of	colonial	power	was	ending.	What	is	more	important	to	appreciate	is	that	the	French	had	an	inconsistent	set	of	colonial	policies.	In	addition,	the	French	desire	to	reassert	colonial	rule	over	Vietnam	affected	the	United	States’	Military	Aid,	the	training	that	went	along	with	that	aid,	and	eventually	the	Military	Assistance	provided	to	South	Vietnamese	soldiers.	The	relevance,	though,	to	both	the	United	States	and	this	research	project	specifically,	is	that	the	Vietnamese	population	would	readily	perceive	the	United	States’	efforts,	no	matter	how	well	intended,	as	a	continuation	of	French	colonialist	policy,	due	to	the	population	seeing	American	equipment	being	used	to	support	French	colonialism.8	At	the	same	time,	in	a	more	expansive	sense,	the	inconsistent	political	goals	of	the	United	States	would	be	unable	to	be	supported	by	military	operations,	thereby	creating	an	unachievable	and	unwinnable	scenario	for	the	United	States	Armed	Forces.	The	historical	relationship,	however,	between	the	United	States	and	Vietnam	began	at	the	birth	of	the	United	States,	when	newly	installed	Ambassador	to	France,	Thomas	Jefferson,	asked	some	French	traders	in	what	is	now	known	as	Vietnam	to	find	rice	seeds	that	he	hoped	could	grow	in	the	Southern	States.9	While	the	seed	venture	failed,	it	was	a	future	prognosis	for	the	commercial	endeavors	between	the	two	countries	until	the	20th	century.	As	both	Dr.	Douglas	Borer,	a	professor	at	the	Naval	Postgraduate	School,	and	historian	Ambassador	Robert	Miller	recognized,	with	the	Spanish-American	War	and	the	occupation	of	the	Philippines	by	the	United	States,	and	Japan’s	newfound	power	after	the	Russo-Japanese	War,	a	conflict	was	inevitable	between	the	United	States	and	Japan.10	Interestingly,	it	was	Vietnam	that	would	exacerbate	the	conflict	between	
																																																								
7	Lawrence,	The	Vietnam	War:	A	Concise	International	History,	29.	8	Kathryn	C.	Statler,	Replacing	France:	The	Origins	of	American	Intervention	in	
Vietnam	(Lexington:	University	Press	of	Kentucky,	2007),	261.	9	Robert	Hopkins	Miller,	The	United	States	and	Vietnam,	1787-1941	(Washington,	D.C.:	National	Defense	University	Press,	1990)	p.	xv-xvi	(preface).	10	Miller,	The	United	States	and	Vietnam,	154.	Douglas	A.	Borer,	Superpowers	
Defeated:	Vietnam	and	Afghanistan	Compared	(London:	Frank	Cass,	1999),	51-52.	
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the	United	States	and	Japan.	However,	the	first	direct	interactions	between	the	United	States	and	Vietnam	in	the	early	part	of	the	century	were	at	the	Paris	Peace	Conference	in	Versailles	in	1919,	when	Vietnamese	nationalists11	stated,	“Since	the	Allies’	victory,	all	subject	peoples	are	trembling	with	hope	before	the	prospect	of	an	era	of	law	and	justice	that	ought	to	open	for	them	by	virtue	of	the	formal	and	solemn	commitments	undertaken	before	the	whole	world	by	the	various	Entente	powers	during	the	fight	of	Civilization	against	Barbarism.”12	Nothing	came	of	that	communication,	and	it	is	unlikely	that	Secretary	of	State	Robert	Lansing	received	the	message.	However,	as	an	interesting	side	note,	future	Secretary	of	State,	John	Foster	Dulles,	who	would	become	central	in	the	Vietnam	conflict,	was	assisting	his	uncle,	Secretary	Lansing,	during	the	negotiations	at	Versailles.13	Moving	forward,	once	the	Japanese	began	their	invasion	of	China	in	1931,	as	a	forerunner	to	WWII,	the	United	States	began	using	Vietnam	as	platform	for	logistical	transit	so	as	to	support	the	Chinese	war	efforts	in	a	program	of	Military	Aid	and	Military	Assistance	to	Chiang	Kai-shek.14	Interestingly,	this	became	an	issue,	as	the	pre-war	French	government	insisted	that	the	United	States	protect	Vietnam,	or	Indochina	as	it	was	known	then,	from	Japanese	aggression.	This	demand	was	considered	recompense	for	the	United	States	continuing	to	use	Vietnam	as	a	supply	transit;	however,	the	United	States	declined.15	Within	a	few	years,	Japanese	expansion	had	led	to	taking	over	Vietnam	from	the	French,	and	with	the	German	conquest	of	France	and	establishment	of	the	French	Government	in	Vichy,	the	point	of	contention	was	moot.	As	Borer	commented	about	the	entire	United	States-Vietnam	relationship	prior	to	WWII:	“One	could																																																									
11	The	author	is	identified	as	Nguyen	Ai	Quoc,	who	would	later	be	known	as	Ho	Chi	Minh.	12	Ho	Chi	Minh,	“An	Appeal	to	the	World	Powers,”	Note	to	US	Secretary	of	State	Robert	Lansing	at	the	Versailles,	June	18,	1919,	in	The	Vietnam	War:	An	
International	History	in	Documents,	ed.	Mark	Atwood	Lawrence	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2014),	5.	Lawrence,	The	Vietnam	War:	A	Concise	
International	History,	18-19.	13	Michael	A.	Guhin,	John	Foster	Dulles:	A	Statesman	and	His	Time	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	1972),	26-33.	14	Borer,	Superpowers	Defeated,	32-33.	15	Borer,	Superpowers	Defeated,	33.	Miller,	The	United	States	and	Vietnam,	159.	
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characterize	US	policy	toward	Vietnam	in	terms	of	a	continuous	absence	of	significant	interaction,	with	major	changes	occurring	in	the	years	following	the	Second	World	War.”16	
Post-World	War	II	and	the	First	Indochina	War	In	August	1945,	after	the	unconditional	surrender	of	the	Japanese,	Bao	Dai,	the	Emperor	of	Vietnam,	attempted	to	instate	a	provisional	Vietnamese	government,	but	was	unable	to	do	so,	due	to	Viet	Minh	forces	that	were	already	establishing	themselves	as	the	new	authority	in	the	land.17	In	addition,	“the	Vietnamese	had	learned	that	the	British	would	be	arriving	in	Vietnam	to	[formally]	receive	the	Japanese	surrender	south	of	the	16th	parallel,	as	the	Chinese	were	to	do	in	the	north.	Behind	the	British,	however,	hovered	the	French.”18	Bao	Dai,	recognizing	the	situation	with	the	Viet	Minh,	chose	to	abdicate	to	Ho	Chi	Minh,	who,	as	president,	declared	the	independence	of	the	newly	formed	Democratic	Republic	of	Vietnam.19	In	one	of	his	last	acts	as	Emperor,	Bao	Dai,	fearing	the	coming	French	re-colonization	of	Indochina,	wrote	to	French	leader	Charles	de	Gaulle:	“I	address	myself	to	the	people	of	France,	to	the	country	of	my	youth.	I	address	myself	as	well	to	the	nation's	leader	and	liberator	and	I	wish	to	speak	as	a	friend	rather	than	as	Head	of	State.	You	 have	 suffered	 too	 much	 during	 four	 deadly	 years	 not	 to	understand	that	the	Vietnamese	people,	who	have	a	history  of	twenty	centuries	 and	 an	 often	 glorious	 past,	 no	 longer	wish, can	 no	 longer	support	any	foreign	domination	or	foreign	administration.	You	 could	 understand	 even	 better	 if	 you	were	 able	 to	 see	what	 is	happening	here,	if	you	were	able	to	sense	this	desire	for	independence	which	has	been	smoldering	in	the	bottom	of	all	hearts,	and	which	no	human	force	can	any	longer	hold	back.	Even	if	you	were	to	arrive	to	re-establish	a	French	administration here,	it	would	no	longer	be	obeyed;	each	 village	 would	 be	 a	 nest of	 resistance,	 every	 former	 friend	 an	
																																																								
16	Borer,	Superpowers	Defeated,	38.	17	Arthur	J.	Dommen,	The	Indochinese	Experience	of	the	French	and	the	Americans:	
Nationalism	and	Communism	in	Cambodia,	Laos,	and	Vietnam	(Bloomington,	IN:	Indiana	University	Press,	2001),	100-107.	18	Dommen,	The	Indochinese	Experience	of	the	French	and	the	Americans,	105-106.	19	Lawrence,	The	Vietnam	War:	A	Concise	International	History,	26.	
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enemy,	 and	 your	 officials  and	 colonists	 themselves	 would	 ask	 to	depart	from	this	unbreathable	atmosphere.	I	 beg	 you	 to	 understand	 that	 the	 only	 way	 to	 safeguard	 French	interests	 and	 the	 spiritual	 influence	 of	 France	 in	 Indochina	 is  to	recognize	 frankly	the	 independence	of	Vietnam	and	to	renounce	any	idea	 of	 re-establishing	 French	 sovereignty	or	administration	 here	 in	whatever	form	it	may	be.	You	would	be	able	to	listen	to	us	so	easily	and	become	our	friends	if	you	would	stop	aspiring	to	become	our	masters	again.	Making	 this	 appeal	 to	 the	 well	 recognized	 idealism	 of	 the	 French	people	and	the	great	wisdom	of	their	leader,	we	hope	that	peace	and	the	joy	which	has	rung	for	all	the	people	of	the	world	will	be	guaranteed	equally	to	all	people	who	live	in	Indochina,	native	as	well	as	foreign.”20		This	statement	would	be	a	harbinger	of	the	things	to	come	over	the	next	thirty	years,	one	of	numerous	signs	that	the	dynamics	at	play	in	Vietnam	were	not	favorable	to	any	form	of	external	intervention.	Bao	Dai	himself	said	regarding	his	abdication,	“that	he	could	live	as	a	simple	citizen	in	an	independent	country	rather	than	king	of	a	subjugated	nation.”21	In	what	could	only	be	described	as	a	perfect	storm	of	events	leading	to	the	First	Indochina	War,	the	United	States	unintentionally	created	an	eventual	vacuum	that	would	lead	to	further	involvement	in	Vietnam,	by	positioning	Vietnam	to	become	a	symbol	for	the	ideological	fight	between	the	West	and	the	Global	Communist	movement.	To	start	with,	when	Roosevelt	and	Stalin	met	in	Tehran	in	November	of	1943,	both	had	begun	discussing	the	post-war	order.	Neither	was	supportive	of	the	European	Powers	regaining	their	colonial																																																									
20	Office	of	the	Secretary	of	Defense	Vietnam	Task	Force,	United	States	–	Vietnam	Relations,	1945	-1967:	Study	Prepared	by	the	Department	of	Defense,	“The	Pentagon	Papers,”	Part	1,	Section	B	(Washington,	D.C.:	Department	of	Defense,	1971),	29-30,	accessed	November	3,	2016,	https://www.archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers.	Hereinafter	referred	to	as	“The	Pentagon	Papers.”	Citing	Joseph	Buttinger,	Vietnam:	A	Dragon	Embattled,	vol.	1	(London:	Pall	Mall	Press,	1967),	435-436.	Citing	Bao	Dai,	“Letter	of	Bao	Dai	to	General	de	Gaulle,”	August	18,	1945,	Conflict	in	Indo-China	and	International	
Repercussions:	A	Documentary	History,	1945-1955,	ed.	Allan	B.	Cole	(Ithaca,	NY:	Cornell	University	Press,	1956),	17-18.	21	Stanley	Karnow,	Vietnam:	A	History	(London:	Century	Publishing,	1983),	147.	This	comment	is	quoted	but	an	original	source	is	not	cited.	
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possessions,	and	used	the	occasion	to	agree	that	France	should	not	regain	control	of	Indochina.	This	played	out	in	that	Stalin	wanted	France	to	pay	for	supporting	Nazi	Germany	during	the	war,	and	Roosevelt	was	against	colonialism	in	general,	as	an	institution.22	The	French	after	WWII,	on	the	other	hand,	believed	that	they	would	only	be	able	to	regain	power	on	the	world	stage	once	they	had	recovered	the	colonies	and	territories	lost	during	the	War.23	The	contention	began	with	the	end	of	WWII,	the	death	of	Roosevelt,	the	civil	war	in	China,	and	the	Rise	of	Global	Communism,	leading	to	a	perceived	need	to	keep	a	Western	alliance	together.	At	the	end	of	the	War,	the	Chinese,	still	under	the	authority	of	Chiang	Kai-shek,	along	with	the	British,	demobilized	the	Japanese	occupying	Vietnam.	As	the	French	re-inserted	themselves	through	politics	and	force	in	1946,	the	Truman	Administration	was	called	upon	to	do	a	quick	calculation	on	an	issue	that	seemed	to	be	of	prime	importance	to	its	French	allies	and	of	little	importance	to	the	United	States.	The	Truman	Administration	declared,	despite	many	efforts	by	Ho	Chi	Minh	and	the	newly	formed	DRV,	that	the	United	States	would	remain	neutral,	while	as	a	matter	of	American	policy	indicating	its	displeasure	for	colonialism.	With	the	fall	of	China	to	Mao’s	Communist	revolution	in1949,	and	the	perception	within	the	United	States	that	Truman	had	“lost”	China,	the	United	States	began	to	be	lured	into	the	First	Indochina	War	as	part	of	the	extensive	fight	against	Communism.	This	neurosis	was	carefully	supported	by	the	French	to	maximize	the	benefits	of	the	involvement	of	the	United	States’	money	and	equipment	without	the	involvement	of	the	United	States	in	the	field,	which	the	French	regarded	as	an	internal	matter.24	The	United	States,	as	mentioned	earlier,	began	supporting	the	French	and	South	Vietnamese	allies	with	Military	Aid	through	the	work	of	MAAG	Indochina.25	The	Truman	Administration	tried	to	convince	the	French	that	the																																																									
22	The	Pentagon	Papers.	Part	5,	Section	B,	Volume	1,	24-25.	23	Lawrence,	The	Vietnam	War:	A	Concise	International	History,	p.	29.	24	Robert	H.	Spector,	Advice	and	Support:	The	Early	Years,	1941-1960	(Honolulu,	HI:	University	Press	of	the	Pacific,	2005,	reprinted	from	1985	edition),	95,	103,	110.	25	Spector,	Advice	and	Support:	The	Early	Years,	115-121.	
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Vietnamese	would	stop	supporting	Ho	Chi	Minh	if	they	did	not	identify	the	South	Vietnamese	as	a	tacit	continuation	of	French	colonial	rule.	The	French,	however,	easily	manipulated	the	United	States	due	to	its	need	of	French	support	on	the	global	stage,	specifically	in	Europe	against	the	Soviet	Union,	and	more	importantly,	due	to	the	ongoing	war	in	Korea.	Additionally,	other	communist	movements	began	during	1948	in	Malaya	and	Burma,26	which	continued	the	perception	that	there	was	a	communist	wave	in	the	making.27	This	created	a	domestic	pressure	whereby	the	Truman	Administration	was	unable	to	strongly	protest	French	actions	in	Vietnam,	allowing	the	colonial	machinations	reasserting	control	to	continue.28	The	relevance	of	this	history	to	the	present	research	project	is	that	the	ability	of	the	French	to	manipulate	greater	involvement	in	Vietnam	by	the	United	States	is	very	like	the	actions	other	client	nation	states	would	pursue	so	as	to	involve	either	great	power	during	the	Cold	War.29	In	fairness	to	the	French,	they	were	not	the	first	actors	to	pursue	this	strategy	of	endeavoring	to	draw	in	the	Great	Powers	in	this	conflict.	Indeed,	Ho	Chi	Minh	specifically	designed	the	announcement	of	the	DRV	to	reflect	the	terminology	of	the	United	States’	Declaration	of	Independence.30	On	the	founding	of	the	DRV,	Ho	Chi	Minh	stated,	“All	men	are	created	equal;	they	are	endowed	by	their	Creator	with	certain	unalienable	Rights;	among	these	are	Life,	Liberty,	and	the	pursuit	of	Happiness.”31	To	be	fair	to	the	United	States,	it	was	adjusting	to	its	newfound	leadership	of	the	Western	democratic	world	as	it	was	pushed	onto	the	world	stage	after	the	victory	of	WWII.	However,	with	loss	at	the	Battle	at	Dien	Bien	Phu,																																																									
26	Lawrence,	The	Vietnam	War:	A	Concise	International	History,	p.	36.	27	The	idea	of	a	communist	wave	is	essentially	the	argument	of	the	“domino	theory”	that	was	prominent	from	the	late	1940s	until	the	withdrawal	of	US	forces	from	Vietnam	in	1945.	Domino	theory	was	discussed	extensively	in	Chapter	2:	Military	Assistance	and	Grand	Strategy,	but	it	was	a	driving	rationale	that	the	French	were	able	to	utilize	to	bring	the	United	States	into	the	First	Indochina	War.	28	Lawrence,	The	Vietnam	War:	A	Concise	International	History,	p.	29-41.	29	Benjamin	Miller,	States,	Nations,	and	the	Great	Powers:	The	Sources	of	Regional	
War	and	Peace	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2007),	226-227.	30	Lawrence,	The	Vietnam	War:	A	Concise	International	History,	p.	27.	31	The	Pentagon	Papers,	Part	1,	Section	B,	34.	
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the	French	negotiated	a	peace	at	the	Geneva	Conference	of	1954	that	would	create	the	separate	countries	popularly	known	as	North	and	South	Vietnam	and,	more	broadly,	created	the	likelihood	that	Southeast	Asia	would	be	perceived	to	be	“lost”	to	Communism.32	There	were	additional	dynamics	with	respect	to	the	French,	due	to	their	perception	that	Vietnam	was	critical	to	their	regaining	the	power	and	prestige	in	world	affairs	that	they	had	lost	during	WWII.	There	existed	a	real	chance	that	had	the	United	States	not	responded	to	aid	the	French	in	Indochina,	the	French	would	have	abandoned	the	Western	alliance	in	Europe	and	other	places	in	the	world.33	As	mentioned,	the	French	skillfully	modified	the	concept	of	the	fight	in	Vietnam,	from	the	reinstatement	of	colonial	rule,	which	the	United	States	was	opposed	to,	into	a	fight	against	Communism,	knowing	that	the	United	States	would	not	resist	being	drawn	into	the	conflict.34	This	change,	along	with	the	real	risk	that	the	French	could	and	likely	would	abandon	NATO	and	other	global	security	cooperation	efforts	around	the	world,	was	a	risk	that	the	United	States	was	unwilling	to	take.	In	this	case,	the	challenge	was	that	the	Grand	Strategy	being	pursued	by	the	United	States,	that	of	containment	of	the	Global	Communism	movement,	dictated	an	involvement	in	Vietnam.	Direct	Involvement	of	the	United	States	in	Vietnam	The	hubris	of	the	United	States	was	not	that	it	chose	a	specific	side	in	the	conflict,	or	even	the	belief	that	it	could	succeed	where	France	had	failed,	despite	France’s	long	history	in	the	nation.	The	United	States’	failure,	and	hubris,	resulted	from	not	appreciating	the	internal	nuances	of	the	Vietnamese	people	and	their	relationship	to	a	ruling	authority.	It	has	been	said	that	wars	begin	because	of	miscalculations	upon	miscalculations.35	The	Vietnam	War,	or	in	this																																																									
32 Bernard B. Fall, Street Without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina (Barnsley, 
UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2005, originally 1961), 312-313. 33	Statler,	Replacing	France,	19-21.	34	Statler,	Replacing	France,	15-16.	35	Barbara	Tuchman	is	often	quoted	as	saying,	“War	is	the	unfolding	of	miscalculations.”	She	is	even	cited	for	this	quote	in	the	New	York	Times	(Anatole	Broyard,	“Books	of	the	Times:	War	by	Albert	R.	Leventhal,”	The	New	York	Times,	December	3,	1973,	accessed	March	15,	2017,	
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case	the	Second	Indochina	War,	is	a	perfect	example	of	these	miscalculations.	What	if	the	people	of	the	United	States	had	heard	Ho	Chi	Minh	in	1945	declaring	the	independence	of	the	DRV,	and	been	motivated	to	support	him,	or	at	least,	to	not	support	the	conflict	against	him?	What	if	the	United	States	had	been	able	to	convince	the	French	that	they	did	not	need	to	reestablish	themselves	in	Vietnam	to	be	thought	a	global	power?	These	“What	ifs”	could	go	on	and	on,	but	the	importance	for	this	research	project	is	that	these	miscalculations	started	at	the	very	beginning	of	the	direct	involvement	of	the	United	States	in	Vietnam,	specifically	influencing	the	Military	Assistance	efforts,	in	addition	to	the	United	States’	political	goals.	As	stated,	as	France	looked	after	its	own	interests,	it	manipulated	the	United	States	into	giving	large	amounts	of	Military	Aid	in	the	form	of	supplies	and	equipment.	In	addition,	the	United	States	in	the	form	of	MAAG	Indochina	gave	advice	to	the	French	concerning	the	use	of	that	equipment,	which	was	mostly	ignored,	when	it	was	permitted	to	be	given	at	all.36	Furthermore,	the	United	States	was	also	consulted	for	advice	at	Dien	Bien	Phu.	The	defenses	at	Dien	Bien	Phu	were	toured	by	many	senior	military	officers	from	around	the	world,	including	the	United	States,	studying	all	areas	of	the	defensives,	and	giving	all	sorts	of	tactical	advice.	Lieutenant	General	John	O’Daniel,	the	commander	of	MAAG	Indochina,	led	the	United	States	team.37	The	advice,	however	well	intentioned,	proved	to	be	poor,	especially	regarding	the	location	of	the	artillery.38	As	Vietnam	historian	Bernard	Fall	put	it,	the	blame	was	very	much	
																																																								http://www.nytimes.com/1973/12/03/archives/through-a-lens-darkly-books-of-the-times-expression-of-proud.html).	There	is,	however,	no	known	original	source	that	Mrs.	Tuchman	ever	made	this	statement.	It	is	the	belief	of	the	Yale	University	Manuscripts	and	Archives	Division,	where	Mrs.	Tuchman’s	papers	were	donated,	that	the	quote	was	mistaken	from	the	original:	“History	is	the	unfolding	of	miscalculations”	in	her	book	Stilwell	and	the	American	Experience	in	
China,	1911	-1945	(originally	published	by	Macmillan	in	1970	but	quoted	from	the	2001	edition	published	by	Phoenix	Press,	page	132).	This	note	is	to	clarify	any	confusion	that	may	arise	regarding	this	citation.	36	Ott,	Vietnam	Studies:	Field	Artillery,	1953-1973,	21.	37	Fall, Street Without Joy, 318 and 323-324.	38	Joseph	Buttinger,	Vietnam:	A	Dragon	Embattled,	vol.	2	(London:	Pall	Mall	Press,	1967),	824.	
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placed	at	the	feet	of	the	French	Commander-in-Chief,	the	northern	theater	commander,	and	the	fortress	commander.39	In	fact,	the	fortress	artillery	chief,	Colonel	Piroth,	was	the	first	to	understand	the	“fatal	error,”	and	killed	himself	during	the	battle	with	a	grenade	after	apologizing	to	those	around	him	for	the	failure.40	In	contrast	with	the	French	artillery	placement,	the	DRV	forces	were	perfectly	placed.	Mountains	that	the	French	and	other	military	advisors	believed	would	be	insurmountable	with	any	type	of	artillery	surrounded	the	French	base	at	Dien	Bien	Phu.	They	had	chosen	this	position	because	of	the	airfield,	which	allowed	easy	access	for	supplies	and	soldiers.	The	DRV,	cognizant	of	the	hazardous	terrain,	were	nevertheless	able	to	bring	their	artillery	up	into	the	mountains	and	surround	the	French,	digging	into	the	mountain	to	provide	ideal	cover	and	concealment	for	that	artillery.	The	result	was	that	the	DRV	forces	could	deploy	their	artillery	in	an	effective	circle	around	the	French	base,	firing	down	on	the	French	with	minimal	risk	to	DRV	forces,	whereas	the	French	artillery	had	very	little	ability	to	strike	back	and	neutralize	the	threat.	Once	the	attack	from	the	DRV	forces	was	underway,	the	French	had	begun	to	realize	that	Dien	Bien	Phu	was	their	last	stand.	The	Fourth	Republic’s	dreams	of	the	French	Union	were	quickly	being	undone.41	Knowing	that	the	Geneva	Conference	was	taking	place	in	a	few	weeks,	the	French	decided	to	make	a	final	diplomatic	effort	to	prevent	a	disaster.	The	US	Ambassador	to	Vietnam,	Donald	Heath,	was	deeply	concerned	with	the	situation,	and	believed	that	conflict	in	some	form	would	continue	until	the	Vietnamese	people	were	independent	of	France.	At	the	same	time,	the	United	States	Ambassador	to	France,	C.	Douglas	Dillon,	argued	in	Washington	that	the	Vietnamese	were	at	fault	and	that	the	United	States	should	not	do	anything	to	undermine	the	French.42																																																									
39	Fall, Street Without Joy, p 318	40	Fall, Street Without Joy, p 323.	41	Tony	Smith,	"A	Comparative	Study	of	French	and	British	Decolonization,"	
Comparative	Studies	in	Society	and	History	20,	no.	1	(1978):	74	accessed	April	28,	2017,	http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0010417500008835.	Dommen,	The	Indochinese	Experience	of	the	French	and	the	Americans,	212-216.	42	Dommen,	The	Indochinese	Experience	of	the	French	and	the	Americans,	224.	
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Unites	States	Considers	Airstrikes	to	Support	the	French	While	the	diplomatic	back	and	forth	continued,	the	French	Chief	of	the	General	Staff	of	National	Defense,	General	Paul	Ely,	led	a	mission	to	the	United	States	in	March	of	1954,	about	one	week	into	the	siege	of	Dien	Bien	Phu.	The	diplomatic	efforts	between	the	various	factions	of	the	Communist	Vietnamese	and	the	French	Government	had	failed;	the	political	negotiations	in	the	French	Government	that	would	have	allowed	a	French	withdrawal	and	Vietnamese	independence	failed;	and	the	military	situation	was	failing.	While	President	Eisenhower	removed	himself	and	tried	to	appear	disengaged,	multiple	efforts	were	taking	place;	one	of	the	more	important	events	was	a	meeting	hosted	by	Secretary	Dulles,	Admiral	Radford	(Chairman	of	the	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff),	and	the	Congressional	leadership.	This	meeting	was	a	background	brief	on	the	current	state	of	affairs	in	Indochina,	and	was	meant	to	have	Congressional	leaders	begin	efforts	around	a	joint	resolution	for	airstrikes,	since	the	United	States	had	the	military	resources	in	the	area	on	a	“training”	exercise.43	As	noted,	French	General	Ely,	who	had	sought	to	plea	for	American	military	support,	predicated	the	meeting	with	Congressional	leaders	on	his	mission	to	the	United	States.	However,	upon	confronting	Admiral	Radford,	General	Ely	found	that	there	was	already	a	plan	being	formulated	to	support	the	French	at	Dien	Bien	Phu,	Operation	Vulture,	once	there	was	a	formal	request	from	the	Government	of	France	to	the	Government	of	the	Unites	States.	After	General	Ely	had	returned	to	France	the	request	was	made,	but	in	a	stunning	reversal,	the	United	States	formally	rejected	the	request.	Secretary	Dulles	had	intervened.44	
																																																								
43	Chalmers	M.	Roberts,	“The Day We Didn’t Go to War,” from The Reporter, 
September 14, 1954, reprinted in The Vietnam Reader: Articles and Documents on 
American Foreign Policy and the Vietnam Crisis, eds. Marcus G. Raskin and Bernard 
B. Fall (New York: Random House, 1965), 57-66. John	Prados,	Vietnam:	The	
History	of	an	Unwinnable	War,	1945-1975	(Lawrence:	University	Press	of	Kansas,	2009),	27-29.	44	Guhin,	John	Foster	Dulles,	242-243	and	247.	Buttinger,	Vietnam:	A	Dragon	
Embattled,	vol.	2,	816-824	and	1082-1083	(endnotes).	Dommen,	The	Indochinese	
Experience	of	the	French	and	the	Americans,	233.	
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What	could	easily	be	thought	a	betrayal	was	considered	by	Secretary	Dulles	as	a	strategic	necessity.	“He	[Secretary	Dulles]	did	not	want	a	one-strike	American	intervention	to	save	the	French	at	Dien	Bien	Phu.	He	wanted	more.	Indochina	—	all	of	it	—	had	to	be	saved	from	Communism.”45	This	was	the	shift	in	which	the	United	States	moved	from	supporting	the	efforts	of	the	French,	to	taking	on	the	responsibility	for	the	outcome.	While	it	is	only	natural	to	question	why	Secretary	Dulles	shifted	his	strategic	perspective,	and	why	President	Eisenhower	supported	such	a	shift,	what	is	obvious	is	that	“Dulles	was	not	interested	in	U.S.	intervention	merely	to	improve	the	position	of	the	French	for	a	deal	with	the	Communists	at	Geneva.”46	This	change	was	based	on	a	belief	that	there	was	a	requirement	to	expand	the	conflict,	supporting	it	to	evolve	from	a	regional	conflict	to	bring	a	colonial	empire	back	to	power,	and	into	a	full	civil	war	that	was	being	supplied	and	supported	by	Western	democracies	and	the	Soviet	Union	and	their	Communist	allies.	This	entire	incident	relates	back	to	the	issues	around	Military	Assistance	in	a	rather	unique	way,	because	what	becomes	clear	from	this	example	is	that	the	circumstances	surrounding	the	airstrikes	in	support	of	the	French	at	Dien	Bien	Phu	were	not	Military	Assistance	nor	was	it	Military	Aid.	As	discussed	earlier,	Military	Assistance	is	about	developing	capacities	and	capabilities	of	an	indigenous	force	to	support	a	long-term,	sustainable	security	for	the	recipient	nation;	Military	Aid	refers	to	the	equipment	and	training	on	that	equipment	for	an	indigenous	military.	This	example	does	not	readily	fit	either	definition,	as	the	French	and	their	Vietnamese	allies	were	already	capable	and	already	had	sufficient	capacity	at	Dien	Bien	Phu	in	terms	of	the	definitions	explored	in	this	research	project.	This	situation	does	exemplify	the	issue	that	just	because	a	given	military	already	has	a	high	level	of	capabilities	and	capacities,	it	does	not	guarantee	victory	in	battle.	It	could	well	be	argued	that	the	circumstances	of	this	example	of	Military	Intervention	at	Dien	Bien	Phu,	and	that	of	the	Korean	War,	discussed	previously	
																																																								
45	Buttinger,	Vietnam:	A	Dragon	Embattled,	vol.	2,	820.	46	Buttinger,	Vietnam:	A	Dragon	Embattled,	vol.	2,	820.	
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in	Chapter	4,	were	quite	similar.	In	one	sense,	in	each	scenario	there	was	an	ally	on	the	ground	facing	an	aggressive	Communist	attack	being	ultimately	supported	by	the	Soviet	Union.	Both	are	examples	of	a	Military	Support	type	of	Military	Intervention,	while	at	the	same	time	both	had	an	integrated	Military	Assistance	mission	already	underway,	although	the	KMAG	in	Korea	was	far	more	robust	than	its	Vietnamese	counterpart.	In	the	case	of	Vietnam,	as	seen	here,	there	had	not	been	a	robust	Military	Assistance	mission	previously	due	to	the	presence	of	the	French.	The	perspective	from	the	discipline	of	international	relations,	however,	is	far	more	interesting.	In	Korea,	there	was	an	expanded	Military	Support	mission	that	was	tied	to	a	focused,	limited	political	objective	to	prevent	a	first	Communist	victory,	and	from	the	domestic	politics	side	to	prevent	any	interpretation	of	giving	way	to	the	Communists.	In	Vietnam,	due	to	the	machinations	of	Secretary	
Dulles,	a	limited	Military	Support	mission	to	help	the	French	at	Dien	Bien	Phu	was	
disconnected	from	the	limited	United	States	Military	Assistance	mission,	which	was	
not	pursued	in	order	to	enable	a	more	expansive	political	objective	—	the	global	
containment	of	Communism.	This	is	in	direct	contrast	to	the	Korean	War,	in	which	the	Military	Assistance	mission	and	the	Military	Support	mission	were	dependent	and	supportive	of	one	another.	With	hindsight,	the	remarkable	issue	is	not	that	every	military	official	missed	the	possibility	that	the	DRV	forces	would	be	so	familiar	with	the	territory	as	to	capably	place	artillery	in	what	was	considered	impossible	places.	What	is	striking	is	that	after	observing	the	defeat	of	the	French	at	Dien	Bien	Phu,	there	was	no	reassessment	from	any	level	of	military	establishment	of	the	DRV’s	will	to	fight,	especially	in	context	of	Bao	Dai’s	original	plea	to	de	Gaulle.	Although	there	was	little	additional	consideration	that	there	might	be	shifted	situational	dynamics	that	should	give	pause	before	fully	committing	additional	forces	from	the	military	perspective,	there	was	plenty	from	the	political	perspective.	Everyone	involved	was	exhausted	with	spent	efforts,	and	saw	the	Geneva	Conference,	which	began	while	the	Battle	of	Dien	Bien	Phu	raged,	as	the	sole	possible	agency	to	untangle	the	situation	with	a	minimal	amount	of	
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embarrassment.47	There	was	no	reconsideration	of	the	desired	political	end	state,	though	it	should	be	argued	that	there	was	an	inconsistent	one	between	the	United	States	and	France	and	their	Vietnamese	allies.	The	defeat	at	Dien	Bien	Phu,	which	happened	in	the	middle	of	the	Conference,	however,	forced	the	French	to	negotiate	with	the	DRV	for	a	withdrawal	from	North	Vietnam,	as	well	as	the	effective	pullout	of	French	forces	from	the	south.48	The	eventual	split	of	Indochina	and	the	founding	of	the	Republic	of	Vietnam	(or	South	Vietnam),	occurred	through	negotiations	at	the	Geneva	Conference.	In	addition,	it	was	due	to	this	conference	that	the	Military	Assistance	in	Vietnam	began	as	the	mission	focus	by	the	United	States	through	the	Military	Assistance	Advisory	Group	Vietnam,	which	had	been	in	country	since	1950	as	a	distributor	of	Military	Aid.	The	Geneva	Conference	of	1954	The	Geneva	Conference	of	1954	was	initially	structured	around	the	issues	of	the	Korean	peninsula,49	but	since	the	Korean	peninsula	had	evolved	into	a	cold	peace	after	the	Armistice	was	signed	in	July	1953,	the	focus	of	the	conference	became	squarely	intent	on	Indochina.	This	was	a	general	agreement,	since	the	battle	of	Dien	Bien	Phu	was	being	played	out	during	the	conference	opening.	This	conference	was	like	any	other	foray	in	international	relations,	however,	with	declining	nations,	such	as	France,	trying	to	maintain	their	power,	and	ascending	nations	attempting	to	be	recognized	for	the	achievements	they	had	already	made,	such	as	the	DRV’s	intention	to	capitalize	on	their	soon-to-be	victory.	In	addition,	each	negotiating	government	was	deeply	concerned	with	its	own	domestic	politics:	British	Foreign	Minister	Anthony	Eden	and	the	British	tried	to	maintain	popular	support	for	the	Conservative	Party;	the	French	were	in	the	process	of	a	governing	upheaval	that,	combined	with	Algerian	uprising,	would	bring	about	the	collapse	of	the	Fourth	Republic;	the	DRV	attempted	to	secure	the	recognized	independence	that	it	had	promised	its	citizens;	the	United	States																																																									
47	Prados,	Vietnam:	The	History	of	an	Unwinnable	War,	30.	48	Ott,	Vietnam	Studies:	Field	Artillery,	1953-1973,	22.	49	The	dynamics	of	the	Korean	War	had	a	distinctive	impact	on	United	States’	operations	in	the	Philippines	and	Vietnam.	
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aimed	to	prevent	being	seen,	in	any	way,	as	soft	on	Communism,	given	the	state	of	McCarthyism	going	on	domestically.	This	conference,	however,	was	the	first	meeting	of	the	international	community	trying	to	settle	the	question	of	Southeast	Asia,	once	the	lines	of	the	Cold	War	had	been	set.	The	importance	of	the	Geneva	Conference	is	that	while	the	fall	of	Dien	Bien	Phu	set	the	stage	for	the	military	conflict	to	come,	the	Conference	set	the	stage	for	the	political	and	diplomatic	conflicts	that	would	inevitably	arise.	As	mentioned	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter,	prior	to	the	fall	of	Dien	Bien	Phu,	Bao	Dai,	the	Emperor	who	abdicated	the	throne	in	1945	to	become	Chief	of	State,	asked	Ngo	Dinh	Diem	to	become	the	Prime	Minister	of	what	would	become	the	Republic	of	Vietnam,	and	it	was	during	this	Conference	that	Diem	accepted	that	offer.50	One	of	the	major	outcomes	of	the	conference	was	the	partition	of	Vietnam.	While	there	were	some	extended	discussions	concerning	whether	Indochina	should	be	partitioned	into	two	or	three	separate	areas,	an	agreement	was	finally	settled	upon:	it	would	split	into	a	North,	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Vietnam	(DRV),	and	a	South,	the	Republic	of	Vietnam,	at	the	17th	parallel.	As	scholar	and	diplomat	Dr.	James	Waite	stated,	“Partition,	coupled	with	the	failure	to	reunite	Vietnam	in	1956,	[through	the	Geneva	Conference-scheduled	free	elections]	provided	an	important	cause	for	the	conflict’s	second	phase,	which	culminated	with	US	entry	into	the	war	as	a	belligerent.”51	While	the	conference	ended	declaring	a	state	of	peace	and	armistice,52	many	disagreed	with	the	diplomatic	conclusion,	and	this	would	come	to	define	the	Military	Assistance	mission	in	Vietnam.	The	challenge	with	the	partition	was	rooted	in	the	challenges	of	the	Geneva	Conference	itself.	Bao	Dai	and	his	government,	with	the	partnership	of	the	French,	had	been	fighting	a	war	against	the	DRV	and	the	Viet	Minh.	Bao	Dai’s																																																									
50	Prados,	Vietnam:	The	History	of	an	Unwinnable	War,	37.	James	Waite,	The	End	
of	the	First	Indochina	War:	A	Global	History	(Abingdon,	UK:	Routledge,	2012),	130-131. 51	Waite,	The End of the First Indochina War, 81.	52	“Final	Declaration	of	Geneva	Conference,	July	21,	1954,”	in	The	Vietnam	
Reader:	Articles	and	Documents	on	American	Foreign	Policy	and	the	Vietnam	
Crisis,	eds.	Raskin	and	Fall,	96-97.	
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administration	knew	that	the	French	were	losing	their	will	to	fight,	and	while	his	government	was	ardently	anti-communist,	they	were	also	firmly	nationalist.	They	feared	that	the	Conference	would	think	that	the	French,	in	their	desire	to	withdraw	with	some	semblance	of	dignity,	would	ignore	their	wishes	completely	and	make	a	deal	directly	with	the	DRV	and	the	Viet	Minh,	abandoning	the	South	Vietnamese.	The	reason	this	was	so	risky	for	Bao	Dai’s	government	was	that	its	political,	and	potentially	literal,	survival	was	dependent	on	an	external	ally	for	some	form	of	Military	Intervention,	which	had	been	Military	Aid	and	Military	Support,53	though	not	in	the	traditional	sense.	That	these	would	be	an	ancillary	concern	was	the	primary	reason	for	Bao	Dai’s	government’s	resistance	to	the	Geneva	Conference.54	This	became	relevant	since	the	Republic	of	Vietnam’s	government	felt	no	ownership	of	either	the	process	or	the	outcome.	These	well-found	fears	became	reality.	The	French	saw	the	partition	as	a	way	for	them	to	withdraw	with	some	honor	intact;	the	Soviets,	Chinese,	and	Viet	Minh	were	all	pleased	because	they	knew	that	with	continued	support,	the	Viet	Minh	and	the	DRV	would	eventually	be	able	to	conquer	the	remaining	part	of	the	south	that	was	not	under	their	control,	and	that	the	French	would	no	longer	be	a	part	of	the	military	equation.55	The	continuing	conversation	during	the	Geneva	conference	between	Eden	and	Prime	Minister	Churchill	was	a	recognition	that	the	United	States,	through	Secretary	Dulles,	wanted	to	escalate	the	situation	in	Indochina,	and	the	British	were	increasingly	uninterested	in	going	along.56	As	Dulles	wrote	Eisenhower,	“UK	attitude	is	one	of	increasing	weakness.	British	seem	to	feel	that	we	are	disposed	to	accept	present	risks	of	a	Chinese	war	and	this,	coupled	also	with	their	fear	that	we	would	start	using	atomic	weapons,	has	badly	frightened	them.”57																																																									
53	As	previously	discussed,	the	French,	prior	to	the	Geneva	Conference,	would	not	allow	Military	Aid	to	be	given	directly	to	the	Vietnamese	people,	even	their	allies.	54	Buttinger,	Vietnam:	A	Dragon	Embattled,	vol.	2,	834.	55	James	Cable,	The	Geneva	Conference	of	1954	on	Indochina	(London:	Macmillan	Press	Ltd,	1986),	61-65.	56	Ibid.	57	John	Foster	Dulles,	“Telegram	to	President	Eisenhower,”	in	Foreign	Relations	of	
the	United	States,	1952–1954,	The	Geneva	Conference,	Volume	XVI,	eds.	Allen	H.	
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The	relevance	of	this	entire	focus	on	the	1954	Geneva	Conference	to	the	Military	Assistance	mission	in	Vietnam	is	that	this	issue	set	up	the	entire	mission	for	failure.	Because	the	local	government	had	not	bought	into	the	Conference	and	the	resulting	partition,	they	did	not	feel	obligated	to	follow	through	on	the	commitments	made	on	their	behalf.	This	resulted	in	a	disastrous	situation,	when,	after	consolidating	power	for	two	years,	President	Diem	(previously	appointed	Prime	Minister	in	1954	under	Bao	Dai),	purposefully	declined	to	hold	free	elections	in	1956	as	agreed	to	at	the	Geneva	Conference.	His	argument	declared	that	the	Republic	of	Vietnam	was	now	a	sovereign	state,	and	therefore	was	not	bound	by	a	treaty	signed	by	a	foreign	power,	France,	on	its	behalf,58	exacerbating	an	already	tense	political	situation	locally.	The	result	of	this	situation	was	that	there	were	multiple	constituencies	vying	for	power,	playing	the	French	off	the	Americans	and	vice	versa.	The	political	will	in	the	South	Vietnamese	ruling	class	was	not	one	that	accepted	a	long-term	sustainable	political	resolution	to	the	conflict,	as	much	as	it	aimed	to	gather	enough	power	and	wealth	for	itself,	resulting	in	a	military	coup	in	1963.	As	a	result,	there	were	no	legitimate	political	partners	for	the	United	States	to	work	with	to	establish	a	long-term	political	objective	so	that	the	Military	Assistance	mission	could	meet	a	long-term	goal,	there	being	no	long-term	goal.	Without	political	partnership,	there	was	no	possibility	for	any	military	to	achieve	a	long-term,	sustainable	security	through	any	kind	of	military	operation,	including	Military	Assistance.	On	the	international	side,	Secretary	Dulles	managed	to	both	fail	to	develop	a	partnership	of	an	ally,	the	British,	while	at	the	same	time	committing	to	the	strategy	of	containing	Global	Communism	when	there	was	no	clarity	that	the	United	States	had	the	ability	or	resources	to	achieve	such	a	significant	goal.	This	inconsistency	would	affect	the	Military	Assistance	mission’s	beginnings	and	goals.																																																									Kitchens	and	Neal	H.	Petersen	(Washington,	D.C.:	United	States	Government	Printing	Office,	1981),	Document	378,	accessed	December	5,	2016,	https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v16/d378.	Originally	in	Cable,	The	Geneva	Conference,	65.	58	Dommen,	The	Indochinese	Experience	of	the	French	and	the	Americans,	343-348.	
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The	Origins	of	Military	Assistance	in	Vietnam	While	there	was	some	ongoing	activity	between	of	the	DRV	and	Viet	Minh	leaders	with	the	Office	of	Strategic	Services	(OSS),	the	forerunner	to	the	CIA,	during	WWII,	the	establishment	of	the	Military	Assistance	Program	did	not	begin	until	1950.	The	initial	effort	of	Military	Intervention	came	in	the	form	of	a	Military	Aid	request,	which	was	characterized	“as	modest	and	appropriate	in	view	of	the	military	situation	in	Vietnam.”59	However,	as	military	historian	Robert	Spector	stated,	“military	leaders	earlier	had	viewed	Southeast	Asia	as	important	chiefly	because	of	its	relationship	to	the	island	chain	of	Japan,	Okinawa,	Taiwan,	and	the	Philippines,	the	Joint	Chiefs	now	[in	1950]	saw	Southeast	Asia	as	strategically	important	in	its	own	right.”60	
The	Joint	Chiefs’	of	Staff	Strategic	Shift	Although	the	reasons	why	the	Joint	Chiefs	made	such	a	strategic	shift	is	not	germane	to	this	research	project,	the	point	is	that	they	did,	and	the	ramifications	of	this	strategic	transition	are	germane	to	this	research	project.	It	very	likely	could	have	been	the	general	view	that	many	in	the	West	had,	seeing	Communism	as	a	monolithic	movement,	there	being	no	difference	between	Stalin	and	Mao	in	their	minds,	no	matter	that	both	deeply	mistrusted	one	another,	especially	after	the	Korean	War.	Perceiving	a	monolithic	communist	movement	that	was	expanding	across	the	Asian	continent	had	to	be	a	concern.	Their	suspicions	could	only	have	been	confirmed	a	few	months	later,	when	North	Korea	launched	a	surprise	attack	on	the	unprepared	South	Korea,	pushing	allied	forces	to	the	sea.	Articulating	their	views	in	the	memorandum,	the	Joint	Chiefs	stated,	“With	respect	to	the	measures	which,	from	the	United	States	military	point	of	view,	might	be	taken	to	prevent	Communist	expansion	in	Southeast	Asia,	the	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff	recommend	early	implementation	of	military	aid	programs	for	Indochina,	Indonesia,	Thailand,	the	Philippines,	and	Burma.”61	
																																																								
59	Spector,	Advice	and	Support:	The	Early	Years,	105.	60	Spector,	Advice	and	Support:	The	Early	Years,	107.	61	Omar	Bradley,	“Memorandum	to	the	Secretary	of	Defense:	Strategic	Assessment	of	Southeast	Asia,”	April	10,	1950,	in	The	Pentagon	Papers,	Part	5,	
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This	is	germane	for	examining	the	failures	made	by	senior	leaders	with	respect	to	Military	Assistance	in	Vietnam.	This	memorandum	outlines	the	first	recommendation	by	military	leaders	to	the	civilian,	political	leadership	to	formalize	a	Military	Aid	and	Military	Assistance	program.	The	problem	with	the	Joint	Chiefs’	recommendation	is	that	it	lacked	a	connection	to	any	political	objective.	Certainly,	prevention	of	the	spread	of	communism,	the	domino	theory,	is	a	political	objective;	however,	the	disconnect	is	that	the	Joint	Chiefs,	like	many,	had	a	monolithic	view	of	Communism	—	that	what	was	happening	from	a	policy	side	in	the	Soviet	Union	was	having	a	clear	manifestation	in	Southeast	Asia.	Although	there	is	little	question	that	there	was	an	inherent	relationship,	at	this	point	there	was	poor	connection	to	the	underlying	reasons	of	pursuit.	Whereas	in	Russia,	Communism	came	to	fruition	due	to	class	and	economic	disconnects,	in	Southeast	Asia	there	existed	the	belief	that	the	Capitalist	West	intended	colonial	interests	and	prevention	of	local	governance.	In	pursuit	of	Grand	Strategy,	there	was	the	argument	to	contain	the	global	spread	of	Communism;	however,	the	advice	of	George	Kennan	to	initially	pursue	the	policy	of	containment	where	it	was	feasible	had	not	been	heeded.	The	Joint	Chiefs	were	mindful,	in	the	memorandum,	about	expenses,	and	made	a	clear	budget	request	for	the	fiscal	year;	however,	in	1950	there	had	been	no	in-depth	study	of	resource	input	versus	outputs.	It	is	entirely	possible	that	this	was	the	beginning	of	the	gradual	escalation	that	seemed	to	feature	prominently	in	planning	during	the	entire	period	that	the	United	States	was	active	in	Vietnam,	but	more	concerning	was	the	Joint	Chiefs	themselves.	All	the	Joint	Chiefs	—	General	of	the	Army	Omar	Bradley	as	Chairman,	General	Clifton	Cates	as	Commandant	of	the	Marine	Corps,	Admiral	Forrest	Sherman	as	Chief	of	Naval	Operations,	General	Hoyt	Vandenberg	as	Chief	of	Staff	of	the	Air	Force,	and	Lawton	Collins	as	Chief	of	Staff	of	the	Army	—	had	extensive	war	records,	having	served	in	combat	during	both	WWI	and	WWII.	In	addition	to	their	extensive	war	records,	all	were	part	of	the	Joint	Chiefs	during	the	first	part	of	the	Korean	War,	so	the	natural	question	to	ask	is	how	one																																																									Section	B,	Subpart	2(b),	310.	Originally	referenced	in	Spector,	Advice	and	
Support:	The	Early	Years,	107.	
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Military	Assistance	mission	came	to	become	so	successful	while	this	one	was	clearly	not.	One	difference	was	in	the	wars	themselves.	In	the	Korean	War,	there	was	an	immediate	full	spectrum	engagement,	while	in	Vietnam	there	was	a	gradual	escalation.	The	problem	with	this	answer,	however,	is	twofold.	First,	in	the	Korean	War,	as	noted	in	Chapter	4,	the	Joint	Chiefs	thought	that	Brigadier	General	Roberts	and	the	KMAG	had	done	a	poor	job	in	preparing	the	Republic	of	Korea	(ROK)	Army	for	combat	against	the	Communist	North.62	This	view	caused	the	KMAG	to	be	essentially	ignored,	but	for	ROK	President	Syngman	Rhee	giving	command	and	control	of	the	ROK	Army	to	General	MacArthur,	until	the	KMAG	was	able	to	prove	its	worth	by	assisting	in	the	replacement	and	development	of	many	ROK	Army	officers.	Furthermore,	the	policy	regarding	corrupt	or	inept	officers	being	replaced	must	also	have	impacted	the	overall	outcome	of	the	conflict.	In	addition,	the	Korean	War	more	clearly	resembled	the	wars	of	the	Joint	Chiefs’	pasts,	in	that	it	was	a	war	with	clear	battle	lines	and	military-on-military	maneuvers,	attacks,	and	counterattacks.	In	contrast,	the	war	that	was	being	fought	in	Vietnam	was	one	of	counterinsurgency	and	the	perception	by	the	local	populace	that	the	United	States	had	intentions	to	reassert	foreign	rule.	The	second	reason	is	that	none	of	the	Joint	Chiefs	would	remain	in	their	positions	much	longer.	General	Cates	would	leave	in	1951,	Admiral	Sherman	died	that	year,	and	Generals	Vandenberg,	Collins,	and	Bradley	would	all	leave	in	1953.	Who	is	to	know	what	they	would	have	decided	in	later	years	if	they	had	been	in	the	same	positions,	and	whether	they	would	have	pushed	back	against	Secretary	Dulles’	desire	to	expand	the	nature	of	the	containment	of	the	perceived	communist	threat?	In	this	regard,	there	was	an	inherent	flaw	in	the	system.	Significantly,	the	system	at	that	time	did	not	require	strategic	review	or	long-term	planning.	Indeed,	while	this	1950	memorandum	to	Secretary	of	Defense	Johnson	is	termed	a	“Strategic	Assessment,”	rather	than	an	actual	strategic	assessment,	it	became	more	of	a	situational	assessment.	The	difference	is	that	
																																																								
62	Bryan	R.	Gibby,	The	Will	to	Win:	American	Military	Advisors	in	Korea,	1946–
1953	(Tuscaloosa:	The	University	of	Alabama	Press,	2012),	7	and	9.	
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the	memorandum	examined	the	situation	in	Southeast	Asia	but	reviewed	very	little	of	the	strategic	dynamics	at	work.	In	addition,	there	is	no	related	analysis,	but	a	wholehearted	embracing	of	the	domino	theory	when	the	memo	states,	“The	fall	of	Indochina	would	undoubtedly	lead	to	the	fall	of	the	other	mainland	states	of	Asia.”63	This	declaration	was	made	years	before	President	Eisenhower	would	similarly	articulate	the	issue.	The	relevance	of	this	is	to	ask	whether	there	was,	in	fact,	a	structural	problem	regarding	the	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	in	that	each	Chief	would	only	serve	approximately	four	years	and	as	such,	would	be	unable	to	assess	and	reassess	their	strategic	decisions,	or	whether	simply	a	tragic	mistake	was	made	by	extraordinarily	competent	and	experienced	men.	However,	there	was	a	reversal	of	the	underlying	dynamics	of	the	Joint	Chiefs,	although	not	a	change	in	policy.	About	a	year	after	the	Strategic	Assessment	memorandum	was	written,	Truman,	on	the	advice	of	the	same	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	relieved	MacArthur	from	command	of	United	Nations	Forces	in	Korea.	In	May	of	1951,	Bradley	was	asked	to	testify	at	a	joint	Senate	committee	composed	of	the	Committees	on	Armed	Services	and	Foreign	Relations	on	the	circumstance	around	the	relief	of	MacArthur.	General	Bradley	represented	the	thoughts	of	the	Joint	Chiefs	regarding	the	broader	situation	of	the	Korean	War,	stating,	“Under	present	circumstances,	we	[the	Joint	Chiefs]	have	recommended	against	enlarging	the	war.	The	course	of	action	often	described	as	‘limited	war’	with	Red	China	would	increase	the	risk	we	are	taking	by	engaging	too	much	of	our	power	in	an	area	that	is	not	the	critical	strategic	prize.”64	In	this	case	the	Joint	Chiefs	were	articulating	need	for	a	limited	war	of	the	“limited	war,”	that	is,	to	narrow	the	military	focus	of	the	Korean	War	to	achieve	the	political	objective	of	a	limited	containment	of	Communism.	Bradley	continued	to	make	his	now	infamous	statement,	“Red	China	is	not	a	powerful	nation	seeking	to	dominate	the	world.	Frankly,	in	the	opinion	of	the	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	this	strategy	would	involve	us																																																									
63	Bradley,	“Memorandum	to	the	Secretary	of	Defense,”	in	The	Pentagon	Papers,	Part	5,	Section	B,	Subpart	2(b),	309.	64	Omar	N.	Bradley,	“Testimony,”	May	15,	1951,	United	States	Senate,	Committee	on	Armed	Forces	and	the	Committee	on	Foreign	Relations,	Military	Situation	in	
the	Far	East,	hearings,	82d	Congress,	1st	session,	part	2	(Washington,	D.C.:	Government	Printing	Office,	1951),	731.	
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in	the	wrong	war,	at	the	wrong	place,	at	the	wrong	time,	and	with	the	wrong	enemy.”65	This	was	all	unfolding	while	at	the	same	time	there	was	gradual	escalation	of	commitment	to	French	Indochina,	and	at	no	point	did	the	Joint	Chiefs	state	that	the	conflict	in	Indochina	threatened	to	expand	throughout	Southeast	Asia.	However,	the	1950	Strategic	Assessment	memorandum	from	the	Joint	Chiefs	requests	the	development	of	Military	Aid	programs	throughout	the	region.	In	addition,	while	there	was	no	way	to	know	how	these	military	leaders	would	have	changed	and	evolved	in	their	thinking,	or	not,	had	they	continued	in	their	positions	as	Joint	Chiefs,	Bradley’s	views	are	in	fact	known.	Bradley,	after	his	retirement	from	active	service	in	1954,66	continued	to	give	advice	on	the	Vietnam	conflict	to	President	Johnson	as	part	of	an	informal	group	called	the	Wise	Men.	Bradley	stood	out	as	one	member	in	1968,	after	the	Tet	Offensive,	who	continued	to	advise	that	military	escalation	continue.67	The	question	again,	then,	is	how	could	there	be	such	a	divergence	in	results	between	the	wars	and	their	relation	to	Military	Assistance?	The	difference	in	results	is	much	the	same	with	respect	to	both	the	wars	and	the	Military	Assistance,	and	ultimately	has	to	do	with	a	foundation	of	Liberal	international	relations	theory,	which	is	based	on	partnerships	and	international	cooperation.	The	evolving	situation	in	Indochina	could	not	develop	government	that	was	considered	as	legitimate	in	the	eyes	of	the	population.	The	French	were	viewed	as	invaders	and	colonial	occupiers,	and	after	the	loss	at	Dien	Bien	Phu,	the	Republic	of	Vietnam	was	viewed	as	a	personal	fiefdom	of	Prime	Minister,	later	
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President,	Ngo	Dinh	Diem	and	his	family.	After	Diem’s	overthrow	and	assignation	in	November	1963	by	a	military	junta,	the	Republic	of	Vietnam	was	ruled	by	a	succession	of	military	leaders	—	all	of	whom	failed	in	varying	degrees.	For	the	United	States,	there	was	no	legitimate	government	to	partner	with	throughout	the	war	with	which	it	could	engage	on	a	broader	political	objective.	In	addition,	after	the	French	left	Indochina	due	to	the	negotiated	settlement	at	the	1954	Geneva	Conference,	and	the	United	States	took	on	more	and	more	of	the	burden	of	the	Vietnam	conflict,	there	was	not	the	same	sense	of	international	cooperation	as	there	had	been	in	the	Korean	War.	This	was	due	to	Truman’s	taking	advantage	of	the	lack	of	Soviet	Union	participation	in	the	United	Nations	Security	Council,	and	securing	broad,	global	support	against	the	clear	aggression	of	the	DPRK.	In	contrast,	due	to	the	continuing	challenges	of	any	clear	political	objective	in	the	Vietnam	conflict,	there	existed	far	less	of	an	international	presence	in	the	combat	force,	with	so	few	nations	contributing	that	the	effort	was	more	of	a	regional	security	effort.	Interestingly,	a	young	Colin	Powell	saw	this	first-hand,	and	made	certain	that	the	concept	of	broad,	international	involvement	was	a	cornerstone	of	future	engagements	for	which	he	would	be	responsible	during	his	service	in	Vietnam,	forming	the	important	tenet	of	the	Powell	Doctrine	as	discussed	in	Chapter	1.	Given	the	wide	ramifications	of	the	Vietnam	conflict,	these	moments	may	seem	insignificant	or	trivial	at	best,	but	they	all	point	to	tremendously	important	fundamentals	of	Military	Assistance.	It	is	clear	from	the	Joint	Chief’s	memorandum	that	there	was	an	intent	to	have	an	established	Military	Assistance	mission	in	what	would	become	Vietnam	from	the	very	beginning	of	the	United	States	Armed	Forces	involvement.	That	Military	Assistance	mission	was	never	properly	linked	to	a	political	objective,	something	of	which	senior	military	leaders	such	as	the	Joint	Chiefs	were	certainly	aware,	taking	Bradley’s	comments	about	“Red	China”	in	his	Congressional	testimony	into	account.	The	Failure	of	the	Military	Assistance	Mission	While	the	shift	in	thinking	by	the	Joint	Chiefs	happened	prior	to	the	beginning	of	the	Korean	War,	the	change	in	approaches	for	the	Military	Assistance	mission	happened	after	the	Battle	Dien	Bien	Phu,	as	the	French	withdrew,	and	the	United	
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States	became	more	involved	in	the	Republic	of	Vietnam.	MAAG	Indochina	had	been	formed	due	to	the	recommendations	in	the	Joint	Chiefs’	memorandum	to	the	Secretary	of	Defense	on	April	10,	1950.	MAAG	Indochina	was	specifically	designed	as	a	small	unit	to	keep	track	of	equipment	and	money	from	the	United	States	to	the	French	and	French	Union	soldiers,	but	this	became	a	challenge	due	to	efforts	by	political	leaders	to	expand	the	influence	of	the	United	States	in	Indochina.	The	first	commander	of	MAAG	Indochina,	Brigadier	General	Francis	Brink,	who	commanded	from	the	fall	of	1950	to	the	summer	of	1952,	had	a	disagreement	with	the	newly	installed	head	of	the	State	Department	run	Economic	Cooperation	Administration,	Robert	Blum.	Blum,	along	with	the	State	Department	for	which	he	distributed	economic	aid,	thought	that	given	the	level	of	financial	commitment	the	United	States	was	making,	it	should	be	afforded	more	influence	over	the	military	affairs	in	Indochina,	and	directly	train	the	Vietnamese	rather	than	the	French	training	the	Vietnamese.	Brink	and	much	of	his	team,	disagreed,	believing	that	to	properly	resource	such	a	change	in	the	military	mission	would	require	over	4,000	soldiers.68	This	break	between	the	understanding	of	the	political	leadership	in	the	form	of	the	State	Department	and	the	United	States	Armed	Forces	responsible	for	carrying	out	their	agenda	would	not	be	the	first	such.	In	this	case,	many	Washington,	D.C.	leaders	must	have	misunderstood	the	reports	being	filed	by	MAAG	Indochina,	which	the	Washington,	D.C.	based	leaders	believed	were	positive.	This	is	in	direct	contrast	to	MAAG	Indochina’s	actual	statements	reporting	a	lack	of	understanding	or	training	on	American-made	equipment,	with	the	Vietnamese	Navy’s	readiness	even	worse.	These	challenges	culminated	in	Brink’s	suicide	while	in	Washington	D.C.	in	July	1952.	He	was	replaced	by	a	commander	from	the	Korean	War,	Brigadier	General	Thomas	Trapnell,	who	provided	a	youthful	enthusiasm.	He	quickly	sobered,	having	deep	concern	with	
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the	French	and	their	inability	to	properly	incorporate	the	Vietnamese	soldiers	into	their	efforts.69	The	experience	of	Brink	highlights	a	frequent	challenge	that	the	United	States	Armed	Forces	has	had	with	political	leadership	with	respect	to	military	operations	and	Military	Assistance	more	specifically,	which	is	appropriately	linking	resources	with	objectives.	This	has	been	seen	in	Brink’s	being	refused	resources	for	the	change	in	training	the	Vietnamese,	Defense	Secretary	Les	Aspin	turning	down	a	request	for	armored	vehicles	to	be	used	in	the	Somali	raid	in	1993	(popularized	by	the	book,	Black	Hawk	Down),70	and	General	Shinseki’s	testimony	stating	the	need	for	far	more	soldiers	than	had	been	planned	to	conquer	and	hold	Iraq.71	There	is	a	natural	“tug-of-war”	that	occurs	between	policymakers	and	operators,	with	operators	asking	for	more	and	policymakers	wanting	or	being	constrained,	making	it	necessary	to	give	less,	either	due	to	expense	or	the	political	challenges	of	having	a	heavy	military	footprint	in	the	respective	country.	This	tug-of-war	has	beneficial	results,	in	that	it	demonstrates	that	each	profession	is	acting	in	accordance	with	how	they	are	required	to	function	to	achieve	their	respective	goals.	The	fundamental	challenge,	however,	is	one	of	contingencies.	In	all	military	operations,	from	the	smallest	Military	Aid	mission,	such	as	MAAG	Indochina	when	it	was	conceived,	to	the	largest	scale	battles	such	as	Operation	Overlord	in	WWII,	there	is	one	question	that	must	always	be	asked:	What	happens	if	every	assumption	being	made	is	wrong?	This	is	a	question	ultimately	of	risk	for	both	policymakers	and	military	leaders.	Brink	and	his	staff	had	clearly	made	the	assessment	that	given	the	dynamics	in	Indochina	at	the	time,	especially	given	the	complications	of	dealing	with	the	French,	it	would	be	a																																																									
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mistake	to	pursue	a	more	extensive	Military	Assistance	mission.	This	was	an	assessment	that	General	Shinseki	had	been	able	to	make	with	respect	to	the	Iraq	invasion,	and	that	Secretary	Aspin	had	not	been	able	to	make	with	respect	to	the	Somali	raid.72	This	is	exactly	the	set	of	challenges	and	issues	that	would	greet	Lieutenant	General	John	O’Daniel	when	taking	command	of	MAAG	Indochina	in	April	of	1954.	O’Daniel	was	considered	a	top	field	commander,	having	served	in	WWI	and	WWII	with	distinction,	but	his	experience	in	Vietnam	was	less	stellar,	highlighted	by	his	declaration	that	it	was	not	possible	that	the	French	base	at	Dien	Bien	Phu	would	fall.	In	a	report	to	the	Joint	Chiefs,	he	stated,	“I	feel	that	it	[Dien	Bien	Phu]	can	withstand	any	kind	of	an	attack	that	the	Viet	Minh	are	capable	of	launching.	However,	a	force	with	two	or	three	battalions	of	medium	artillery	with	air	observation	could	make	the	area	untenable.	The	enemy	does	not	seem	to	have	this	capability	at	present.”73	It	was	also	clear	from	the	report	that	the	French	remained	uninterested	in	involving	the	United	States	in	Indochina	affairs	that	the	French	regarded	as	internal,	while	at	the	same	time	the	Vietnamese	were	extremely	anxious	for	more	assistance	from	the	United	States.74	It	is	important	to	note	that	MAAG	Indochina	in	1954	remained	a	unit	focused	on	tracking	Military	Aid.	After	the	French	defeat	at	Dien	Bien	Phu	and	the	subsequent	negotiations	at	the	Geneva	Conference	culminating	in	the	Geneva	Accords,	with	the	formal	division	of	Indochina	into	the	Republic	of	Vietnam	and	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Vietnam,	MAAG	Indochina	was	renamed	MAAG	Vietnam	and	placed	under	the	command	of	Lieutenant	General	Samuel	Williams.	Here	was	a	unique	officer	in	that,	after	having	been	fired	from	his	position	as	a	general	officer	during	combat																																																									
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operations	in	WWII	and	being	transferred	to	a	staff	position,	Williams	was	able	to	perform	at	a	high	enough	level	of	excellence	that	he	was	later	able	to	secure	a	promotion	back	to	a	general	officer	rank.	When	he	took	over	MAAG	Vietnam	from	O’Daniel	in	1955,	the	entire	Military	Intervention	in	Vietnam	was	at	a	critical	juncture.	In	his	book,	Masters	of	War,	acclaimed	Professor	Robert	Buzzanco	stated,	“[Lieutenant	General]	Williams	ignored	both	[President]	Diem’s	repressive	ways	and	the	need	to	train	the	southern	Vietnamese	army	to	fight	a	guerrilla	war.	With	U.S.	acquiescence,	Diem	organized	his	army	not	to	fight	the	Communist	enemy	so	much	as	to	maintain	his	own	authority.”75	Williams	commented	in	an	interview	in	1964	about	how	good	his	relationship	was	with	Diem	and	how	the	Republic	of	Vietnam	Army	(ARVN)	was	organized	based	on	the	desires	of	Vietnamese	general	officers,	and	not	the	United	States’	military	leadership.76	In	this	interview,	in	addition	to	other	sources,	Williams	cannot	help	but	come	across	as	incredibly	naïve	in	that	he	fails	to	recognize	that	Diem’s	regime	was	corrupt,	or	that	the	Vietnamese	general	officers	might	have	an	ulterior	motive	for	the	organization	of	the	ARVN	in	supporting	Diem’s	powerbase.	The	organization	decided	on	was	a	division-based	army,	which	is	a	structure	that	is	based	on	a	larger	movement	of	soldiers,	15-20,000,	and	equipment.	It	is	a	structure	that	is	based	on	force	versus	force,	or	in	the	language	of	international	relations	—	a	state	versus	state	conflict.	As	historian	Joseph	Buttinger,	pointed	out,	“Organized	under	American	direction	on	a	division	instead	of	in	small	mobile	units,	and	equipped	for	the	task	of	holding	off	an	invasion	from	the	North,	the	army	was	technically	unprepared	to	counter	insurgency.”77	Williams,	while	stating	that	he	was	following	the	guidance	of	the	Republic	of	Vietnam	military	leaders,	was	criticized	in	a	report	written	by	a	contractor	based	on	the	question	of	how	the	United	States	could	be	victorious	in	so	many	battles	but	ultimately	be																																																									
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defeated	in	the	overall	war.	The	reported	stated,	“That	concentration	on	the	conventional	approach	[an	organization	around	divisions]	to	security	was	objected	to	by	both	the	South	Vietnamese	military	and	the	United	States	Embassy.”78	Brigadier	General	James	Collins,	writing	on	the	training	of	ARVN	in	The	
Development	and	Training	of	the	South	Vietnamese	Army,	commented:	“In	organizing	and	training	the	South	Vietnamese	Army,	the	United	States	relied	heavily	on	its	recent	experience	in	South	Korea.	The	similarity	between	the	Vietnamese	situation	of	1954	and	the	Korean	situation	of	1950	prompted	the	Military	Assistance	Advisory	Group	in	Vietnam	to	concentrate	on	developing	a	South	Vietnamese	force	capable	of	meeting	an	overt	invasion	from	North	Vietnam.”79	This	tends	to	be	the	trend	for	many	militaries,	and	the	United	States	Army	is	no	exception	in	training	for	the	next	war	based	on	the	last	war.	When	Williams	took	command	of	MAAG	Vietnam	in	1955,	the	Korean	War	was	fresh	in	the	minds	of	most	in	the	United	States,	and	especially	with	respect	to	his	own	most	recent	operational	time	as	a	division	commander	of	the	25th	Infantry	Division	in	the	Korean	War.	As	military	historian,	Max	Boot,	stated,	“A	veteran	of	the	Korean	War,	Williams	worried	primarily	about	a	conventional	invasion	across	the	DMZ…The	army	that	he	was	building	was	ill	equipped	to	handle	the	guerrilla	threat	that	South	Vietnam	would	soon	face.”80	However,	ultimately	the	“American	military	and	civilian	observers	in	the	field	had	no	trouble	at	all	in	finding	out	why	the	armed	forces	of	the	Diem	regime	failed	so	conspicuously	in	fighting	the	Vietcong	guerrillas.	It	needed	no	military	
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expert	to	see	that	the	army	had	been	trained	for	the	wrong	kind	of	war.”81	Williams	and	MAAG	Vietnam,	along	with	the	political	and	military	leadership	of	the	Republic	of	Vietnam,	had	been	training,	to	use	Bradley’s	words,	for	the	“wrong	war,	at	the	wrong	place,	at	the	wrong	time,	and	with	the	wrong	enemy.”82	The	war	in	South	Vietnam	was	a	counterinsurgency	war,	being	fought	in	the	south,	in	hearts	and	minds	of	villages	and	highlands,	and	by	the	time	it	was	discovered	to	be	a	mistake	it	was	too	late.	“While	the	threat	of	an	external	aggression	was	real,	it	was	not	until	1959	that	the	internal	subversion	and	insurgency	openly	supported	by	the	north	was	recognized	as	the	major	threat	and	that	a	strong	effort	to	give	South	Vietnam	a	counterinsurgency	capability	began.”83	The	United	States	had	failed	before	its	soldiers	were	committed	to	combat.	Conclusion	Observing	the	breadth	of	history,	from	the	waning	days	of	WWII	through	to	the	Gulf	of	Tonkin	Resolution,	and	knowing	what	would	happen	to	the	United	States	over	the	course	of	the	next	decades	to	a	generation	of	service	members,	their	families,	and	communities,	one	cannot	help	but	be	pressed	with	feelings	of	awe	and	frustration.	Awe	with	reference	to	the	sacrifices	that	were	made:	frustration	at	the	numerous	failures,	large	and	small,	that	no	one	of	substance,	at	any	juncture,	asked	aloud,	“What	are	we	doing?”	or	“What	if	everything	we	have	assumed	is	wrong?”	There	seems	to	have	been	an	almost	blind	and	continuous	miscalculation,	an	underlying	inability	to	assess	and	reassess	what	the	long-term	goals	and	ramifications	were	of	continuing	the	Military	Assistance	mission	and	then	following	that,	the	Military	Support	mission	in	Vietnam.	Eventually,	after	the	Gulf	of	Tonkin	resolution	and	the	buildup	of	troops	in	Vietnam,	the	United	States	settled	on	a	strategy	for	winning	over	the	Vietnamese	people.	The	program	was	called	Civil	Operations	and	Revolutionary	Development	Support	(CORDS)	and	worked	well	for	a	while,	but	in	the	end,	it	was	as	Robert	Komer,	the																																																									
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first	leader	of	the	CORDS	program,	who	observed,	“its	failure	to	have	greater	effect	on	the	overall	Vietnam	situation	to	too	little,	too	late.”84	For	his	doctoral	dissertation,	retired	Lieutenant	General,	and	previous	National	Security	Advisor,	H.R.	McMaster	wrote	what	became	the	book	
Dereliction	of	Duty.	It	has	been	popularized	that	the	Joint	Chiefs	failed	to	confront	their	civilian,	political	leaders	when	they	saw	that	the	strategy	was	not	working	in	Vietnam.	The	true	failure	of	Vietnam	can	be	extrapolated	from	the	experience	of	the	Military	Assistance	mission	a	decade	before	the	events	of	Dereliction	of	
Duty,	and	the	lack	of	securing	a	clearly	defined	political	objective	—	one	that	would	allow	the	United	States	Armed	Forces	to	both	project	power	and	strengthen	international	cooperation.	This	inability	to	define	an	end	state	for	the	Vietnam	Military	Assistance	mission	was	exacerbated	by	the	lack	of	partnership	options	that	existed	for	stable	governance.	The	constant	dependency	by	the	United	States	on	President	Diem,	further	showed	that	Roger	Makins,	the	United	Kingdom’s	ambassador	to	the	United	States	at	this	time,	was	correct	in	his	assessment	that	United	States	has	a	consistent	desire	to	have	“their	man”	in	power.85	Another	important	lesson	learned	from	the	actions	in	Vietnam	is	that	United	States	Armed	Forces	can	have	a	relatively	successful	security	force	assistance	program,	followed	by	a	good	Advise	and	Assist	effort,	even	coupling	it	with	a	hearts	and	minds	program	like	CORDS,	winning	every	battle	but	still	losing	the	war.	Ultimately,	the	Vietnamese	people	voted	with	their	support,	the	support	of	the	security	structure	that	would	keep	them	safe.	The	United	States,	as	some	have	argued,	has	been	thought	to	have	lost	the	Vietnam	War	domestically	—	in	newspapers,	town	halls,	and	college	campuses	—	before	the	political	will	escalated	to	pressure	Congress	and	the	rest	of	the	United	States	Government	to	stop	the	Vietnam	War.	This	case	shows,	however,	that	the	Vietnam	War	had	been	
																																																								
84	Ross	Coffey,	“Revisiting	CORDS:	The	Need	for	Unity	of	Effort	to	Secure	Victory	in	Iraq,”	Military	Review	86,	no.	2	(March-April,	2006):	32.	Due	to	the	lack	of	correct	grammar,	it	should	be	noted	that	this	is	a	direct	quote.	85	Interview	between	Roger	Makins	(Lord	Sheffield)	and	Max	Hastings	on	10	Jan	1986.	Max	Hastings,	The	Korean	War	(London:	Michael	Joseph	Ltd,	1987),	23.	
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lost	at	the	very	beginning	by	leaders	who	failed	to	understand	the	political	goals	of	military	action,	and	were	unable,	or	unwilling,	to	question	and	reassess	whether	their	military	strategy	was	meeting	any	political	objective	at	all.	The	Military	Assistance	mission	was	a	microcosm	of	this	entire	endeavor,	and	given	its	relatively	small	size,	would	have	been	far	easier	to	perceive	where	there	were	serious	strategic	shortfalls.	Had	this	effort	been	made,	perhaps	a	different	result	would	have	been	possible,	were	it	possible	to	re-make	history.
	 201	
Chapter	6	In	Summation:	Military	Assistance	in	the	Context	of	Warfare	and	International	Relations		This	project	began	with	the	goal	of	understanding	what	concepts	of	international	relations,	both	the	discipline	and	the	phenomenon,	could	contribute	to	a	successful	Military	Assistance	mission	and	as	in	all	projects	of	this	magnitude,	it	has	evolved	into	something	similar	and	yet,	slightly	different	from	its	intended	goals.	In	one	sense,	the	consistency	between	the	beginning	of	the	project	and	its	completion	has	been	that	goal	to	understand	the	components	of	a	successful	Military	Assistance	mission,	namely:	discovering,	understanding,	and	appreciating	the	necessity	for	political	objectives	in	any	form	of	Military	Intervention,	including	Military	Assistance.	More	specifically	to	Military	Assistance	is	the	crucial	component	of	a	partnership	between	supporting	and	recipient	nations	that	is	of	good	faith.	In	another	sense,	the	method	and	process	by	which	the	conclusions	were	made	were	vastly	different	than	those	at	the	project’s	beginning.	Initially,	the	idea	was	to	compare	the	Military	Assistance	done	during	the	height	of	the	British	Empire,	when	the	British	Army	trained	and	developed	foreign	security	forces	in	India,	the	Caribbean,	Africa,	and	everywhere	the	Union	Jack	flew,	with	the	efforts	of	the	United	States	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan	to	train	and	develop	their	respective	indigenous	forces.	The	challenge	with	this	approach	was	that	areas	in	which	the	British	Empire	was	training	and	developing	foreign	security	forces	were	colonies	in	some	form,	and	thus	regarded	by	the	Government	in	London	as	possessions.	In	contrast,	the	United	States	has	struggled	mightily	to	assist	the	development	of	governance	and	security	forces	on	all	levels	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan,	trying	to	respect	each	county’s	sovereignty,	but	in	many	cases	failing	to	appreciate	local	customs	or	traditions	that	directly	affected	the	abilities	of	the	government	to	govern	in	those	countries.	These	efforts	were	attempts	to	impose	some	hybrid	of	Western	democracy	on	peoples	who	had	little	history	or	connection	to	that	form	of	governance,	while	at	the	same	time	being	cultures	with	long	traditions	of	honor	and	justice.	This	is	a	critical	point	as	it	relates	to	
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Military	Assistance,	because	ultimately	the	British	Empire	could	impose	its	will	and	methods	on	foreign	security	forces,	due	to	those	forces	being	part	of	the	Empire,	and	the	Royal	Army	along	with	the	Government	in	London	considering	and	relating	to	them	as	such.	However,	the	United	States	had	to	rely	on	relationships	and	influence	in	its	experiences	with	Military	Assistance,	while	the	foreign	security	forces	simply	looked	to	the	United	States	as	a	supermarket	of	resources.	Though	the	United	States	is	often	considered	an	empire,	and	many	times	referred	to	pejoratively	as	a	colonial	power	or	an	imperial	republic,	there	is	minimal	evidence	to	suggest	that	the	United	States	has	operated	as	a	traditional	colonial	power	post-WWII.	Put	more	bluntly,	if	the	United	States	is	a	colonial	power,	it	is	without	a	doubt	the	most	incompetent	colonial	power	in	the	history	of	the	world.	Though	there	can	be	no	question	that	the	United	States	has	used	its	power	and	influence	to	further	its	interests,	as	any	nation	state	does,	the	number	of	setbacks	that	have	occurred	with	client	states	such	as	Iraq	and	Afghanistan	suggest	an	ongoing	effort	by	the	United	States	to	respect	other	nations’	sovereignty	and	long-term	independence.	With	reference	to	Military	Assistance,	the	United	States’	challenges	in	training	and	developing	forces	in	Iraq	and	Afghanistan	were	compounded	by	Army	doctrine.	The	doctrine	at	that	time	emphasized	large,	unit	maneuvers,	and	very	little	in	the	realm	of	Advise	and	Assist	or	Security	Force	Assistance.	Indeed,	much	of	the	thinking	in	this	area	was	done	in	2006	during	the	development	of	Field	Manual	3-24,	the	United	States	Army’s	Counterinsurgency	Field	Manual,	which	concluded	that	training	foreign	security	forces	was	a	critical	method	for	increased	local	security.	Although	the	Counterinsurgency	Field	Manual	adjusted	military	thinking	at	a	tactical	level,	it	did	not	include,	nor	was	it	appropriate	to	include,	a	reassessment	of	the	political	dynamics	and	Grand	Strategy	that	led	to	the	broad	failures	in	combatting	the	Iraqi	Insurgency.	
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This	leads	to	an	addition	crucial	point	that	is	often	confused	by	political	leaders:1	Military	Assistance	is	not	a	strategy,	but	a	tool	within	the	broad	array	of	policy	and	even	military	options	for	policymakers	to	employ	to	reach	their	political	goals,	ideally	in	order	to	pursue	a	grand	strategy.	This	confusion	tends	to	be	due	to	the	lack	of	understanding	about	the	nature	of	strategy	as	a	general	concept	within	the	political	leadership	in	general,	as	this	group	is	far	more	concerned	with	immediate	needs	and	concerns,	as	opposed	to	long-term	thinking	and	planning.	The	challenge	with	this	misunderstanding,	however,	is	that	if	Military	Assistance	is	incorrectly	viewed	as	a	strategy,	then	it	may	be	considered	a	comprehensive	solution	to	an	overall	conflict,	which	is	unlikely	at	best	and	very	dangerous	at	worst.	Military	Intervention	of	any	sort	should	not	be	considered	a	strategy,	and	to	do	so	would	seem	to	continue	that	misunderstanding	despite	Professor	Sir	Freedman’s	highlighting	the	vagueness	of	the	definition	of	strategy.	Furthermore,	if	Military	Assistance	is	correctly	recognized	as	a	tool	rather	than	a	strategy,	then	like	all	military	efforts,	it	must	be	linked	with	a	specific	set	of	broader	strategic	or	political	goals:	A	military	
means	to	a	political	end.	In	this	way,	it	has	a	great	deal	of	applicability	within	the	field	of	international	relations	as	a	practical	application	in	the	discipline.	These	differing	experiences	by	policymakers	can	be	seen	throughout	the	case	studies	in	this	research	project:	South	Korea	and	Vietnam	prior	to	the	Gulf	of	Tonkin	resolution.	
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	 204	
The	examination	of	the	case	studies	of	South	Korea	and	Vietnam	reveals	a	commonality	of	history:	that	of	colonialism	and	its	relation	to	the	Military	Assistance	provided	by	the	United	States.	At	the	same	time,	the	United	States	entered	into	these	relationships	with	each	nation	differently,	creating	an	understandable	confusion	in	relating	to	an	all-embracing	grand	strategy	or	strategic	vision	for	the	United	States	in	its	approach	to	international	relations.	This	is	not	to	say	that	there	is	a	uniform	approach	to	Military	Assistance,	but	the	broader	commonality	should	be	strategic	in	nature,	and	for	the	United	States,	as	a	Global	Power,	a	grand	strategy.	In	this	respect,	the	United	States	falls	woefully	short	in	its	approach	to	global	hegemony,	if	that	was	in	fact	its	goal.	Considering	itself	far	more	of	a	limited	power	—	and	failing	to	be	cognizant	of	its	perception	in	the	world	by	other	nations	—	the	United	States	pursued	relations	with	South	Korea	and	Vietnam	in	an	almost	transactional	methodology,	or	as	a	grand	strategy	of	selective	engagement,	picking	and	choosing	where	to	be	active.	By	this	means,	the	United	States	gave	a	truly	clear	understanding	of	a	long-term	strategy	neither	to	allies	nor	enemies.	The	main	difference	between	the	examples	was	the	clarity	of	the	long-term	sustainable	political	goals	the	United	States	had	with	each	country,	as	well	as	the	extent	to	which	each	nation	agreed	with	that	political	goal.	The	relationship	with	South	Korea	is	the	one	clear	exception,	though	more	by	accident	of	circumstances	than	deliberate	purpose.	The	accident,	of	course,	was	one	of	timing.	The	DPRK	and	their	allies,	the	Soviet	Union	and	People’s	Republic	of	China,	had	assumed	that	the	United	States	would	not	return	to	assist	the	Republic	of	Korea,	after	all	but	abandoning	the	peninsula	a	few	months	prior.	President	Truman	was	forced	from	a	domestic	political	perspective	to	pursue	war	and	resist	the	aggression	from	the	DPRK,	although	domestically	challenged	by	the	general	perception	of	having	“lost”	China,	and	having	developed	the	cornerstone	of	the	post-WWII	American	Grand	Strategy	of	containment,	a	policy	specifically	focused	on	communism.	The	accidental	timing	also	helped	to	create	the	deep	relationship	between	the	ROK	Army	and	KMAG,	even	enabling	the	KATUSA	program	into	existence.	Although	the	Military	Assistance	mission	had	already	been	underway	in	the	ROK,	this	timing	allowed	for	a	designed	effort	to	pursue	a	Military	Assistance	mission	that	
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formed	the	foundational	basis	for	the	strategic	relationship	between	the	United	States	and	the	Republic	of	Korea	for	years	to	come.	That	strategic	relationship,	together	with	the	strategic	relationship	with	the	Japanese,	formed	the	basis	of	the	United	States’	influence	in	Asia.	While	there	was	an	underlying	dependence	on	the	United	States	by	the	Republic	of	Korea,	much	like	most	client-based	relationships,	there	still	existed	a	sincere	perception	of	indebtedness	by	the	South	Korean	people	to	the	United	States,	for	the	American	servicemen	who	served	and	sacrificed	for	the	freedom	of	the	South	Korean	people.	In	addition,	the	relationship	of	the	Republic	of	Korea	with	those	providing	Military	Assistance	was	successful	due	to	the	nature	of	the	Korean	War,	and	to	postponing	any	long-term	political	concerns	due	to	the	necessity	of	survival.	These	“smaller”	successes	built	the	foundation	of	the	long-term	successful	strategic	alliance	and	Military	Assistance	relationship	enjoyed	by	the	United	States	and	the	Republic	of	Korea.	While	the	timing	of	the	Korean	War	and	the	political	circumstances	that	forced	President	Truman	into	the	conflict	may	have	seemed	happenstance,	those	circumstances	could	not	have	developed	into	an	actual	success	had	it	not	been	for	the	important	dynamics	that	were	unique	to	the	relationship	between	the	United	States	and	Republic	of	Korea.	One	of	the	most	important	dynamics	was	a	clear	understanding	of	the	political	goals	of	the	relationship,	namely,	to	resist	the	aggression	of	the	DPRK,	which	also	fit	well	within	the	American	Grand	Strategy	of	containment,	preventing	a	global	spread	of	communism.	Although	the	goals	of	the	United	States	with	respect	to	its	Grand	Strategy	were	clear	in	the	case	of	Korea,	Vietnam	offered	a	muddling	effect	of	the	domino	theory	concept.	In	stark	contrast	to	the	Republic	of	Korea,	Vietnam	provided	few	or	no	examples	of	a	successful	relationship,	either	sustainable	or	strategic,	related	to	Military	Assistance.	As	the	case	study	explores,	the	relationship	misfired	from	the	beginning,	as	the	United	States	misunderstood	the	anti-colonial	sentiments	in	Vietnam,	allowing	the	French	to	frame	the	conflict	as	an	anti-communism	endeavor,	rather	than	a	desire	by	the	Vietnamese	to	be	a	free	people,	a	policy	the	United	States	fervently	supported.	The	failure	was	also	due	to	a	poor	broader	strategic	understanding	of	the	United	States,	one	that	gripped	its	international	
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relations	for	decades:	the	domino	theory	—	a	different	manifestation	of	the	Grand	Strategy	of	containment.	This	conceptualization	would	eventually	(and	similarly)	place	the	United	States	on	an	unstable	strategic	footing.	Rather	than	following	the	Truman	Doctrine	of	containment,	with	clear	limitations	on	how	far	the	United	States	would	extend	itself,	the	United	States	allowed	the	Vietnam	conflict	to	occupy	more	and	more	of	its	time	and	resources.	The	origins	of	the	United	States’	involvement	in	Vietnam	were	such	that	unless	a	dramatic	and	widespread	reevaluation	of	the	original	assumptions	had	changed,	there	was	little	possibility	of	any	other	outcome.	The	inability	of	the	United	States	to	find	a	legitimate	partner	and	develop	a	set,	or	even	a	single,	clear	political	goal	created	a	disconnect	between	the	operations	in	Vietnam	and	the	Grand	Strategy	being	pursued	by	the	United	States.	In	this	case,	Military	Assistance	was	unable	to	truly	contribute	positively	to	the	overall	mission	due	to	the	inherent	challenges	evident	in	the	mission	itself.	Many	of	lessons	learned	by	the	United	States,	from	both	military	and	political	aspects,	failed	to	take	hold,	and	inevitably	the	United	States	repeated	numerous	mistakes.	Many	policy	leaders	who	worked	in	government	during	the	years	of	the	Vietnam	conflict	continued	in	public	service,	and	some	evolved	into	a	group	of	fervent	anti-communists	known	as	the	Neoconservatives.	They	recognized	that	the	Soviet	Union	and	the	communist	system	upon	which	it	survived	were	crumbling	at	its	foundation,	and	this	group	came	to	believe	that	a	little	external	pressure	was	all	it	would	take	to	bring	down	that	house	of	cards.	As	many	of	them	came	into	power	during	the	presidency	of	George	W.	Bush,	their	understanding	of	the	fall	of	communism,	joined	with	their	belief	in	the	domino	theory	of	Vietnam,	made	for	a	dangerous	combination	applied	to	the	Middle	East,	where	they	sought	to	spread	democracy	through	a	strategy	of	reverse	domino	theory,	with	disastrous	results.	Ultimately,	the	failure	of	Vietnam	and	the	domino	theory	is	the	same	as	reverse	domino	theory	—	an	external	pressure	or	actor	cannot	bring	down,	or	build	up,	a	nation	state	with	a	predictable	end	state	because	any	external	actor	may	create	unforeseen	factors	that	can	affect	a	positive	outcome	for	all.	In	fairness,	however,	this	concept	could	be	an	entirely	new	dissertation	topic	in	and	of	itself.	
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New	Areas	for	Research	As	in	all	research	studies,	a	few	answers	always	result	in	more	questions	and	this	one	is	no	different.	Although	the	focus	of	this	study	has	always	been	on	Military	Assistance,	and	the	research	aimed	to	avoid	involving	the	experience	of	Military	Aid,	there	is	a	distinctive	linkage	between	the	two.	An	area	in	need	of	further	exploration	is	an	understanding	about	the	point	of	the	convergence	between	Military	Assistance	and	Military	Aid.	This	is	due	to	the	practical	reality	that	many	American-	and	NATO-based	tactics	are	directly	tied	to	the	equipment	being	used.	In	addition,	there	is	a	need	to	explore	the	instances	of	Military	Assistance	that	have	been	implemented	to	reduce	a	recipient	nation’s	dependence	on	Military	Aid.	Such	objectives	may	have	been	continued	influence	and/or	the	continuation	of	a	domestic,	industrial	base,	among	others.	On	a	more	conceptual	level,	this	research	project	has	shown	how	some	of	the	factors	that	the	United	States	Armed	Forces	takes	for	granted	may	be	the	reasons	for	so	much	concern	or	failure	with	respect	to	Military	Assistance.	Some	years	ago,	Peruvian	author	Hernando	de	Soto	published	The	Mystery	of	Capital:	Why	
Capitalism	Triumphs	in	the	West	and	Fails	Everywhere	Else.	This	book	detailed	a	theory	that	the	reason	capitalism	was	successful	in	the	West	was	due	to	there	being	a	recognized	and	minimally	corrupted	manner	of	acknowledging	property	rights,	allowing	anyone	to	be	recognized	owners	of	property.	Alternatively,	in	countries	where	there	was	little	or	no	proof	of	ownership,	the	poor	were	unable	to	claim	assets	that	may	have	existed	in	their	families	for	generations.	When	capitalist	systems	were	introduced	in	these	societies,	they	failed	for	the	most	part	because	only	those	with	recognized	ownership	rights	could	participate.	Essentially,	this	occurred	because	no	one	thought	to	question	whether	the	very	foundational	principles	of	the	free	flow	of	capital	was	in	place	for	all	to	experience.	The	point	in	relation	to	this	study	is	that	there	are	many	underlying	factors	of	a	Western-style	democracy	that	are	taken	for	granted,	that	are	part	of	the	fabric	of	democracy,	and	that	should	be	examined.	This	is	especially	true	where	it	pertains	to	security	and	the	military	where,	by	and	large,	the	benefit	of	the	doubt	is	given	to	others.	
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One	of	democracy’s	founding	principles	with	reference	to	its	military	is	civilian	authority	of	the	military.	The	United	States	is	truly	unique	in	the	world	in	that	it	has	never	experienced	a	military	coup,	as	the	United	States	Armed	Forces,	as	an	institution,	relies	on	the	political	leaders	to	understand	and	appreciate	the	support	necessary	to	conduct	military	operations.	This	research	project	has	discussed	at	length	how	one	of	the	most	sacred	values	of	the	United	States	Armed	Forces,	civilian	control	and	oversight,	is	a	principle	neither	communicated	nor	developed	as	a	value	of	Military	Assistance	in	a	clear,	consistent	manner.	Civilian	control	of	the	military	should	be	explored	from	the	perspective	of	the	military,	as	it	is	a	cornerstone	of	sustainable,	long-term	security	for	a	nation.	Another	impression	that	came	out	of	this	research	project	and	the	review	of	literature	is	that	much	of	the	strategic	thinking	about	the	contest	and	competition	with	Communism	may	be	compared	to	that	of	the	War	on	Terror.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	1:	Military	Assistance	and	Grand	Strategy,	the	domino	theory	was	popularized	during	the	Cold	War	as	a	method	to	prevent	the	spread	of	Communism.	Similarly,	the	reverse	domino	theory	developed	from	Kant’s	theory	about	democracies	not	attacking	one	another.	In	this	regard,	there	has	been	little	change	in	the	strategic	approach	to	the	War	on	Terror	as	it	relates	to	the	Cold	War.	In	addition,	the	language	used	is	very	similar	when	discussing	the	War	on	Terror	and	the	Cold	War.	It	could	be	argued	that	this	has	much	to	do	with	the	actors	in	the	United	States’	national	security	apparatus,	whether	they	are	Democrat	or	Republican,	liberal	or	conservative.	Furthermore,	this	may	be	due	to	whether	their	careers	started	during	the	Cold	War	or	whether	they	were	educated,	or	mentored,	by	those	who	were	involved	in	policy-making	at	that	time.	Either	way,	the	similarity	of	language	begs	for	further	insight	and	research.	Lastly,	an	area	in	which	further	research	is	clearly	needed	is	that	of	international	relations	political	theory	as	it	relates	to	Military	Assistance.	This	research	project	was	not	intended	to	be	an	international	relations	theory	project;	however,	there	is	a	great	deal	of	applicable	international	relations	theory	left	to	explore.	Having	only	reviewed	and	interacted	with	the	major	schools	of	international	relations	theory,	it	has	become	clear	that	this	entire	topic	could	and	
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should	be	the	subject	of	a	research	project	of	its	own,	one	that	encompasses	international	relations	theory	and	security	sector	reform.	Conclusion	In	conclusion,	this	research	project	gives	evidence	of	the	following:	
• Military	Assistance,	while	not	a	strategy,	is	a	useful	tool	for	policymakers;		
• Like	other	tools	of	military	power,	it	must	be	linked	with	a	broader	strategy	and	ideally,	a	grand	strategy;		
• As	simple	as	the	concept	may	seem,	it	is	incredibly	hard,	resulting	in	the	United	States	failing	far	more	than	it	has	succeeded.		The	resolution	of	conflict	is	immensely	complicated,	and	the	case	studies	of	this	research	project	portray	only	certain	aspects	of	some	of	those	complications.	The	creation	of	those	complications	is	due	to	limited	warfare.	There	has	come	to	be	a	need	for	limited	warfare	with	respect	to	international	law	and	the	Geneva	Conventions	of	War.	In	a	modern	context,	specifically	with	respect	to	nuclear	war,	limited	warfare	has	been	the	standard	of	the	United	States	since	Truman	fired	MacArthur	for	communicating	contrary	policy	about	the	use	of	nuclear	weapons	during	the	Korean	War.	Once	the	decision	has	been	made	to	operate	a	conflict	with	limitations,	options	for	the	conduct	of	that	conflict	and	its	conclusion	became	limited	as	well.	Under	the	“Pottery	Barn	rule”	for	nation	states	where	Secretary	of	State	Colin	Powell	famously	stated	that	“if	you	break	it	[Iraq]	you	own	it,”2	Military	Assistance	becomes	a	tool	that	should	naturally	be	considered	as	a	practical	option	for	nation	building.	While	the	nature	of	warfare	has	not	changed	from	the	Clausewitz-principled	idea	of	the	imposition	of	political	will	through	violence,3	the	speed	at	which	war	and	peace	develop	has	been	changing	the	character	of	war	itself.	The	order	and	manner	by	which	conclusions	of	warfare	are	imposed	must	be	being	acted	upon																																																									
2	William	Safire,	“It	You	Break	It…,”	The	New	York	Times	Magazine,	October	17,	2004,	accessed	July	31,	2018,	https://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/17/magazine/if-you-break-it.html.	3	Carl	von	Clausewitz,	On	War,	trans.	J.	J.	Graham,	revised	by	F.	N.	Maude	(Hertfordshire,	UK:	Wordsworth	Editions	Ltd,	1997),	11-14	and	20-21.	
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and	pursued	at	the	same	time	and	in	the	same	aggressive	manner	as	the	war	itself	for	the	peace	to	have	any	hope	of	being	sustainable.	As	Chairman	of	the	Joint	Chiefs,	General	Dunford,	stated,	“the	nature	of	war	I	wouldn’t	argue	has	changed,	but	the	character	of	war	—	highlighted	by	those	capabilities	and	functions	that	I	spoke	about	earlier	and	what	our	peer	competitors	as	well	as	—	as	well	as	non-state	actors	would	have	—	the	character	of	war	is	actually	pretty	dynamic.”4	Given	the	dynamics	of	Military	Assistance,	there	is	an	inherent	necessity	to	secure	a	plan	to	develop	and	incorporate	all	aspects	of	Military	Assistance	prior	to	the	beginning	(or	at	very	least,	immediately	after	the	beginning)	of	a	conflict,	and	to	be	flexible	in	the	application	of	such	a	plan.	Creating	this	immediate	basis	of	sustainable	security	can	only	help	to	solidify	the	gains	made	during	the	conflict,	as	well	as	creating	the	bond	for	both	opposing	security	forces	and	the	population.	If,	however,	the	idea	for	such	a	plan	is	considered	as	an	afterthought,	or	as	a	secondary	problem	to	the	coming	conflict,	there	will	be	an	unavoidable	and	possibly	irreparable	disconnect	between	the	conquering	military	force	and	the	development	of	a	sustainable	security	for	the	population.	While	it	could	be	argued	that	the	plan	for	what	should	happen	after	a	war	should	be	second	to	the	plan	for	the	war,	the	experience	of	Military	Assistance	post-WWII	suggests	the	opposite.	In	the	two	case	studies	in	this	research	project,	the	one	case	that	was	a	clear	success,	South	Korea,	happened	without	planning	and	under	duress,	in	the	sense	that	there	was	no	real	initial	plan	other	than	for	survival.	However,	as	the	Korean	War	progressed,	the	tool	of	Military	Assistance	that	was	integrated	prior	to	the	war’s	beginning	became	more	integrated	at	every	level,	in	every	aspect	of	the	war,	and	then	after	the	war.	This	was	evident	when	South	Koreans	began	serving	in	the	United	States	Army,	so	that	Military	Assistance	became	a	main	driver	for	the	military-to-military	relationship.	The	key	was	having	the	tool	of	Military	Assistance	understood	by	both	recipient	and	supporting	nations	as	
																																																								
4	Joseph	F.	Dunford,	Jr.,	“Keynote	Speech	at	the	Center	for	a	New	American	Security,”	Defense	One	National	Security	Forum,	Washington,	D.C.,	December	14,	2015.	
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integral	to	the	success	of	the	Korean	War,	and	naturally	to	the	peace	that	would	follow.	Vietnam,	unfortunately,	did	not	have	such	integrated	approaches,	and	the	development	of	a	Military	Assistance	program	was	more	of	an	added	effort	once	other	options	failed.	Seeking	to	recreate	some	of	the	success	seen	in	South	Korea,	the	United	States’	Vietnam	involvement	started	as	a	Military	Assistance	mission,	and	yet	became	an	example	of	what	happens	to	a	Military	Assistance	mission	when	there	are	no	clear	set	of	political	goals,	in	addition	to	a	lack	of	a	willing	recipient	nation	that	has	a	sustainable	security	plan,	or	at	least	security	objectives.	These	efforts	seem	to	have	been	continued	in	military	operations	after	Vietnam,	as	have	the	poor	ability	of	policymakers	to	give	sufficient	policy	guidance	for	the	United	States	Armed	Forces	to	implement.	However,	leaders	of	the	United	States	Armed	Forces	must	shoulder	some	of	this	blame,	as	they	have	become	more	reluctant	to	push	back	against	their	political	leaders.	In	conclusion,	the	one	principle	that	has	become	abundantly	clear	from	this	research	project	is	that	military	operations	are	implemented	and	concluded	best	when	both	policymakers	and	military	leaders	work	together	and	challenge	each	other	constructively.	Grand	Strategy	must	be	understood	to	be	a	vision	to	which	the	entire	nation	commits	all	aspects	of	its	resources;	policymakers	and	military	leaders	are	most	successful	when	they	understand	and	support	that	vision	through	their	own	respective	endeavors.	Military	Assistance,	as	has	been	shown	in	this	research	project,	is	but	one	tool	in	pursuit	of	that	Grand	Strategy.
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